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Abstract 
 
This thesis presents the results of a qualitative investigation of Unemployment Benefit II 
(UBII) recipients' experiences of skill training and job placement services under Germany's 
Hartz IV welfare reforms—arguably a (neo-) liberal intervention in the context of what has 
traditionally been described as a conservative-corporatist welfare regime. This thesis explores 
the experience of skills training and job placement services in terms of the degree to which 
these support mechanisms engage with UBII recipients’ needs and perceptions and how these 
necessarily reflect the purposes of the support and activation mechanisms (to provide support 
to and assist the long-term unemployed find work) and the underlying policy assumptions 
(that the long-term unemployed need to be made to demonstrate responsibility in finding 
work). The evidence presented suggests such services have not necessarily provided a route 
into regular employment. Instead the ‘support’ mechanisms tend to ‘busy’ the recipients; to 
be irrelevant to the recipients’ employment history and/or future interests; and not to match 
what recipients wish to, or are interested in, doing. Secondly, the policy rhetoric and design 
of the Hartz IV reforms implied, ostensibly, a shift with some cultural significance—from 
social solidarity to individual responsibility; from old (conservative) to new (neo-liberal) 
paternalism. The thesis examines UBII recipients’ perception of their ‘right’ to and 
‘responsibility’ in finding work. The evidence suggests that popular discourse and 
understandings of the right to and responsibility in finding work in Germany are not so 
distinct or dissimilar from the Anglophone world. Finally, this thesis identifies a potential 
contradiction within the German government’s political objective of providing support 
(Fördern) to recipients in return for UBII recipients demonstrating responsibility (Fordern) in 
finding work. The findings suggest there is little need to make unemployed Germans feel 
‘responsible’ for finding work. The demands placed on recipients to demonstrate to case 
managers that they are taking responsibility for finding work may undermine the recipient’s 
ability responsibly to look for work. And UBII recipients may ‘trick’ the system to meet these 
demands, ostensibly wasting the time and resources of Jobcenter staff and UBII recipients. 
 
This thesis concludes by arguing that Fördern and Fordern are ultimately not compatible 
within a policy framework. Where Fordern (demand/require) exists in conjunction with the 
threat of sanctions for non-compliance, there is too much of a chance that Fördern (support), 
in the form of job placement and skill training services, will be used to regulate the conduct 
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of and discipline UBII recipients rather than provide legitimate support. Thus, any support 
provided starts to break down as soon as Fordern is inserted into the policy framework.   
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Chapter One: Introduction  
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
The last two decades have witnessed fundamental changes to welfare state policies that have 
been the subject of intense scholarly research in recent years. Supported by the EU and the 
OECD
1
, policy makers in many Western European countries, in the United States, and in 
Australia have sought to reduce welfare dependency via policies promoting personal 
responsibility through labour market participation. Here Germany has followed this trend, 
instituting comprehensive labour market and welfare state reforms between 2003 and 2005 
known as the Hartz I-IV reforms. Specifically, under the policy maxim of Fördern and 
Fordern, the fourth Hartz law incorporated active labour market policy (ALMP) interventions 
based on a ‘rights and responsibilities’ policy logic into the administration of unemployment 
benefit for the long-term unemployed.
2
 Therefore, using the significant case of post-Hartz IV 
reformed Germany, the purpose of my research project is to explore Unemployment Benefit 
II (UBII) recipients’ experience of skills training and job placement services in terms of the 
degree to which these support mechanisms engage with their needs and perceptions. The 
second objective of this thesis is to explore how meaningful the discourse of Fördern 
(support) and Fordern (demand/require) is to those UBII recipients who experienced the 
support and activation mechanisms first hand. In this context Fördern und Fordern
3
 means the 
state purports to provide sufficient support to assist Unemployment Benefit II recipients 
integrate into the labour market in return for the jobseeker demonstrating personal initiative 
and engagement in finding work. Given that ‘Fördern and Fordern’—arguably a (neo-) liberal 
intervention in the context of what has traditionally been described as a conservative-
corporatist welfare regime—was central to the design of the structure and administration of 
active labour market policies, this thesis will therefore examine the meaning UBII recipients’ 
attach to their right to and responsibility in finding work.  Exploring recipient perceptions of 
their right to and responsibility in finding work can help gauge the degree to which the policy 
                                                 
1
 Expansion and enhancement of the effectiveness of active labour market policies was one of the ten policy guidelines of the OECD Jobs 
Strategy and was the same principle included in the EU Employment Guidelines (Martin and Grubb, 2001).  
2 Prior to the induction of the fourth Hartz law in January 2005 German social security for the unemployed was administered through three 
schemes: unemployment insurance, unemployment assistance and social assistance. As of January 2005, the social insurance scheme was 
converted to Unemployment Benefit I. Unemployment assistance and social assistance was collapsed into one flat rate, means-tested benefit 
called Unemployment Benefit II. The changes to the structure and administration of benefit will be discussed in further detail in Chapter 
Two (section 2.2).  
3 The then SPD-Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and his Minister for Economic Affairs, Wolfgang Clement, introduced the principle of 
Fördern und Fordern into their Agenda 2010.This is not a direct translation, but rather Fördern and Fordern draws on the premise of rights 
and responsibilities. The Federal Employment Service translates ‘Fördern und Fordern’ as ‘challenge and promotion’.  
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discourse fits with and/or is internalized by UBII recipients and how this then (if at all) 
manifests itself in UBII recipient interactions with the Hartz IV policy interventions. To that 
end, my research questions are as follows: 
 
 Are the policy objectives expressed by the Hartz IV reforms reflected in the manner 
and substance of the lived experiences of Unemployment Benefit II recipients? 
 
 How meaningful is the Fördern and Fordern policy discourse for Unemployment 
Benefit II recipients, in terms of their perception of a ‘right’ to and ‘responsibility’ in 
finding work?    
 
This study is not an evaluation of the efficacy of skills training and job placement 
interventions. Rather the aim of this study is to explore their deeper meaning and effect: the 
degree to which UBII recipients’ experience with the skills training and job placement 
services necessarily reflect the purposes of the support and activation mechanisms (to provide 
support to and assist the long-term unemployed find work) and the underlying policy 
assumptions (that the long-term unemployed need to be made to demonstrate responsibility in 
finding work).  Since the Hartz reforms are guided by the theory that a job is the best form of 
welfare and the use of sanctions have been expanded on and now made applicable to all 
Unemployment Benefit II recipients (those who prior to the reforms were recipients of 
unemployment assistance and social assistance), understanding how UBII recipients 
experience these support and activation mechanisms can lend insight into who benefits from 
the support mechanisms and why (or why not). How indeed do UBII recipients utilize the 
services offered and how, if at all, does participation in, for example, a skills training, impact 
recipient job search and the job they ultimately take? This is relevant because as some 
qualitative studies that draw on user experience of job placement and skills training services 
in the UK, Australia and the US suggests, such support mechanisms have tended to busy 
recipients or recipients take a job they do not or cannot retain (Murphy et al., 2011; Blalock, 
et al., 2004; Finn and Schulte, 2008). If this is the case for a proportion of recipients in 
countries that have adopted similar active labour policy mechanisms, then it becomes a larger 
policy question of whether, as McKnight (2001) suggests, simply taking a job for a job’s sake 
in order to meet the objective of a policy, does not necessarily result in long-term benefit 
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either to the state, that has to be prepared for recidivism, or the individuals who may find 
themselves unemployed and back on benefit, with no increase in earnings to speak of.   
 
In the event, this thesis presents a serious critique of the German approach. The evidence 
offered by this study suggests (see Chapters Six, Seven and Eight), that the policy objectives 
informing the support mechanisms used to assist in integrating the long-term unemployed 
into the labour market by and large contradict the real-life experiences of the respondents 
interviewed for this study. In fact, it appears that skills training and job placement services 
may be leaving some recipients in a more precarious position. Indeed it seems that the 
German government’s political objective of providing support (Fördern) to UBII recipients 
may be undermined by them having to demonstrate –rather than effectively to exercise—
responsibility (Fordern) in finding work. Moreover, an analysis of the evidence for this study 
suggests there is little need to make unemployed respondents feel ‘responsible’ for finding 
work. The demands placed on respondents to demonstrate to case managers that they are 
taking responsibility for finding work in some cases appear to undermine the recipient’s 
ability responsibly to look for work. And UBII recipients may ‘trick’ the system to meet these 
demands, ostensibly wasting the time and resources of Jobcenter staff and UBII recipients. In 
the end, this is a story concerning the popular and political discourses that shape what is 
being done with the lives of people who are unemployed and on benefit.  
 
1.2 The Research Process 
 
This is a qualitative study of user experience with Jobcenter support and activation 
mechanisms. Fifty semi-structured interviews were conducted at two Jobcenters (25 
interviews at a Jobcenter in Hamburg and 25 interviews at a Jobcenter in Bremen) with 
Unemployment Benefit II recipients in order to answer my two research questions. An 
additional five interviews were conducted with Jobcenter case managers, two who worked at 
a Jobcenter in Bremen and three who worked at a Jobcenter in Berlin. The initial objective 
with interviewing a small sub-sample of case managers was to check whether any general 
issues and themes that arose from my interviews with the fifty respondents was a result of 
internal policy or something else. My second objective was to better understand the day-to-
day practicalities of the case managers’ job and the reasons and motivations for the decisions 
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they made that impacted UBII recipients generally (see Chapter Five, section 5.3.1 for more 
detail).    
 
In designing the study, I did not set out with a pre-existing theoretical framework, nor did I 
create a new one. I did not aim to test a hypothesis or a theory. Nevertheless I was mindful as 
to whether recipient experiences with the active labour market policy interventions adopted in 
the Hartz IV reforms—specifically the skills training and job placement services—would 
echo the findings of qualitative studies exploring similar themes and similar active labour 
market policies in the welfare-reform context stemming from the UK, the US and Australia. 
And in this context, I was especially mindful as to what, if anything, can be said about the 
adoption of neo-liberal interventions in a traditionally defined conservative corporatist 
welfare regime. Accordingly, I had some clear ideas about what themes I might explore. 
However, my initial analytical framework was essentially centred on my research questions 
and the interview questions that I subsequently pragmatically developed with a view to 
answering the said research questions. The questions from the interview schedule provided 
the springboard from which I then formulated the initial thematic categories or 'codes' for 
analysis. A myriad of additional codes, which will be discussed further in Chapter Five 
(section 5.6.1), emerged from an analysis of the fifty interview transcripts—codes that I had 
not anticipated but nonetheless became major themes for analysis. But I did not allow a 
preconceived set of assumptions to affect how I formulated and ultimately asked the 
questions in my interviews with respondents. My objective was to let respondents relate their 
experience as best as possible without me influencing what I thought their responses should 
or might be. My principal aim was to let respondents’ voices (i.e., their responses to 
questions) guide my analysis. 
 
While I had not set out explicitly to use a grounded theory approach, I am able in retrospect 
to say that it was the principles of grounded theory that were ultimately employed in the 
development of this research project (Charmaz, 2006; Corbin and Strauss, 2008). Here my 
objective was to let the data speak for themselves. It was only after the analysis was complete 
and the themes to emerge from my findings became clear, that I was able to bring theoretical 
perspectives to bear. I had not wanted to embrace assumptions that might influence the tone 
of my fieldwork and ultimately the type of responses respondents gave.  
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Writing up my research findings proved to be very much an iterative process. The thesis had 
evolved from the initial flickering of an idea of what to explore, to the development of the 
research questions, to the fieldwork, the analysis of the data and finally the reporting of the 
findings. Each stage in the research process, particularly while I was drafting my empirical 
chapters, brought me closer to understanding what my findings were ultimately saying—what 
conclusions I could draw. But it was only after I had completed first drafts for my empirical 
write-up that the pattern of findings was discernible. It was at this point that I explored how 
best to make sense of these findings.  
 
At this stage I adopted a Foucauldian analytic because it offered what I found to be the most 
effective interpretation of my findings. This required me to reframe elements of my thesis 
and the empirical chapters to incorporate the analytic and explain the larger meaning and 
significance of my findings. Key here is that the Foucauldian analytic adopted had not 
informed the development of my research questions, my coding framework or my initial 
analysis of the evidence. That said, while I draw on Foucault’s use of immanent function and 
the 'conduct of conduct' to assist in interpreting the findings of this study, this thesis is not a 
classical Foucault study of power, authority and exploitation. Instead, I will be drawing on 
Foucault where applicable, while utilizing other normative frameworks, such as Hartley 
Dean’s heuristic modelling device for understanding competing constructions of rights and 
responsibilities, within which to interpret the findings of this study.    
 
1.3 Brief summary of findings 
 
This thesis makes two contributions to the academic literature. The First contribution is the 
finding on the degree to which the policy objectives expressed by the Hartz IV reforms 
reflect the manner and substance of the lived experiences of UBII recipients. While this is a 
small study and the findings are not generalizable to the larger UBII recipient population, 
nevertheless, this study does provide some insight into the experience of respondents who 
participated in skills training and job placement services. The findings contribute to the 
existing body of literature that explores the impact support and activation measures have on 
recipients’ ability to find work generally, while providing greater insight into the German 
case specifically. Indeed, the findings suggest that there is a contradiction between the policy 
objective of the support mechanisms and the real-life experiences of those respondents who 
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participated in them. This contradiction manifests itself in that skills training and job 
placement services do not necessarily provide the support respondents for this study needed 
in order to integrate into regular employment. Instead the ‘support’ mechanisms tended to 
‘busy’ many respondents; were irrelevant to their employment history and future interests; 
and did not match what they wished to, or were interested in, doing. Moreover, my research 
suggests that the German government’s policy objective of providing support (Fördern) to 
recipients has the potential to be undermined by UBII recipients having to demonstrate 
responsibility by meeting Jobcenter activation requirements (Fordern). Instead of providing 
the support needed as perceived by the respondents for this study, it appears such 
mechanisms were used to regulate their conduct in order to ensure they meet the activation 
requirements (and demonstrate responsibility). It is here that Foucault helps us to understand 
the wider significance of the meaning behind the findings for this study. Drawing on 
Foucault’s use of immanent function, the support measures (Fördern) that are an integral part 
of the reforms appear to serve an immanent, or symbolic, rather than an actual function (see 
Chapter Three for a larger discussion of Foucault’s conceptualisation of immanet function). 
While policy makers did not consciously set out to design active labour market policies that 
would fail to meet users’ needs, for the majority of respondents, the support mechanisms did 
little to ultimately meet their needs and provide the type of support they required. It is at this 
juncture that the support provided takes on a symbolic function in that the image being 
conveyed by the government is that it is investing a great deal into helping those categorized 
as the long-term unemployed find work. Whether UBII recipients are, as a result of the 
support, better positioned to integrate into the labour market, is not the point because 
irrespective of the outcome, the government has done its duty and provided ‘support’.  
 
Secondly, researchers have not heretofore explored the degree to which (if at all) the policy 
discourse of Fördern and Fordern is meaningful to UBII recipients in terms of their 
perception of their right to and responsibility in finding work. In relation to this research 
question there are two key implications of the findings to stem from an analysis of the 
research. First, Germany has been described as a conservative-corporatist welfare regime 
(Esping-Anderson, 1990). Thus, when drawing on H. Dean’s (see Chapter Four, figure 4.1) 
competing constructions of rights and responsibilities, one might suppose then that UBII 
respondents for this study—many raised in the German tradition of welfare provision—
would perceive their right to and responsibility in finding work in line with the conservative-
corporatist—with some overlap in the social democratic—tradition. But given that 
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respondent responses to the question of whether they have a right to and responsibility in 
finding work fall in all four of Dean’s quadrants—(neo-) liberal, social democratic, utilitarian 
and conservative—suggests that the respondents’ understanding of the popular discourse of 
their right to and responsibility in finding work is not so distinct or dissimilar from those in 
Anglophone (or Nordic) countries. This finding also implies that policy initiatives in place to 
prompt UBII recipients to demonstrate responsibility in finding work—something they are 
presumed to lack—is not completely necessary because for a majority of respondents, a 
responsibility to find work and to work was already instilled in them. Secondly, and more 
broadly, given that respondent responses fall in all four of Dean’s quadrants suggests that 
how respondents internalize their understanding of a right to and responsibility in finding 
work in many ways reflects what Hemerijck et al (2000) have argued. Namely, while the 
social Catholic principles of solidarity, subsidiarity and equivalence were embedded in the 
design of the post-war German welfare state, so too were Calvinist principles, stemming from 
Bismarck’s inception of social insurance for manual workers, where work was perceived as 
salvation and the responsibility to work ultimately rests with the individual. The relevance of 
this finding to my research question suggests that when considering the degree of change that 
the Hartz policy interventions represent, the principles—Fördern and Fordern—of the Hartz 
reforms represent more continuity with the past than change. Indeed the German social state 
has always been a hybrid of principles that are reflected in respondent responses.   
 
1.4 Structure of the thesis 
 
This thesis is divided into nine chapters. In this introductory chapter, I outline the main 
themes relevant to this study and introduce the research questions to be answered in the 
following chapters. Chapter Two sets the historical, ideological and moral context for how 
the Hartz reforms came into existence, focusing specifically on the policy changes introduced 
in the fourth Hartz law. Given that Germany did not have a blueprint for reforms, policy 
makers looked to neighbouring countries of the Netherlands and the UK for models of 
reform. It is argued that reforms introduced in the UK under New Labour proved particularly 
insightful and instructive to German policy makers. More detail is provided on the actual 
structural changes made to unemployment benefit and who was affected by these changes. 
This chapter then proceeds to question whether Fördern and Fordern signify a fundamental 
shift from social solidarity to individual responsibility. In order to answer this question, this 
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chapter examines the historical roots of the Christian Democratic social state and the 
relevance Catholic and Protestant social doctrine has had on the design of unemployment 
insurance in Germany. In line with Kaufmann (1988), Manow (2004) and Kahl (2005), this 
chapter argues that the idea of individual responsibility as a condition of welfare provision is 
not completely and fundamentally new to the German social state. By exploring the variants 
of Protestant social doctrine and its influence on the design of the German social state, this 
chapter shows that threads of individualistic and (coercive) paternalistic elements have 
always been present. Indeed, this chapter, building on Manow and Van Kersbergen’s 
analysis, will argue that, the German social state as we know it today is a hybrid of Catholic 
and Protestant principles forged through compromise.  
 
Chapter Three explores four key themes as they relate to the respondents’ experiences with 
their (in)ability to integrate into the labour market. First, this chapter reviews the literature 
and the evidence on the degree to which active labour market policies generally, and in 
Germany specifically, assists participants in labour market integration. Second, the issues of 
atypical, temporary and low-wage work are integral to the experience of respondents for this 
study who were in receipt of Unemployment Benefit II. Thus, this chapter reviews the 
literature and evidence on how these issues impact jobseekers ability to find work, stay in 
work and move from low-paid positions to higher paid positions. Finally, this chapter reviews 
the evidence on the impact and the effectiveness of the Hartz reforms, looking specifically at 
evaluations of the One-Euro-Job. Through a review of the evidence, a gap in the literature 
presented itself.  
 
A two-fold analytic was adopted to assist in understanding the findings of this study. Thus 
Chapter Four has two objectives. First, this chapter starts out by presenting the reasons why a 
Foucauldian analytic was eventually adopted for interpreting and understanding the findings 
of this study. Specifically, this chapter explores how the concepts of immanent function and 
the conduct of conduct in Foucault’s work relate to my own work. Second, I explain my 
adoption of a critical understanding of citizenship theory in order to interpret the findings as 
they pertain to my second research question that examines respondents’ perceptions of a right 
to and responsibility in finding work.  Within this context, Hartley Dean’s heuristic device for 
understanding competing constructions of rights and responsibilities as they pertain to 
capitalist social policies is used to interpret this study’s findings.  
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Chapter Five discusses the research methods. It addresses the reasons for adopting a 
qualitative approach in relation to the research questions and refers to the ethical issues of 
concern to the research. The first section describes the sampling approach adopted, including 
how the two cities were selected as locations for the research. The next section discusses how 
the two Jobcenters were selected as locations to conduct the interviews. The chapter then 
proceeds to present the research sample of UBII recipients and Jobcenter case managers and 
discuss the limitations of the sample. The interview process is then outlined, whereby semi-
structured interviews were carried out with UBII recipients and Jobcenter case managers. 
Finally, this chapter explores the data analysis and issues concerning validity and reliability 
of the data.  
 
Chapters Six to Eight present the findings of the study in relation to the research questions.  
Chapter Six explores the experiences and perceptions of respondents for this study who 
participated in skills trainings. It considers whether their ability to enter the regular labour 
market was either helped or hindered by the type of training they participated in. While there 
are a range of skills trainings that are considered ‘Maßnahmen’ by the Jobcenter, respondents 
for this study primarily participated in short-term, One-Euro-Jobs and/or vocational (re-) 
training placements which in turn form the three categories of analysis for this chapter. Key 
themes discussed in this chapter include the degree of autonomy and choice respondents had 
in selecting which skills training they wished to participate in. Here, the role of the case 
manager in providing support is explored in more detail. It is, after all, the case manager who 
ultimately does or does not approve participation in a given skills training. Indeed, this 
chapter will argue that the decisions made as to which training a respondent participated in 
was not necessarily aligned with their professional history or future job prospects.  
 
Chapter Seven focuses on the experiences and perceptions of respondents who received job 
placement services. Like Chapter Six, Chapter Seven also considers whether respondents’ 
ability to integrate into the regular labour market was either helped or hindered by the job 
placement assistance provided them. Here support provided was understood as job 
placement, consultation and/or mediation. This chapter discusses the Jobcenter’s use of 
profiling recipients in order to determine the degree of ‘support’ (Fördern) and/or ‘activation’ 
(Fordern) required. Respondents did not know that they had been placed in a profile category 
type that may have impacted the degree of support received or the level of activation required 
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of them. In light of Jobcenters’ use of profiling, the issue of case manager discretion used to 
determine the amount of activation and/or support required is explored in more detail.  
 
Chapter Eight explores respondents’ perception of a right to and responsibility in finding 
work. It considers the larger significance of respondents’ perceptions in terms of what 
popular discourse can tell us about the nature of welfare regimes. In order to account for 
diversity in respondents’ perceptions of a right to and responsibility in finding work, four 
categories of a right to work and four categories of a responsibility in finding work emerged 
from an analysis of the evidence. Since it is argued that the Fördern and Fordern policy logic 
is grounded in the distinctly neo-liberal rights and responsibilities framework, this chapter 
explores respondents’ understanding and perception of Fördern and Fordern. Indeed, 
respondents felt that it was fair and realistic for the government to expect something in return 
for their receipt of benefit from the state. But it was the fact that the support promised 
(Fördern) was not that which respondents needed or required in order to assist them integrate 
into the regular labour market that they found problematic.  
 
Chapter Nine discusses the conclusions of the research with regard to the literature and refers 
to the implications of the findings for social policy. First this chapter explores whether the 
policy objectives expressed by the fourth Hartz law are reflected in the manner and substance 
of the lived experiences of respondents for this study. Second, this chapter considers how 
meaningful the Fördern and Fordern policy discourse is for respondents in terms of their 
perception of a right to and responsibility in finding work. This Chapter discusses the 
immanent function of the skills training and job placement mechanisms and questions 
whether support can ever be meaningful in the context of the neo-liberal activation paradigm. 
With this in mind, given the centrality of Fördern and Fordern to the design of the Hartz 
reforms, the tension between providing Fördern (support) while meeting requirements 
Fordern (demand/require) at the same time is explored more closely.  Indeed, it is argued that 
so long as the Fördern (support) provided is predicated on meeting Fordern (requirements), 
the two can then never really successfully work in tandem because requirements coupled with 
the threat of sanctions undermine the ‘support’ mechanisms provided. Moreover, this chapter 
explores the three key issues of ‘work’, ‘skills’ and ‘support’ as they relate to welfare reforms 
and active labour market policies more generally. Both the popular and political discourse 
calls for tougher work requirements for the unemployed, skills trainings to fill skill gaps and 
support during their endeavour to find work. This chapter argues that what is instead needed 
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is a more nuanced discussion of what is meant by ‘work’, ‘skills’ and ‘support’, especially in 
an ever changing labour market landscape.  
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Chapter Two: German Welfare State Change in Context 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The foundation of German social security has its roots in legislation passed in 1883, 1884 and 
1889.
4
 Chancellor Otto van Bismarck created the first-of-its-kind social insurance for 
regularly employed manual workers. The influence of his policies has been long and vast. 
Indeed Germany has been referred to as the “social insurance state” (Riedmüller and Olk 
1994; Hinrichs, 2010). In accordance with the social insurance approach, the German welfare 
state primarily provided wage-earner-centred social policies within which the precondition 
for receiving benefits had been a prior standard employment relationship (Vobruba, 1990). 
On account of this institutional arrangement, benefits were therefore to be financed through 
equal contributions by workers and employers and not through general taxation (Seeleib-
Kaiser and Fleckenstein, 2007). Indeed Seeleib-Kaiser and Fleckenstein (2007) argue that 
securing the ‘achieved living standard’ (Lebensstandardsicherung) through different social 
insurance schemes became the overarching objective of post war social policy.  
And yet, is social insurance—specifically unemployment insurance—still at the heart of 
social security in post-Hartz reformed Germany?
5
 The changes made to labour market and 
unemployment benefit policy on account of the Hartz reforms have prompted Weishaupt 
(2010) to question whether ‘Modell Deutschland’ is in flux. The fourth Hartz law, instituted 
in January 2005, changed the structure of unemployment benefit—reducing receipt of 
unemployment insurance from 32 months to one year, dissolving unemployment assistance 
while arguably substantially increasing the role of a tax-financed, non-earnings related and 
means-tested basic income benefit (see section 2.2 for more detail). This ‘change’ has 
prompted some academics to question whether the Hartz reforms represent an altogether new 
set of social security principles and objectives (Seeleib-Kaiser, 2004; Betzelt and Bothfeld, 
2011a). And therein lies the key issue: it is not only a question of what has changed but the 
degree of change and what this then means for how Germany has traditionally been defined 
as a conservative corporatist welfare regime (Esping-Andersen, 1990). Indeed, my second 
                                                 
4 Health Insurance Bill of 1883; Accident Insurance Bill of 1884; Old Age and Disability Insurance Bill of 1889. Compulsory 
unemployment insurance was introduced in 1927.   
5 Social security in the German welfare state context consists of a number of social policy areas including health, pensions and 
unemployment benefit. For the purpose of this chapter (and this thesis) I will only be discussing social security in the context of 
unemployment benefit. 
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research question asks how meaningful the Fördern and Fordern policy discourse is for 
Unemployment Benefit II recipients, in terms of their perception of a ‘right’ to and 
‘responsibility’ in finding work. Taking this analysis one step further, do the institutional and 
structural changes to unemployment benefit coupled with the introduction of Förden and 
Forden into both the policy rhetoric and design imply a significant shift with some cultural 
significance—from social solidarity to individual responsibility; from old (conservative) to 
new (neo-liberal) paternalism? 
 
This chapter will therefore explore changes made to unemployment benefit over time and 
especially with the advent of the fourth Hartz law. It will then proceed to explore the 
principles that underpin the design of German social security more broadly but with an 
emphasis on unemployment benefit specifically. Instrumental in Germany’s ‘uniqueness’ 
were the Christian democratic [social Catholic] principles of solidarity, equivalence and 
subsidiarity (van Kersbergen, 1995). In order to answer the question of whether the 
introduction of Förden and Forden signifies a fundamental shift from social solidarity to 
individual responsibility it is important to first, as van Kersebergen and Manow (2009) argue, 
consider the difference between Catholicism and the major variants of Protestantism and the 
respective influences religious beliefs had on the design of social security generally and 
unemployment benefit specifically. This is relevant to this thesis’ research objectives for two 
reasons. First, embedded in the notion of rights and responsibilities is the question of who is 
responsible for one’s state of unemployment—the state or the individual? The introduction of 
Fördern and Fordern into the policy rhetoric and design of the Hartz reforms places the 
responsibility squarely on the individual who, if necessary, needs to be made to demonstrate 
that he or she is actively and responsibility seeking work. And yet, in a country where social 
security was ostensibly predicated on the principle of solidarity, is the notion of individual 
responsibility all that new? By stepping back in time and exploring the different tenants of 
social Catholic and variants of Protestantism and their influence on German social policy, we 
find that individual responsibility was always a leitmotiv in German unemployment benefit. 
Secondly, that individual responsibility was always a leitmotiv in German unemployment 
benefit policy goes a little way towards explaining—for some respondents (others of whom 
did not have German heritage)—why responses to questions about respondents right to or 
responsibility in finding work shared characteristics with those to be found in Anglophone 
countries (see Chapter Eight for further discussion).    
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First however, section 2.2 will start by explaining the Hartz reforms and why they might be 
regarded as a step-change. Section 2.3 to 2.5 will suggest a more nuanced story: Section 2.3 
will trace the roots of Christian Democracy in relation to different understandings of moral 
responsibility.  Section 2.4 will consider the incremental development of the post-WWII 
unemployment benefit system. Section 2.5 will conclude with a summary of the issues 
discussed in this chapter.  
 
2.2 The structure of unemployment benefit pre-and post-Hartz reforms 
 
Prior to the reforms, there were three types of benefit schemes for the unemployed/non-
employed: unemployment insurance (UI), unemployment assistance (UA) and social 
assistance (SA). The Federal Labour Office (Bundesanstalt für Arbeit later renamed in 2004 
Bundesagentur für Arbeit-Federal Agency for Work) administered both unemployment 
insurance and unemployment assistance. Funded by compulsory contributions,
6
 those eligible 
for unemployment insurance, i.e., those who had worked in insured-type employment for a 
minimum of 12 months,  received 63 per cent of their last earned net salary (68 per cent if 
they had dependent children) for up to 32 months—only if sufficient contributions had been 
made and depending on the recipient’s age.7 Once the period of unemployment insurance 
expired (i.e. 32 months had passed) or he or she did not qualify for unemployment insurance 
from the start because they had not been in insured employment long enough, the jobseeker 
received unemployment assistance. Unemployment assistance was paid out of general 
(federal) taxation (rather than contributions) and was means-tested (taking into account a 
spouse’s income) though provided benefits which were proportional to previous earnings 
with up to 53 per cent of last earned net income (or 58 per cent with dependent children).
8
         
 
In addition to unemployment insurance and unemployment assistance, there was the means-
tested and non-earnings related social assistance benefit administered and funded by the local 
authorities that were also charged with reintegrating those on benefit into the labour market 
                                                 
6
 Subject to a ceiling, are proportional to gross earnings, which Clasen (2005) points out, were 3 per cent in 1980 and 6.5 per cent in 2004.  
7
 Recipients of unemployment insurance age 55 and older could be in receipt of UI for longer than three years. Unemployment insurance at 
a replacement rate of 68 percent of the previous wage was to insure a relatively stable income for workers during spells of unemployment 
and until they found a job that paid a comparable wage to their last position. As Clasen (1994) has pointed out, this was to ensure that an 
unemployed worker would not have to take a job offer, which compared to their previous job, either paid less or was in an inferior 
occupational field or position. 
8 It is this last point under which unemployment assistance shared both social insurance and needs-based benefit characteristics (Clasen, 
2005: 55).  While unemployment insurance was limited in its duration, unemployment assistance in principle was paid for an unlimited 
period of time so long as the need was there and individual or family circumstances had not changed (Kemmerling and Bruttel, 2006) 
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(Konle-Seidl et al., 2007).
 9
 This was the social security benefit of last resort that a person 
could receive in Germany. Social assistance allocated basic income support for those who 
could not rely on sufficient resources from other sources of income or to those jobseekers 
who did not qualify for unemployment insurance and unemployment assistance, both of 
which required a certain contribution period through employment (Rauch and Dornette, 
2009). It secured a minimum standard of living above the poverty line and was paid for an 
unlimited period of time.   
 
The Hartz reforms resulted in changes to the structure and administration of benefits for the 
unemployed by combining unemployment assistance with social assistance (see table 2.1). 
Since 2005, an employed person who has paid sufficient unemployment insurance 
contributions and becomes unemployed receives Unemployment Benefit I (UBI) for up to but 
now not exceeding 12 months of unemployment.
10
 The current benefit rate is 67 percent of 
prior earnings for an individual with children and 60 percent prior earnings for an 
individual.
11
 Thereafter—and here the fundamental change—the recipient is transferred to 
Unemployment Benefit II (UBII) which is a non-earnings related benefit of €36412 per month 
(plus the ‘adequate’ cost for housing and heat) and is means-tested.13 In addition to former 
UBI recipients,
14
 those who have never paid (or did not pay enough) social security 
contributions, though deemed capable of working, receive UBII from the start.
15
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 A considerable share of the social assistant recipients also received UA. In 1998, for example, c. 40 per cent of all unemployed social 
assistance recipients received UA as well (Clasen and Goerne, 2011).  
10Originally UBI was available to workers 55 years and older for up to 18 months. In 2008 the government extended maximum entitlement 
period for UBI to 15 months for those aged 50 and older and 24 months for those aged 58 plus (Weishaupt, 2010).   
11
 Clasen and Goerne point out that remarkably little has changed from unemployment insurance to Unemployment Benefit I. The change 
from benefit being 68 per cent of previous net earnings to 67 per cent for individuals with families and 63 to 60 per cent for an individual 
was already introduced in 1994. The Hartz reforms as such did not alter these rates; but the reforms did change the maximum entitlement 
period (2011: 7). 
12 The monthly stipend increased in 2013 to €374 and in 2014 to €384 based on inflation. At the time of this study, respondents were 
receiving a monthly stipend of €364. This is the amount that will be referred to throughout this thesis.   
13 UBII is means-tested, which means receipt of benefit is predicated on combined household income. Single parents, as well as adults with 
a minor are entitled to the full amount of UBII. As of 2013 UBII recipients with adult partners receive €345. Children younger than 6 years 
receive €224. Children between 6 and 13 years of age receive €255. Children and young persons between 14 and 17 years receive €289. 
Young adults between 15 and 25 years of age who live with their parents receive €306. Young adults who are 25 years and older must file 
their own application for unemployment benefit II regardless of whether they live in their own flat or with their parents. 
14 If a long-term unemployed person has received a sufficiently high UBI benefit, the transition towards the lower UBII income is smoothed 
out over a two-year period. Thus only the unemployed with no prior or insufficient UBI entitlements are dependent on the flat-rate benefit 
from the very start (Hinrichs, 2010).  
15 Recipients who receive UBI but, owing to their limited contributions while working, are not receiving enough are then eligible for UBII 
top-up.  
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Table 2.1 Major characteristics of the old and new unemployment protection system 
 
   
before/after 2005           before 2005   since 2005 
  UI/UBI  UA  SA  UBII 
           
Eligibility  contribution means-test means-test* means test 
based 
 
Benefit  earnings-related earnings-related flat-rate**  flat-rate 
 
 
Funding  contributory taxation  taxation  taxation*** 
(federal budget) (municipal budgets) 
 
 
Notes:*stricter means test for SA than for UA applied; **plus additions depending on family 
situation and needs; ***largely federal budget plus municipal funding for accommodation (from Clasen and Goerne, 2011). 
 
Moreover, while the Labour Promotion Reform Law of 1998 introduced further 
conditionality such as ‘actively seeking work’ measures and a ‘reintegration contract’, with 
the advent of the Hartz reforms, receipt of UBII became conditional on every Unemployment 
Benefit II recipient demonstrating that they are actively seeking work. This conditionality 
was manifested through the Integration into Work Agreement. Every UBII recipient must 
enter into an agreement with the state that outlines what the recipient must do to demonstrate 
he or she is actively seeking employment or they face sanctions.
16
  
 
2.2.1 Outlining the Hartz reforms  
 
It was not until two major events collided in February of 2002 that the possibility of change 
could be realized. In February 2002 the Alliance for Jobs Training and Competitiveness 
(Bündnis für Arbeit)—a corporatist arrangement modelled on tripartite bodies that had 
successfully negotiated reforms in the Netherlands—was terminated by Chancellor Schröder 
because no agreement on substantial reforms could be reached. Schröder’s termination of the 
Alliance proved to be a critical juncture—signalling a move away from Germany’s 
classically corporatist model upon which labour and social policies were negotiated. At the 
same time the German National Audit Office discovered that the German Public Employment 
Service (PES) had falsified the figures of its job placement performance.
17
  Together, the so-
                                                 
16 § 2(1) Social Security Code II: Grundsatz des Forderns. 
17 Prior to the Hartz reforms, the Public Employment Service (PES) was tasked with placing the unemployed into work. The PES and its 
private partner companies were given wide latitude and resources by the federal government to create projects to improve placement. In 
2002 Germany’s Federal Auditing office discovered that the PES and its partner companies had systematically reported over three times as 
many placements as it had produced. The PES management and employees provided training and financial support activities. The PES 
counted all jobseekers having benefited from one of the services provided as a “placement”, though they had led to a job in only 30 per cent 
of the cases.  
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called ‘placement scandal’ coupled with the impossibility of achieving negotiated reforms 
presented an opportunity for the Red-Green government to unilaterally redesign labour 
market policies not backed by a compromise with the social partners (Hinrichs, 2007; 
Fleckenstein, 2008).
18
 As a result, Chancellor Schröder established the Hartz Commission, 
named after its Chairman Peter Hartz, which was tasked with creating a proposal that would 
recommend measures for organizational reform of the Public Employment Service, address 
the problems associated with the institutional separation of the unemployment benefit 
schemes and address the reintegration of the long-term unemployed into the labour market 
through activation measures (Fleckenstein, 2008).
 
In the summer of 2002, the Hartz 
Commission published its long-awaited concept outlining the changes needed to create 
modern services for the labour market (Moderne Dienstleistung am Arbeitsmarkt) and a 
reorganization of the Public Employment Service. The Red-Green coalition under Gerhard 
Schröder took up the Commission’s proposals after re-election in September 2002. The 
reforms were subsequently legislated into four packages called the Acts for Modern Services 
for the Labour Market (Gesetze für moderne Dienstleistung am Arbeitsmarkt) otherwise 
known as the Hartz I-IV laws.  
 
On the face of it, the laws instituted between January 2003 and 2005 (see table 2.2) 
constituted a change to both labour market and associated unemployment benefit policy in 
Germany. Getting people back to work quickly, efficiently and effectively was the main goal 
and the central logic of all new or reformed labour market policies (Hinrichs, 2007). Thus the 
goal was to create a three-way reform strategy that sought to improve the effectiveness and 
efficiency of labour market services, ‘activate’ the unemployed within a ‘rights and 
responsibilities’ (Fördern und Fordern) policy framework, and stimulate employment demand 
by deregulating the labour market.  Broadly speaking, the combined reforms modified 
already existing active labour market policy measures while introducing new measures that 
fundamentally changed how institutions operated and cooperated with one another. Policies 
that deregulated the labour market concentrated on the temporary work sector, while the 
largest and—fundamental to my project—most important changes took place in the realm of 
job placement and skills training services and the benefit system (Joacobi and Kluve, 2007; 
Oschmiansky, 2007). Yet ultimately Seeleib-Kaiser and Fleckenstein (2007) argue that the 
                                                 
18 The placement scandal resulted in the dismissal of the head of the Public Employment Service and was subsequently replaced by the 
appointment of the Commission for Modern Services in the Labour Market which became known as the Hartz Commission. The 
Commission consisted of selected trade unionist, personnel directors of large corporate enterprises, representatives of the States, 
management, consultants and academics. 
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activation measures implemented in the Hartz reforms were similar to those implemented by 
many local authorities in their social assistance schemes since the mid-1980s. They argue that 
to some extent the use of activation measures built on the shift towards increased means-
testing that had already occurred by stealth during the 1990s.  
 
2.2.2 The impetus for reform 
 
Owing to the ongoing and consistently rising numbers of recipients on unemployment 
assistance in the former East Germany (i.e. the German Democratic Republic) and recipients 
on social assistance in the West coupled with well-known inefficiencies in both systems, 
there was increased pressure in the mid-1990s to reform social security for the long-term 
unemployed (see section 2.4.2 for more detail). Yet, the ability to actually move legislative 
change through parliament entailed a complicated set of checks and balances that Boeri et al 
(2001) argue resulted in gradual solutions rather than “cold turkey policies” (see also Palier, 
2010). Given that general, popular support for the welfare state was high, any reforms 
supporting vast change prior to 2000 were met and blocked by political opposition. Hence 
reforms to German social policies generally, and the labour market specifically, have tended 
to be slow (Zohlenhöfer, 2001) and were largely path-dependent in nature (Hinrichs, 2010). 
Yet, based on their analysis of political debates in the 1990s, Fleckenstein and Seeleib-Kaiser 
point out that the macro-level political discourse about the need for welfare state and labour 
market reform had slowly been shifting well before the Social Democrats and the Greens 
entered government in 1998. Indeed, since the mid-1990s there had been intensified efforts to 
reform unemployment benefit. But for Hinrichs it was ultimately the financial cost of 
reunification, coupled with high unemployment that promoted a change in political discourse 
and created a space for the possibility of large-scale reforms.  
 
At the same, time non-wage labour costs, the rise of ‘globalization’ and concerns about 
generational equity became dominant ‘catch-words’ in the public and political discourse that, 
Hinrichs (2010) argues, combined with the cost of reunification and high unemployment, 
helped change the perception that social insurance was an effective problem-solving tool to 
the perception of social insurance as the actual problem. Thus, after years of opposing the 
main arguments of the CDU-FDP (Christian Democrats/Liberal Democrats) coalition, the 
SPD (Social Democrats) embraced the pro-active labour market policy pattern that the CDU 
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had long championed. The problem was that neither the SPD nor the CDU and their partners 
had a blueprint for policy reform. Policymakers therefore looked to countries, such as 
Denmark, the Netherlands and the UK for a blueprint because they were perceived as 
countries that had successfully reformed their unemployment benefit system and labour 
markets (Fleckenstein, 2008; Seeleib-Kaiser and Fleckenstein, 2007). Policy strategies in 
those countries were therefore closely followed by German political actors. And since these 
countries were governed by centre-left parties at the time, their policy strategies were 
increasingly seen as politically feasible by the SPD. 
 
Seeleib-Kaiser and Fleckenstein (2007) argue that policy change in Germany cannot be 
explained by predominant theories such as the path dependence theory or the ‘varieties’ of 
capitalism approach. They are not suggesting that these explanatory approaches do not matter 
at all, but that the policy concepts that eventually turned into the Hartz reforms were 
developed through a process of social learning and it is this that is the key factor to 
understanding the recent developments in German labour market policy. Hall defines social 
learning as “a deliberate attempt to adjust goals or techniques of policy in response to past 
experience and new information” (1993: 293).  For them it was the UK Jobcentre/New Deal 
model that was particularly instructive in the types of programmatic changes made to the 
German system of unemployment benefit. Indeed the reduction in the amount and duration of 
benefit coupled with the strong workfare component all appealed to German reformers. Thus 
in the end, while some initially viewed the UK model with scepticism, those within the SPD 
who wished to modernize unemployment benefit looked to the UK approach for guidance 
which, Seeleib-Kaiser and Fleckenstein (2007) argue, ultimately led to the eventual adoption 
of policy activation instruments similar to those in the UK. Yet despite convergence, they 
argue that differences between the UK and Germany remain. For example, the overall 
expenditure for active labour market policy is still considerably higher in Germany than the 
minimalistic UK approach (Seeleib-Kaiser and Fleckenstein, 2007). 
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Table 2.2 Elements and timing of the Hartz reforms 
Immediate Measures 
Reform of the top-level administrative structures of the Public Employment Service (PES) 
Deregulation of job placement (in particular, placement vouchers) 
 
Hartz I Law (German Social Code III or SGB III—Operative January 2003) 
Introduction of personnel service agencies 
Deregulation of temporary agency work 
Tightening the criteria of reasonable work and the sanction regime 
Introduction of vouchers for further training 
Introduction of remuneration security 
Reduction of unemployment insurance contributions when hiring an older job-seeker 
 
Hartz II Law (German Social Code III or SGB III—Operative January 2003) 
Introduction of the Mini-/Midi-Job scheme 
Introduction of the Me/Family, Inc.  
 
Hartz III Law (German Social Code III or SGB III—Operative January 2004) 
Renaming PES as ‘Federal Employment Agency’ 
Reduction of the regulatory density of the Social Code III 
Reform of the executive boards in local agencies 
Tightening the sanction regime 
 
Law for Reforms in the Labour Market 
Reduction of the maximum duration of unemployment benefits 
 
Hartz IV Law (German Social Code II or SGB II—Operative January 2005) 
Introduction of ‘Basic Security for Jobseekers’ 
Tightening criteria of reasonable work and sanction regime 
Establishment of Jobcenters 
Introduction of work opportunities 
Introduction of start-up grants 
Source: Fleckenstein (2011) 
 
2.2.3 The advent of the Jobcenter and the reliance on New Public Management tools 
 
The European Employment Strategy policy approach to active labour market policies has 
underlined the importance of adopting a ‘personalized’ tactic that is responsive to the 
individual needs of those unemployed (Freud, 1997; Lindsay and McQuaid, 2008). This 
‘personalized’ approach became associated with casework methods (Peck, 2001), i.e., 
unemployment benefit recipients being assigned a ‘case manager’ to assist them at a 
‘Jobcenter’. Indeed, the German government’s point of crafting modern services in the labour 
market was to secure work for the unemployed by creating an integrated consulting and 
support service that was to be provided by case managers at a ‘Jobcenter’ while supplying 
material safeguards through provision of a cash benefit (BMAS, 2006). This involved a 
mixture, albeit contradictory, of on the one hand placing emphasis on the tailoring of 
provision to the individual needs of those unemployed, while on the other, moving recipients 
into a job, irrespective of whether it meets the individual’s needs and interests (Considine, 
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2001; Peck, 2001; Finn, 2005). The German government adopted New Public Management 
tools in the managing of the Federal Employment Agency and the municipalities to ensure 
that services were personalized and responsive to individual needs while tackling high 
unemployment and economic inactivity.
19
   
 
New Public Management tools were first introduced into the then Public Employment 
Service (later renamed the Federal Employment Agency) after the 2002 ‘placement scandal’. 
In response to the scandal, the top-level administrative structure of the PES was transformed 
from a public bureaucracy to a management structure comparable to private companies. Here 
the tripartite management board and the presidency were replaced with a corporate-like board 
of three managers, nominated by the government. New elements of competition were 
introduced into the job placement regime. This included allowing private job placement 
agencies to demand (limited) fees for their services from jobseekers. Moreover, unemployed 
persons who had been seeking a job for three months or longer were entitled to a job 
placement voucher enabling them to use the private service. The policy shift towards NPM 
was further strengthened through the Hartz III law which stipulated “administrative steering 
by output-oriented contract management instead of control by decree and budgetary 
allocations (input-oriented management)” (Seeleib-Kaiser and Fleckenstein, 2007:433).  The 
Federal Ministry for Labour and Social Affairs and the Federal Employment Agency, for 
example, signed performance agreements outlining specific quantitative goals that must be 
met by the local offices. To underscore the importance placed on successful placement, the 
FEA must pay approximately €10,000 to the federal government for each UBI recipient that 
is transferred to UBII on account of the agency not successfully placing the UBI recipient in a 
job within 12 months (van Berkel, 2010).  
 
2.3 Stepping back: the influence of Christian [Democratic] principles on the 
design of German social insurance 
 
 
In constructing his typologies, Esping-Andersen (1990) drew on the power resources theory 
(Korpi, 1989) to help explain why Germany was as generous in terms of its social spending 
as the traditionally social democratic countries. But in 1995 van Kersbergen argued that 
                                                 
19 For Clark and Newman (1997) New Public Management was a tool used in the ‘marketization’ of public services. If public services could 
not be relocated to the private sector, then private sector tools would be integrated into the management of public services. Key to this was 
to change public service delivery by positioning the recipient of benefit as the ‘customer’ or ‘client’.  
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Esping-Andersen’s regime typologies failed to take into consideration the influence Christian 
Democracy (i.e., Catholic social doctrine) had on explaining why Germany was as generous 
as the Scandinavian countries but was not designed to counter market pressures (i.e., to 
decommodify labour) to the same extent as the social democratic welfare states. Christian 
Democracy, van Kersbergen (1995) argued, with its social Catholic underpinnings, produced 
a traditional, conservative patriarchal, status-oriented model of society. There were a 
multitude of factors that influence the development of a nation-state’s welfare state. And here 
van Kersbergen together with Manow (2009) has argued for a more nuanced understanding 
of how welfare regimes are categorized, given the complexity of their histories and the 
competing interests involved. The welfare state literature now finds itself at an interesting 
crossroads on account of the type of unemployment benefit reforms that have been instituted 
throughout Western Europe since the late 1990s. And once again Germany makes for an 
interesting case study. Specific to Germany is the question of the degree to which the role and 
use of ‘responsibility’ in the provision of Unemployment Benefit II indicates something 
new—or whether threads of individual responsibility have always been embedded in 
unemployment benefit policy design.   
 
Moreover, academics differ about the degree to which the Hartz reforms represent a break 
from the Federal Republic’s social insurance tradition of benefit provision (Palier and Martin, 
2007; Hinrichs, 2010; Clasen and Goerne, 2011). Indeed if a break with tradition has taken 
place, is there then a shift in principles as well? At the heart of this discussion is, on the one 
hand, an empirical question of whether the structural changes to social security prompted by 
the Hartz reforms resulted in a decreased role for a social insurance contribution-based 
benefit, while on the other, a normative question of whether the introduction of ‘rights and 
responsibilities’ into the policy logic of basic income support signalled a shift in principles—
from less emphasis on the [social Catholic] principles of subsidiarity and solidarity to more 
emphasis on the [Lutheran and Calvinist] principle of individual responsibility? In order to 
answer this question, one must step back and explore the development and influence of 
Catholic and Lutheran and Calvinistic principles on German unemployment benefit as we 
know it today. It is through an analysis of how given principles have been employed in policy 
making over time that it becomes clear that while the introduction of individual responsibly 
into the policy rhetoric and design of the Hartz reforms represents aspects of ‘newness’, there 
is actually more continuity with the past than one might initially suppose. 
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2.3.1 The concept of responsibility  
 
While the Hartz reforms arguably brought individual responsibility to the fore in German 
unemployment benefit in ways it had not necessarily been before, as noted in Chapter One, 
Kaufmann (1988), Manow (2004) and Kahl (2005) all argue that this individual responsibility 
is not completely and fundamentally new to German social security. Both aspects of 
Reformed Protestant (Calvinist) and Lutheran principles
20
 informed the design of German 
social security generally but unemployment benefit specifically (the distinction between the 
two will be discussed further below). But what makes Germany unique is the degree to which 
Catholic social and political factions, though a minority, had substantial influence over policy 
making.
21
 This helps to explain Germany’s [Catholic] social conservatism on the one hand 
and its [Protestant] industrial, enterprising work ethic on the other (Kahl, 2005). This 
confluence of religious doctrines is particularly important and relevant to understanding the 
role of work and individual responsibility in the provision of unemployment benefit. Here 
Lutheranism is chiefly influential in explaining how threads of individualistic and 
paternalistic elements made their way into unemployment benefit—principally social 
assistance. As Kahl (2005) explains, the notion of the poor taking individual responsibility 
for their unemployed circumstance first came to the fore in post-Reformation poverty ‘policy’ 
of the Protestants that differed fundamentally from the previous Catholic approach to 
alleviating begging. 
  
Indeed one of the first signs of changes in poverty policy was the change in the municipal 
edicts on begging that were a result of the Reformation. One of the cornerstones of 
Catholicism was that an individual’s existence was justified by their faith in Christ and by a 
life of good works (Kahl, 2005). This manifested itself in the relationship between begging 
and almsgiving. Giving alms to the poor was essential for Catholic salvation. It was very 
much a quid pro quo relationship: it was the duty of the rich to give alms to the poor for 
which in return their soul would be saved.
22
 Kahl (2005) argues that this is why the Catholic 
church of the early modern period opposed secularizing poor relief because it was believed 
                                                 
20 Here reformed Protestantism refers to Calvinism which is a major branch of Protestantism but differed with Lutherans on the real 
presence of Christ in the Lord’s supper, theories of worship and the use of God’s law for believers. The movement was first referred to as 
‘Calvinism’ by Lutherans who opposed it, but many who practice within the Calvinist tradition would prefer to use the word ‘Reformed’. 
21
 Kahl (2005) who draws on Dinges’ work (1988) goes as far back as the late middle ages and early modern period as important starting 
points in order to understand the development of modern German social security. It is important to point out that, as Dinges (1988) does, 
there was also ambivalence by the patrician classes about meeting the needs of the poor and sick in the late middle ages and early modern 
period by Catholics. Dinges’ analysis of poverty in Bordeaux is a good illustration of this.  
22
 As medieval edicts on begging show, municipalities had started to regulate begging both as a reaction to the social problem, but also 
because of the Catholic duty to care for the poor (Kahl, 2005).  
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that a secular system would erase the divine benevolence of the giver. It was the Reformation 
that largely changed attitudes to how the poor should be cared for—attitudes that resonate 
with the provision of social assistance today. “With the Reformation and Luther’s translation 
of the Bible, two things happened to the concept of work: first Luther raised the profile of 
work immensely and work became an intrinsically positive activity that was pleasing to God; 
second, work no longer equalled poverty but was seen instead as a way to overcome poverty” 
(Kahl, 2005: 102). Not working became associated with laziness. Luther rejected individual 
almsgiving and denounced the able-bodied beggars—the cheaters, idlers and vagrants—as 
“undeserving poor” who should be excluded from alms.23  
 
Over time Lutheran social reformers developed their version of poverty policy: in the 1859 
edition of the Protestant Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaften (Handbook of State 
Policies) it was written that the state both had to protect the community from the undeserving 
poor but also ensure that the “truly needy” were cared for. “Poor relief [thus] rigorously 
enforced the distinction between the ‘deserving’ and the ‘undeserving’ and relief tended to be 
restricted to the residential, authentic and morally upright poor” and—here the key point—
the able bodied should work and be made to work if necessary (Kahl, 2005: 104). Indeed, 
Kaufmann (1988) points out that the political guarantee to participate, established in the 
Weimar Constitution from 1919, not only brought rights, but duties with it as well. For 
example, Kaufmann (1988) cites Article 163 in the Weimar Constitution that stipulated that 
every able-bodied man had a duty to earn his living by working, and while the right to 
necessary support was provided for those who lacked the appropriate opportunity to work, 
within the confines of poor assistance, he should be required to work if necessary. 
 
Calvin took Luther’s interpretation of work further. He made work an absolute duty; a 
spiritual end in itself and the best way to please the Lord. Calvin developed the ethos of work 
and individual responsibility and fundamentally changed the requirements on how people 
should work.
 24
 Work became a certain mark of elation. Being saved by God meant 
demonstrating one’s success in an occupation. Wealth, as a result, became an absolute sign 
that one was saved by God while poverty became the certain sign of damnation (Kahl, 2005). 
                                                 
23
 Kahl cites the forward to Luther’s 1523 German edition of the Liber Vagatorum, a collection of fraudulent begging techniques, where 
Luther demanded that the “undeserving poor”—the cheaters, idlers and vagrants—be excluded from the alms (2005: 103). 
24 Applying for relief became a bureaucratic process that required a formal examination of need and eligibility. Whoever fulfilled the criteria 
was to get relief according to their need, number of children, individual conduct and budget keeping (Kahl cites Rüger, 1932). Lutheran 
cities took over the workhouse idea from Calvinist cities. German workhouses were to deter the able-bodied poor from claiming relief. It 
was to remind them of their duty to support themselves. The workhouse was fundamentally a punishment and a correctional institution for 
the socially deviant.  
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“The Calvinist creation of the Protestant work ethos and the strict and systematic 
requirements about what constitutes a life that increases the glory of God (i.e., personal 
responsibility, individualism, discipline and asceticism) made poverty appear to be the 
punishment for laziness and sinful behaviour” (Kahl, 2005: 107).25 This meant that the poor 
needed to be punished and forced to work if necessary. Catholics vehemently criticized this 
approach. The Reformed Protestant approach was too individualistic and ultimately lacked 
responsibility for and towards the poor. And yet, for Catholics, it was not the responsibility of 
the state to address the needs of the poor. It was a religious rather than a political matter. It 
was the role of charity, of the individual, to set a good example through assisting the poor. 
 
2.3.2 The roots of Christian Democratic principles 
 
Although there are a multitude of factors that have contributed to welfare state development 
over time, Christian principles are historically embedded even in ostensibly secularized 
countries such as Germany. The rise of Christian Democracy in Germany, Van Kersbergen 
(1995) has argued, was a result of (social) Catholic parties mobilizing between 1870 and 
1914 in response to Bismarck’s anti-Catholic Kulturkampf (culture war).26 While the Catholic 
social movement did not dominate politics like Protestantism at this time, it nonetheless held 
a certain amount of political sway. Fundamental differences existed between how variants of 
Protestant and Catholic social doctrine in the late nineteenth century addressed social 
problems. For example, as noted above, Catholics advocated that the church and other 
community-grounded bodies and not the state provide the support necessary to addresses 
social ills. Moreover, the difference in variants of Protestant and Catholic social doctrine is 
perhaps best embodied in the fact that Bismarck, a staunch Protestant, blocked any initiatives 
that would strengthen the protection and rights of the worker citing the cost incurred to the 
manufacturer and thus the economy. One of the main goals of Catholic social policy in 1870 
was to improve the relationship between employer and employee in order to prevent an 
escalation of class struggles. As Kaufmann (1988) argues, the difference between Catholic 
and Protestant influence on unemployment benefit policy is best manifested in Bismarkian 
                                                 
25
 The workhouse was the invention of Reformed Protestant social reformers. The first German workhouse was established in Bremen in 
1609. In the 18th century there were 63 workhouses in the German Lutheran territories and only five in the German Catholic territories 
(Kahl, 2005).  
26 Between 1910 and 1925 the German population was 61.2%-64.1% Protestant and 37.2%-32.4% Catholic. After World War II, the ratio 
changed drastically to 50.5% Protestant and 45.8% Catholic. The division of Germany after WWII cut off the Soviet zone with its 
traditionally social democratic and communist (and Protestant) strongholds. This left the predominant Catholic states of Bavaria, Rheinland-
Pfaltz and Nord-Rhein-Westpfalia who gained prominence as a result. 
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social insurance while the regulation of factory work for the purpose of equality between 
work and capital was (and remains) a continuous theme of the Catholic social movement. 
 
The Catholic principles of subsidiarity and solidarity are important to understanding Christian 
Democracy. Catholic social doctrine called for a correction of the most objectionable societal 
effects of capitalism. The Catholic principle of subsidiarity maintains that in the last instance 
the (nation-) state has a duty to intervene to correct for morally unacceptable market 
outcomes. Catholic social doctrine does not address the type of workers’ social rights and 
emancipation argument that one finds in Social Democratic ideology, but rather, as noted 
earlier, the obligation Christians have to help the poor in the tradition of Jesus Christ (Manow 
and van Kersbergen, 2009: 2). Social policies therefore are mechanisms that can help protect 
and maintain a stable and fair social order. Moreover, Christian Democratic ideology 
grounded in Catholic social doctrine typically stresses Gemeinschaft (community) over 
Gesellschaft (society)—doctrines rooted in the concept of solidarity. The idea of solidarity in 
this context is used in social policy to temper inequalities that are considered unjust and result 
in an undesirable distribution of power (van Kersbergen, 1995). Indeed van Kersbergen 
argued that “the notion of solidarity as harmony is an intrinsic component of the Christian 
democratic tradition and is alternately paraphrased as ‘integration’, compromise, 
accommodation and ‘pluralism’” (1995: 184). The relevance for Christian Democratic 
support for social insurance is that it entails an essentially conservative conception of risk 
sharing rather than a socialist conception of solidarity.      
 
Given the strong emphasis on subsidiarity and solidarity in Catholic social teaching, it is 
argued that such beliefs will be reflected in social policies where Catholics are potentially 
strong and that in turn, a distinct type of policy design will follow (Hornsby-Smith, 1999). 
But Manow (2004) argues that in contrast to previous thinking on the lack of influence of 
Protestantism on welfare state development in the literature (van Kersbergen, 1995 and 
Esping-Andersen, 1990), Protestantism has indeed contributed in a distinct way to welfare 
state development in Europe—even in Germany.27 Indeed Hemerijck, van Kersbergen and 
Manow (2000) argue that the origins of the German welfare state were grounded in 
Protestantism. This project was then “usurped and expropriated by Social Democracy and 
                                                 
27
 In 1995 van Kersbergen’s work rejected the idea that Protestantism had any positive contribution to either Christian Democracy or the 
welfare state. But in his 2009 essay with Manow, he amends his earlier argument and notes that the exclusive focus on Catholic social 
teaching and Christian Democracy neglects the influence of specific types of Protestantism on Christian Democracy. 
39 
 
social Catholicism, as a result of which the bourgeois Protestant middle class, the initial 
reform fraction, was alienated from the welfare state venture” (Hemerijck, van Kersbergen 
and Manow, 2000:108). Thus the Protestant middle class adopted the social reform doctrine 
of ‘Ordoliberalism’.28 Ordoliberalism, in addition to embracing liberal economic policy, also 
contained elements of interventionism with a social reform purpose (van Kersbergen and 
Manow, 2009). Ordoliberalism was concerned with social equality, social harmony and the 
pursuit of a decent life. It was against state redistribution programmes, but not against a 
‘caring state’, i.e., a state that ensured peace and justice, even if this meant intervening in and 
correcting the free market economy to ensure peace and justice. 
 
Moreover, for Manow (2004), the difference in welfare regimes is not whether they are social 
Democratic or Christian Democratic in nature, rather whether reformed Protestantism or 
Lutheranism bore its mark on welfare state development. “The existing studies in the field 
have focused exclusively on Catholicism—thereby implicitly assuming that the main 
analytical dividing line runs between Catholicism and Protestantism instead of within 
Protestantism” (Manow, 2004: 3). As opposed to Lutheranism, reformed Protestantism’s 
influence on welfare state development is often seen as ‘negative’ owing to its strict anti-state 
platform, the emphasis on self-help, autonomy, strict separation of church and state and 
individual asceticism. All of which, it is perceived, delayed and restricted the growth of 
modern social security (Manow and van Kersbergen, 2009). Instead it was, Manow argues, 
the Lutheran State Church, that did not have any major reservations against the State playing 
a dominant role in social protection or at least mounted no substantial resistance against the 
nation-state taking a role in social security provision. “The Protestant free churches and other 
reformed currents (Dissenters, Calvinists, Baptists, etc.) held a strongly antiétatist position, 
whereas the Lutheran state churches never questioned the prerogative of the central state in 
social policy and education” (Manow and van Kersbergen 2009: 4). For Manow, the 
Lutheran State Church positively contributed to the early introduction of social protection 
programmes and welfare state development (2004: 4; Manow and van Kersbergen 2009).  
Indeed, the Federal Republic has always been unique in its ability to moderate religious 
conflict and other social cleavages via the welfare state. The status of the German social state 
today is the result of years of merging and consolidation of different religious principles and 
camps forged through ‘amicable agreement and parity representation’. As Manow notes, 
                                                 
28 Ordoliberalism is the German variant between social liberalism and neoliberalism that emphasizes the need for the state to ensure that the 
free market produces results close to its theoretical potential. 
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“The different pillars all formed their own welfare organizations which gained privileged 
status in the field of welfare provision and which became stabilized and subsidized through 
the ‘corporatist’ welfare state programmes” (2004: 9).   
 
2.3.3 The interwar years  
 
The last years of the German Empire and the democratic Weimar Republic (1918-1933) 
witnessed the continued development of social insurance schemes. Despite the radically 
different political regimes in power in Germany since 1871, the organizational arrangements 
and financing of German social security had shown a remarkable degree of continuity over 
time (Solsten, 1995).  
 
Between the periods of 1890 to the year of Bismarck's resignation in1918 improvements were 
made to the initial three social insurance programs legislated. The National Insurance Code of 
1911 integrated the three separate insurance programs into a unified social security system 
and compulsory coverage and benefits were extended to white-collar workers. Survivors' 
pensions for widows were introduced in 1911
29
 while in 1916 survivors' benefits were 
increased. The retirement age for workers was reduced from 70 to 65.  
 
The Weimar Republic (1918-33) saw the further expansion of social security programs.
30
 
Unemployment relief was consolidated in 1923 into a regular assistance program, financed 
by employees and employers. Also in 1923, a national law on miners created a single agency 
for the administration of social insurance programs for miners; before the law went into effect 
110 separate associations had administered the program. In 1924 a modern public assistance 
program replaced the poor relief legislation of 1870 and in 1925 the accident insurance 
program was reformed, allowing occupational diseases to become insurable risks. In 1927 the 
national unemployment insurance program entitled the Job Placement and Unemployment 
Insurance Act (Gesetz über Arbeitsvermittlung und Arbeitslosenversicherung) was 
established and created the fourth branch of the social insurance system. Interestingly, 
                                                 
29 Solsten (1995) points out that the many amendments to the National Insurance Code of 1911 were later integrated into the Social 
Insurance Code of 1988. 
30
 In 1920 war victims' benefits were added to the social welfare system. In 1922 the Youth Welfare Act was passed. In 1923 the 1913 
agreement between doctors and sickness funds about who could treat sickness-funds patients was integrated into the National Insurance 
Code. 
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regulations contained considerable elements of conditionality, such as the recipient’s 
willingness to take up work at another place or from another profession after being 
unemployed for a period of time. Yet any gains in social insurance and assistance programs 
were threatened by the Great Depression of the early 1930s. Reduced wages meant smaller 
contributions to social insurance and assistance programs, all of which were soon on the 
brink of bankruptcy (Solsten, 1995).  
 
The Hitler regime introduced changes in individual programs and program administration. In 
1934 the regime dismantled the self-governance structure of all social insurance programs 
and appointed directors who reported to the central authorities. Broadly speaking, social 
policy in Germany between 1933 and 1942 focused heavily on labour market and economic 
policy—but with varying objectives. On the one hand, any employment creation policies to 
address mass unemployment implemented between 1933 and 1936 were linked to 
rearmament planning which were in turn responsible for the rapid growth in jobs in the 
capital goods sector.
31
 But on the other, this focus only on rearmament came at the expense of 
other branches of industry that resulted in a very slow solution to mass unemployment 
(Mason, 1993). Indeed, employment creation policies of the early- to mid-1930s were not 
aimed at increasing real wages as a means to help revive the general economy and as such 
reduce poverty. For example, as Mason (1993) points out, any employment creation policies 
were designed to meet the demands of big industry for government contracts (armaments, 
railways), tax reductions and tax waivers.  In fact, on account of the abolition of trade unions 
and the working classes political parties, workers conditions, earnings and social insurance 
contributions were dictated by the government and as result not in line with improving the 
quality of life for the worker.
32
 Indeed workers’ living standards from 1933 to 1937 did not 
improve. Average hourly earnings did not keep pace with the rising cost of living. 
 
While the initial policy to align labour market policy to a policy of rearmament resulted in 
poor wage and poor working conditions (on account of the government simply not having the 
workers’ interest at heart), ultimalty Mason (1993) argues, the government was forced to 
                                                 
31
 By dissolving the trade unions, wage demands could largely be ignored thereby maximizing the profit that could then be reinvested in the 
economy and thus keeping stable one of the largest cost factors in manufacturing. “In the same way, the expansion of the consumer goods 
industries could be held in check, so that capital, hard currency and raw materials could be channelled primarily into heavy industry” 
(Mason, 1993: 130).  
32
 Mason points out that an additional drain on worker earnings were the salary and wage deductions that consisted of increased 
contributions for social insurance mandated by the Emergency Decrees of the Brüning government (1930-1932) and the added deductions of 
the Labour Front, Winter Relief Aid and other Nazi organizations. Deductions thus constituted between 13 and 20 per cent of gross income 
after 1933 (Mason, 1993). 
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yield to workers’ wage and working condition demands. The ability for workers to actually 
press for improved living and working conditions was, as Mason argues, the result of full 
employment, which in turn was the inevitable result of rearmament.
33
 As the state of the 
‘worker’ as a problem got worse, it became important for powerful organizations within the 
power structure, primarily the DAF (Deutsche Arbeitsfront: German Labour Front) and the 
NSDAP (National Socialist German Workers’ Party) to represent the desire of the workers to 
better their lot—“even if they did this unsystematically, with minimal determination, and for 
selfish political reasons that had little to do with the welfare of the workers” (1993: 255). For 
Mason, the decisive factor was the government’s anxiety about the solidarity of its political 
authority—it was the only way for the government to indoctrinate the workers into their 
philosophy of National Socialism by taking into account the working class’s desire for 
improved living conditions (1993: 255-256).  Thus by 1942 all wage-earners regardless of 
occupation were covered by accident insurance, health care became unlimited, and maternity 
leave was extended to twelve fully paid weeks with job protection (Solsten, 1995). But it 
must be stressed that any changes or improvements made to social insurance programs and 
benefits were according to national-socialist political ideology with respect to who is worthy 
of relief and were in place to serve the interest of the regime rather than the population. While 
the three older branches of social insurance kept some of their central features with some 
reforms even improving benefits and expanding coverage as mentioned, unemployment 
insurance broke from its insurance principle in 1939 (Frerich and Frey 1996). According to 
Schmidt (2005) the insurance principle was virtually abolished and replaced with a means-
tested benefit. The point here is that there were past precedents for distinctly non-corporatists 
models of provision.  
 
2.4 The post-war Christian democratic model 
 
The Christian Democratic model as we know it today was shaped in post-World War II 
Germany by the CDU’s 1947 Ahlener Programme and the Düsseldorfer Leitsätze (principles) 
of July 1949.
34
 Following the collapse of the Nazi dictatorship, post-war Germany needed to 
                                                 
33
As the war economy slowly shifted mass unemployment to full employment, by the end of 1936 the time had passed when the 
unemployed would fight over any job that became available; when poorly-paid work was welcomed under any condition or in any field. 
Indeed, by the end of 1936, the war economy resulted in workers able to choose their own job, and even change jobs for better wages and 
conditions.  
34 On February 3, 1947 the CDU Zone Committee of the British Zone completed the Ahlener Programme. The Ahlener Programme was the 
CDU’s post-Nazi vision for a fundamental reorganization of Germany’s social and economic institutions. The Düsseldorfer Leitsätze 
(Düsseldorfer principles of the CDU and CSU working group) followed the CDU Ahlener Programme and became the economic and social 
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build its social, political and economic structures and institutions from the ground-up, 
including its welfare state. Multiple meetings took place with the intention of planning a new 
Christian Democratic party. Out of these meetings sprang the Christian Democratic Union 
(CDU) —the predominantly Catholic party—that was established in Berlin on June 26, 1945 
as the main political challenger to the Social Democratic Party (SPD).
 
Given the Social 
Democrat’s inability to mount an opposition to the Christian Democrats in federal elections 
in the years immediately following the war, the CDU headed the coalition government 
consisting of the liberal Free Democrats (FDP) and the Christian Social Union (CSU) 
between 1949 and 1969 and was influential in rebuilding institutions, steering the economy 
and designing the post-war social state.
35
 The influence of Catholic social doctrine on the 
design of the CDU’s political platform following the war is not to be underestimated at this 
period of time.
36
 Many discussions took place between political and religious (Catholic) 
groups that sought to address and ultimately resolve how the party’s political platform was 
going to reconcile the anti-capitalist aspects of Catholic ideology, i.e., the belief in a just 
wage and the Catholic church’s general concern for the welfare of the poor, with the more 
economic liberal
37
 interest in a free market economy.
38
 For example, the Ahlener Programme 
of the CDU in 1947 started with the critique: “Das kapitalistische Wirtschaftssystem ist den 
staatlichen und sozialen Lebensinteressen des deutschen Volkes nicht gerecht worden…” 
(The capitalist economic system belies the state and social interest of the German people…)  
(Krämer, 2000: 138). Yet, not all camps of the Christian Democratic Union were social 
Catholic embedded in their perception of the role of capitalism as the CDU of North Rhine-
Westphalia, for example. Indeed there was substantial disagreement among the party factions 
                                                                                                                                                        
programme of the CDU for the first post-war federal elections. The Düsseldorfer Leitsätze on July 15, 1949 was a product of the discussions 
that followed the Ahlener programme. While the Leitsätze drew on the principles of the Ahlener programme they also mark the reorientation 
of the CDU towards a free market economy and a departure from the Christian socialism of the Ahlener Programme of the CDU of North 
Rhine-Westphalia.    
35 Van Kersbergen (1995) argued that the post-war Social Democratic party platform was outdated given the party’s structural bias towards 
free market capitalism. The SPD was slow to adjust to the “emanating new configuration of the social structure in West Germany. The 
Social Democrats found it particularly difficult to find a feasible answer to the challenge of Christian Democracy, especially since this new 
political movement attracted the working class as well. It took the Social Democrats until 1954 to adjust to the evolving and partly already 
institutionalized new relations of power and to accept the competitive market as a regulating principle of the economy” (80).  
36 The Bochumer Katholikentag of 1949 main objective was to create a platform for how Gesellschaft (society) and Wirtschaft (the 
economy) could be formed in the spirit of Christianity (and as an alternative to the economic liberal economy) (Krämer, 2000). Indeed, the 
political economic working group of the Bochumer Katholikentag (Bochum Catholic Day) questioned the fundamental value of a capitalistic 
economic system, the conditions under which the economy developed, the power structure between economy and society and the 
development of workers’ rights. 
37 It is important to clarify what is meant by ‘liberalism’ here. It is easiest to distinguish between economic and social liberalism. Economic 
liberalism is grounded in ‘classical’ liberal-individualist egalitarian perception, while social liberalism can share the political centre with 
social democratic thinking. The term neo-liberalism is often used in conjunction with the New Right (the Reagan/Thatcher thinking that 
blended classical liberalism with authoritarian neo-conservatism) and the particular brand of economic liberalism that adapted to global 
capitalism.      
38 It was not just an issue of morality that determined the pro-welfare stance of religious political parties. Stephens (1979) also suggested 
that there was a political reason why Christian democratic parties were supporters of the welfare state. Namely, he argues that the parties 
operating at the political centre were seeking the working class vote and hoped to cooperate with the Catholic unions. Social policies 
promised to secure the support of the Catholic working class for the Christian Democratic Union, a party that traditionally attracted the 
middle-class vote. 
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about the role of the state and social and economic institutions in smoothing over the ill-
effects of a free market economy.  
 
Since the Christian Democrats of post-war Germany aspired to a new social order based on 
social justice, socially responsible freedom and human dignity, a comprehensive social policy 
for all economically and socially dependent groups was needed. In the end this resulted in the 
Christian Democrats adopting Ludwig Erhard’s creation of an essentially economic liberal 
social market economy—soziale Marktwirtschaft—into their party platform. While the liberal 
wing of the Christian Democrats ensured that social policy was grounded in a sound and 
‘healthy’ economic policy, one would be wrong to underestimate the importance of the 
‘social’ in the social market economy (van Kersbergen, 1995).  Given that Catholic social 
doctrine called for a correction of socially unacceptable—market produced—outcomes, the 
social market economy enabled the two sides (the pro-market stance and the desire to 
moderate social and economic policy) to reconcile by finding a compromise between the 
liberal laissez-faire doctrine and the doctrine of the controlled or planned economy.
39
 But 
Hemerijck, van Kersbergen and Manow (2000) argue that soziale Marktwirtschaft cannot—
as it has usually been—be understood as a compromise between Catholic social doctrine, as 
embodied in the conservative corporatist welfare state, and economic liberalism. Rather 
soziale Marktwirtschaft should be understood as a compromise between Catholic and 
Lutheran social doctrine (Manow, 2004).  
 
Indeed, according to the Düsseldorfer Leitsätze that embraced the social market economy, the 
new social and economic order of the Federal Republic meant that competition had to be 
guaranteed, the monetary system was to be placed under central control and prices were to be 
freely determined. Moreover, wage moderation was called for and considered essential for 
economic recovery. Economic management was to consist mainly of credit and monetary 
policy, although public investment was not excluded. Compensation rather than prevention 
came to define German social security. For the employed this meant that there was a right to 
work (for men and women in principle, though in practice mainly for men based on the male 
breadwinner model), there was the freedom of choice for occupation, fair, equal and a ‘just’ 
wage sufficient for a family,
40
 a six-day work week, and labour protection. The typically 
                                                 
39 The economic policy proposed by the Christian democrats was barely distinct from the manifestos of the republican middle class of the 
Weimar Republic except for the stress on monopoly control (van Kersbergen, 1995). 
40 Related to this is the assumption about the ‘proper’ role of women and their special task in child rearing. There is a strong emphasis on 
parental rights in the education of their children and concerns about undue involvement of the state. 
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centrist position of Christian Democratic parties is a result of a political platform aimed at 
social integration, class compromise, political mediation, accommodation and pluralism. 
“Class reconciliation and cooperation lie at the heart of what defines Christian democracy as 
distinctive” (van Kersbergen, 1994:36). 
 
2.4.1 Incremental changes made to unemployment benefit policy  
 
Prior to Reunification, the German welfare state was widely viewed in Europe as a success 
because of a social arrangement that contributed to economic growth, productivity and high 
employment, as well as low poverty and inequality (Seeleib-Kaiser and Fleckenstein, 2007: 
429). And yet, starting in the mid- to late-1970s incremental changes were being made to 
labour market and unemployment benefit policy that, some would later argue (Seeleib-
Kaiser, 2004; Heinelt and Weck, 1998; Betzelt and Bothfeld, 2011a), ultimately affected 
Germany’s ‘social arrangement’.41 In terms of unemployment benefit this was reflected in the 
unemployed receiving income transfers to replace lost earnings coupled with selected use of 
active labour market programmes. In the post-war years ALMPs were available to 
unemployment insurance and to some extent unemployment assistance recipients in order 
provide extensive vocational training and job creation programmes. Vocational trainings 
were given particular emphasis in the context of the German labour market where 
qualifications were officially classified and protected and a prerequisite for many jobs 
(Schluter, 1995). But it was the advent of the oil crisis in the mid-1970s that marked a point 
when gradual changes were made—notably in the 1980s and 1990s—to unemployment 
benefit in terms of tightened eligibility criteria
42
, contribution caps, and the move away from 
using active labour market measures for human capital building purposes toward a means to 
test, among other things, one’s willingness to enter paid employment.  
 
Therein lies an important point about whether (and if so, to what degree) the Hartz reforms 
represent a sharp change in the nature of unemployment provision in Germany. Clasen (2005) 
argues that when stepping back and reviewing the changes made to unemployment benefit 
policy in the last thirty years, the Hartz reforms were, in effect, drawing on policies that had 
                                                 
41Seeleib-Kaiser (2004), for example, argues it was the onset of cutbacks made in the mid-1970s and legislated by the Social Democratic-
Liberal (SDP/FDP) coalition government that started, what would become, incremental withdrawal from the principle of securing the 
achieved living standard coupled with an increased reliance on the market. 
42
 For those at the margins of the labour market, for example, with shorter contribution periods and those with repeated spells of 
unemployment, incremental legislative change in 1982, 1994 and 1998 tightened eligibility conditions of unemployment protection (Clasen 
and Clegg, 2007). 
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been implemented incrementally since the early 1980s. Yet there are two key points that need 
to be made here. First, who participated in active labour market schemes or experienced 
tighter conditionality in the 1980s and 1990s was very much dependent on whether one was 
in receipt of social insurance, unemployment assistance or social assistance. This coupled 
with how strictly the regional offices interpreted the law very much depended on how and to 
what degree (if at all) sanctions were used. Some municipalities were simply stricter than 
others. Second, how high a regions unemployment numbers were combined with money 
available to fund ALMPs greatly determined the degree to which ALMPs were used as 
mechanisms to contain costs (i.e., move social assistance recipients into short-term work 
schemes). Thus depending on funding arrangements, there was a constant ebb and flow in 
terms of the use of ALMPs during this time period coupled with different objectives for 
different unemployment benefit schemes.   
 
I would argue, what makes the introduction of the fourth Hartz law unique and distinguishes 
it from previous legislation is that the law made—what was arguably a fragmented system—
more uniform. Indeed, as Clasen points out “suitability criteria, defining jobs deemed 
acceptable for unemployed people, had already become tighter in the 1970s and 1980s 
(Clasen, 1994) and some local offices would require recipients of SA deemed able to work to 
engage in employment-related schemes. However, general and encompassing activation 
policies…remained less prescriptive in comparison [to the UK]” (2005: 56-7). On the one 
hand, the third and fourth Hartz law standardized the rules and regulations concerning 
eligibility, benefit provision, the use of sanctions and active labour market policies for all 
recipients of Unemployment Benefit II and on the other hand, justified any changes under the 
rights and responsibilities policy maxim. And while there is always variance inserted into any 
system at the very local level where policies play out, the fact that, in this study, there was no 
variation in respondent responses in terms of their experience of UBII rules and regulations 
between the Jobcenter in Hamburg and the Jobcenter in Bremen, suggest, on a small scale, 
that what goes on at the local level is more uniform than not.  
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2.4.2 The provision of unemployment insurance and unemployment assistance from the 
1980s onwards  
 
Unemployment insurance and unemployment assistance were administered by the Federal 
Labour Office (FLO) (later renamed the Federal Employment Agency).
43
 The Federal Labour 
Office and its regional and local labour offices were responsible for transferring payments of 
unemployment compensation and funded active labour market policies.
44
 These were 
financed out of the same fund as unemployment insurance, with the federal government 
having to balance the annual budget of the Federal Labour Office should deficits occur. This 
was the case, for example, in the early 1980s and for each year in the 1990s.
45
 As Clasen 
(2005) has noted, this particular funding structure had several implications. First, for 
individual unemployed persons, access to labour market programmes was, pre-Hartz reforms, 
largely determined by which benefit a recipient was in receipt of, with those receiving 
unemployment insurance and unemployment assistance the privileged clients of the Federal 
Labour Office (Clasen, 2005). This meant that trainings for further qualifications often went 
to those in receipt of unemployment insurance and to some extent unemployment assistance 
but were generally not made available to the long-term unemployed on social assistance or 
those older than 55 (Bosch, 1994). Second, the funding and budget matrix of the Federal 
Labour Office coupled with the national and regional unemployment status at any given time 
had a direct effect on the degree of active labour market policies offered recipients. This 
meant that during times of high unemployment the joint funding structure of the Federal 
Labour Office resulted in limited funds available for active labour market policy 
programmes; when unemployment fell, there was then more room for expanding activation 
programmes because of the reduced pressure on the Federal Labour Office’s budget (Clasen, 
2005: 55-56). Indeed, the requirement to balance annual deficits in the Federal Labour 
Office’s budget proved to be a strong cost-saving incentive for the federal government. “The 
state of the annual BA [Federal Labour Office] budget was a major determinant in labour-
market policy making” (Clasen, 2005: 56).  Thus there is both ambiguity and tension between 
new and old paternalistic impulses: on the one hand between a desire to reduce social 
                                                 
43 The Federal Labour Office was, on the one hand, an independent public authority subject to federal legislation and on the other, a tripartite 
organization consisting of representatives from employers, trade unions and the state (Clasen, 2005). 
44 The FLO also distributed other benefits such as the short-term working allowance.  
45Reissert (1994) explains that the financial model of the Federal Labour Office came under particular pressure with the 1974/75 recession 
where it fell into deficit, one that the Federal Labour Office was unable to dig itself out of until much later. It was because of this that the 
discussion about how to fund labour market policies remained topical throughout the 1980s and 1990s. 
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expenditure through 'work-first' labour market activation policies and on the other, a desire to 
provide support through 'human capital' oriented labour market activation policies.       
 
The impact of growing unemployment numbers in the 1980s as a result of the second major 
post-war recession impacted access to active labour market policies schemes and slowly 
prompted increased conditionality. Indeed, the first two years of the Christian Democratic-
Liberal coalition government of 1982 were characterized by cutbacks to unemployment 
insurance, active labour market policies and social assistance. In many ways the 
unemployment benefit policies of the 1980s can be characterized by selective cuts and 
targeted improvements (Clasen, 2005). In the early 1980s unemployment had reached, at that 
time, an unprecedented level with more than two million people out of work (Clasen, 2005: 
66). In addition, the combination of the growth of long-term unemployment and tighter 
eligibility criteria reduced the share of unemployment insurance recipients by the mid-1980s.  
As Clasen (2005) points out, while this eased fiscal pressure on the Federal Labour Office, 
pressure on tax-funded unemployment assistance and local social assistance budgets grew. 
Indeed, Reissert (1998 from Clasen 2005) refers to a ‘vicious circle’ which stems from the 
compartmentalized treatment of unemployed recipients in Germany. “High regional 
unemployment tends to push up local social assistance spending, which tends to deplete 
resources for regional public investment which, in turn, fosters further employment losses 
and unemployment” (Clasen, 2005: 56).  
 
Redefining job suitability criteria and placing more responsibility on unemployment benefit 
recipients to find work was already apparent in the late 1970s and 1980s. As for ALMPs, the 
option of applying works tests and using labour market and work experience programmes as 
a way to transfer those on benefit into the labour market had existed in Germany since the 
1970s (Clasen, 2005). Conditionality and ALMPs were increasingly used by some local 
authorities who were responsible for social assistance (SA) recipients as unemployment 
numbers swelled at regional levels. Following the principle of subsidiarity, the Federal Social 
Assistance Law from 1961
46
 stipulated that every potential benefit recipient is obliged to 
make full use of their earnings capacity to provide for the individual and their family. Thus 
                                                 
46
 The Federal Social Assistance law (Bundessozialhilfegesetz) adopted in 1961 instituted an effective minimum subsistence guarantee by 
entitling every citizen passing a means-test to a poor relief benefit which would enable the recipients to lead a life in keeping with human 
dignity including a certain degree of participation in civic and cultural life. The law required all potential beneficiaries to make full use of 
their own earning capacity. If this requirement was not met, the benefit could be reduced or denied entirely. Alber and Heissig (2011) argue 
that two of the elements which are usually regarded as key characteristics of the new “work first” approach were already a key aspect of the 
old German social assistance scheme, i.e. the obligation to make use of one’s earning power and the right to retain some of the earned 
income from work without reducing the benefit entitlement. 
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they must actively look for job offers if unemployed. Indeed the law stipulated that the 
‘sozialamt’ should provide work opportunities for those who cannot find work, but also 
stipulated that the right to benefits were forfeited if a suitable work offer was refused (Alber 
and Heisig, 2011). 
 
By 1991 it was the question of how the federal government and the federal parliament were 
going to finance the increased need for active labour market services in the new German 
states. It was predicted in 1991 that the extra provision of active labour market services in 
East Germany would mean an increase in the Federal Labour Office’s budget from 30 to 70 
billion DM (Reissert, 1994). The Federal Labour Office’s income from contributions as a 
result of unification would only increase by c. 6 billion DM. A result of the speed at which 
reunification took place, the budget of the Federal Labour Office was suddenly facing a 
financial deficit of more than 20 billion DM—a deficit larger than any earlier deficit of the 
Federal Labour Office. Reissert (1994) points out that in order to close this financial hole, 
two options were discussed. The first, the federal government and the federal parliament 
could close the deficit through a grant to the budget that came out of the federal budget 
(which meant it was financed through taxes or increased credit) or the government could 
change the Labour Promotion Law (Arbeitsförderunggesetz)
47
 and increase the shared 
financial contribution of employees and employer. The second option was chosen. On April 
1, 1991 the contributions for employer and employee were increased from 4.3 to 6.8 per cent 
of gross wage. This was the largest increase to social insurance in the Federal Republic since 
the Pension Reform (Rentenreform) of 1957 (Heinelt, 1994). Indeed Reissert (1994) argues 
that the financing of active labour market policies in the former East and West were in 
principle completely financed through social insurance contributions for the years that 
followed 1991.
48
           
 
But other changes were underway that would ultimately impact the unemployed. The major 
aim of the Labour Promotion Law of 1969 was to abolish ‘substandard’ employment through 
various instruments of active labour market policy (Kühl, 1982).  It was the induction of the 
                                                 
47
 The German Labour Promotion Law of 1969 (Gesetz über die Leistung und Aufgaben zur Beschäftigungssicherung und zur Förderung 
des Wirtschaftswachstums) replaced the prior law entitled The Job Placement and Unemployment Insurance Law (Gesetz über 
Arbeitsvermittlung und Arbeitslosenversicherung). The Labour Promotion Law remained the basis for labour law until December 1997. 
Through the Labour Promotion Reform Law the Labour Promotion Law became the Third Social Code Book in January 1998. The German 
Social Code Book III replaced the Labour Promotion Law.       
48
 Even with the social insurance contribution increase from April 1, 1991, the federal government still had to cut active labour market 
services and in 1993 the federal government had to provide a subsidy from the federal budget to the Federal Labour Office of 25 billion and 
in 1994 c. 18 billion to close the Federal Labour Office budget deficit (Heinelt, 1994). 
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Labour Promotion Reform Law in 1997 where substantial changes were made to ALMPs and 
conditionality in terms of a shift to activation being used as workfare rather than vocational 
training mechanisms (Bieback, 1997). A gradual decrease in benefit rates for the long-term 
unemployment assistance recipient was introduced as well as stricter rules regarding active 
job search and work requirements.  “Previously the normative orientation had been to aim for 
job offers which corresponded with individual skills and acquire status. By contrast, the new 
legislation indicated a shift towards a system of income protection, but no longer wage 
replacement or status-adequate employment integration” (Clasen, 2005: 69). Whereas prior to 
the law an unemployed worker could reject job offers that were considered inferior to his or 
her former occupational status. Under the new law if, within the first three months of 
unemployment, a recipient received a job offer that paid up to 20 per cent less than the 
previous job, that job would be deemed suitable. From the fourth to the sixth month of 
unemployment any job offer paying up to 30 per cent less than previous earnings was 
considered suitable and from the seventh month of receiving benefits any job with a net wage 
equal to the unemployment compensation payment became defined as suitable (Bieback, 
1997).          
 
Furthermore the new legislation not only shifted the responsibility for employment towards 
employers but this time particularly towards the workers themselves which fundamentally 
redefined the aim of the original law. In contrast to the ‘old’ goals of the Labour Promotion 
Law of 1969—which stated that it was the primary responsibility of the state to prevent and 
avoid unemployment—the new law did not state a clear normative aim (Seeleib-Kaiser and 
Fleckenstein, 2007). Seeleib-Kaiser and Fleckenstein (2007) argue that these reforms must be 
considered as quite significant at the level of statutes because they gave local administrators 
substantial leverage to sanction unemployed workers to take up job offers outside their 
previous occupation. However, due to the fairly moderate sanction regime at the level of 
implementation, they argue that the administrators did not make full use of the possibilities 
given to them by the statutory framework. Moreover Seeleib-Kaiser and Fleckenstein (2007) 
argue that in the period immediately following reunification the conservative Kohl 
government relied heavily on ALMP instruments in order to minimize unemployment. 
However, funding was discontinued two years later (1993) when ALMPs were once again at 
the mercy of budgetary constraints. In the end, Heinelt and Weck (1998) argue that the policy 
approach of recommodification—initiated in the 1980s—was continued and accelerated. For 
them legislation that resulted in unemployment benefit entitlements being retrenched, 
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especially for recipients of unemployment assistance, and the shift to ALMPs increasingly 
being used to test the willingness of recipients to work (instead of being used to promote 
standard employment relationships through training and employment measures) coupled with 
the provision of temporary and ‘substandard’ work (instead of promoting reintegration into 
the regular labour market) signalled the development towards an ALMP approach 
characterized increasingly by the desire to exert ‘control’ and ‘discipline’ over recipients of 
unemployment benefit (Heinelt, 1994: 201).
49
  
 
2.4.3 Social Assistance 
 
The perception of social policy experts in the 1960s and early 1970s was that an improved 
social insurance system would eventually cover the standard social risks, so that social 
assistance, in terms of providing a minimum subsistence, would ultimately become 
diminished (Giese, 1986). But over time, this proved not to be the case. Indeed, while the 
number on social assistance decreased between 1960 and 1970, between 1970 and 1992 the 
number actually quadrupled, from 750,000 recipients in 1970 to 2.8 million in 1991 
(reunification of course being a major factor for the increase in numbers in the early 1990s) 
(Statistisches Bundesamt, 1993: 22 from Buhr, 1994). As Buhr points out, it was not just 
those on the margins of society who went to the ‘Sozialamt’ rather those seeking social 
assistance stemmed from common social risk categories, such as unemployment, age or 
divorce. This change resulted in social assistance no longer being something for a mere few 
in society who, for one reason or another, could not turn to unemployment insurance or 
unemployment assistance. Therefore since 1985 local authorities increasingly became “a 
reluctant third source of social security support, particularly for long-term unemployed 
people” (Clasen, 2000: 95) and by the early 1990s social assistance had become a function of 
the ever growing system of social provision in Germany. 
 
Federally regulated, social assistance was funded and administered by the local authorities 
and municipalities. During periods of high unemployment in the 1980s and 1990s significant 
pressure was placed on local authorities’ budgets because of the increased percentage of 
long-term unemployed who required social assistance (and could not draw from 
                                                 
49 Heinelt and Weck (1998) argue that the policy objective of status preservation embedded in social insurance was increasingly relegated to 
the short-term unemployed, while the process of recommdification and workfare increasingly dominated the unemployment and social 
assistance schemes. Indeed, Clasen and Clegg argue that “prior to 2005 claimants of unemployment insurance have not been subjected to a 
routine form of mandatory activation” (2007: 179).  
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unemployment insurance or unemployment assistance). As a result, local authorities in high 
unemployment areas began to develop and implement their own job creation programmes.
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This meant transferring employable social assistance recipients to activation (workfare) 
programmes, such as limited work contracts that would enable recipients to re-qualify for 
insurance benefits as well as other subsidized employment (Clasen et al., 1998 from Clasen 
2005; Finn et al., 2005). These workfare measures provided ‘socially useful’ employment. 
More important, those jobs that paid wages had the advantage of helping the participant to 
qualify for unemployment insurance thereby shifting responsibility for future benefit 
entitlement to the social insurance fund or the Federal Government. By the late 1990s, many 
local authorities had also begun to implement ‘work for benefit’ programmes as a way of 
testing willingness to work. Indeed Seeleib-Kaiser (2004) argues that policy reforms at the 
local level since the mid-1980s and reforms at the federal level in 1993 and 1996 put an 
increased emphasis on workfare requirements within the social assistance program.  
 
But there was a financial reason for localities increasing their use of workfare measures to 
activate social assistance recipients. Workfare programmes entitled participants to receive 
unemployment compensation after the publicly funded or subsidized activation measure 
expired and he or she still had not found work in the regular labour market. Thereby the costs 
of unemployment were redirected from the local back to the federal level, which became a 
form of ‘cost-containment strategy’ for the local authorities (Clasen, 2000). Thus the main 
reason behind the increased emphasis on activation for SA recipients at the local level was to 
reduce social assistance expenditure (Seeleib-Kaiser, 2004; Clasen, 2000). “In other words, 
localities have a financial incentive to activate unemployed social assistance recipients, due 
to the existing financing structures of the German welfare state” (Seeleib-Kaiser, 2004: 135).   
 
2.5 Chapter summary and conclusion 
 
The history of the principles that underlie the German welfare state is more complex than 
Esping-Andersen’s ideal model suggest. Broadly speaking, the German welfare state is an 
                                                 
50 Different numbers are cited by different academics to illustrate the increase in social assistant recipients participating in active labour 
market polices—or what Seeleib-Kaiser (2004) refers to as ‘welfare-to-work’ initiatives. In 1998 c. 300,000 (former) social assistance 
recipients participated in ALMPS whereas the numbers for 1982 and 1993 were 20,000 and 110,000 respectively (Alber, 2001). Clasen 
(2005) points out that the number of social assistance recipients participating in different types of local employment programmes went from 
below 120,000 in 1993 to c. 200,000 in 1996 (Heinelt and Weck, 1998: 52).  According to a survey by the German Association of Cities 
(Duetscher Städtetag) about 400,000 (former) social assistance recipients participated in ALMPs during the year 2000, an increase of about 
100,000 since 1998. About 50 per cent of the participants were employed in ‘regular’ employment relationships (Deutscher Städtetag, 
2001).  
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ideological and moral hybrid. Ideal, typical modelling of welfare states, like Esping-
Andersen’s, simplifies the complex, even messy part of welfare state history. While Betzelt 
and Bothfeld (2011a) argue that the introduction of active labour market policies has replaced 
the former logic of social security—a combination of equity and solidarity—as the typical 
organizing principles of German social security, I would argue that unemployment benefit 
pre-Hartz reforms was not necessarily designed with the intent to extend equity and solidarity 
to everyone in the first place: those eligible for unemployment insurance and social 
assistance. German unemployment insurance was always both solidaristic in that it was about 
sharing risk, but it was premised on individual contributions which identified, separated and 
rewarded the ‘worker’ from the non-worker. Unemployment Benefit was thus from the start a 
mixture of ‘Bismarck and Beveridge’—rewarding those who ‘worked’ i.e., the core worker, 
the protected worker with status-preserving social insurance while preventing the ‘outsider’, 
i.e., the social assistant recipient, the low-wage, periodically workless worker from falling 
into abject poverty with a flat-rate means-tested benefit. And indeed, so long as the robust 
German economy of the post-war years fostered near-full employment, this separate system 
of unemployment benefit—and principles—functioned well in that the majority of jobseekers 
received social insurance. But this system started to falter with rising unemployment in the 
late 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. Indeed it was no longer those on the margins of the labour 
market who prescribed to social assistance, rather those from typical risk categories, such as 
age, divorce and unemployment, who were turning to social assistance for help. How 
municipalities responded to the increased numbers that put pressure on their budgets varied. 
Some turned to active labour market policies as a cost containment strategy and increased use 
of sanctions. Others did not. Thus perhaps it is not whether the core, Christian Democratic 
principles that came to define German unemployment benefit have disappeared, rather 
whether political actors view them as applicable in the globalized, post-industrial context of 
an ever evolving labour market.  
 
Without question, the Hartz reforms ushered in new institutional, administrative and 
regulatory changes that happened also to coincide with the ascendancy of Anglophone—
‘Third Way’—managerialist orthodoxy. Yet are these changes as radical and as ‘new’ as they 
appear? Social Catholic principles of solidarity, subsidiarity and equivalency coupled with 
the call for a fair and just wage underpinned the design of the post-war German social state. 
As a result of the reforms, some are questioning whether these very principles have been 
undermined by the type of policies adopted in 2005. Yet, this assumes that the social Catholic 
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principles of solidarity and subsidiarity were the only founding principles of the German 
social state. As van Kersbergen and Manow (2009) argue, both variants of Protestant and 
Catholic principles were always embedded in the design and message of the welfare state 
since Bismarck. This is perhaps best manifested in the idea of individual responsibility (Kahl, 
2005; Kaufmann, 1988).  Arguably a Protestant principle, individual responsibility was 
embedded in both Lutheran and Calvin edicts on begging and poverty post-Reformation. This 
culminated in the contemporary perception that work is salvation and while unemployment 
benefit should manage risk, it was not meant as a replacement for work. The individual 
should be forced to find work if necessary. Thus threads of individual responsibility were 
already embedded in the German consciousness—a thread that appears in an analysis of the 
evidence that follows (see Chapter Eight). As such, the advent of Fördern and Fordern 
arguably represents less of a shift to something new and instead signifies more substantive 
and ethical continuity of German social security over time.   
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Chapter Three: The Role of Active Labour Market Polices in an Ever 
Changing Labour Market Landscape 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The topics selected for review in this chapter are directly associated with and relevant to the 
themes explored in the empirical chapters (see Chapters Six and Seven specifically).  Indeed, 
the topics initially selected for review were done so in order to set the context for the research 
I wished to conduct. Moreover, one purpose of the literature review conducted in Chapter 
Two was to explore gaps in the literature and research that required further investigation. 
This chapter therefore extends that review by discussing the literature pertaining to themes as 
they relate to my own work: active labour market policies generally and in Germany 
specifically; the rise of atypical, temporary and low-wage work; and the impact and 
effectiveness of the Hartz reforms (and One-Euro-Jobs). The review attempts to be as 
systematic and comprehensive as circumstances allow. But given time and space limitations 
coupled with taking into consideration the breadth and depth of evidence on any one of these 
topics, I have selected those studies that best illustrate the complexity of the issue at hand.  
 
To that end, this chapter will start with a review of active labour market policies generally 
and in Germany specifically (section 3.2). Central to any discussion of active labour market 
policies is the type of ‘activation’ introduced into social insurance provision in an ever 
changing labour market landscape—should ALMPs focus on human capital development or 
on workfirst mechanisms? This chapter will thus unpack the evidence about whether and how 
effective skills trainings are that contribute to human capital development. This discussion is 
relevant to this thesis because I am exploring UBII recipient experience of skills trainings that 
may or may not improve their human capital. Next, this chapter will draw on the literature 
and the evidence to describe and illustrate changes in the German labour market (section 3.3). 
Specifically three issues will be explored in this context: the rise in atypical and temporary 
work; the rise in low-wage work and to that end whether low-wage work can act as a 
stepping stone to better paid work. These three issues directly affect a high proportion of the 
sample for this study, as will be demonstrated in Chapters Six and Seven. Given that one of 
the Federal Republic’s objectives for implementing the Hartz reforms was to reduce benefit 
dependency and thus unemployment numbers, this chapter will explore the quantitative 
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evidence on the effectiveness of the Hartz reforms generally and the One-Euro-Job 
specifically at integrating UBII recipients into the regular labour market (section 3.4). 
Finally, section 3.5 will conclude with a summary of the topics discussed in this chapter. 
 
The objective of this chapter is to provide a context for this study. That said, this study does 
not evaluate the effectiveness of active labour market policies as they pertain to the Hartz 
reforms, rather explores how they affect a sample of those who have participated in activation 
mechanisms. It is therefore important to understand the issues to arise out of any evaluation 
as they can and indeed have helped inform the type of questions asked in this thesis. 
Moreover, it is important to emphasise that the interviews conducted for this study consisted 
of a sample for whom the reforms had not been especially ‘effective’. Or put another way, we 
do not know the counterfactual; whether those former UBII recipients who have entered the 
[regular] labour market (and thus were not at the Jobcenters for me to speak with) did so on 
account of the activation mechanisms in place to support them in their endeavour to find 
work thus rendering the support mechanisms ‘effective’.  The findings of the evaluations 
reviewed in the following sections of this chapter suggest how some of the skills trainings 
were effective for some participants but not for others. Thus this chapter is, in part, critiquing 
the limitations of existing evaluations. The crucial missing component here is that we do not 
know a lot, if anything, about why. On the one hand, it is not clear to what extent ‘positive’ 
outcomes are attributable to deadweight effects. On the other, a challenge with non-
experimental techniques (such as propensity score matching technique) employed in place of 
randomized control trials to evaluate the effectiveness of a program depend critically on 
maintained assumptions about the nature of the process by which participants select into a 
program (Bryson et al., 2002). As a result, capturing the ‘hard to reach’ recipient is simply 
difficult which has the potential of skewing the perception of what, then, is effective and for 
whom.  
 
The challenge with any such review is reconciling the divergent findings that are based on 
very different levels of abstraction and to some degree epistemologies. For the purpose of this 
chapter it is not about whether these differences in abstraction and epistemologies can be 
reconciled (positivist versus interpretavist analytical approaches for example) rather more 
about presenting how academics heretofore have gone about analysing, evaluating and 
studying topics as they pertain to the issues discussed in this thesis. Different research 
questions and objectives require different types of methods that may result in diverse findings 
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on a similar topic. This review informed the decisions I made as to the type of research 
questions I asked and which method I would then use to answer the said questions. Indeed, 
the quantitative evidence on the effects of temporary and low-paid work as a stepping stone 
to long-term and/or higher paid work, combined with the evidence on the effectiveness of 
ALMPs assisting in UBII recipients integrate into the regular labour market, became a crucial 
baseline for the qualitative work which is to follow in the three empirical chapters (see 
Chapters Six, Seven and Eight).    
 
3.2 Active labour market policies in context 
 
From workfare to welfare-to-work to work-first
51
, different terms have been used to refer to a 
move towards the implementation of ‘activation’ policies that has been central to the process 
of welfare reform in OECD countries in the last two decades. A rich literature exists on the 
increased emphasis placed on ‘activating’ the unemployed into employment through specific 
active labour market policies.
52
 Many have sought to describe the different types of ALMPs 
that exists in different countries (Considine, 2001; Lødemel and Trickery, 2001; Peck, 2001; 
Lindsay and McQuaid, 2008; Hoefer and Midgley, 2006; Grey, 2004; Bonoli, 2010).  Yet, in 
the end, they all share common roots: the lack of employment (worklessness) experienced by 
a growing percentage of the population put pressure on social assistance expenditure. This 
pressure on expenditure is cited as one of the key motivating factors for the introduction or 
increased use of active labour market policies, including workfare (Heikkilä, 1999). Broadly 
speaking, part of the ‘activation-turn’ in labour market policy making (Bonoli, 2010) is the 
increased use of conditions and sanctions, if necessary, to force unemployment benefit 
recipients to look for, accept or undertake employment. The stick here is the threat of 
punishment through the loss of benefit should the recipient not demonstrate that he or she is 
actively seeking work. Thus, being ‘active’ and ‘available for employment’ takes on an 
altogether new meaning and relevance in the ALMP context. Yet here Bonoli (2010) argues 
that ALMP is too broad a category to be used without further specification. He puts forward a 
typology of ALMPs based on two dimensions: policies oriented towards pro-market 
                                                 
51
 Workfare as used, for example by Jessop (1993), implies a hard line taken toward those on unemployment benefit. Here any job is 
preferred to no job at all and the state rather than the jobseeker dictates which job should be taken after a certain period of unemployment.  
Welfare-to-work conveys the softer image of helping the unemployed escape from ‘dependence’ on state benefits while work-first’s aim is 
to move recipients off benefits and into work quickly (Standing, 2002). 
52
 Active labour market programmes for unemployed workers and those on unemployment benefit can consist of job search assistance, 
labour market training, wage subsidies and direct job creation in the public sector.  
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employment and policies that place emphasis on human capital investment (Bonoli, 2010: 
436).  What distinguishes different activation regimes is the degree of and emphasis placed 
on human capital investment through the use of active labour market policies such as skills 
trainings. Should activation policies focus solely on job placement or should the focus be 
more on filling a gap in the skills set of an individual in order to assist a benefit recipient in 
finding a regular labour market placement?  
 
For European Union member states, since the launch of the Lisbon Strategy by the European 
Union in 1998, ‘activation’ has been at the fore of Commission social policy initiatives. 
Indeed, active labour market policies are central to the European Employment Strategy, 
which defines employment as one of the main objectives of a joint economic policy in the EU 
(Kluve, 2010). EU member states have integrated different types of ALMPs into their 
reforms which is part of an effect of Europeanization. Indeed, in addition to the regulation by 
the EU, ALMPs have been enthusiastically promoted and defined by international bodies 
such as the OECD (Clasen et al., 2001).  By the late 1980s and early 1990s, there was a 
noticeable shift within the OECD to distinguish between active labour market policies and 
passive benefits. Most influential was “The OECD Jobs Study” from 1994. The language in 
the report stressed that social insurance benefits were ‘passive’ because, it was believed, they 
did not encourage activity from people out of work; while training, retraining and 
employment services were seen as keeping people ‘active’ in their search for work (Sinfield, 
2001). Since the OECD Jobs Study, concern with disincentives and the ‘active’ vs.  ‘passive’ 
policy emphasis spread more widely to individual countries (Holzmann and Jørgensen, 
2000).
53
 
 
Although the Commission’s employment reports picked up the ‘active’ theme by the end of 
the 1980s, it was not until the early 1990s that social insurance benefits were being described 
as ‘passive’. With the publication of the Commission’s Employment in Europe 1995 report, 
the passive-to-active shift was made evident: “The effectiveness of employment policy must 
be increased by avoiding practices which are detrimental to the readiness to work, and by 
moving from a passive to an active labour market policy” (EC, 1995: 105, from Sinfield, 
2001). The European Employment Strategy (EES), established with the Amsterdam Treaty of 
                                                 
53As discussed in Chapter Two (section 2.3.1 and 2.3.2), it is important to note that the transition from ‘passive’ to ‘active’ social insurance 
policies is a matter of degree. Social insurance schemes were never completely provided without certain conditions attached to hasten the 
return to work, such as paid work, work tests and job search requirements (Clasen, 2004). Indeed in Britain, for example, under the original 
1911 unemployment benefit scheme, entitlement to benefit was predicated on meeting an ‘availability for work test’ that in many ways 
paved the way for tests applied to the current Jobseekers Allowance (JSA).    
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1998, encouraged member states to implement employment policies that improved 
employability, developed entrepreneurship, encouraged adaptability and promoted equal 
opportunities (Fleckenstein, 2011). The policy solutions recommended, such as ‘activation 
policies’, the reduction of non-wage labour costs, facilitating self-employment with the 
reduction of tax and social insurance burdens, are generally associated with the Third Way 
agenda of modernized social democracy (Fleckenstein, 2011: 129). 
 
Within Germany, initial enthusiasm for the EES echoed across the Red-Green government 
(1998-2005) down to civil servants at the Ministry of Labour who were ‘excited’ about the 
prospect of a new tool for improving labour market policy making. That said, Fleckenstein 
(2011) argues that the influence of the European Employment Strategy did not play a 
significant part in the making of the Hartz reforms.
54
 He cites two reasons for this. First, a 
lack of peer pressure which second, led to the European Employment Strategy not being 
picked up in parliamentary debates in the Budestag or the Bundesrat. Because of the non-
binding character of the Employment Guidelines,
55
 in order to create a platform for domestic 
change, the EES relies on its capacity to generate peer pressure (Fleckenstein, 2011). One 
avenue for putting pressure on policy makers is through Media coverage which can result in 
public awareness on a given issue. Here, Fleckenstein cites the sporadic media coverage of 
the EES which meant that peer pressure as a result of public awareness could not be assured. 
Coincidentally, the EES in Germany was barely picked up in parliamentary debates in the 
Bundestag and Bundesrat (Fleckenstein, 2011). Thus, the government did not have to worry 
about its reputation suffering by the general public when it ignored the Luxembourg Process 
in policy formation at the national level.
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3.2.1 Work-first or human capital development? 
 
In terms of the type of activation embedded in the policy design of welfare reform initiatives, 
the ALMPs offered unemployment benefit recipients hinge, to a degree, on the government’s 
objective for reform. As discussed on Chapter Two (section 2.4.1 and 2.4.2) the use of active 
                                                 
54 There are, naturally, divergent opinions on this issue. See for example Heidenreich and Bischoff (2008) who argue that the European 
Employment Strategy helped trigger active labour market reforms in Germany. 
55 In the absence of sanctions to ensure compliance, the Luxembourg Process is thus not a device for ‘obligated policy transfers’ (see 
Dolowitz, 2000). 
56 Regarding possible peer pressure by policy experts at the European level or pressure for compliance with the guidelines from the 
Commission, Fleckenstein’s findings did not give any indication that national policy-makers perceived any significant pressure from either 
that could have made them conform to the objectives set by the EES (Fleckenstein, 2011: 130). Though that said, he notes that the reforms 
proposed by Schröder’s government in 2002 were ultimately very similar in nature to those suggested in the ESS. 
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labour market policies prior to the Hartz reforms (specifically the fourth Hartz law) were 
principally used as human capital development mechanisms for those on unemployment 
insurance and to a lesser extent, those on unemployment assistance. As unemployment 
increased post Reunification, municipalities started to employ active labour market policies 
more as a work-first tool for the long-term unemployed (Buhr, 1994). Although the work-first 
and the human capital development model characterize most of mainstream active labour 
market schemes, they are nonetheless at odds with each other’s objectives. The human capital 
approach prioritizes the development of social attitudes and marketable skills that will enable 
individuals to find and retain suitable jobs (Peck and Theodore, 2001; Lødemel and Trickey, 
2001; Dean, 2003), whereas the work-first approach focuses less, if at all, on skills training 
and development and more on moving recipients into, often any type of, work quickly. 
According to job search theory, the aim of participation in further vocational training, 
provided as part of active labour market policies, is to expand the individual’s employment 
prospects by improving his or her skills, which in turn signals to potential employers their 
willingness to work. Indeed, participation in further vocational training is an investment in 
human capital (Calmfors, 1994; Mortensen, 1986). On the one hand, this investment could 
result in higher wages for the participant. The overall probability of dropping out of the 
labour market may decrease, job search efficiency may be enhanced, and in the end, training 
may also prevent social isolation (Raaum and Torp, 2002). There is a direct return on the 
investment made by the government for the individual and the economy (Becker, 1962).  But 
on the other hand, there is the issue of lock-in effects. The costs of human capital 
development may lower the present earnings potential of the participant because if the 
participant had not been spending time in the training, he or she could have been using that 
time to search and find a job (Becker 1962). Thus the time spent in further vocational 
training, it is argued, results in overall lower employment prospects than non-participants— 
they are locked-in the measure. While this lock-in effect is interpreted as negative in general, 
this is not the case if the programme leads to a vocational certificate. Obtaining such a 
certificate reduces the risk of repeat unemployment and results in a more stable employment 
career (Bernhard and Krupp, 2012). 
 
Based on an analysis of Germany’s (and the Netherlands') budget and composition of active 
labour market policies, the definition of suitable work and the use of sanctions, Bruttel and 
Sol (2006) conclude that while Germany’s current policies are a mixture of both models, 
ultimately they are a shift away from human capital development towards the work-first 
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model. Should this matter though? Is one model necessarily more successful at assisting 
recipients in finding work, short-or long-term? Or do UBII recipients at Jobcenters find 
themselves stuck between the demands of obtaining human capital, i.e., participating in a 
skills training and the demands of work-first, i.e., taking the first job made available to them? 
Dean (2004) argues that while the human capital approach does place emphasis on investing 
and developing a person’s skills through training, this is done both to provide a benefit for the 
wellbeing of the individual and the economy. But as he points out, the human capital 
approach fails to take into account the wider social context of the individual and how that 
effects a person’s ability to enter the labour market and maintain a job. “The metaphor 
‘human capital’—while affording a welcome emphasis on things that disabled people, for 
example, can do—is narrowly construed in terms of the productive potential of workers as 
economic actors, rather than the broader human capacities of citizens as social actors” (Dean, 
2003: 443).   
 
Moreover, as Noon (2002) points out, it was human capital theorists, such as Becker (1964) 
who argued that a person’s human capital will determine their value as an employee in a 
market economy. This places the burden of ‘choice’ squarely on the individual—the choice 
of an individual to increase their human capital through taking advantage of educational 
opportunities and skills trainings or not participating with the consequence of lowering his or 
her value in the labour market. The policy focus is too often on supply side policies at the 
expense of thinking about the value and need for demand side policies. As a result the 
responsibility for success in work lies with the individual rather than exploring the broader 
labour market context and trends in both the demand for and supply of the types of skills 
needed in the labour market (Noon, 2002; Sinfield, 2001). Moreover, Bruettel and Sol (2006) 
note that the work-first model contradicts the objective of quality in work, particularly in East 
Germany where one of the preconditions of a successful work-first strategy is a strong labour 
market, which is absent. In such an environment, increased job activity will yield few 
benefits. While the authors support elements of a work-first model, they argue that it is not 
enough simply to provide a stepping stone into work. Provisions must also be made to ensure 
that job placements are followed by on-the-job training. For Mick Carpenter et al. 
“the...problem with a human capital or a ‘work-first plus’ approach is that equalities measures 
are only seen as justifiable so long as they have an economic rationale consistent with current 
government policies. They therefore do not prioritize social or human rights considerations 
over economic considerations” (2007: 160-61). 
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The probability of finding a job depends on previous unemployment duration for several 
reasons not least among them the concern that long periods of unemployment result in a loss 
of human capital (Layard et al., 2005; Shimer, 2008; Bourdet and Persson, 1990). This results 
in a frustrating cycle where the duration of unemployment decreases the probability of 
finding a job. Blanchard and Diamond (1994) found that firms rank applications based on 
those who have been unemployed for the least amount of time. Indeed, firms use the duration 
of unemployment as a signal for the loss of human capital and productivity. Conversely, a 
jobseeker unemployed for only a short period of time has a much better chance for placement 
than a long-term unemployed jobseeker, even if the latter has higher formal qualifications. 
For Wolff and Jozwiak (2007) the fundamental question is whether short-term training 
programmes in classrooms or within companies effectively integrate the participants into the 
labour market in Germany. Their study estimated the effects within company and classroom 
training separately. They found that training programme participation that established contact 
with an employer had a considerable impact on the regular employment rate of the 
participants, more so than classroom training.  
 
Not only may human capital decline with longer unemployment duration, but also self-
esteem (Jahoda and Zeisel, 1933; Wulfgramm, 2011). The longer people are unemployed the 
less is their search intensity because they have faced frustrating experiences and they see their 
chances of being invited to an interview as rather low (Layard et al., 2005; Falk et al., 2006). 
Thus the unemployed search less for a job as they see the effort as futile. As a result of 
searching less, the job-finding probability of unemployed workers declines as the 
unemployment duration rises. Moreover, family and health restrictions prevent the long-term 
unemployed from finding a job because they are not necessarily able to work a full day 
(Thomsen, 2009). 
 
Moreover, after more than a decade of experience with work-first and workfare approaches, 
there is evidence that a work-first policy runs the risk of low job retention. Indeed, the high 
rate of ‘repeaters’ in the UK points to rather low sustainability of workfare strategies (Finn 
and Schulte, 2008). McKnight (2001) points out that the unemployed are more likely to find 
work in low-paid jobs than well-paid jobs and low-paid workers are more likely to experience 
unemployment than are higher-paid workers (see section 3.3.3 for a more detailed discussion 
on stepping stone effects). Thus, while work provides a means for individuals to improve 
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their income, due to the complex relationship between low-pay and poverty, a job may not be 
enough to lift a family previously on benefit out of poverty. While work-first programmes 
move the unemployed or non-employed into work, for those with few skills or work 
experience their job-options have the potential to result in a low-pay, low-skill trap 
(McKnight, 2001). 
 
Kluve (2010) conducted a meta-analysis on a comprehensive data set of 137 ALMP 
programme evaluations from 19 European countries. His intent was to explore how the 
different programme types designed for different target groups, taking into consideration the 
varied economic and institutional settings, succeeded at placing participants in employment. 
This analysis allowed for the identification of systematic patterns from the available cross-
country evidence on ALMP effectiveness. Kluve identified four main categories of ALMP 
that exist across European countries: 1. training measures;
57
 2. private sector incentive 
schemes, such as wage subsidies to private firms and start-up grants;
58
 3. direct employment 
programmes that take place in the public sector;
59
 and 4. services and sanctions, a category 
that consist of all measures aimed at increasing job search efficiency, such as counselling and 
monitoring, job search assistance and corresponding sanctions for noncompliance.
60
 The 
objective of this meta-analysis was to investigate ALMPs in Europe by correlating the 
effectiveness of the program on employment (the outcome variable). The variable was 
categorized as a trinomial outcome of whether the reported treatment effect on employment 
probability in a particular study was ‘significantly positive’, ‘significantly negative’ or 
‘insignificant’. A number of variables were used to try and explain variation in the treatment 
impact that included the program type; the research design; the institutional context; and the 
economic background in a country at the time the particular program was run (Kluve, 2010: 
905).   
 
                                                 
57 This category encompasses classroom training, on-the-job training and work experience. These courses can provided either a more general 
education (i.e., language courses, basic computer courses or other basis courses) or specific vocational skills (i.e., advanced computer 
courses or courses providing technical or manufacturing skills). “The main objective with this category of training is to enhance the 
productivity of the participants and to enhance human capital by increasing skills” (Kluve, 2010: 905).  
58 The objective of private sector incentive programmes is to change the employer and/or worker behaviour through creating incentives, the 
most prominent is wage subsidies. Here the objective is to subsidise (and thus encourage) employers to hire new workers or to maintain jobs 
that would otherwise be broken up. These subsidies can either be direct wage subsidies to employers or financial incentives to workers for a 
limited period of time. They frequently target the long-term and more disadvantaged unemployed.  
59
 This programme type focuses on the direct creation and provision of public works or other activities that produce public goods and 
services. These measures are typically targeted at the most disadvantaged with the aim of keeping them in contact with the labour market 
and to prevent further loss of human capital during a period of unemployment. That said, these types of jobs are jobs that are created in 
addition to and generally not close to the actual labour market.  
60
 These are programmes that aim to increase the efficiency of the job matching process.  
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Once the type of programme was taken into account, there seemed to be little systematic 
relationship between programme effectiveness, the macroeconomic environment and a 
variety of indicators for institutional features of the labour market. The main patterns to arise 
in the meta regression concerned programme type. Kluve found that traditional training 
programmes have a modest likelihood of generating a significant positive impact on post-
programme employment rates. Relative to training, both private sector incentive programmes 
and services and sanctions show significantly better performance—30 to 50 percentage points 
higher probability of estimating a significant positive impact than training programmes. On 
the other hand, evaluations of direct employment programmes were c. 25 percentage points 
less likely to estimate a significant positive impact on post-programme employment 
outcomes. Moreover, the researchers consistently found that programmes targeting youth 
were significantly less likely to be effective in terms of employment outcomes. Finally, it 
seemed to be the case that ALMP programmes were more likely to be effective when the 
unemployment rate was higher. Here the results are particularly robust for training 
programmes.   
 
3.3 The rise of atypical work in Germany 
 
Without question the labour market landscape has drastically changed since the induction of 
the ‘globalisation era’ (1975-2008) when neo-liberal economists and politicians worked 
together to create a global market economy based on competitiveness and individualism 
(Standing, 2011). In order to keep labour costs down and prevent the transfer of production 
elsewhere, many countries introduced ‘labour market flexibility’. Standing (2011) points out 
that ‘flexibility’ took many shapes from wage to employment to job and to skill flexibility. 
Moreover, in order to reduce unemployment rates while meeting the needs of an ever-
changing labour market landscape, flexicurity has been introduced as a way to make 
workplaces adaptable by offering more flexible contract arrangements. Here too flexicurity’s 
policy focus is to link cash benefits more firmly to labour market participation and/or training 
in an “effort to make social policy a ‘productive factor’” (Lewis and Plomien, 2009: 434). 
Indeed, it is a result of this restructuring of global capital and labour markets that Standing 
argues a new class of worker has emerged, known as the precariat (2011). Arguably a 
proportion of UBII recipients, including a high proportion of my sample, belong to the 
precariat—those who move from one short-term contract to the next, absent an employment 
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contract or the ability to contribute to social insurance, with little control over their skills 
development thus potentially making it difficult to use temporary work as a step into a better 
position. 
 
Among its European neighbours, Germany has become a country with a relatively high 
percentage of flexible ‘atypical’ employment forms that account for a quarter of its working 
age population (Schmid and Protsch, 2009).
61
 Analysing Microcensus data, the German 
Federal Statistics Office (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2010) found that between 1997 and 2007 
standard (regular) employment declined by 1.53 million jobs (8.5 percentage points) and 
atypical employment increased by 2.58 million.
62
 Overall, the total volume of hours worked 
remained stable, which meant that employment was being redistributed between a growing 
number of individuals (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2010). Ultimately Betzelt and Bothfeld 
(2011c) argue that the increase in ‘atypical’ employment after 2003 can be attributed in part 
to the different inquiry and extrapolation methods of the German Microcensus data and partly 
due to the Hartz reforms relying on ‘atypical’ employment to place recipients in work.  
 
In my opinion, within a relatively short period of time the degree of change in Germany’s 
employment patterns has been astonishing. The self-employed—those who are considered the 
least socially protected because they are not generally included in mandatory social insurance 
systems—increased by 13.3 percent between 1998 and 2008 (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2009). 
In terms of what type of work makes up the highest share of ‘atypical’ employment Betzelt 
and Bothfeld (2011c) note that part-time employment (up to 20 hours per week) is followed 
by marginal employment (mini-jobs with a monthly wage of €400 that are exempt from 
mandatory social insurance) and then fixed-term work. Indeed, the 2009 report by the Federal 
Statistics Office Niedrigeinkommen und Erwerbstätigkeit (Low Income and Employment) 
notes that by 2008 marginal employment more than doubled and temporary work even 
tripled, (though still remains at a modest level) while fixed-term contracts increased by 46 
percent. Important here is that there is considerable overlap between single atypical 
employment forms, especially between part-time, fixed-term and marginal employment. 
Using German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) data from 1991 to 2006 Vogel (2009)  found 
                                                 
61 Based on European Labour Force (Eurostat) data, atypical employment is defined as part-time work (<36), fixed-term contracts and solo 
self-employment (i.e., without employees) (Betzelt and Bothfeld, 2011c).   
62 Using Microcensus data from the period between 1985 and 2005 Oschmiansky (2007) found similar results. Using German Socio-
Economic-Panel (GSOEP) data, Brehmer and Seifert (2008) found that between 1997 and 2007, taking into account all part-time employees 
as ‘atypical’  (but not including the self-employed) the share of ‘atypical’ employment of total employment was 37 percent in 1997 and has 
since raised 12 percentage points.   
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that while the proportion of part-time employment has increased amongst male employees—
almost one in ten male employees is a part-time worker—women are the predominant part-
time employees where four out of five females work part-time. Indeed women aged 36 and 
older share an above average proportion of part-time employment. Furthermore employees 
age 55+ as well as labour market entrants have experienced a significant increase in the 
prevalence of part-time work. Yet, in the period of economic growth in 2007-2008, the 
number of regular employees grew even more than the still slightly increasing atypical 
employment. But in 2009 when the economic crisis hit the German labour market it was, not 
surprisingly, the atypical workers, especially the fixed-term and temporary-agency workers, 
who were the first to be dismissed (Betzelt and Bothfeld, 2011c).  
 
In Germany it is one’s age, skill-level and nationality that are indicators of the risk of being 
atypically employed. The deregulation of the employment contract—though at first glance 
appearing to affect a small portion of the young male core worker, but by high growth rates, 
actually, with the insight of a longitudinal perspective, affects certain social groups (also 
men) with long or frequent unemployment spells who are disproportionately more often 
affected by ‘atypical’ employment and low pay (Alda and Bartelheimer, 2008). Within the 
last decade, the share of atypical employment among people aged 15-25 years has nearly 
doubled, on account that entering into a job is typically preceded by periods of fixed-term 
employment (Betzelt and Bothfeld, 2011c).
63
 Those with low skills are the group most 
exposed to the risk of atypical employment (40 percent). Within this group, a high proportion 
of foreign workers from outside the EU are most often employed in non-standard forms of 
work because of their precarious legal status, their lack of work permits or due to language 
barriers. In the end, Betzelt and Bothfeld argue that taken together, this increase can be read 
as a “remarkable new trend towards destandardized employment” (2011c:110). 64 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
63 The interrelationship between sex and age is interesting. For men, the youngest (15-25) are affected three times more frequently than men 
in mid to older age groups. Whereas for women, the incident of atypical employment hardly differs across age groups (Statistisches 
Bundesamt, 2008: 17).  
64 Oschmiansky argues that the Hartz-Reforms target an expansion of low wage work and atypical employment forms and thus he explores 
how labour market policy promotion of atypical employment affects social security insurance and whether it contributes to the displacement 
or substitution of regular employment liable to social security benefits. Referencing the literature, he concludes that there are quite a few 
indications for a partial displacement of regular employment liable to social security benefits as a result of the promotion of atypical 
employment (Oschmiansky, 2007). 
67 
 
 
Table 3.1 Socio-demographic distribution of atypical employment, 1997-2007* 
 
*No comparable figures available for 2008 and 2009; X: no data available; Source: Betzelt and Bothfeld, 2011c 
 
3.3.1 Temporary work in Germany 
 
The use of temporary agency work has increased dramatically in most OECD countries over 
the past decade—a process that has been driven largely by incremental legislative changes 
starting in the 1970s that “eased regulations governing temporary agency employment while 
leaving almost unaltered legislation applying to the stock of workers employed under 
permanent contracts” (Antoni and Jahn, 2009: 227). Once one of the most heavily regulated 
in the OECD, the Federal Republic’s ongoing effort to liberalize its traditionally ‘rigid’ 
labour market regulations has resulted in a markedly changed labour market landscape. The 
gradual reform of the Labour Placement Act between 1972 and 2003 to allow for the use of 
temporary agency work contracts was one step of many in this direction. While the Labour 
Placement Act reforms have gone through a series of fits and starts between 1972 and 2003, 
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the end result is a German labour market that welcomes temporary agency work and, to a 
degree, relies on it to keep labour costs down while integrating the unemployed into the 
labour market in order to keep unemployment numbers low.
65
  
The theoretical impact of temporary agency employment on the employment outcomes of the 
unemployed is not clear. On the one hand, it can be argued that temporary work may improve 
a worker’s human capital while providing the worker with labour market contacts that can 
later lead to regular employment (Houseman et al., 2003; Jahn and Ochel, 2007). In this case, 
temporary agencies may reduce the time job-seekers spend looking for a new job and may 
facilitate rapid (re-)entry into regular employment—especially if client firms use temporary 
staffing arrangements to screen workers to fill open positions. On the other hand, it can be 
argued that any human capital effects arising from temporary work are not significant enough 
because of the primarily short-term, low-skilled nature of temporary jobs (Segal and Sullivan, 
1997). Temporary jobs often limit a worker’s regular employment prospects because they are 
dead-end jobs owing to the fact that firms usually have no plans to fill the position 
permanently and the job itself can tend to be beneath a worker’s qualifications (Heinrich et 
al., 2005). The very nature of temporary jobs designed to fill an employer’s short-term work 
needs means that the work completed is not intended to provide significant opportunities to 
develop productive job search networks and as a result it may even crowd out direct job 
searches, inhibiting longer-term labour market advancement (Jahn and Rosholm, 2010).
66
  
 
A study from Denmark, the US and Germany highlight different attempts made by 
researchers to capture the effect temporary work has had on labour market outcomes. While 
the empirical evidence is often contradictory (owing to the analysis of different data, 
                                                 
65 Antoni and Jahn analysed the gradual changes made to the Labour Placement Act between 1972 and 2003. They divided the nature of 
change into five ‘regimes’. Between 1972 to 1985 Germany first started to permit temporary agency employment but only on the basis of a 
permanent employment contract. The maximum period of temporary assignment was three months. The first regime was from May 1985 to 
1993 and here the maximum period a temporary contract could be assigned was extended from three to six months. The second regime took 
place between 1994 and 1997 where the government again extended the maximum assignment period for a temporary contract from six to 
nine months. For the first time temporary contracts actually became attractive to firms to hire temporary agency workers as a means of 
circumventing employment protection legislation and avoiding firing costs. However hiring a temporary worker was still expensive for the 
firm. The third regime took place between April 1997 and 2001 where the temporary contract assignment period was extended to 12 months. 
Temporary agencies were allowed to conclude fixed-term contracts which could be extended up to three times with total employment being 
up to 24 months. Perhaps the most important change during this period was that temporary agencies were allowed to dismiss the worker as 
soon as the assignment ended. The fourth regime was 2003 when the maximum assignment time was extended from 12 to 24 months. The 
amended Act made clear that temporary agency workers were entitled to the same remuneration and working conditions as comparable 
workers employed at the same firm. Finally, the fifth regime happened in 2004 where the reform of the Labour Placement Act permits a 
temporary agency to deviate from the principle of equal treatment if the conditions stipulated in a sectoral collective agreement apply to all 
temporary agency workers. As a consequence of this loophole, wage gaps between temporary and permanent staff of a user firm are 
permissible if the wages established in the user firm’s collective agreement are higher than those in the temporary industry’s collective 
agreement. This is permissible because the temporary agency is the legal employer of the temporary worker (Antoni and Jahn, 2009: 233-
234).  
66In addition, there is evidence that temporary agency workers more often receive arbitrary supervision, face higher labour turnover and are 
more likely to become unemployed (Houseman et al., 2003; Segal and Sullivan, 1997). 
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modelling techniques used, time periods explored and country-specific policies under review) 
the three studies cited below provide some insight into the type of questions asked and the 
complexity of the findings. First, researchers in Denmark conducted a comprehensive 
analysis of stepping-stone effects of temporary agency employment on unemployed workers 
in Denmark for the period 1997-2006. Using duration models and timing-of-events 
approach
67
 (time from becoming unemployed to finding a non-temporary job) they estimated 
the causal effects of temporary employment on finding regular work and whether temporary 
work affects post-unemployment job quality.
68
 They found no evidence of lock-in effects 
(i.e., while participating in a temporary job). On the contrary, estimating for heterogeneous 
effects revealed that for some groups, temporary employment even sped up the transition out 
of unemployment benefits. In addition, the researchers found that when examining these 
effects across individuals, first- and second-generation non-western immigrants and 
unemployed jobseekers with low educational backgrounds were those who benefited most 
from temporary work. The temporary work enabled this category of worker to improve their 
labour market career prospects by building up their human capital and enlarging their 
professional networks. In total, temporary jobs tended to improve subsequent job quality by 
increasing post-unemployment wages and longer post-unemployment job durations (Jahn and 
Rosholm, 2010).   
 
Heinrich et al. (2005) drew on administrative data from Missouri and North Carolina’s 
records to administer the states’ federal welfare programme (Temporary Assistance for 
Needy Families (TANF)) coupled with data on all employment covered by unemployment 
insurance to analyse who among TANF recipients takes up temporary agency work and what 
the consequences were for their labour market outcomes compared to those TANF recipients 
hired directly by the firms they work for.
69
 Their results confirm earlier findings by Segal and 
Sullivan (1997) that TANF recipients in temporary jobs receive lower earnings and have 
                                                 
67 The timing-of-events approach takes selection based on observed and unobserved heterogeneity into account. They use this approach to 
model the in-treatment effect and post-treatment effect of taking a temporary agency job during a phase of unemployment (Jahn and 
Rosholm, 2010).  
68 Being employed by a temporary agency during a spell of unemployment is the treatment. Jahn and Rosholm then estimate the effect of 
this treatment on the exit rate from unemployment to employment, both during and after the treatment. The empirical analysis is based on 
two sets of Danish register data. The primary data set is an extract from a matched employer-employee data set. The data set is compiled 
from a variety of sources maintained by Statistics Denmark. To this, Jahn and Rosholm match additional socio-economic information 
available from the Integrated Database for Labour Market Research (2010: 16).  
69 The analysis examines cash recipients in the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)—the program prior to the reform in which 
AFDC became Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) in 1996. The sample consists of all AFDC/TANF recipients in Missouri 
during 1993 and 1997; the sample of North Carolina is for 1997. Heinrich et al. use a multinomial logit model to examine how differences in 
individual characteristics and past welfare and employment experience affect the probability of working in a temporary job relative to either 
not working at all or working for a firm in an alternative industry. They compare the earnings, earnings growth and patterns of AFDC/TANF 
receipt of recipients who work for temporary service firms with those of recipients who either do not have jobs or have jobs with end-user 
firms, controlling for individual characteristics (2005: 154). 
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poorer prospects for moving off of TANF into regular work than those who have non-
temporary jobs. However, once the researchers controlled for individual characteristics, they 
found that although recipients who worked for temporary help agencies have lower initial 
wages than those with jobs in other sectors, they experience fast subsequent wage growth. 
Indeed two years later, earnings for temporary agency workers increased faster than those in 
other industries. Thus, they concluded that temporary agency workers have better future 
prospects than those who are unemployed on TANF. Indeed their analysis suggests that 
temporary agency work provides a route to work with ultimately higher pay and greater 
stability (Heinrich et al., 2005).  
 
Using an extended version of the IAB Employment Sample (IABS),
70
 Antoni and Jahn 
estimated a mixed proportional hazard rate model in order to examine how the reforms to 
liberalize temporary agency work in Germany effected employment duration in temporary 
agency jobs.
71
 The objective of the research is to provide empirical evidence on the job tenure 
of temporary work and the factors that influence their employment duration. Antoni and Jahn 
(2009) found that job turnover in the temporary work sector was indeed remarkably high in 
addition to employment in temporary help agencies usually being a brief episode in workers’ 
employment histories. Temporary work offers employment options, particularly for male 
workers and disadvantaged groups (poorly qualified workers, unemployed persons, migrants, 
and young workers). Moreover, and as predicted by the researchers, the legislative changes 
made to allow for firms increased use of temporary help workers coincided with the rise in 
firms using temporary workers over time. Finally, a workers previous employment status had 
a significant effect on their temporary employment duration. Those workers who were 
previously workless left their temporary jobs much more quickly than workers who came 
from employment or unemployment. In addition, the exit rates out of temporary agency 
employment were very high for workers with relatively weak labour market position, such as 
non-German workers, low-skilled workers with little education and those aged 25 and below. 
                                                 
70 The IABS is a 2% random sample of all employees registered by the social security system at least once during the sample period. Spells 
during which workers received unemployment benefits, unemployment assistance or a maintenance allowance were added to the sample. 
Due to the administrative nature of the IABS, the longitudinal information on the employment and unemployment history of individuals is 
exact to the day. The records are used to compute the social security contributions paid by the employer and the unemployment benefits paid 
by the Public Employment Service. Thus, these data sets are likely to contain fewer measurement errors than survey data. The inflow sample 
is restricted to 1980 to 2003 with censoring on December 2004, allowing the researchers to investigate and compare the effects of the five 
reforms between 1985 and 2003. Focus is limited to employees aged 15 to 64 in West Germany owing to the effects of 1985-1990 only 
being available for West German workers.  
71 The researchers compare and explore the effects of five reforms between 1985 and 2003. Due to the division of Germany, information on 
East Germany was only available from 1992 onwards. Analysis is limited to workers between 15 and 65 and the data only distinguishes 
between part- and full-time work. Information on the number of hours and thus hourly wages is not available. They thus drop part-time 
employees, interns, home workers and mini-jobs. They argue that since temp jobs are rarely part-time or second jobs, that this should thus 
not affect their results.    
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Overall Anoni and Jahn (2009) found that only a small fraction of temporary workers were 
able to gain work experience and improve their labour market networks through temporary 
agency work. 
 
3.3.2 The rise of low-wage work in Germany 
 
In addition to the rising labour market insecurity that has resulted from an increase in 
atypical, temporary work, the Federal Republic’s deregulation strategy has resulted in the 
creation of an ever steadily but persistently growing low-wage sector. Using GSOEP data, 
Kalina and Weinkopf (2010) found that in 2008, 6.55 million people or 20.7 percent of total 
employment fell into the low-wage sector (an increase of 2.3 million since 1998) with an 
average nominal hourly wage of €7.09 in West and €5.18 in East Germany (2010: 8).72 The 
average nominal low-wage stagnated within the last years such that the real wages of 2008 in 
the low-wage sector were even below the level of 1995 (Kalina and Weinkopf, 2010). For 
Betzelt and Bothfeld “this strikingly illustrates the trend of ‘fraying’ wages at the lower end 
in a country without a minimum wage” (2011: 112).73 Indeed 71.9 per cent of low-waged 
employment in Germany is at a medium skills-level, located mostly in the services sector 
with 69.2 per cent of the work done by women (Kalina and Weinkopf, 2010). Employment 
instability is twice as high for atypical workers compared to regular employees where 33.8 
per cent of atypical workers earned less than two-thirds of median income which was only 
true for 9.5 per cent of regular employees (Brehmer and Seifert, 2008). Drawing on 
Microscensus data, 99 per cent of regular workers earn their living mainly from their job, 
while this is only true for 70 per cent of atypical workers (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2008: 
21). A crucial point here is that low-waged employment is one of the major reasons for a 
steep increase in recent years of UBII recipients who work, often fulltime, but still need to 
receive wage top-up—the so-called ‘supplementers’ or Aufstocker—making up 27.4 per cent 
or 1.31 million of all UBII recipients, about half of which work in a ‘mini-job’ (Statistik der 
Bundesagentur für Arbeit, 2010: 4).   
 
 
                                                 
72According to Grimshaw (2011) the most commonly used definition of low pay is a level equivalent to two-thirds of the median wage for 
all employees in the economy. This has become a standard benchmark following its use in OECD reports. Kalina and Weinkopf’s (2010) 
analysis uses the same definition for low pay.  
73 The extremely low wages in East Germany are partly due to a lack of collective wage agreements or because of very low, but collectively 
agreed on, wage levels (for example, for many female-dominated occupations) (Kalina and Weinkopf, 2010).   
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Figure 3.1 Trends and patterns in the incidence of low-wage work in the United States and five European 
countriesª, 1973-2005 (low pay is defined as two-thirds of median earnings for all employeesᵇ) 
 
Notes: a. National data sources for all six countries, with additional OECD data for France (dotted line). b. All 
employees are covered, except for Germany and the OECD data for France, which only cover full-time 
employees (Mason and Salverda, 2010).  
 
 
Figure 3.2 Percent of low-wage employees—distinguishing between East- and West Germany (including 
part-time and mini-jobs in %) 
 
Source: SOEP 2008 (Kalina and Weinkopf, 2010) 
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3.3.3 Evidence on whether low-paid jobs act as a stepping stone to better [paid] jobs 
 
Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998) argue that European, as opposed to US labour markets, are 
more vulnerable to recessions because generous unemployment benefits reduce incentives for 
laid-off workers to quickly accept jobs with lower wages than those of their previous jobs. In 
time of economic crises, the argument goes, the number of ‘good jobs’ with high wages is 
limited and increased reservation wages of laid-off workers leads to long-term 
unemployment, a factor producing a significant loss of human capital. By taking up a low-
paid job instead of waiting for a well-paid job, unemployed individuals could shorten 
unemployment duration and thereby avert scarring effects associated with unemployment 
(Ljungqvist and Sargent, 1998). On the other hand, Marimon and Zilibotti (1999) point out 
that searching for the ‘right’ job match during unemployment may have positive returns such 
as reducing job mismatch. “Unemployment benefits provide a ‘search subsidy’ for giving the 
unemployed time to find, not just a job, but the right job. Thus, in a labour market with 
search frictions, unemployment benefits tend to reduce job mismatch” (Burdett, 1979 from 
Marimon and Zilibotti, 1999: 267).
74
 
 
The fundamental question then is whether a low-wage job, or a job beneath one’s skill level, 
ultimately provides a stepping stone to something better, i.e., better pay and/or a better 
position, or whether it is at best an improvement over unemployment. Here the thinking is 
that unemployment generally leads to a loss of human capital and/or to negative signalling 
effects which increases the probability of facing unemployment or low-wage employment in 
the future (Lockwood, 1991). Transitions costs (i.e., the cost of the job search) may reduce 
the likelihood that workers will take up a new job and the incidences of non-employment 
may also alter preferences (Hyslop, 1999). Individuals who experience an episode of non-
employment may place a higher value on leisure and a lower value on wages and 
consumption than in the past. As a consequence individuals could reduce labour supply and 
raise reservation wages (Hotz et al., 1998). Thus, the thinking is that taking up a low-wage 
job is better than not working at all. Indeed there is evidence that seems to support this 
assertion. Drawing on GSOEP data, Uhlendorff (2006) analysed low pay and non-
employment dynamics of men age 20 to 55 in West Germany between 1998 and 2003. 
                                                 
74 Marimon and Zilibotti (1999) go on to point out that unemployed workers without a ‘safety net’ might accept unsuitable jobs and become 
a part of the ‘working poor’. When this safety net is too high, however, workers become too selective, and reject matches which would have 
been socially efficient and expedient to accept. 
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Uhlendorff estimated a dynamic multinomial logit model with random effects and his results 
suggest that there exists a strong link between low pay and no pay.  Compared to high paid 
workers not employed, individuals have a higher probability to be low paid in the future and 
vice versa. Uhlendorff argues that there is some evidence that low-wage jobs are stepping 
stones to better jobs and no evidence that being low paid does have any adverse effects on 
future employment prospects if it is compared with non-employment. Even though a low-
wage job reduces the chance to move into a high-wage job for German men and increases the 
risk of non-employment in the future, the employment prospects of low-wage earners are still 
better than the prospects of individuals who are unemployed. “Despite this clear evidence for 
a ‘low pay-no pay cycle’, compared to non-employment low-wage jobs increase the 
probability of being employed in the future and low pay seems to lead to higher paid jobs” 
(Uhlendorff, 2006: 4).  
 
Using GSOEP data Mosthaf et al. (2009) investigated labour market dynamics of West 
German women between the ages of 20 and 55 from 2000 through 2006.
75
 They estimate 
dynamic multinomial logit models with random effects in order to analyse the effect of the 
experience of low-wage employment on future employment prospects for women in West 
Germany. They found that being in a low-wage job reduces future employment prospects of 
German women by increasing the probability of being low-paid and decreasing the chances 
of being high-paid in the future. This effect was most profound for low-paid women working 
part-time. However, future wage prospects were better for low-paid women than for 
unemployed and inactive women, especially when they have full-time jobs. Indeed, the 
evidence suggests that being unemployed or inactive leads to a stronger decline in the 
probability of getting a high-paid job than being low-paid and to a higher probability of 
becoming unemployed or inactive again. Thus taking the evidence into consideration, the 
authors argue that “for women, low-wage jobs can serve as stepping stones out of 
unemployment and are to be preferred to staying unemployed and waiting for a better job” 
(Mosthaf et al., 2009: 15).   
 
Andreas Knabe and Alexander Plum (2010) examined whether low-paid jobs have an effect 
on the occupational advancement probability of unemployed individuals in West Germany to 
                                                 
75 For the analysis the authors constructed four mutually exclusive labour market states: high-wage employment, low-wage employment 
(distinguishing further between full- and part-time work), unemployment and inactivity. In order to take into account the business cycle, 
they added data from the Federal Employment Agency about monthly unemployment rates at the month of the GSOEP interview. Low pay 
is defined as earning less than two-thirds of the median hourly gross wage.   
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obtain better paid jobs in the future (i.e., the stepping stone effect). Drawing on GSOEP data 
for the years 1998 to 2007, Knabe and Plum apply a dynamic random effects probit model 
that takes potential endogeneity of the initial period and time-invariant individual effects into 
account when analysing whether a low-wage job improved the chances of unemployed 
persons being able to obtain better-paid jobs in the future.
76
 The results suggest that 
individuals in low-paid jobs generally have a significantly higher chance of moving into a 
higher paid position compared to an unemployed person. With the assistance of interaction 
terms, Knabe and Plum tested the heterogeneity of this stepping stone effect to determine 
which groups benefit most from low-paid jobs in terms of increasing their chances of moving 
into a higher paid position. Here they found that the ‘stepping-stone effect’ was particularly 
strong for people with low or intermediate levels of education, for those who have been 
unemployed for longer periods of time and if the low-wage job was associated with a 
relatively high social status. They thus concluded that low-paid jobs do not result in a 
‘poverty trap’. Indeed, such jobs provided a ‘stepping stone’ to better jobs compared to being 
unemployed. Following on the findings from Knabe and Plum’s analysis, Mosthaf (2011) 
took the effect heterogeneity into account and hypothesized that the negative signals of low-
paid jobs are stronger for individuals with high qualifications than those with low or no 
qualifications compared to those without a job.
77
 For low-qualified workers he found that 
low-wage jobs clearly incur weaker scaring effects compared to non-employment. However 
for high-qualified workers, low-wage employment is associated with negative signals and 
thus reduces the chances to move into a high-paid job in the future as much as non-
employment (Mosthaf, 2011).  Thus his results concur what other studies have found, namely 
that low-wage jobs serve as stepping stones to better-paid jobs for individuals without 
vocational training and/or without an Abitur (secondary school degree).  
 
Grün et al. (2011) researched persons entering low-paid jobs out of unemployment in 
Germany and Austria.
78
 They explored if, and for whom, low-paid jobs served as a stepping 
                                                 
76Knabe and Plum (2010) defined low-paid jobs as individuals earning less than two-thirds of the median gross hourly wage. To obtain a 
more differentiated picture of the stepping-stone effect, they conducted separate analyses for men and women and for two different time 
periods (1998-2002 and 2002-2007). 
77 Mosthaf’s study uses data from the German Integrated Employment Biographies Sample (IEBS). The analysis is restricted to West 
Germany because at the time the study was conducted, labour market conditions still varied considerably between East and West. He 
applied dynamic multinomial logit models with random effects which control for the problem of initial conditions and include interaction 
terms of the lagged labour market state allowing him to measure heterogeneity in state dependence (i.e., how labour market history affects 
current labour market success) in low-wage employment and non-employment with respect to qualifications. A panel dataset was 
constructed with yearly observations between 2000 and 2006 in order to analyse yearly transitions between high-wage and low-wage 
employment and non-employment.  
78This study analysed both Germany and Austria. For Germany they used the 1975-2004 version of the IAB Employment Sample containing 
information on the employment history (including wages) of employees liable to social security on a daily basis. For Austria, they use a 
similar dataset based on social insurance data, offering detailed longitudinal and cross-sectional information for dependent employment 
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stone to better-paid jobs and whether they provided a step towards stable integration into the 
regular labour market or resulted in a quick return to unemployment.
79
 At the aggregate level, 
Grün et al.’s research showed that low-wage earners face a higher risk of getting trapped in a 
low-pay, no-pay cycle since the chance of becoming unemployed at a later point in time is 
much higher for people in low-wage jobs. However, low-wage jobs still seem to offer better 
labour market prospects compared to being unemployed. The baseline hazard of becoming 
unemployed is again higher for low-than for higher-wage spells in both countries. But they 
found that even more high-wage spells end in unemployment in the medium term which 
would seem that the findings contradict themselves. Yet, this contradiction can be explained 
by longer durations of higher-wage spells and therefore Grün et al. (2011) argue that there is 
no convincing evidence for a distinct low-pay, no-pay cycle since movement between higher-
pay and no-pay also seem to be of great relevance. 
 
Research out of the UK by Stewart (2007) examined the extent of state dependence (i.e., the 
lack of new human capital acquired during a spell of unemployment and the effect of adverse 
signalling) in individual unemployment and the role low-wage employment plays. Stewart 
modelled the probabilities of unemployment and low pay using dynamic random effects 
probit regressions for each process controlling for endogenous initial conditions. Using data 
from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) waves 1-6 (1991-1996),
80
 he found that the 
chances of becoming low paid were significantly more likely for unemployed individuals 
than for high-paid employees.
81
 Among employed individuals, the chances of entering 
unemployment were larger for individuals who had low-paid rather than high-paid jobs. 
Crucially here, there was also evidence that low pay acted as a conduit to repeat 
unemployment: unemployed individuals who found a low-paid job were more likely to fall 
back into unemployment than those who found a high-paid job (Stewart, 2007). For Stewart, 
                                                                                                                                                        
spells and unemployment spells. The German data do not include those self-employed or who are civil servants and only employees who are 
liable to social security contributions. In addition, when people are unemployed, they can only be ‘observed’ if they are registered 
unemployed and receiving unemployment benefit. Finally, IABS data only distinguishes between full- and part-time workers, but do not 
contain information on working hours. Thus this analysis uses information on West German full-time workers between 18 and 60 years of 
age. Low wage is calculated as two-thirds of the median wage for each year between 1998 and 2004. The researchers then construct a 
sample of low-wage spells starting out of unemployment during this period. For Austria, they do this for the period 1998-2003. In order to 
reduce heterogeneity of the sample, the sample for Austria only includes men between the age of 25 and 54 at the time of inflow.   
79 Results are compared against a third possibility: persistence of low-wage employment. Persisting in a low-wage job at least provides for 
employment integration and may be appropriate for persons with low-skills and productivity potential. However this is less the case for high 
skilled workers. Moreover the income levels remain low, in many cases not much above preceding unemployment related benefits. 
Nonetheless, both upwards mobility and persistence in low-wage employment can be considered as employment integration (Grün et al., 
2011).  
80 The sample used is restricted to those aged between 18 and 65 for men and 60 for women (age of state retirement) and excludes full-time 
students.   
81 Hales’ et al., (2003) research on the UK Employment Zones found that there were few opportunities for those in work to progress toward 
better jobs within the organization where they obtained their first job. Those who lost their jobs tended to revert to unemployment rather 
than their previous ‘employability’ enabling them to make a more rapid return to work. 
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the results suggest “that not all jobs are ‘good’ jobs” (2007: 529). In terms of improving 
future prospects, low-wage jobs do not typically lead on to a better position or pay.  
 
Following Stewart’s (2007) work, Cappellari and Jenkins (2008) provide evidence about 
labour market transitions for British men. Using BHPS data from 1991-2000 (waves 1 to 10), 
they modelled annual transitions between unemployment and low- and high-paid 
employment using a first order Markov model that allows for interrelationships between the 
dynamics of low pay and unemployment to be analysed. In addition, they took into account 
three potentially endogenous selection processes: initial conditions in low-paid employment, 
selection into employment and panel attrition.
82
 They found that controlling for observed and 
unobserved individual heterogeneity, there is some evidence of labour market scarring 
effects, but they operate across labour market states as well as within them. “For example, the 
probability of a man having a low-paid job in one year depends not only on whether he had a 
job a year before but also whether that job was low paid. The probability of his being 
employed at all depends on whether he had a job the previous year” (Cappellari and Jenkins, 
2007: 59). Generally there appears to be a real state dependence effect that helps to determine 
men’s chances of being low-paid or unemployed. Thus from a policy perspective Cappellari 
and Jenkins point out that “policies targeted on unemployed men may reduce the chances of 
being low-paid once they get a job, and measures designed to raise the earnings potential of 
the low-paid may also reduce their chances of becoming unemployed in the future” (2007: 
78).  
  
Taking into account the variation in findings that, to a large extent, arise out of different 
levels of abstraction, the relevance of the albeit very limited review of the evidence on 
stepping stone effects rest in the concern with the experiences of those individuals for whom 
low paid jobs have not ended up being a stepping stone to a better position and/or higher pay. 
If indeed, as some of the evidence is suggesting, low-wage jobs do not necessarily act as a 
stepping stone to a better paid job compared to being unemployed, then policies that 
encourage exit from unemployment benefit will have little impact so long as being in receipt 
of benefit is a consequence of the recipients’ individual and not structural characteristics. In 
                                                 
82 Cappellari and Jenkins work differs from Stewart’s (2007) in two ways: Stewart also has modelled low-pay dynamics using random 
effects dynamic panel models. But in these models, “estimation is based on a wave-by-wave sequence of observations starting at the first 
panel wave, with each followed until panel drop-outs, so that individuals joining the panel subsequently are not included, and nor are 
individuals who return to the panel after one or more non-response waves—thus excludes a relatively large number of cases. By contrast our 
[Cappellari and Jenkins] approach includes panel joiners and those with incomplete panel participation patters” (Cappellari and Jenkins, 
2008: 59). Secondly, their approach allows regressors to have different impacts on the outcome variable depending on outcomes in the 
previous period.    
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other words, activation policies such as job creation schemes and wage subsidies will have 
little impact on benefit recipients’ long-term unemployment status. But if a low-wage job can 
act as a stepping stone to a higher paid and/or a more permanent position—in other words, 
being on unemployment benefit increases the probability of future benefit receipt—then 
activation policies that either prevent entry or expedite exit from unemployment benefit can 
potentially have a lasting effect on reducing benefit dependency. Here the prevention of an 
initial unemployment experience becomes an important policy objective, in which case a 
possible policy response would be to focus on education and training mechanisms.  This is 
the argument from a theoretical perspective. Given that a high proportion of the sample for 
this study have indeed experienced periods of unemployment followed by periods of low-
wage jobs, the debate both contextualises and has salience for their experience.  
 
3.4 Research on the impact and effectiveness of the Hartz IV reforms 
 
Heretofore government, academics, and analysts have evaluated many aspects of Hartz IV 
reforms. The Institute for Employment Research (IAB), the Research Institute of the Federal 
Employment Agency, is one of the leading research institutes to conduct Hartz IV 
programme evaluations in addition to a wide range of other types of labour market analysis. 
Their findings are integral and directly inform the government, policy makers and the public 
about what works, what does not work and at what cost. Yet, as a review of the IAB’s 
research shows, they rely heavily on the analysis of administrative and survey data, using 
propensity score matching techniques as a non-experimental impact estimator to evaluate the 
Hartz programmes. In the absence of being able to conduct random assignment experiments, 
generally viewed as the most robust means of estimating programme effects, propensity score 
matching techniques allow an evaluation of policy to determine whether the introduction of 
new programmes influence the outcomes of employment and earnings for those subject to the 
policy change (Bryson et al., 2002). Yet, when stepping back from the IAB’s findings on the 
effectiveness of the Hartz reforms, other studies (including this one) that ask different types 
of questions  and employ a wider range of research methods provide a more nuanced picture 
of the impact the reforms have had on UBII recipients ability to find work and move off of 
benefit. Indeed, the development of new research—mainly qualitative—has brought to light 
the unintended consequences of the Hartz reforms, such as for the working poor, poverty and 
social exclusion. Göckler (2010), for example, uncovered the discrimination and exclusion of 
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people with special needs. While the results of the quantitative evaluations demonstrate 
positive treatment effects for at least some sub-groups, the heterogeneity of the findings (as 
will be discussed below) indicate that variation in results is dependent on a multitude of 
factors, including the method of analysis used, the investigation period and the underlying 
dataset, not to mention the timing and scale of focus (national versus local). The challenge for 
policy makers is not to jump to conclusions based on the limited evidence that active labour 
market policy interventions such as skills training and job placement ‘work’. Thus, alongside 
the findings highlighted below, it is equally important to explore a wider set of research 
questions using qualitative and quantitative methods in order to understand what policy 
‘success’ means and for whom.  
 
Although the goal of improving employability as part of active labour market policies is 
broadly discussed and deeply embedded on a programmatic level of active labour market 
policy, changes in employment status as a result of ALMP intervention has been less 
frequently analysed empirically. That said there are key studies that evaluate the effect active 
labour market policies have on integrating UBII recipients into the labour market. The 
Federal Ministry for Labour and Social Affairs (Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales) 
commissioned the IAB to conduct a progress report on the effectiveness of the active labour 
policy mechanisms—specifically the Maßnahme (skills training)—available to UBI and UBII 
recipients. The report synthesized all the evidence prior to 2011 that explored whether 
participation in a skills training resulted in entering unsubsidized regular employment (the 
outcome variable) (BMAS, 2011).
83
 The studies reviewed drew on administrative data 
collected by the Federal Employment Agency that used propensity score matching techniques 
to compared recipients not placed in a skills training (the non-treated population) to those 
recipients who were (the treated population). The skills trainings designed to improve the 
chances of integration into the labour market (die Maßnahmen zur Verbesserung der 
Eingliederungchancen) are divided into three groups: Job placement voucher for a third party 
provider;
84
 short-term trainings (maximum of 12 weeks long) that are meant to be small 
                                                 
83 The report was published both by the Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales entitled “Sachstandsbericht der Evaluation der 
Instrumente” (2011) who commissioned the report from the IAB. The IAB subsequently published the same findings under Gerd Heyer et 
al. (2011) “Evaluation der aktiven Arbeitsmarktpolitik. Ein Sachstandsbericht für die Instrumentenreform.”  IAB Discussion Paper 17/2011. 
84 First researchers reviewed studies using propensity score matching techniques that evaluated the net effect of job placement vouchers to 
third party placement organizations and the probability of entering unsubsidized employment twelve months after the issue of the voucher 
between 2003 and 2005 (Dann et al., 2005; Hujer and Zeiss, 2005; Kruppe 2006; Pfeiffer and Winterhager, 2006). Taken together, for this 
set of studies they found a tendency for a positive effect of the voucher (Heyer et al., 2011). For every 100 vouchers issued, five to six 
successful placements were on account of the voucher. However, some employment found on account of the voucher was on average shorter 
than other employment placements, which could possibly because of deadweight loss.  Second, Heyer et al. (2011) reviewed a Hartz 
evaluation conducted by the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (2006). Here they differentiated between subsidized and unsubsidized 
employment and thus measured the effect vouchers had four months from it being issued on entering regular unsubsidized employment. The 
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additional qualifications to assist in labour market entry; and skills training for advanced 
education or vocational training.
85
   
 
For a review of the evidence on short-term trainings (maximum of 12 weeks long) the IAB 
progress report explored a series of studies. Using administrative data from municipalities, a 
study by Boockmann et al. (2008) explored access to trainings in November and December of 
2006. The study evaluated short-term trainings but did not take the different types of trainings 
into account and showed overall an insignificant effect on labour market entry for the treated 
compared to the untreated population. Yet studies by Wolff and Jozwiak (2007), Hartig et al. 
(2008), Kopf (2009) and Kopf and Wolff (2009) that differentiated between different types of 
short-term trainings and their content found positive effects for the treated population. Using 
propensity score matching technique these studies measured the effect the training had on 
UBII recipients entering unsubsidized employment in the first quarter of 2005. Taken 
together the findings for short-term skills trainings provided to UBII recipients show positive 
integration into unsubsidized work effects. When difference in training types was taken into 
account—differentiating between CV training, aptitude tests, training within firms, 
knowledge brokering trainings and training combinations—the IAB studies (Wolff and 
Jozwiak, 2007; Hartig et al., 2008; Kopf, 2009; Kopf and Wolff, 2009) measured UBII 
recipients who entered one of the trainings at the beginning of 2005. The studies explored the 
effect of the trainings up to 28 months after the start of the training. The findings suggest that 
the effect of participating in a training within a company is differentiated by age, migration 
status and the length of prior unemployment as well as the status of the local labour market. 
For those under 25, the integration into the labour market effect was several percentage 
points lower than if a participant was over 25. Short-term trainings that focused on CV and 
knowledge brokering had the most positive effect on labour market integration—the 
probability that one would enter the unsubsidized labour market was 3 to 4.5 percentage 
points higher up to 28 months compared to the untreated population. This was followed by 
                                                                                                                                                        
findings suggest that individuals who were on average unemployed for nine months and received a voucher valued at €2,500.00 profited less 
from the voucher compared to the short-term unemployed (less than three months) who received a voucher of lesser value. Men profited on 
average somewhat more than women. Finally, researchers reviewed the study by Bernhard and Kruppe (2010). They explored who among 
the unemployed received the voucher and the subsequent whereabouts of UBI and UBII recipients six months after they were issued the 
voucher between 2004 and 2007. Here it was not about the net effect rather they analysed the character traits of individuals who did and not 
receive vouchers and compared that to their success rate of finding regular unsubsidized work. Bernhard and Kruppe (2010) found that 
vouchers were issued to UBI and UBII recipients who had better chances of entering the regular labour market. Unemployed East Germans 
have a higher probability of receiving a voucher than West Germans as well as to find a job with the assistance of the voucher. UBII 
recipients compared to UBI recipients have a lower probability of remaining at their job for a minimum of six months after they have used 
their voucher (Heyer et al., 2011).      
85 Those in receipt of Unemployment Benefit I have a legal claim to a third party job placement voucher after two months of being 
unemployed whereas those in receipt of Unemployment Benefit II do not have that same claim. Instead the instrument is optional and used 
at the discretion of the Jobcenter.  
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aptitude tests and combination trainings. However, after the 28 month observation period 
ended, researchers could not conclude that there were statistically significance effects from 
CV training on integrating participants in the unsubsidized regular labour market (Heyer et al, 
2011).  
 
Drawing on administrative data
86
 between February and April 2005
87
 from the IAB using 
propensity score matching technique to construct a comparison group, with finding an 
unsubsidized job as the outcome variable, Bernhard and Kruppe (2012) found positive effects 
for UBII recipients who participated in educational or vocational training. The empirical 
findings are consistent with hypotheses derived from human capital theory (Becker, 1962). 
Owing to the lock-in effect, as long as the vocational training lasts, participants have lower 
chances of finding employment—but this effect can nonetheless be interpreted as a phase of 
investment in the recipient’s human capital. After the vocational training is finished, 
participants gained up to 13 percentage points higher employment prospects and up to 10 
percentage points lower receipt of benefit than non-participants (Bernhard and Kruppe, 
2012). Their findings on the effect vocational training programmes have on recipients finding 
work in Germany are in line with results from earlier evaluations (Stephan, 2008; Biewen et 
al., 2007; Rinne et al., 2011). Taking into account the effects of vocational training for groups 
differentiated by age, sex, migration status, skills, length of training, duration since the end of 
the last job and differences between East and West Germany, Bernhard and Kruppe (2012) 
found that more disadvantaged groups benefit from participation in further vocational 
training to pretty much the same degree as less disadvantaged groups. This applies to 
migrants, the elderly and individuals without qualifications and/or those unemployed for a 
long period of time. Thus Bernhard and Kruppe (2012) argue that if more disadvantaged 
groups were comprehensively encouraged to participate in further vocational training, the 
effect would not decrease. It would instead generate opportunities for more disadvantaged 
groups to gain from further vocational training. From an equal opportunities perspective, they 
argue that more disadvantaged groups should take part in and be offered expanded 
opportunities to participate in vocational skills training in order to increase their labour 
market opportunities.      
 
                                                 
86 The Integrated Employment Biographies dataset from the IAB. 
87 The treatment group consists of all registered UBII recipients on January 31, 2005 and who started further vocational training between 
February and April 2005. The control group consist of a 20 percent random sample of the stock of unemployed receiving UBII on January 
31, 2005. The control group did not start future vocational training between February and April 2005, but they could have participated later 
on.  
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Through an operationalization of employability, Brussig et al. (2010) analysed whether UBII 
recipients become more employable over time as a result of ALMP interventions.
88
 Overall 
the findings suggest that individual employability and more so, the individual dimensions of 
employability, can be influenced through ALMPs. Indeed those ALMP instruments that place 
a value on in-business internships result in a significant improvement for individual 
employability. Qualification related skills trainings improve employability in two 
dimensions: individual resources and the willingness to make job concessions. But they do 
not significantly increase the total index of employability. Moreover, segmentation of 
recipients into specialized training placements improved their qualifications and competence 
and thus their employability. In this context, it could mean that tailoring skills training to an 
individual’s needs and wants are more effective than general programmes designed for 
everyone. Similar to Heyer et al.’s (2011) findings, the use of third-party providers of 
services increased the employability of respondents which suggests, when combined, the 
specialization of third-party providers of services and the training instruments work well 
together (Brussig et al., 2010).  
 
3.4.1 Research on the effectiveness of One-Euro-Jobs 
 
With the induction of the law, the Second Book of the German Social Code (SGBII), in 
January 2005 two types of workfare or work opportunity programmes were introduced: the 
One-Euro-Job
89
 and the salaried work opportunity job (Entgeltvariante). These were two 
types of training ‘support’ (Fördern) provided by the Jobcenters.90 Participants in the One-
Euro-Job still receive their UBGII benefit plus an additional payment of €1.00 to €2.00 an 
                                                 
88 The main data stems from a two-wave panel survey of persons who, from October 2006 on, received UBII. The first wave was from 
January-April 2007 and the second wave was from November to March 2008. The substance of the survey consisted of social-demographic 
data on recipients’ age, sex, and the construction of the household. Those surveyed were asked how they were ‘activated’ i.e., which 
instruments were used, which skills training they participated in and how they would evaluate the instrument. Respondents were asked about 
their employment history including qualifications, competence, personality, individual resources, willingness to make concessions, personal 
circumstances and social environment. Using propensity score matching techniques Brussig et al. create statistical twins by taking from the 
‘not participated’ group individuals and matching them with the ‘participated’ where the outcome variable ‘employability’ is identical. But 
the assumed effect is only identifiable when the relevant characteristics are observable. The matching technique leads to a consistent 
assumption of the average (mean) treatment effect only if the decision to participate in an ALMP instrument has no influence on the ‘did not 
participate’ results. This is ensured through the conditioning of the relevant observed characteristics.   
89 The official name of the One-Euro-Job is Arbeitsgelegenheit in der Mehraufwandsvariante §16d SGBII, but is pejoratively referred to in 
media and research as the One-Euro-Job. 
90 The decision ultimately rest with the case manager as to which type of training a recipient is placed in. With the salaried work opportunity 
job, participating employers are subsidized by the Jobcenter when they hire UBII recipients who are in need of labour market support who 
otherwise, for various individual reasons, have found it very difficult—if not impossible—to find regular work. The UBII recipient can 
receive up to 75 percent of the regular wage for the job done for a length of 24 months (as opposed to the previous five years). In order to 
participate the UBII recipient has to be considered long-term unemployed and have had at least two additional problems, based on either 
placement constraints or obstructions that they can prove, that prevented them from being mediated into the regular employment. The 
recipient must receive intensive mediation support for at least six months, after which time it can be determined by the case manager that 
integration into the general labour market appears hopeless and the recipient is thus advised to participate in the support for work conditions 
training (Hohenmeyer and Wolff, 2012). 
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hour. Participation is limited to 30 hours per week so that the recipient has time remaining to 
look for regular work. On average the participant earns an extra €200.00 a month in addition 
to the UBII benefit received. Prior to the discontinuation of the Entgeltvariante (salaried work 
opportunity programme), participants receive a regular salary (or an hourly wage) in a job 
with compulsory insurance (which until the end of 2008 also included unemployment 
insurance).
 91
  Both are considered skill trainings (Maßnahmen). In the 2012 law to Improve 
the Integration Chances of the Unemployed in the Labour Market (Gesetz zur Verbesserung 
der Eingliederungschancen am Arbeitsmarkt §16e SGBII) the Federal Employment Agency 
combined the salaried work opportunity programme with the employment subsidy scheme 
and thus the salaried work opportunity programme ceased to exist. The One-Euro-Job 
remained unchanged. With c. 436,000 participants in 2011 alone, at the start of this research 
the One-Euro-Job was the most used active labour market policy instrument for the 
professional integration and activation of the unemployed on UBII. In comparison, only 
39,000 UBII recipients participated in the salaried work opportunity programme in 2011 
(Statistik der Bundesagentur für Arbeit, 2011). The One-Euro-Job embraces both the 
principle of Fördern (to support the recipient in finding work) and the workfare element of 
Fordern (demand/activate). Thus One-Euro-Jobs provide a recipient an opportunity to 
become ‘employable’ while at the same time if a recipient refuses to participate, he or she can 
be sanctioned. This use of competing principles is what Bellmann et al. call ‘mixed motive 
decisions’ that form the basis of the One-Euro-Job (2006).  
 
One-Euro-Jobs are considered a skill training (Maßnahme) and not a ‘job’ because the One-
Euro-Job provides the UBII recipient, who may heretofore have had little or no work 
experience, an opportunity to accustom the recipient to regular work habits, introduce them to 
a professional work setting while also testing a recipient’s willingness to work. The One-
Euro-Job should help generate a job for someone who is otherwise considered hard to 
integrate into the labour market (‘arbeitsfern’) with the goal of making the recipient 
“employable” (Hohendanner et al., 2011). One-Euro-Jobs usually run for six months (though 
in practice they last much longer) and are generally located in the public or non-profit sector. 
A One-Euro-Job can only be work performed in addition to (‘zusätzlich’) an organization’s 
regular work needs (SGBII §16d(2)); must be in the public interest (‘im öffentlichen 
Interesse’) (SGBII §16d(3)); and cannot displace jobs in the regular labour market or result in 
                                                 
91 Up until 2009, the actually hourly wage was not set and varied from location to location. After 2009 the Federal Employment Agency 
recommended a sum of 1000€ per month which was instituted in 2010. The length of participation in a work opportunity job can last up to 
one year and often results in the person being hired full-time (Bundesagentur für Arbeit, 2009b).  
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regularly employed employees losing their job (‘wettbewerbsneutral’) (SGBII §16d(4)). This 
last legal point is to prevent crowding out effects and distortion of competition. The 
additional €1.00-€2.00 euros earned per hour is not considered a ‘wage’ or ‘salary’ and 
therefore no ‘regular’ employment takes place. This is an important nuance because since the 
recipient is not ‘working’ rather he or she is being ‘trained’ the employer is not required to 
make social insurance contributions (Wulfgramm, 2011). Thus the employer is not to expect 
that his or her workload or employment needs will be met through the recipient’s work. 
While some recipients may (and do) welcome the opportunity to supplement their income by 
taking part in the One-Euro-Jobs and may (and do) actually seek participation, as 
Hohendanner et al. (2011) and Kettner and Rebien (2007) point out, the implementation of 
the One-Euro-Job is stuck between two contrary goals: “Zwischen Arbeitsmarktintegration, 
die über unverzichtbare Tätigkeiten besser gelänge und der Vermeidung von Missbrauch 
durch Eingrenzung der Tätigkeiten auf verzichtbare Arbeit” (Between the goals of labour 
market integration and the prevention of abuse. Labour market integration would benefit 
from permitting indispensable activities while restricting activities to 
dispensable/unnecessary labour would help prevent abuse) (Hohendanner et al., 2011:8).  
 
To-date, there have been few studies (and thus few findings) on the effect One-Euro-Jobs 
have had on integrating recipients into the regular labour market. Hohmeyer and Wolff 
(2007) used a stock sample of UBII recipients from January 2005 who participated in a One-
Euro-Job from February to April 2005. They were then followed for 20 months after the start 
of the programme to determine whether there was an uptake in employment as a result of 
participating in a One-Euro-Job. At the end of the observation period they found insignificant 
effects on employment uptake for men and slightly positive effects for women, especially 
female immigrants in West Germany.
92
 Using the same data Hohmeyer and Wolff (2012) 
analysed a cohort who participated in either the One-Euro-Job or the salaried work 
opportunity programme (Entgeltvariante) in order to analyse the effect each workfare 
programme had on the recipients’ ability to find regular work. The salaried work opportunity 
programme distinguishes itself from the One-Euro-Job in that it is actual work the recipient is 
doing and he or she is placed in a job that matches his or her interest and skills. The job 
                                                 
92 Several shortcomings may cast doubt on the reliability of the estimates. The One-Euro-Job was introduced only at the beginning of 2005 
and it took almost a year to implement. Moreover there were known data collection and data transmission problems in the Jobcenter offices 
during this time, which may have affected the results. Second, relying on a stock sample of UBII recipients may result in biased estimates 
due to an over-representation of the long spells. Although the sample was drawn at the end of January 2005, UBII recipients originally were 
transferred from formally social assistance and unemployment assistance and thus they could have been registered in the system for several 
years already. In addition, the sampling design did not take into account the exact timing of treatment during the UBII spell.  
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usually last for one year or more and the recipient is paid an actual wage that comes directly 
from the employer. Given that both training programmes have the same objectives but are 
designed differently, it makes for an interesting and important point for comparing the effect 
programme design has on integrating the unemployed into regular work. Overall the direct 
comparison of the participant effects shows that the support provided through the work 
opportunity jobs is a better alternative to the One-Euro-Jobs: the employment effects for 
participation in the work opportunity jobs are significantly higher (Hohmeyer and Wolff, 
2012). However in the short-term both types of skills trainings had slightly (negligible) 
reduced the chance of participants finding regular work. This effect was stronger with the 
salaried work opportunity programme as opposed to the One-Euro-Job and was due to the 
lock-in effect of the salaried work opportunity job.
93
 In the mid-term both types of skills 
trainings improved the likelihood that the recipient would move into regular work. But 
participation in the salaried work opportunity jobs resulted in faster and higher numbers 
being integrated into the regular labour market compared to One-Euro-Job participants. 
Indeed, the long-term view showed that after one year, participants of the work opportunity 
jobs had more positive employment effects. One-Euro-Job participants generally have 
positive support effects (Föderwirkung), but these effects are delayed and clearly weaker. 
 
For Hohenmeyer and Wolff (2012) the possible reasons for these results rest in the different 
composition of the participants and the different design of the programmes. The support 
(Föderung) provided by the salaried work opportunity programmes is more attractive to the 
UBII recipient because he or she receives an actual wage. It offered the UBII recipient a 
wider field from which to choose a job and given that the recipient received more intense 
support, the jobs they performed were more interesting and germane to the recipient. Here 
programme design is highly relevant. That the salaried work opportunity programme was not 
viewed by the recipient or the employer as a ‘training’ per se, like the One-Euro-Job, the 
salaried work opportunity job was not work done in addition to the actual work performed by 
the regular employees.  This meant that the recipient conducts actual work that resulted in 
experience that could translate into future employment opportunities that increased the 
integration probability of the participant.  Hohmeyer and Wolff (2012) argue that a better fit 
                                                 
93 Work opportunity programmes should increase the employment chances of the participants, through for example, obtaining work 
experience, getting used to working regular hours and working in a professional environment. But the time taken out to participate in the 
training results in time taken away from the actual job search. This lock-in effect can be stronger if the recipient is participating in a training 
that last for a substantial amount of time and/or is paid well. Thus the lock-in effect of the work opportunity jobs is stronger than for One-
Euro-Jobs because the work opportunity job is better paid, is an actual job, last longer and is a more intensive work experience than the One-
Euro-Job. (Hohmeyer and Wolff, 2012).   
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between participant and training (Maßnahme) are the reasons for this result.
94
 Overall the 
results demonstrate that the recipient’s selection into, as well as the design of, the training is 
important for the effectiveness of the support (Förderung) measure. 
 
Huber et al. (2010) evaluated the effects of a set of active labour market programmes 
including the One-Euro-Job on regular employment uptake. They investigated short- and 
longer-term training with a planned duration of up to three months that aimed at increasing 
regular employment rates. They also analysed the One-Euro-Job aims at improving the 
employability of UBII recipients with particularly poor employment prospects. Using data on 
a stock sample of UBII recipients who participated in programmes from October 2006 and 
March 2007, they considered the short-run outcomes up to 17 months after programme start. 
They found that short-term training programmes, which are a combination of job-search 
assistance, work tests and minor improvement of general skills, on average, increased 
participants’ employment perspectives. But they did not find significant treatment effects for 
participation in One-Euro-Jobs or further training programmes.
95
 Thomsen and Walter (2010) 
evaluated the effects of working in a One-Euro-Job on the chance of exiting UBII and taking 
up regular employment for immigrant and German recipients. For the empirical analysis they 
used an inflow sample of UBII recipients from 2006 who were followed until July 2008.
96
 
Using propensity score matching techniques to estimate the average effect of treatment on the 
treated, their empirical results showed strong lock-in effects of participation, independent of 
sex and ethnic group, resulting in negative employment effects during the time of programme 
participation. After programme’s end, the employment effects tended to increase only slightly 
and remain negative or at best insignificant until the end of the observation period in all 
groups. The negative effects are a bit more pronounced for Germans than for immigrants and 
therefore they conclude that the One-Euro-Job fails to achieve the intended purpose of 
providing a means for integrating UBII recipients into the regular labour market (Thomsen 
and Walter, 2010).    
 
                                                 
94 The authors argue that one cannot conclude from this study that the work opportunity jobs instead of the One-Euro-Jobs should be 
expanded because the results are dependent on a small sample from the support group. Plus the analysis of the effects is predicated on 
participants who were supported very shortly after the induction of SGBII in 2005. 
95There is some indication that the training courses may result in regular employment and that further training has had some positive 
employment effects. But the sample size was too small to draw definite conclusions based on the estimated effects being insignificant. 
Moreover, their evaluation window was too short to draw any conclusions with respect to mid- and long-term effects, especially for the One-
Euro-Job.   
96Thomsen and Walter argue that they overcome prior studies limitations by using an inflow sample of UBII recipients in Germany in 2006 
who are followed until July 2008. In addition, the size of the sample allows for a meaningful comparison of estimated treatment effects for 
immigrants and Germans.   
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As part of the Federal Ministry for Labour and Social Affair’s 2011 progress report on the 
effectiveness of the government’s active labour market instruments, IAB researchers (Heyer 
et al., 2011) analysed the effect One-Euro-Jobs had on moving East and West German men 
and women into the regular labour market and compared their labour market success with 
those who were similar but did not participate in a One-Euro-Job. They found that 
participation in a One-Euro-Job increased the chance of finding regular employment only for 
specific groups of participations. This included East and West German women, persons 
between the age of 36 and 50 or 51 and 62 and was especially significant for the long-term 
unemployed. The chance of integration into the regular labour market increased by 1 to 6 
percentage points after 20 months from the start of the recipient’s One-Euro-Job. For young 
men and women, differentiated by sex, whether they lived in East or West Germany, 
education, apprenticeship history and work experience, the results of participation in the mid-
term (28 months after the start of the One-Euro-Job) could not be traced to their success in 
the regular labour market. For this group of participants there are slightly positive integration 
effects for young East German men and West German women without an apprenticeship 
certificate. Their chance of integration increased by 3 to 4 percentage points compared with 
the comparison groups.
97
 The report stresses the overall success of the One-Euro-Job in 
meeting its objective, though the results are nonetheless mixed and varied based on the 
heterogeneity of the recipients. Hohendanner et al. (2011) investigated in-firm transitions 
from One-Euro-Jobs to regular employment. Indeed, they explored whether the organization 
ended up offering permanent positions to their One-Euro-Job recipients. They found that in-
firm transitions for the One-Euro-Job participant did not take place. Instead, the benefit fell 
on the organizations that profited from the indirect funding of regular work through the 
financial support received from the One-Euro-Job skill training (Hohendanner et al., 2011).  
 
An internal audit conducted by the Bundesrechnungshof (Germany’s Supreme Audit 
Commission) (2010) found that One-Euro-Jobs hardly helped improve the labour market 
chances of UBII recipients. Indeed, in more than half of audited cases, the One-Euro-Job 
failed to meet the conditions of ‘support’ (Fördern) either because the job was not, as 
                                                 
97 This study uses administrative data from the Federal Employment Agency (Bundesagentur für Arbeit). The data has detailed information 
on the socio-demographic descriptors (indicators) that included time of unemployment, whether UBI or UBII recipients, participation in 
skills training, etc. The participants were unemployed on April 30, 2005 and began a One-Euro-Job between May and July 2005. A similar 
comparison group was selected who did not participate in a One-Euro-Job. The researchers used propensity score matching techniques to 
match the two groups. They selected a non-treated person with a similar probability of participation as the treated person. The analysis 
assumes that the success of the non-treated person in the labour market correlates exactly to the success of the treated in the One-Euro-Job in 
terms of getting a regular job. Yet, a common problem is that one cannot glean from the data the non-treated person’s motivation or personal 
interests that can impact decision making processes. This can result in skewed findings (Heyer et al., 2012).   
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prescribed by the law, ‘in addition to’ (zusätzlich) work otherwise not needed or was not 
work that served the general interest of the public (im öffentlichen Interesse). The long-term 
unemployed were found to be removing illegal waste, to be working in a building yard or 
were cleaning bathrooms at a retirement home. Moreover, the Audit Commission (2010) 
found that One-Euro-Jobs do indeed displace regular workers; One-Euro-Job participants 
were performing ‘regular’ work. As a result those organizations who took on One-Euro-Job 
participants were profiting from their labour.  
Melike Wulfgramm (2011) analysed the subjective effects of ALMPs by investigating 
whether One-Euro-Jobs reduce the negative psychological effects of unemployment by 
influencing one’s sense of overall wellbeing and self-esteem.98 She uses the PASS 
(Arbeitsmarkt und soziale Sicherung) panel data and created three indicators to operationalize 
the subjective effects One-Euro-Jobs have on UBII recipients: gesellschaftliche Teilhabe 
(social participation), sozialer Status (social status) and Lebenszufriedenheit (overall sense of 
contentment and happiness with life). She found that while participation in One-Euro-Jobs 
increased participants’ feelings of social participation, nothing changed in terms of their 
perception of their social status. Participants’ level of ‘happiness’ or ‘contentment’ was 
positive, but remained far behind the effect for those who are in regular employment. Indeed, 
overall the results of her study showed that UBII recipients belong to one of the most 
unhappy and least content group of Germans. They feel socially excluded with a very low 
social status. Yet that said, UBII participants felt that the One-Euro-Job gave them a sense of 
purpose. Indeed the One-Euro-Job does partly fulfil its social-psychological objective, 
namely to provide the participant with a feeling of inclusion in the workforce. This feeling 
was significantly stronger when participating in a One-Euro-Job then when not. Per the 
Federal Employment Agency, one of the goals of One-Euro-Jobs is to socially integrate the 
unemployed through participation in a One-Euro-Job and as the findings suggest, this does 
indeed happen. Yet, qualitative studies to-date show that UBII recipients feel limited and 
restricted in terms of their identity, rights, agency and participation. In addition to 
investigating One-Euro-Job participants ability to integrate into regular work, Schröder 
(2009) investigated whether participation in One-Euro-Jobs resulted in the recipient feeling 
less socially isolated—what Bartelheimer (2007: 24) calls a “sekundäre Teilhabe” (secondary 
participation). Indeed Schröder found when she asked UBII recipients whether participation 
                                                 
98 For example, having a job may make you feel better, give a person sense of purpose, self-esteem, etc.  
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in a One-Euro-Job enabled them to temporarily overcome feelings of social isolation, the 
response was overwhelmingly ‘no’.  
 
3.5 Chapter summary and conclusion 
 
The purpose of this chapter was to set the context for the subsequent research questions asked 
and the study conducted. Thus, this chapter has explored literature that pertains to key themes 
surrounding the role and function of active labour market policies in reformed unemployment 
insurance schemes generally and in Germany specifically. The topics selected for review are 
directly related to the two research questions set out in this thesis. Indeed this research aims 
to address empirical and conceptual gaps in relation to the following questions:  
 
 Are the policy objectives expressed by the Hartz IV reforms reflected in the manner 
and substance of the lived experiences of Unemployment Benefit II recipients? 
 
 How meaningful is the Fördern and Fordern policy discourse for Unemployment 
Benefit II recipients, in terms of their perception of a ‘right’ to and ‘responsibility’ in 
finding work?    
 
Central to the fourth Hartz law in Germany was the policy objective to reduce benefit 
caseloads and thus unemployment numbers through the enhanced use of active labour market 
policy mechanisms such as skills training and job placement services. While these activation 
mechanisms have existed since the late 1970s in Germany (see Chapter Two section 2.4.1 
and 2.4.2) and receipt of benefit has generally been accompanied by some form of 
conditionality, the advent of the fourth Hartz law nonetheless created a uniform system under 
which every UBII recipient now has to demonstrate responsibility (Fordern) in return for 
their being supported (Fördern). Given this relationship between Fördern and Fordern 
coupled with the objective of the reforms, it is then a question of whether the support 
measures in place, taking the current labour market context into consideration, actually assist 
in integrating participants into the [regular] labour market. As a review of the literature has 
shown, there is indeed little consensus on whether and if so which type of ALMP 
programmes actually reduce unemployment for those in receipt of unemployment benefit. 
That said there are challenges to any review given the limitations of data, different levels of 
90 
 
abstraction, the challenges with propensity score matching techniques and programme 
differentiation both within and across countries.  
 
What does seem to be clear is that the nature of the German labour market has changed in the 
last thirty years. As Standing has argued, the change in the labour market landscape since the 
1970s that has resulted in an increase in fixed-term contracts and temporary work has brought 
about a new class of worker—the precariat. Yet, it is not only a new class of worker that has 
emerged but also the precarious position that jobseekers and workers alike find themselves in 
as a result of the change in the labour market conditions. This rise of atypical employment 
and suppressed real wages are often intertwined and, without question, disproportionately 
affect the long-term unemployed and/or those considered difficult to integrate into the labour 
market. Not so long ago, Germany provided some of the highest wages to the protected and 
unprotected worker alike. Yet, as a review of the literature has shown, a-typical work coupled 
with low-wage jobs is on the rise in Germany with women, the low-skilled and immigrants 
disproportionately affected by these changes. Indeed, as will be demonstrated in Chapter Five 
(section 5.3), it is these sub-groups in Germany that are disproportionately in receipt of 
Unemployment Benefit II.  
 
Thus, on the one hand, UBII recipients are presented with support mechanisms that may or 
may not assist them in integrating into the labour market, and if they do integrate, some may 
find themselves stuck in the cycle of short-term contracts with low pay with the potential to 
end up back on benefit. It is this nexus that is hard to untangle through quantitative analysis 
because research, for example, employing propensity score matching techniques is limited in 
the questions that can be asked and the themes that can be explored. As a result, issues 
relating to skills training and job placement services such as purpose, utility and value of 
training and placement services are more difficult to capture in quantitative research. That is 
why the lived experiences of UBII recipients are essential to explore because it allows 
researchers to addresses and unpack these very issues. It is through an analysis of interviews 
with 50 UBII recipients that this research aims to better understand whether the policy 
objectives expressed by the Hartz IV reforms (integration into the labour market through the 
use of support mechanisms) is reflected in the manner and substance of the lived experiences 
of Unemployment Benefit II recipients. This thesis employs qualitative semi-structured 
interview methodology to unpack a range of issues that are more difficult to uncover in large-
scale quantitative analysis. As a result this study will provide a rich context for understanding 
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the objectives of the reforms in conjunction with the lived experience of UBII recipients who 
interface with this changed labour market landscape (Standing, 20ll and Doogan, 2009) and, 
as such, fill this gap in the literature.      
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Chapter Four: A Two-Fold Framework: From Foucault’s Theory of 
Governmentality to Critical Theories of Citizenship 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
As announced in Chapter One, a Foucauldian analytic—specifically premised on the concepts 
of immanent function and the ‘conduct of conduct’—will later be adopted to help make sense 
of the findings that suggest a tension or contradiction between the policy objectives expressed 
by the Hartz IV reforms and the lived experiences of UBII recipients who participated in 
skills training and job placement services. This chapter will therefore present a discussion of 
the relevance Foucault’s use of immanent function and the ‘conduct of conduct’ has to 
understanding the larger significance of the findings on skills training and job placement 
services. But Foucault is not the only analytic that will be adopted. Indeed, in order to 
interpret the findings that related to my second research question, I adopted a broader 
understanding of citizenship theory—specifically Hartley Dean’s heuristic device for 
understanding competing constructions of rights and responsibilities as they pertain to 
capitalist social policies (see figure 4.1). The construction of categories is always fraught 
with difficulties in that there is simply never a perfect category that neatly captures all 
components of an issue. That said Dean’s diagram nonetheless provides a context and thereby 
gives meaning to the categories I constructed based on an analysis of respondent responses to 
their perception of a right to and responsibility in finding work (see Chapter Eight). Here it is 
important to reiterate that the two-fold analytic consisting both of Foucault’s theory of power 
and critical theories of citizenship were only adopted after the analysis of my data was 
complete. It was at that point that each theory’s relevance to understanding my data was 
revealed. Indeed any analytic adopted here was not applied to the design of the project, but 
used subsequently in order to make sense of the data. Thus, before we can proceed with 
unpacking the evidence in the proceeding chapters, it is first important to step back and 
explore the significance the shift away from the Marshallian understanding of welfare as a 
social right
99
 to the New Right’s (and indeed the Third Way) perception of a right to welfare 
being predicated on one’s ability to demonstrate responsibility has had on the type of policy 
interventions adopted in Germany.   
                                                 
99
 Marshall does address responsibility too, but from the perspective of public duty instead of seeing rights and responsibility as part of a 
reciprocal relationship (see for example Marshall, 1950: 41). 
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Therefore, in this chapter section 4.2 introduces more broadly the relevance Foucault’s 
governmentality analytic has to social policy analysis. Section 4.3 explores further the 
justification for adopting a Foucauldian approach to assist in interpreting the findings from 
this study. Here Foucault’s use of immanent function and the ‘conduct of conduct’ are 
discussed in relation to the main themes to emerge from an analysis of the evidence. Section 
4.4 will then examine the meaning of Fördern and Fordern as it relates to the academic 
literature on rights and responsibilities. This includes a discussion of the Marshallian 
understanding of welfare as a social right and its implication on policy design generally but in 
in post-war Britain specifically. This section then explores the impact the New Right’s 
change in perception of welfare as a social right to it being predicated on demonstrating 
responsibility has had on social policy design in the West since the 1990s. Section 4.5 
concludes by providing an overview of the two-fold theoretical analytic adopted as it relates 
to this thesis’ two research questions. 
 
4.2 The Foucauldian Analytic 
 
In recent years, the use of a state-centred analytic in social policy and welfare state analysis 
specifically has been questioned by a growing number of policy researchers as it has failed to 
provide a way in which concepts can be problematized in order to make sense of the 
changing landscape of social policy practice (M. Dean, 2010). An analytic of 
governmentality re-emerged as part of the ‘street-level’ policy evaluations that came about as 
a result of welfare reforms in the US and UK in the late 1990s (see Brodkin, 1997) because it 
provided a much needed framework within which to analyse the actual practices of 
government instead of just the institutions of government.  Newman’s (2001) macro-level 
governance approach to welfare state analysis only allows an arms-length understanding of 
how power and authority operate through a more traditional top-down analysis of public 
administration. The Governmentality analytic however provides a distinctly new form of 
thinking about how power is exercised within certain societies and in specific contexts and as 
such offers an alternative to Newman’s (2001) top-down analysis. As Foucault wrote “rather 
than asking ourselves what the sovereign looks like from on high, we should be trying to 
discover how multiple bodies, forces, energies, matters, desires, thoughts and so on are 
gradually, progressively, actually and materially constituted as subjects” (Foucault, 2003: 
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28). It is not the intention of a Foucauldian analytic to remove the ‘state’ from social policy 
analysis but rather to reposition how we think about power, authority and the state. Using 
governmentality to analyse social policy allows us to “…explore the ways and means by 
which participants both transform themselves and are transformed as a consequence of the 
development and application of specific social policies” (Marston and McDonald, 2006: 4).   
 
Governmentality as an approach recognizes that the state does not have a monopoly on power 
and authority, but as Marston and McDonald point out (2006), the state remains central to the 
exercise of power in social policy practice. Foucault’s thinking about power consists of a 
much broader conception of government as any activity directed towards the conduct of 
others and selves. In other words, and of fundamental importance to Foucault’s analytic, this 
is a break from thinking that power operates primarily at a macro level. This thus allows for 
the seemingly mundane aspects of government action to be understood as important areas 
where power is utilized, such as in the everyday interactions that take place in bureaucratic 
agencies—an important source and site of governmental power. It is within bureaucratic 
agencies where the complexity of power relations and forms of authority take place between 
multiple actors and agents who govern (Marston and McDonald, 2006). 
 
Therefore a Foucauldian analytic provides a framework within which to analyse how the 
finite details impact the ‘big picture’. Korteweg argues that “the framework of 
governmentality directs our focus to the fine grained practices that link subject formation to 
the techniques by which we govern ourselves and others” (2006:112, see also Rose, 1999). It 
is through this micro analysis of the “fine grained practices”—in this case UBII recipients’ 
Jobcenter experience generally—that we are able to go beyond a mere understanding of the 
actions and structures of the state and instead “connect questions of government, politics and 
administration to the space of bodies, lives, selves and persons” and how those are managed, 
directed, ordered and administered (M. Dean, 1999:12). What is interesting here, is that while 
there has been a move in some countries, Britain particularly but Germany as well, to 
outsource bureaucratic state functions to non-state agencies (i.e., contracting out employment 
services), no matter how and by whom bureaucratic state functions are being managed, the 
immanent relations of power remain much the same, irrespective of how they are disguised. 
Given the prominence of the Jobcenter as the central source and site of service provision, one 
reason the German case is an interesting one to study is that the immanent relations of power 
are not so disguised.  
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4.3 The relevance of Foucault’s use of immanent function and the ‘conduct of 
conduct’ to interpreting my findings 
 
A key aspect to understanding the findings on Unemployment Benefit II recipients’ 
experience with skills training and job placement services rest with Foucault’s idea that 
bureaucratic processes serve an immanent function.  According to Foucault, though it is 
possible to identify designs and strategies in power relationships, there is no one individual 
subject (or group of subjects) exercising or guiding this power. This means, in the context of 
the Jobcenter for example, that there is no master plan as such conceived of by, for example, 
policy makers to ensure that support mechanisms, such as skills trainings, provided to UBII 
recipients by the Jobcenter (and by extension, the Federal Republic) fail to meet their needs. 
As Foucault writes:  
If in fact they [the power relations] are intelligible, this is not because they  
are the effect of another instance that 'explains' them, but rather because they 
are imbued, through and through, with calculation: there is no power that is  
exercised without a series of aims and objectives….the logic is perfectly clear,  
the aims decipherable and yet it is often the case that no one is there to have  
invented them, and few who can be said to have formulated them (1998:95).    
   
When this excerpt is put alongside the passage from Discipline and Punish where Foucault 
speaks about the prison’s failure to combat delinquency—"…the prison, apparently 'failing' 
does not miss its target; on the contrary, it reaches it, in so far as it gives rise to one particular 
form of illegality in the midst of others, which it is able to isolate, to place in full light and to 
organize in a relatively enclosed, but penetrable, milieu" (1979: 276-77)—it becomes a 
question of the intelligible instead of the actual function of bureaucracies. While the 
perception and experience of respondents for this study indicate that the Jobcenter, generally, 
is not providing the level of support, for example, that they need, there is, nevertheless, an 
immanent logic behind the Jobcenter not meeting its said purpose. Important here is that the 
policy has not been consciously designed and implemented with the explicit intent of 
preventing rather than supporting UBII recipients in their endeavour to integrate into the 
regular labour market. It is instead the symbolic significance of the support mechanisms not 
meeting UBII recipients’ needs that is important and will be revealed in Chapters Six, Seven 
and Eight.  
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A second key concept used to interpret the findings of this thesis draws on Foucault’s notion 
of the ‘conduct of conduct’.100 In 1978 and 1979, Foucault gave a series of lectures in which 
he focused on the ‘problem of government’ or as he put it—the genealogy of the modern state 
(Marston and McDonald, 2006).  He was interested in developing a new way of thinking 
about how modern forms of government shaped the conduct of others and the conduct of 
‘selves’—known as the ‘conduct of conduct’. The ‘conduct of conduct’ is that which is 
problematized. It provides the researcher a space in which fundamental questions can be 
asked about how (rather than just why) knowledge, power and subjectivity are built into the 
social and governmental structures that we interact with on a day-to-day basis and how this 
shapes our conduct as a result.  
Perhaps the equivocal nature of the term ‘conduct’ is one of the best aids  
for coming to terms with the specificity of power relations. To ‘conduct’  
is at the same time to ‘lead’ others (according to mechanisms of coercion  
that are, to varying degrees, strict) and a way of behaving within a more  
or less open field of possibilities. The exercise of power is a ‘conduct of  
conducts’ and a management of possibilities. Basically, power is less a  
confrontation between two adversaries or their mutual engagement than  
a question of ‘government’… ‘Government’ did not refer only to political  
structures or to the management of states; rather, it designated the way in  
which the conduct of individuals or of groups might be directed…  
(Foucault, 2000: 341).       
It is within these micro-practices that the conduct of individuals is ultimately shaped. This is 
not just a question of how authority is exercised over others, rather more about how we 
govern ourselves within the rubric of this authority. In the context of the Jobcenter, for 
example, the fact that the receipt of unemployment benefit II is predicated on recipients 
performing certain tasks, i.e., participation in a skills training or the requirement to submit to 
the case manager a specified number of job applications applied to, is linked to regulations 
and procedures which dictate how UBII recipients are expected to conduct themselves within 
the governed space of the Jobcenter. This is manifested and solidified through the signing of 
the Integration into Work Agreement between the case manager and the UBII recipient that 
stipulates what he or she must do to find work or face sanctions. Foucauldian concepts of 
disciplinarity involve any set of mundane operations, actions or social relationships that have 
the ability to direct and thus effect what people do and the social order in which they do it. 
Knowles (1999) refers to ‘disciplinarity’ as decentralized power that exists in timetabling, in 
organization, in bureaucratic structures, in the arrangement of space and the operation of the 
gaze—in fact in any set of procedures with a definite outcome. The daily practices of 
                                                 
100
 The ‘conduct of conduct’ as such never appeared in Foucault’s writing. Rather his discourse on conduct was translated into English as 
the ‘conduct of conduct’.  
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Jobcenter case managers are brought into relief because they constitute micro-power clusters 
that have the ability to determine the fate of a UBII recipient based his or her interpretation of 
the rules and regulations. Indeed the UBII recipient has two distinct tasks: one to find a job 
and the other to find a job on the terms and conditions set forth by the Jobcenter. Knowles 
(1999) likens the effect a case manager has on determining a recipients’ behaviour on much 
the same terms as ‘the state’ itself has the authority to shape its constituents’ behaviour based 
on government policies enacted. And indeed, the introduction of the Fördern and Fordern 
policy framework within which both Jobcenter case managers and UBII recipients operate 
has had a profound impact on recipient behaviour as will be disclosed in Chapters Six, Seven 
and Eight.  
 
4.4 From rights and responsibilities to Fördern and Fordern 
 
Fundamental to the practical design and implementation of the fourth Hartz law was the 
introduction of ‘Fördern and Fordern’ into the public discourse as a way to explain the 
purpose of the reforms as well as galvanize public support for them. ‘Fördern’ refers to the 
support provided by the Jobcenter to assist the jobseeker in integrating into the labour market 
while ‘Fordern’ is the activation component—the ability of the Jobcenter to demand, in return 
for the support provided, evidence that the jobseeker is actively seeking work.
101
 The 
obligation to work under such a model is justified on grounds of reciprocity bound through 
the Integration into Work Agreement between the jobseeker and the state (the case 
manager).
102
 The contract outlines the route of entry or re-entry into the labour market. The 
agreement is designed as an instrument of support that is a two-way, legally binding, and 
mutually negotiated agreement (Rauch and Dornette, 2009; Konle-Seidl and Eichhorst, 
2008). This is not to say that prior to the inception of the Hartz IV reforms and the adoption 
of the Fördern and Fordern framework that receipt of unemployment benefit was 
unconditional. Indeed, conditionality varied between the three different unemployment 
benefit programs (social insurance, unemployment assistance and social assistance) and 
                                                 
101
 Fordern (demand) manifest itself through advanced job placement and stricter job suitability criteria which were set up in order to 
shorten periods of individual unemployment. Refusing job offers, apprenticeships or job training or resigning from work without a good 
reason leads to sanctions. Fördern (support) operates mainly through new active labour market instruments, such as public employment 
opportunities and skill training placements that are to assist jobseekers who cannot find work. 
102
 The benefit recipient is required to sign and fulfil the agreement in order to avoid a reduction of benefits through sanctions. Reinhard and 
Kaufman (2008) point out that in legal terms, a contract suggests that both parties have a say in what they are bargaining for and a choice 
with whom they negotiate. In the context of activation, legal experts argue that there is not much to bargain. If the jobseeker complies with 
the requirements, the relevant institution (i.e., the Jobcenter) is obliged to offer an activation measure, i.e., vocational training. On the other 
hand, the jobseeker has to do everything to reintegrate into the labour market. 
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between municipalities (See Chapter Two section 2.4.1 and 2.4.2 for more detail). What is 
new with the advent of the reforms to unemployment insurance, unemployment assistance 
and social assistance is the fundamental contestability of social rights and the premise of 
social citizenship.      
 
The introduction of the concept of Fördern and Fordern into the policy design of the Hartz 
reforms can be seen as the equivalent to the Anglo-centric concept of ‘rights and 
responsibilities’ in the UK (Clasen and Clegg, 2006; Clasen, 2005). Indeed perhaps no 
concept has had such a profound impact on perceptions of welfare recipients’ relationship to 
work as the reinvented interpretation of ‘rights’ and ‘responsibilities’—the desire to enforce 
the civic responsibilities of workers as citizens. As part of the on-going steps to reform 
welfare, it was argued by both the American New Right and the Third Way (the shared neo-
liberal strand in each) that ‘rights’ were out of sync with ‘responsibilities’ and that at the 
heart of the problem was a welfare state that was enabling a culture of dependency (Murray, 
1984).  This ‘dependency’ argument was used to rebuke recipients on benefit as 
irresponsible, not willing to help themselves through finding work and thus undeserving of 
support. Indeed, the concept of ‘social citizenship’—“those rights and duties of citizenship 
concerned with the welfare of people as citizens”103—became increasingly viewed with 
scepticism by the New Right and Neoconservatism in Britain (Roche, 1992: 3). As Roche 
(1992) points out, the 1970s ‘crises’ of the welfare state and the subsequent ‘welfare reform’ 
agenda fostered a unified scepticism about the value and relevance of social citizenship. Thus 
as the concept of social citizenship has changed in the last thirty years, reliance on the 
welfare state has come to be understood as a sign of individual failure, rather than a means to 
redistribute resources to meet competing needs (Dwyer, 2004).  
 
Ever since T.H. Marshall’s ground-breaking essay Citizenship and Social Class (1950) the 
goal of the European welfare state has been the ideal of ‘full citizenship’—citizenship, 
according to Marshall, entailed not only civic and political, but social rights as well—in 
particular the right to income maintenance (H. Dean, 2007). Arguably, T.H. Marshall’s social 
rights were a unique achievement of the 20th century—though one that failed to include 
women in his vision of ‘full citizenship’.104 The induction of social rights—entitlement to 
                                                 
103
 For Roche (1992) ‘welfare’ here is taken in the broadest sense and includes such things as work, education, health and quality of life.  
104
 As Lister points out Marshall is silent on the question of women’s economic dependence and the implication this had on their 
‘citizenship’ status. Women being granted civil, political and social rights has traditionally lagged behind that of men. Indeed the ideal of 
citizenship was built around the gendered understanding of what a man should be, while women have typically been relegated to a 
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education, health, housing and income maintenance—culminated in the creation of Britain’s 
post-war ‘modern welfare state’ (H. Dean, 2002). Marshall later identified political 
democracy, a welfare state and a market economy as the three components that must exist in 
tandem with one another in order to guarantee full citizenship. He characterized modern 
“democratic-welfare-capitalist” societies as “hyphenated societies” (Marshall, 1981). 
Marshall conceptualized citizenship as a “three legged stool”. Here civic and political rights, 
while important, must be supported by some form of entitlement to welfare, that being the 
social right, in order for citizenship to carry any meaning for all members of a given 
community. Over the years, academics have deconstructed Marshall’s concept of full 
citizenship, particularly in an ever-changing welfare state landscape. Like Lister (2003), 
Twine (1994) placed the relationship between structure and agency at the centre of his 
analysis of citizenship and social rights. For Lister, citizenship is pivotal to the definition and 
interpretation of needs and necessary in order for a ‘need’ to be converted into a ‘right’ 
(2003). A well-rounded concept of citizenship, with the potential to enhance women’s agency 
in particular, according to Lister, has to embrace both the social and political dimension of 
citizenship because they are interlinked. “This way citizenship emerges as a dynamic process 
in which the two dimensions of status and practice interact with each other, linked through 
human agency” (Lister, 2003: 8). Yet, as Roche (1992) points out, citizenship today has been 
reinterpreted more widely to work obligations that have dominated the ‘duties discourse’.  
 
The right to social and welfare rights was central to the ideal of citizenship, which in turn 
defined the degree and quality of welfare entitlements (H. Dean, 2002). The degree to which 
welfare rights are seen as an essential element of citizenship depends on how citizenship 
itself is understood, how rights are interpreted and how rights are then understood in relation 
to responsibility. Drawing on prior research, H. Dean (1999 and 2002) articulated four 
ideological justifications for capitalist social policies (social democratic, conservative, 
utilitarian and (neo-) liberal). His heuristic device (see Figure 4.1) provides a tool to help 
understand how social citizenship is conceptualized and how a citizen’s right to and degree 
and quality of welfare entitlements may be construed. In response to this thesis’ second 
research question of whether respondents for this study have a right to and responsibility in 
finding work, four categories of a right and four categories of a responsibility to work were 
manifested through an analysis of the evidence (see Chapter Eight). It was after my initial 
                                                                                                                                                        
secondary private sphere (Lister, 2003). Others have also criticized Marshall for his vague definition of social rights (Powell, 2002); 
Marshall’s failure to take into account the cost implications of social rights (Dwyer, 2000); and not only did Marshall fail to include women 
in his approach, but also those with disabilities and ethnic minorities (Dwyer, 2004; Lister 2003).     
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analysis was conducted and the categories had been constructed that Dean’s diagram (see 
Figure 4.1) was adopted to help understand the larger significance of the findings as they 
relate to our understanding of social rights and welfare regime types.  
 
Figure 4.1 Competing constructions of rights and responsibilities 
 
Source: H. Dean (This diagram as such has never been published by Dean. Rather this particular diagram has 
evolved over time and is different from versions Dean has published. See Dean 2010 and 1999.)  
 
Dean argues that there are two distinct—though competing—constructions of citizenship: 
liberal and republican.  The liberal or contractarian tradition places a premium on individual 
freedom through a notional bargain that is entered between the individual and the state. The 
republican or solidaristic tradition is strongly associated with civic republicanism and/or 
communitarism. Here the emphasis is placed on social solidarity. It is expected that the 
individual citizen is a protected member of a particular society. The interests of the self are 
bound up with the interests of others (H. Dean, 2002).This is not to say that Dean argues that 
the liberal-contractarian and republican-solidaristic conceptions of citizenship do not or 
cannot co-exist in practice—they do. Rather for Dean, it is that their logics clearly differ. 
Indeed, Lister (2003) argues that the different interpretations of citizenship rights and 
obligations and the implications of the liberal-social rights and the republican participator 
tradition should be seen as complementary rather than competing approaches. And yet, 
broadly speaking, contemporary Anglophone welfare states represent different versions of the 
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liberal-contractarian citizenship model while Germany represents a less egalitarian version of 
the republican-solidaristic citizenship model. Given that Germany has traditionally been 
described as having a conservative corporatist welfare state, it is then a question of, on the 
one hand, the degree to which the adoption of the Fördern and Fordern policy framework 
marks a departure from the republican-solidaristic tradition, or at least what one would expect 
in terms of policy design from such a citizenship model. Or whether, on the other hand, the 
adoption of the Fördern and Fordern framework is the symbolic culmination of the historical 
threads of a liberal-contractarian citizenship model that were always, in different guises, 
present in the German social state.   
 
From different understandings of citizenship, flow different interpretations of rights. Rights 
may mean equality of opportunity within a neo-liberal regime; entitle one to substantive 
equality within a social democratic regime; or entitle one, as an active participating citizen, to 
social inclusion within a conservative regime (H. Dean, 2002). Given the limited resources 
available for welfare-state services, a key question is how to allocate resources based on 
one’s social right to benefit. Indeed how do we meet the various needs of citizens? Questions 
of who gets what, how they get it and why they are seen as being entitled to it are at the heart 
of social citizenship debates (Dwyer, 2000). The New Right argued that citizenship cannot 
embrace social rights because they imply a claim on resources and are therefore categorically 
different from civic and political rights (Lister, 2003). Critics like Hayek (1976) stressed the 
civil, as opposed to social rights of citizenship, with special emphasis on ‘active citizenship’ 
in the 1980s. Dean argues that the change in perception of citizenship and rights that took 
place in the 1980s resulted in social policy no longer being about redistributing resources to 
provide for individuals needs’, but rather as a way to enable people to individually manage 
their risk. “Thus, old forms of liberal governance gave way to an individual ethic of self-
responsibility” (H. Dean, 2007: 577). 
 
It was Lawrence Mead who argued that welfare and related social programs needed to be 
infused with a ‘new’ paternalism (1997b). New paternalism called for those on benefit to take 
responsibility for and to sustain themselves (Mead, 1997b).  New paternalism is what Mead 
called ‘supervisory approaches’. It is based on the idea that the poor are indeed different from 
everyone else in that they cannot be assumed to be able to exercise personal responsibility 
and self-discipline. The poor therefore must be forced to be responsible and social programs 
that include strict supervision, mandates and sanctions will result in the poor acting like 
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everyone else. More importantly, Mead argued that the poor will be more likely to make 
progress in overcoming the personal barriers that hold them back and keep them in poverty as 
a result of the supervision, mandates and sanctions of paternalistic programs (1997b). For 
Mead, the only way to ‘cure the disease of poverty’ was to administer paternalistic social 
programs. 
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Mead (1986) and Novak & Cogan (1987) alike emphasize citizenship obligations over rights. 
Both identified engagement in paid work by welfare recipients as obligatory in order to 
support their families. The citizen is offered the opportunity to access certain entitlements but 
must accept the responsibility that comes with such an opportunity. The ‘worth’ of the citizen 
is measured by a social contract in which he or she relinquishes freedoms in return, not 
directly for rights, but for ‘opportunities’ (H. Dean, 2002). For the new paternalists, social 
policy rests on the reciprocity principle—that social rights are conditional on the obligation to 
participate in the labour market. Indeed, people need jobs because they are good for them and 
those who do not want jobs must be induced to want to accept them, because a job is the path 
into ‘social inclusion’ (Standing, 2002).This translated into one’s right to benefit becoming 
conditional and based on an individual’s ability to sell their skills in order to work in the 
labour market. As Offe (1984) argues, the welfare state went from varying degrees of de-
commodification towards varying degrees of re-commodification of labour. As opposed to 
Murray, Mead emphasizes reducing access to welfare and wants to guide welfare recipients 
towards personal responsibility by upholding obligations in exchange for the right to 
benefits.
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 Charles Murray (1994), on the other hand, argued that the problem of dependency 
was not workfare but to end welfare altogether. If necessary, reluctant individuals should be 
forced into activity by the application of benefit sanctions. Only those who ‘take charge’ of 
their own lives are deemed to be responsible ‘active’ citizens (Wetherly, 2001). For Walters 
(1997) the “welfare society” of the past promised, at least theoretically, a common citizenship 
status which guaranteed a universal minimum of welfare rights. This today has been 
superseded by the ‘active society’ in which increasingly individuals can only access social 
rights if they are willing to become workers in the paid labour market. Today “…many of 
                                                 
105 For Mead (1997b) new paternalism differs from earlier paternalism in two ways: First, new paternalism is not anti-government and based 
strictly in the private and non-profit sector. While contracting is often preferable, new paternalism starts in the public sector and is built into 
public programs. It involves close attention to the administration of those programs to ensure that recipients do what is expected of them. 
Second, new paternalism imposes obligations, not in place of rights but in addition to rights. It allows people to receive assistance, but 
conditions the right to assistance on the requirement to fulfil obligations. 
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The 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) reform in the US was more Mead than Murray. 
Mead's (1997a) emphasis on mandated participation in work programs that emphasized work over education or training has been reflected in 
the law.  
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these assumptions about the specifically social obligations and consequent rights of the 
citizen no longer apply with the active society…the active society makes us all workers” 
(Walters, 1997: 223-224). Yet, as Lødemel and Trickry (2001) argue, it is often the lack of 
self-efficacy that is rooted in the personal experience of failure and the sense of defeat that is 
the obstacle to entering the labour market rather than a lack of moral fibre. 
 
Citing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that states “Everybody has the right to 
work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable conditions of work and to 
protection against unemployment” (UN 1948: Article 23[1] from H. Dean, 2002: 100), H. 
Dean points out that the availability and choice of employment are subject to market forces. 
While rights at work exist they are civic and contractual in nature, not social rights per se. 
That said such rights are understood in the EU as social rights (H. Dean, 2002). “To the 
extent social security provisions exist for the protection against unemployment, the rights 
afforded are tied to a ‘duty’ rather than a right to work” (H. Dean, 2002: 100). The moral 
dimension to work—readily accepted by society—is that endeavour and enterprise through 
work is valued over leisure. Work is ‘good’—a virtuous, dignified and worthy activity for 
individuals. Working becomes morally desirable irrespective of any financial or social benefit 
that may accrue to the individual (Anthony, 1971).  Yet, Standing (2002) argues that one 
should also have a ‘right’ not to work. Indeed the right to work should be something other 
than the duty to labour. The right to work—arguably a human right—means a right to choose 
what one believes is rational activity for “only that can be the basis of citizenship and 
occupational security” (Standing, 2002: 2). Jobs for their own sake are not consistent with 
this sense of rationality. Indeed, a job that is chosen for someone against their wishes, 
however well meaning, is no right at all. While work is valuable if it contributes to human 
creativity and development, Standing argues that maximizing labour is not the de facto best 
means of optimizing the amount or quality of work in society. “The challenge is to find the 
means of ensuring that a growing proportion of the population has the opportunity, capacity 
and desire to build an occupation.” (Standing, 2002: 273-4).  
 
4.5 Chapter summary and conclusion 
 
This chapter provided an overview of the justification for why elements of a Foucauldian 
analytic was adopted to interpret the findings of this study as they relate to the first research 
104 
 
question that explores whether the policy objectives expressed by the Hartz IV reforms are 
reflected in the manner and substance of the lived experiences of Unemployment Benefit II 
recipients. Specifically, this chapter introduced how immanent function and the ‘conduct of 
conduct’ are relevant to understanding this study’s findings. In order to interpret the findings 
as they relate to my second research question that explores how meaningful the Fördern and 
Fordern policy discourse is to UBII recipients in terms of their perception of a right to and 
responsibility in finding work, H. Dean’s heuristic device for understanding competing 
constructions of rights and responsibilities provides a complementary analytic. Dean’s 
diagram illustrates the conflicting rationalities associated with the rights and responsibilities 
of citizenship. As my data illustrate, these different, at times overlapping, and indeed 
conflicting rationalities are resolved in different ways by different actors. Dean’s diagram is a 
useful tool to conceptualize how these very different rationales operate both theoretically 
and—when attached to my data—practically.  
 
The Federal Republic’s adoption of Fördern and Fordern—an essentially neo-liberal policy 
discourse predicated on a rights and responsibilities framework—was an innovation in the 
German context. It made conditionality and activation measures uniform for everyone—
irrespective if one was previously in receipt of social insurance, unemployment assistance or 
social assistance and irrespective of whether one lived in an area of high or low 
unemployment. Therefore this chapter discussed the impact welfare reforms predicated on 
new paternalism has had on how unemployment benefit is administered generally, but 
specifically in reference to the fourth Hartz law; and hence the relevance the discussion of 
rights and responsibilities has to contemporary German unemployment benefit politics. While 
personal responsibility coupled with conditionality has always been built into social 
insurance schemes in Germany (and elsewhere), it is the degree and measure of responsibility 
that has taken on new significance in the post-Hartz IV German case.  
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Chapter Five: Research Methods 
 
5.1 Introduction: a qualitative approach 
 
The epistemological position of qualitative work can be described as interpretavist, which 
stresses an “understanding of the social world through an examination of the interpretation of 
that world by its participants” (Bryman, 2004: 266).  In order to answer the two research 
questions for this thesis a qualitative research design was required because here words, rather 
than the quantification of data, help to explain respondents’ experiences and perceptions of 
the policies under examination. The semi-structured interview was the method used to obtain 
the data. Specifically the research questions address:  
 
 Are the policy objectives expressed by the Hartz IV reforms reflected in the manner 
and substance of the lived experiences of Unemployment Benefit II recipients? 
 
 How meaningful is the Fördern and Fordern policy discourse for Unemployment 
Benefit II recipients, in terms of their perception of a ‘right’ to and ‘responsibility’ in 
finding work?    
 
The qualitative methodology used for this research was intended to build on the findings of 
existing studies. As reviewed and discussed in Chapter Three, there is a gap in the literature 
in that the quantitative studies conducted evaluate the effectiveness of skills trainings while 
the qualitative research conducted post-Hartz reforms largely rely on case study and 
participant observation methods to explore changes made to the administration and structure 
of the reforms. Thus the type of questions asked in this study implies, on the one hand, a 
qualitative approach because it is the subjective views, meanings and perceptions of UBII 
recipients that are going to be analysed, while on the other, it is a study that complements the 
current qualitative (and quantitative) findings. Moreover since I am not ‘testing’ a hypothesis, 
coupled with the fact that there has been a substantial amount of statistical analysis done 
using large data sets maintained by the Institute for Employment Research (IAB),
107
 there 
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 The IAB is the Research Institute of the Federal Employment Agency. The IAB Establishment Panel has been in existence in West 
Germany since 1993 and in the East since 1996 and is a comprehensive longitudinal data set that forms the basis for research into the 
demand side of the labour market. This representative survey of employers covers a wide range of topics related to employment policy. 
Close to 16,000 establishments from all branches of the economy and of all sizes are surveyed annually. The Labour Market and Social 
Security (PASS) panel survey allows social processes and the non-intended side-effects of labour market reforms to be assessed empirically. 
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was no need for me to research a larger set of observations than has already been made 
public.  While the surveys that are available provide useful and rich information, they do not 
(nor can they) clarify the rationale behind the reasons why, for example, Unemployment 
Benefit II recipients are more willing to take work that is further from home, at odd hours, 
and/or for less pay than individuals not in receipt of unemployment benefit (Bender et al., 
2009). The purpose of qualitative research is to explore the different representations of an 
issue. Therefore this study allows for a more in-depth exploration of UBII recipients’ 
experiences and perception of skills trainings and job placement services and what their right 
to and responsibility in finding work consists of—something other studies have not explored 
in any great depth. In short: respondents’ subjective views matter here (Marshall and 
Rossman, 2006).  
 
This chapter will describe in detail the methods adopted to obtain the data needed to answer 
the research questions and the rationale for choosing this approach. The methodological 
discussion will centre on the advantages and disadvantages of these methods and the practical 
and ethical issues raised during the research process. Section 5.2 considers the main ethical 
issues of concern to the research including informed consent and the anonymity of 
participants. Section 5.3 outlines the research sample and the selection of cities. This includes 
a discussion of the sample approach used, including the selection of cities and Jobcenters, as 
well as how the sample of Unemployment Benefit II recipients and Jobcenter case managers 
was generated. Section 5.4 explains the interview process, which includes the type of 
interview used, the questions posed and issues affecting the data collection. Section 5.5 
outlines the issues affecting the data collection while section 5.6 describes how the data were 
analysed and considers the reliability and validity of the data. Section 5.7 summarizes the 
methodological process adopted to obtain the data for this research.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
This is a nationwide survey that is repeated annually and covers approximately 12,000 households. The IAB Job Vacancy Survey surveys 
companies and administrations to learn more about the employment situation at individual establishments along with the number and 
structure of positions currently open. The survey also collects information on how the new labour market reforms are viewed by individual 
establishments. The IAB’s Paths Into and Out of Vocational Rehabilitation survey is a survey of 4,000 persons who have completed 
rehabilitation measures in 2006. A repeat of the survey was conducted in 2008 with the same participants. Together with a longitudinal 
dimension relating to the course of schooling/training and one's previous work experience, the survey contains further dimensions of 
analysis such as the interaction that has taken place between the work community and employment agency; health; social integration, and 
continuation once the measure has ended. The third wave of Business Start-Ups survey collects information on previously unemployed 
persons who set up their own businesses in 2003 with the help of either a bridging allowance or business start-up subsidy (Ich-AG). This 
longitudinal study, with an economically matched control group, is intended to provide information about what the participants are doing 
now and how sustainable their business set-ups are. A further aspect includes the number of additional jobs additionally created; the way in 
which the new entrepreneurs are socially insured; the level of income achieved; and work satisfaction. 
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5.2 Ethical issues 
 
Lewis (2003), Silverman (2013) and Wiles et al. (2007), among others, have discussed the 
wider ethical issues concerning the use of semi-structured interviews as a method for 
gathering data. Two issues that are relevant to this research and will be discussed below 
include obtaining participants’ informed consent to be involved in the research and protecting 
the anonymity of those participants.  
 
5.2.1 Informed consent 
 
Semi-structured interviews with UBII recipients (n=50) were carried out at two Jobcenters in 
Germany. One Jobcenter was located in Hamburg and one in Bremen.  
In addition, semi-structured interviews (n=5) were carried out with Jobcenter  
staff—case managers—from two Jobcenters in Bremen and three from a Jobcenter  
in Berlin. Initial contact was made with the Jobcenter by sending an email to a  
generic email address provided on the Jobcenter’s website. I introduced who  
I was and why I was contacting the Jobcenter in the initial email sent.  
I briefly described the nature of my research (outlining the research topic) 
and asked if it was possible to conduct my research at the Jobcenter  
(see Appendix 1). I then conducted a series of email exchanges with  
the Directors via their assistants and me in which more exact questions were answered about 
the nature of my research, how it would be conducted, what I needed from the Jobcenter in 
terms of desk-space, material, time and resources. After a series of email exchanges it was 
agreed that I could provisionally conduct my research at the Jobcenter in Hamburg and later 
at the Jobcenter in Bremen, but only after first meeting in person with the respective 
Directors where the ‘terms’ of the research were outlined. This included securing the 
Directors’ agreement that I could approach UBII recipients in the waiting room of the 
Jobcenter; that the Jobcenter would provide me with a private office to conduct the 
interviews; that the Jobcenter would assist in identifying case managers I could interview 
after I had completed interviewing UBII recipients; how I would obtain consent from UBII 
recipients; and finally that I would provide the Jobcenter with a report on my findings. After 
meeting with the Director of the Jobcenter in Hamburg, and at a later date with the Director 
in Bremen, it was agreed that I could conduct my research at the respective Jobcenters.  
Hansestadt 
Hamburg Hansestadt 
Bremen 
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Initially I drafted a formal consent form (in German) that I was prepared to give to the UBII 
recipient. The form explained that as a participant who freely consented to participate in my 
research project, they did not have to answer any questions they did not wish to, they were 
free to leave at any time, the interview was confidential and that any information they 
provided would be recorded and only used for the purpose of my research (see Appendix 2). 
After reading my proposed consent form, the Director of the Hamburg Jobcenter suggested 
that I did not use it because the nature of the form was too formal and as a result may frighten 
and confuse rather than assist recipients in understanding the parameters of their consent. He 
suggested that instead of providing respondents with a written consent form that I verbally 
explain the content of the consent form and ask their permission (which I had intended to do 
in addition to providing the UBII recipients with the written form). As I approached potential 
respondents in the waiting room I briefly explained the purpose of my research and asked if 
they would be willing to participate. Once we were seated in the office I then proceeded to 
explain in more detail the objective of the research, the purpose of the interview and what 
issues the interview would cover. I then informed potential respondents that they were free to 
leave at any time and they did not have to answer questions if they did not wish to. I stressed 
that the interview was anonymous, that their name or address would not be required and thus 
would never be made public. I then asked if they were comfortable with the interview being 
recorded and explained that the reason for doing this was to ensure that an accurate record of 
the interview was obtained that could then be used for analysis later on. Potential respondents 
were given the option of not being recorded in which case written notes would be taken 
(written notes were taken in two interviews).  
 
5.2.2 Anonymity of participants 
 
The following steps were taken in order to ensure that UBII recipient and case manager 
respondents remained anonymous in the research. First, participants’ names, addresses or any 
other personal information was never asked or required of them throughout the course of the 
interview. Therefore there was no need to anonymize their names. Instead participants were 
always referred to by their interview number (see Chapters Six, Seven and Eight). Second, 
recorded interviews were not shared with any other party except with the person I hired in 
Germany to transcribe interviews that were longer than twenty minutes. He agreed that the 
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information he transcribed would never be discussed with anyone. The transcripts were not 
shared with anyone outside of a selection I transcribed and translated in order to share with 
my PhD supervisors. But given the anonymity of the participant, they had no way of knowing 
who they were reading about. Individual Jobcenter offices and staff interviewed were not 
identified, though I was given permission by both Directors of the Hamburg and Bremen 
Jobcenters that I could use the name of the Jobcenter in my research if I wished.    
 
5.3 Research sample and the selection of cities 
 
This section discusses how the research sample of UBII recipients and Jobcenter case 
managers who were interviewed as part of the primary data collection was developed. Section 
5.3.1 describes the approach taken in order to select the cities where the interviews would 
take place, the selection of Jobcenters and how the sample was then generated. Section 5.3.2 
discusses the sample achieved and the limitations of the approach used.  
 
5.3.1 Sampling approach 
 
This is not a comparative study. I am not drawing a comparison between the responses 
obtained from the two different cities or the two different Jobcenters selected. Nor am I 
grouping and thus comparing respondents’ responses (i.e., male versus female, immigrant 
versus non-immigrant or young versus old respondents). Unemployment Benefit II recipients 
were the units of analysis in this research and I used a natural group sampling frame for 
selecting my sample (see below for further discussion) (Gaskell, 2000). Given that the 
objective of the research was to explore the experiences and perceptions of UBII recipients 
who participated in skills training or job placement services, it was necessary to first identify 
where in Germany the study would be carried out. Since I was not conducting a comparative 
study, it was a question of how best to go about selecting how many Jobcenters to conduct 
the research at and once the number was decided, where then the study should be conducted. 
Should the Jobcenters be in the former East or the former West or both? Which cities should 
the study be conducted in—should the cities be small, medium or large? Should there be an 
urban versus rural element? Did it really matter? Here I drew on elements of the Most Similar 
Systems Design (MSSD) approach to insert rigor in the selection of the location for the study. 
Finally, once the research cities were selected, it was a question of how to generate the main 
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research sample through the Jobcenters. The different stages of this process are discussed 
below.  
 
Selection of research sites 
 
As noted, the first question to arise in the process of selecting my sample was how many 
Jobcenters I should visit to collect my sample. Initially I considered going to six separate 
cities (i.e., six different Jobcenters) in Germany to conduct the interviews. But in discussion 
with my PhD supervisors, the PhD program administrators and my major review examiners, 
it was decided that two locations would suffice on account that this was not a comparative 
study. Since the Jobcenter was simply the place I was going to collect my sample, then 
whether it was at one or two or three Jobcenters would not make a difference. My reasons for 
wanting to visit more than one Jobcenter at two different locations was to ensure that what I 
was hearing from respondents at one Jobcenter was not just related to that particular 
Jobcenter. Thus by conducting interviews at more than one Jobcenter would allow me to 
check responses against each other to ensure they were not based on a particular one-off 
experience germane to a specific Jobcenter.   
 
Next it was a question of where in Germany I should conduct the fieldwork. At the time I was 
about to embark on my fieldwork in the late summer of 2011 the unemployment rate in some 
parts of the former East was 22 per cent.  
 
Figure 5.1 Per cent unemployed in East and West Germany 
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For this reason it was decided that my fieldwork should take place in the former West.
 108
 The 
concern was that, owing to the high rate of unemployment in the former East, there was the 
potential that there would be little variation in the type of UBII recipient available to be 
interviewed. In other words, I did not want to be confronted with a scenario where, in a 
medium sized city with one in four unemployed and no prospects of finding work, 
respondents were relating the same experience. Therefore it was decided that my fieldwork 
would take place in the West and I would draw on aspects of a Most Similar Systems Design 
(MSSD) approach to assist in the selection of the two cities where the fieldwork would be 
conducted. But it is important to stress that the conventional MSSD approach was not 
adopted. The typical MSSD approach is used in comparative qualitative research in which 
two areas are selected that are similar except with regard to the phenomenon being assessed 
and analysed (Anckar, 2007). Although I am not conducting a comparative study between 
two cities, two Jobcenters or groups of respondents, the sampling strategy arguably 
resembled MSSD insofar as it sought similar contexts for the fieldwork. Technically the 
application of MSSD requires researchers to choose, in this case two cities, that are similar in 
a number of specified variables (the ‘control’ variables) and different with regard to only one 
aspect—the ‘dependent’ variable under study (in this case the experiences of UBII 
recipients). This is done to ensure that the selection of Hamburg and Bremen as the cities to 
conduct my fieldwork meant that ideally any difference in the phenomena studied—UBII 
recipients’ experience of skills training and job placement services—would not, generally, 
only be dependent on external factors, such as the size of the city or the unemployment rate 
or the employment landscape. Of course, these factors do matter in explaining the differences 
in the phenomena studied. But my purpose thereby was to confirm whether or not the 
consistency of the resulting data might be clearly distributed by some influence relating to 
subtle or unforeseen difference between the two Jobcenter cites. This, though, was not the 
case.   
 
The Free Hanseatic City-States of Hamburg and Bremen were selected because they are 
similar in a number of criteria, though they are not an exact or perfect match. Both Bremen 
and Hamburg are medieval port city-states with a post-war history of left-leaning leadership 
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 East Germany experienced a slight decline in economic performance in 2011. Compared to the West, the gross domestic product per 
capita in East Germany fell from 73 per cent in 2010 to 71 per cent in 2011 (BMI, 2012). Results from Germany’s first census since 
reunification show that two decades after reunification, East Germany remains a very different place from the west — older, whiter and 
more likely to be out of work (BMI, 2012).  
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(SPD). While in past centuries Bremen's port was the ‘key to Europe’, Hamburg has long 
since surpassed Bremen and is now the largest port in Germany. According to the European 
Metromonitor produced by LSE Cities, in 2012 Hamburg’s unemployment rate was 8.2 per 
cent while Bremen’s was 11.4 per cent. Both cities have robust economies with Hamburg’s 
gross value added (GVA) growth rate at 0.91 per cent and Bremen’s at 1.44 per cent. Bremen 
and Hamburg have diverse economies. Hamburg specializes in renewable energies, logistics, 
aviation, life sciences, maritime technologies, nanotechnology and media, IT und 
telecommunication. In comparison, Bremen has a strong manufacturing industry, logistics, 
shipbuilding and foodstuffs (food and semi-luxuries industry), aerospace industry, marine 
technology, electrical engineering, mobile multimedia communications, material sciences, 
environmental research, information and telecommunications technologies and informatics. 
Hamburg is a much larger city than Bremen with a population of 3,250,797 million compared 
to Bremen’s population of 738,305.  
 
Per the European Metromonitor, in 2012 Hamburg had an employment growth rate of 1.39 
per cent and was the 5th largest metropolitan region in Germany by population. In 2012 
Hamburg was the 2nd metropolitan region in Germany in terms of employment growth and 
had been growing without interruption for nine years. From 1996 to 2012 Hamburg had 
known four years of negative growth rates.  
 
Figure 5.2 Hamburg’s indexed growth: Employment 
 
Source: European Metromonitor 
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Figure 5.3 Hamburg indexed growth by sector 
Source: European Metromonitor 
 
Hamburg’s GVA growth rate was 0.91 per cent in 2012. In 2012 it was the 12th metropolitan 
region in Germany in terms of GVA growth and had been growing without interruption for 
three years. From 1996 to 2012 Hamburg had known two years of negative growth rates. 
 
Figure 5.4 Hamburg’s indexed growth: gross value added (GVA) 
 
Source: European Metromonitor 
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Figure 5.5 Hamburg’s indexed growth: gross value added (GVA) by sector 
Source: European Metromonitor 
 
Compared to Hamburg, Bremen had an employment growth rate of 0.81 per cent.  Bremen 
was the 16th largest metropolitan region in Germany by population.  In 2012, Bremen was 
the 17th metropolitan region in Germany in terms of employment growth and had been 
growing without interruption for three years. From 1996 to 2012 Bremen had known seven 
years of negative growth rates (European Metromonitor). 
 
Figure 5.6 Bremen’s indexed growth: employment 
 
Source: European Metromonitor 
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Figure 5.7 Bremen’s indexed growth by sector 
Source: European Metromonitor 
 
In 2012 Bremen had a GVA growth rate of 1.44 per cent. In 2012, it was the 6th metropolitan 
region in Germany in terms of GVA growth and had been growing without interruption for 
three years. In comparison to Hamburg, from 1996 to 2012 Bremen had known three years of 
negative growth rates. 
 
Figure 5.8 Bremen’s indexed growth: gross value added (GVA) 
 
Source: European Metromonitor 
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Figure 5.9 Bremen’s indexed growth: gross value added (GVA) by sector 
Source: European Metromonitor 
 
Selection of Jobcenters 
 
Once the two cities were selected based on the criteria above, it was a question of which 
Jobcenters in Hamburg and Bremen would host my research. Jobcenters are the national 
statutory employment service for those in receipt of Unemployment Benefit II. This 
employment service operates through local offices (Jobcenters) that are managed at the 
municipal level. The delivery of services, such as skills training and to some extent job 
placement services, are sub-contracted out to a range of private and third-sector providers at 
the municipal level. Jobcenters are located throughout Germany and ‘clients’ register at a 
specific Jobcenter according to their area of residence based on their address.  
 
While I could have sought to gain access to my sample in a number of different ways, my 
reason for wanting to access my sample at the Jobcenter directly was based on my use of a 
‘natural group’ sampling frame for selecting my sample (Gaskell, 2000). Here I needed to be 
at a location where I could technically gain access to every type of person in receipt of 
benefit. The waiting room of the Jobcenter posed the most logical place for that. Once it was 
agreed that Bremen and Hamburg would be the cities in which to conduct my research, I then 
non-discriminately sent out an introductory email to all Jobcenters located in Bremen and 
Hamburg respectively. Thus the selection of Jobcenters in each city was essentially 
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determined by which Jobcenter responded positively to my initial query. Given that I was 
seeking a natural group sampling frame it was important to access a diverse range of 
individuals on UBII. While it could be argued that a Jobcenter located in a wealthier part of 
town might attract a different ‘type’ of jobseeker than a working class neighbourhood, the 
Hamburg and Bremen municipalities were generally divided in such a way that the 
Jobcenters were positioned in an area that usually included a diverse socio-economic 
demographic. For example, the Jobcenter Mitte in Bremen included the postcodes for those 
living in the traditionally working class neighbourhood behind the train station and the 
wealthy upper-middle class neighbourhood called the ‘Viertel’ along the Weser.  
 
Accessing the sample: UBII recipients and Jobcenter staff interviewees 
 
The decision to interview 50 UBII recipients was a pre-defined target. I decided on 50 for 
two reasons. First, I wanted to have a large-enough sample so that I could ensure saturation. 
Second, 50 respondents would capture a range of responses that would result in a rich 
analysis of the data. Initially the study was to be solely respondent driven because it was 
UBII recipient views and experiences that I was interested in accessing. The idea to interview 
case managers was a suggestion made by my major review examiners. They suggested 
interviewing a small sample of case managers in order to cross-check my initial findings 
stemming from my interviews with UBII recipients. As a result of their suggestion, I decided 
that I would seek to interview five or six case managers. In retrospect I would have expanded 
my sample to ten to fifteen case managers given how rich and ultimately how helpful the case 
manager interviews ended up being to understanding my analysis of UBII recipient 
responses. Interviewing a larger number of case managers would have meant a richer analysis 
of their responses. But it was only after the fieldwork was completed and I had started the 
analysis of both UBII recipient and case manager interviews that I realized these limitations.     
 
UBII recipients 
 
Once the Jobcenters in Hamburg and Bremen agreed that I could access UBII recipients by 
positioning myself in the waiting room of the Jobcenter it was up to me to approach 
recipients to ask if they would participate in my study. But the manager of the ‘client centre’ 
(Kundezentrum) in Hamburg —generally the first point of entry for UBII recipients—
suggested that her staff act as gatekeeper to the UBII recipients. The manager proposed that I 
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position myself in an office adjacent to the client centre counter. Unless recipients have an 
appointment to meet with their case manager directly, all administrative issues are dealt with 
at the client centre. Here recipients take a number and wait in the waiting room until their 
number is called and then they approach the counter. There are usually three to five Jobcenter 
staff who sit behind the client centre counter and manage recipients’ issues. The manager in 
Hamburg suggested that those staff members who worked the client centre counter would, 
after the UBII recipient’s business was completed, inform the recipient about the study being 
conducted and ask whether they wished to participate. If the recipient agreed, the staff 
member would send the recipient to me. I was not in agreement with this idea, as it ushered in 
a series of problems with sample selection and bias that would greatly impact my study. 
Moreover, this extreme reliance on gatekeepers in the research process could prove 
problematic given the potential power relationship between the gatekeeper (i.e., the client 
centre staff) and the interviewees. What kind of exchange transpired between the client centre 
staff member and the UBII recipient had the potential to influence an interviewees’ decision 
(and potential consent) to participate in the study (Wiles et al., 2007). UBII recipients may 
have felt they had to participate in order to secure or retain their benefit. Furthermore, the 
staff member may have been self-selecting who they asked and did not ask to participate 
based on their perceived notion of who was the ‘right’ person to participate in the study. 
Thus, after the first two days of following these instructions and being sent potential 
respondents who generally could not be interviewed on account of them not meeting the 
criteria for the study (for example, one Afghan women did not speak any German and one 
man had just signed up for UBII and had no experience to relate), I noted this problem to the 
manager and it was agreed that I would sit in the waiting area and approach UBII recipients 
on my own. This was also the method used in Bremen. I deleted the two interviews that I 
conducted in those first two days in Hamburg and started afresh when I was free to approach 
respondents on my own. This thus eliminated the role of the gatekeeper in my sample 
selection of UBII recipients.  
 
As I noted earlier, for this study I used Gaskell’s (2000) natural group selection process for 
my sampling frame. The traditional option is to use standard statistical or taxonomic groups 
to select respondents, i.e., sex, age, a specific social category (i.e., refugees) or a geographical 
split, (i.e., urban versus rural). Gaskell argues instead for the use of natural groups as an 
alternative approach to thinking about segmentation. With natural groups individuals share 
something in common, i.e., they are all unemployed. Instead of assuming that social and 
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demographic characteristics will be an indication of differing views on a given topic, the 
selection of respondents can instead be based on relevant natural groups or social milieus 
(Gaskell, 2000). For the purpose of my research, I sought to achieve the maximum variation 
of the sample as was feasible within the confines of my methodology. In order to answer my 
two research questions I required a sample that captured and described a central theme but 
also one that cut across a great deal of variation in the type of respondents interviewed. My 
research objective was not to investigate the experiences of just women or just the disabled or 
just youth nor to draw a comparison between groups. Rather my aim was to understand how a 
policy, that is designed for anyone between the ages of 18 and 65 who is unemployed for 
more than 12-months and therefore eligible for UBII, impacts a wide swath of individuals 
and their circumstances. One of the strengths in applying heterogeneity sampling is that “any 
common patterns that emerge from great variation are of particular interest and value in 
capturing the core experiences and central shared dimensions of a setting or phenomenon” 
(Patton, 2002: 235). When selecting a sample of great diversity, Patton (2002) argues that the 
collection and analysis will yield two findings: high quality, detailed descriptions of each 
case and important shared patterns that cut across cases and derive their significance because 
they emerged out of heterogeneity.  
 
Jobcenter staff 
 
Although the main objective of my study was to focus on UBII recipients’ experiences with 
skills training and job placement services coupled with understanding perceptions about 
recipients right to and responsibility in finding work, I interviewed a very small sample of 
case managers in order to triangulate and thus cross check my findings derived from my 
interviews with UBII recipients. While these five interviews were meant to be more 
contextual in nature and were not a focal point of my research, they nonetheless provided 
important and insightful information into the thinking behind and strategy for skills training 
and job placements services. My original intent was to interview case managers from 
Jobcenters in Hamburg and Bremen. In my initial meeting with the Directors of the Jobcenter 
in Hamburg and Bremen it was agreed that they would provide me with the names of staff I 
could interview. Towards the end of my fieldwork at the Jobcenter in Hamburg I found out 
that my gatekeeper, the then Director of the Jobcenter, had left his position. I proceeded to 
make telephone calls and send emails to the interim Director asking if I could complete my 
research by interviewing two to three case managers, but my request was not acknowledged. 
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Thus through a colleague in the Department of Social Policy at the LSE I was able to make 
contact with one case manager at a Jobcenter in Berlin who was very willing to conduct an 
interview with me. After our interview he subsequently recommended two other colleagues 
that I could approach to be interviewed. Potential respondents for a study made through 
contacts from friends or acquaintances can prove problematic. The person contacted may feel 
obligated to participate based on the suggestion coming from an acquaintance or friend. To 
minimize this problem I explained to each case manager that they were under no obligation to 
participate in the study just because they knew the person who recommended them to me.  
 
The interviews with the case managers in Bremen were arranged through a gatekeeper—the 
Jobcenter Director. Here I was provided with the names and email addresses of two case 
managers who worked at two different Jobcenters in Bremen and separate from the Jobcenter 
I conducted my fieldwork at. They were made aware that I would be emailing them asking to 
arrange a time for an interview. Again the use of a gatekeeper in selecting staff members to 
participate in my study posed potential problems with selection bias. The Director as 
gatekeeper may have been inclined to approach staff who he or she thinks will present the 
Jobcenter and its services in a non-critical and positive fashion. Moreover staff members may 
feel that they have to participate in the study when asked by a senior member of staff. Given 
that staff could only be approach in this way (i.e., they would not have agreed to be 
interviewed without authorization from a senior member of staff), there were few other 
options for accessing staff. To ensure that those staff members selected to be interviewed 
were there because they wanted to be, before carrying out the interviews with each case 
manager, I explained the purpose of the research, the purpose of the interview and I verified 
that they were willing to participate. In the end, staff interviewed did speak critically about 
the context in which they worked (and were assured of anonymity before being interviewed). 
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5.3.2 Sample achieved and limitations 
 
Table 5.1 Research sample 
Research site  Provider UBII recipient interviews Staff interviews  
Hamburg  Jobcenter  25    0 
Bremen  Jobcenter  25    2 
Berlin   None       3 
Total      50    5  
 
The limitations of the sample reflect, in part, some of the issues discussed previously in 
relation to the sampling approach. By obtaining a sample through approaching UBII 
recipients at only two Jobcenters in Germany, the sample is essentially restricted to the 
experiences of a relatively small number of respondents. Moreover, the challenge with my 
sample is that I do not know the counterfactual. The UBII recipients with the more positive 
experiences of job search and placement assistance or skills training were likely to be in 
receipt of benefit for only a short period of time before they found employment. Hence this 
group of recipients was less likely to enter the sampling frame. However, this limitation can 
also be seen as a strength. In the natural sample I accessed, I was more likely to encounter the 
longer-term and/or harder-to-help recipients—members of the precariat who pose the greatest 
challenge to the system and whose experiences—in the context of my research questions—
are arguably, therefore, most salient.  
 
Then there is the issue of my own sample bias in selecting respondents I approached to ask if 
they would like to participate in my research. I was cognizant of the fact that I sorted people 
based on how they appeared to me. For example, I did not approach recipients who were 
visibly incapacitated or respondents who appeared aggressive. Phillips and Earle (2010) 
argue that the researcher’s biographical histories and composite identities directly affect field 
relationships and interactions. Thus who we are—our ethnicity, sex and class—invariably 
shapes “how our own positions and interests are, sometimes discretely, imposed throughout 
the research process, influencing the questions we ask, the ones we don’t, who we interview 
and who we don’t, how we interview, how we listen and how we don’t, and ultimately, how 
we understand” (Phillips and Earle, 2010: 363). I was highly cognizant of my position at the 
Jobcenter as a white, highly educated, upper middle class American. It is a question of the 
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degree to which my personhood invariably affected the lens through which I approached my 
research or in this case, who I selected to ask to participate in my research. Indeed, as Phillips 
and Earle (2010) argue, our position generally, and as researchers specifically, should not be 
ignored or isolated, rather viewed as methodologically significant. While I did not want to 
filter who I did and did not approach to participate in my study, nonetheless I realized that I 
was categorizing people based on their appearance as ‘approachable’ or ‘not approachable’. 
This might have to do with their general appearance; whether they dressed nicely, had a 
pleasant look on their face or interacted in a friendly manner with the client centre staff 
member. I tended to shy away from, for example, young men in their late teens or early 
twenties who wore a type of stone-washed jean that gave off an aggressive appearance. It was 
not the jeans that were aggressive per se rather the person wearing the jeans, but the type of 
jeans came to represent aggressiveness. I realized early on in my fieldwork that I was sorting 
people based on their appearance and, thus, decided to challenge myself and approach those 
who I normally would have shied away from. Interestingly, the person who appeared nice and 
approachable was often the very person who was rude or would laugh at me when I explained 
what I was doing and, indeed, it was the gruff appearing person who often proved willing to 
assist me. Moreover, after initially meeting with the client centre staff member, many 
recipients are forwarded to other offices in the Jobcenter. As a result, those who passed me by 
often could not participate as they had elsewhere to go. This sample is therefore only able to 
serve the purpose of a qualitative study by exploring a small number of cases in order to gain 
more in-depth data on respondents’ experiences and perceptions. There are clearly limitations 
to the inferences that may be drawn regarding the experiences of the wider population of 
UBII recipients based on this sample, but this is discussed in section 5.6.3 below.   
 
Characteristics of UBII recipients 
 
We can, however, place the sample in the wider context of UBII recipients as a whole (see 
Tables 5.2 and 5.3). Using data supplied by the Federal Employment Agency, Brenke 
analysed the demographic characteristics of individuals in receipt of UBII between 2005 and 
2009. Contrary to popular belief, not even half of the workless UBII recipients are long-term 
unemployed according to official statistics (Brenke, 2010). During this time period, Brenke 
found that overall about one tenth of the population receives UBII benefits. Indeed, single 
parents under the age of 25 and immigrants are the groups with a very high percentage of 
recipients. The percentage of immigrants who are recipients is twice as high as the percentage 
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of Germans. Adults in couple households make up a comparatively low percentage of 
recipients on benefit. One in six single individuals, one in four single parents and 80 percent 
of all young single parents receive UBII (Brenke, 2010). There was a strikingly high number 
of UBII recipients without professional training, particularly from immigrant populations 
who were in receipt of benefit. The percentage of older individuals receiving benefit is 
relatively low. However, between 2005 and 2009 persons over the age of 55 are the only 
group with rising numbers of recipients. The numbers have gone down in all other age 
groups—especially for youth and young adults. Furthermore, recipients of UBII live more 
often than the average in regions with high unemployment rates and few employment 
opportunities (Brenke, 2010).  
 
Table 5.2 Recipients of UBII benefits by selected characteristics 
     Annual average 2008     September 2009 
Number of persons percentage of that          Number of persons      percentage of that        
population group1    population group1 
Germans 
Under the age of 152                                   1 466 755                     14.7       1 471 483        14.7 
15-64 years                                                              4 113 957                           8.5                                       3 995 409                           8.2 
Total                                                                        5 580 712                           9.5                                       5 466 892                           9.3 
Foreigners 
Under the age of 152                                                                                            271 792                      29.4                                          265 407                         28.7 
15-64 years                                                                   966 643                  16.7                                          971 907                         16.8 
Total                                                                        1 238 435                       18.5                                       1 237 314                         18.5 
Total 
Under the age of 15                                                1 825 523                       16.7                                       1 746 189                         15.9 
15-24 years                                                                   988 460                        10.1                                          910 988                           9.3 
25-54 years                                                             3 365 693                           9.6                                       3 322 335                           9.4 
55-64 years                                                                  688 094                            7.1                                          719 132                           7.3 
Selected household types 
Singles                                                                    1 883 477                         17.0                                       1 950 697                         17.6 
Single parents2                                                                                                            652 286                        27.9                                          636 003                         27.2 
      Thereof: under the age of 252                                                             78 277                         86.0                                            75 223                         82.7 
Total                                                                       6 906 953                       10.5                                       6 733 742                         10.2 
1 Population according to Mikrozensus 2008. 
2 Estimations based on marginal distributions. 
Sources: Federal Employment Agency, Federal Statistical Office, calculations by DIW Berlin.     
Source: Brenke, 2010 
 
 
Table 5.3 Unemployed persons 2009 by group and selected characteristics 
Percentages 
SGB II (UBII) SGB III (UBI) 
Men     53.3   56.9 
Women     46.7   43.1 
Germans     81.9   89.9 
Foreigners    18.1   10.1 
West Germany    65.1   72.8 
East Germany    34.9   27.2 
Severely handicapped persons     4.5     5.6 
Long term unemployed1    41.2   11.0 
Persons without professional training1  54.4   25.3 
15 – under 25 years      8.6   15.5 
50 – under 65 years    24.2   31.5 
55 – under 65 years    11.5   20.2 
1 Only unemployed persons from IT procedure of the Federal Employment Agency. 
Sources: Federal Employment Agency, calculations by DIW Berlin. 
Source: Brenke, 2010 
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Country of origin, age and sex 
 
As well as German, the 50 UBII recipients who participated in this study were from a range 
of countries. Immigrant citizenship status in Germany is complicated by the fact that although 
a child of immigrant parents may be born in Germany, they are not automatically granted 
citizenship. It is common in Germany to have second and third generation immigrants who 
were born in Germany but are not ‘German’. Thus a proportion of respondents were born in 
Germany but still identified themselves by their parents’ country of origin (see table 5.4 for 
details). Eighteen of the 50 respondents were born outside of Germany. Three respondents 
classified themselves as German-born but of another nationality. Twenty-nine respondents 
were German, in that they were born in Germany and were German citizens. Of the 50 
interviewed, 28 were men and 22 were women. Respondents for this study were between the 
ages of 22 and 64, with 40 being the average age.  
 
Education and employment 
 
There was a wide diversity of education and employment backgrounds amongst the 
respondents; from respondents who had not advanced past year nine to those with post-
graduate degrees. At the time of the fieldwork, four respondents only had an elementary 
school education level, 11 respondents graduated from the Hauptschule, 11 respondents from 
the Realschule and 14 respondents from the Gymnasium.
109
 In addition, 12 respondents had 
university degrees and 16 had apprenticeship certificates. Respondents’ employment 
backgrounds were as varied as their educational backgrounds—from those who did ‘odd 
jobs’ to respondents who were teachers, architects and engineers (see table 5.5 for more 
detail). 
 
Use of Jobcenter and its services 
 
All 50 respondents were in receipt of UBII. That said seven respondents were technically on 
UBI but receiving UBII top-up because they had either worked for too short a time-period 
and/or their wage was too low so that their UBI amount, which is based on a percentage of 
                                                 
109
Students are tracked after four years of elementary schooling in Germany. Based on their performance, they are sent to either the 
Hauptschule (general school) which offers Lower Secondary Education, a Realschule or the Gymnasium. Students spend five to six years at 
the Hauptschule, from 5th to 9th (or 10th) grade. They finish at about age 15-16. Students finish the Realschule at about 16-17 and 
Gymnasium students finish at 18. Though there are some exceptions, only students who graduated from the Gymnasium can attend 
university.  
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one’s earnings through social insurance contributions, was too low on its own. Thus, they 
received a percent of UBII to top up their UBI benefit. In addition, of the 50 respondents six 
were working but on account that their wage being too low, they too were also receiving 
UBII top-up. Three of the 50 respondents were on statutory maternity leave—the German 
government provides up to three years of statutory maternity leave. If a person has little to no 
prior work experience and, thus, cannot receive Elternzeit, a paid parental leave scheme for 
those who work, they then are eligible to receive UBII for up to three years. Two respondents 
were currently categorized as disabled and, thus, were in receipt of UBII but not obliged to 
meet work requirements, though they had prior experience of UBII. Three respondents 
received UBII but were categorized as ‘partially disabled’ which meant that they still had to 
meet work requirements.
110
 Of the 50 respondents interviewed, 39 participated in one or more 
skills training. In principle all respondents had access to job placement services given that 
they had a case manager. That said, some respondents cited having little contact with their 
case manager and/or not receiving any assistance in terms of job placement.  
   
Table 5.4 Characteristics of UBII respondents 
 Interview Sex Age Nationality 
Family 
 Status 
Number of 
Children 
Do you live 
alone or with 
someone? 
  
1 Male 34 India Married 1 
With wife and 
child 
  
2 
Female—lone 
parent 39 Nigeria Single 2 With children 
  
3 
Male (partially 
disabled) 32 Turkey Married ? With family 
  
4 
Female—lone 
parent 22 Albania Single 1 With child 
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 Unemployment Benefit II is a benefit for individuals who are ‘capable to work’ (§ 8 SGB II Erwerbsfähigkeit). ‘Capability to work’ 
(Erwerbsfähigkeit) places reformed UBII benefit on the one side and disability pensions or – in the absence of a pension entitlement – 
residual social assistance on the other (§ 4 ff. SGB IX). There are a high percent of individuals with health impairments who receive UBII 
(27%) (Brussig and Knuth, 2010). Long-term health impairments and severe disability are not the same as being incapable to work per the 
Social Code Book. Even when a person has a health impairment, so long as the person can work at least three hours per day under normal 
conditions of the general labour market, he or she is considered ‘capable to work’ per the law. Thus, both the temporarily ill or partially 
disabled and those currently not available for work because of caring responsibilities are considered ‘able to work’. In order to determine 
who, with health impairments, is ‘capable to work’, individuals are evaluated and legally placed in either the category of ‘partially’ versus 
‘severely disabled’. Handicapped individuals who receive a grade of 50 and above and live in the Federal Republic are classified as severely 
handicapped according to § 2 SGB IX. For those who are partially disabled (grade of below 50) or have a health impairment but deemed 
capable to work, the Federal Employment Agency, its regional directorates and local employment agencies provide occupational integration 
assistance if no other fund is responsible. Occupational integration assistance for job seekers who are partially disabled but able to work and 
in need of assistance is provided by the Jobcenters serving jobseekers under Book II of the Social Code (BMAS, 2014a; BMAS 2014b).  
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 Interview Sex Age Nationality 
Family 
 Status 
Number of 
Children 
Do you live 
alone or with 
someone? 
  
5 Female 37 German Married 2 
With husband 
and children 
  
6 Female (disabled) 64 Poland Divorced 1 Alone 
  
7 Male (disabled) 51 German Single 0 Alone 
  
8 Male 42 German Single 0 Alone 
  
9  Male 28 Kazakhstan Single 0 
Lives with 
parents 
 10 Male 45 German Single 0 Alone 
 11 
Female—lone 
parent 32 
Born in 
Germany, 
Tunisian Divorced 2 
Lives with two 
children 
 12 
Female (partially 
disabled) 29 German Single 0 Alone 
 13 Male 38 German Single 0 Alone 
 14 Male 38 German Single 0 Alone 
 15 Male 61 German Single 0 Alone 
 16 Male 64 Cambodia Married 0 With Wife 
 17 Female 58 German Divorced 3 Alone 
 18 Female 28 German Single 0 Alone 
 19 Female 34 
German born, 
Turkish Married 2 With family 
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 Interview Sex Age Nationality 
Family 
 Status 
Number of 
Children 
Do you live 
alone or with 
someone? 
 20 Male 34 Indian Married 2 With family 
 21 
Female—lone 
parent 36 Ghana Single 3 With children 
 22 Male 30 German Single 0 With girlfriend 
 23 
Female—lone 
parent 33 German Single 2 
With two 
children and her 
mother 
 24 Male 60 Iran Divorced 2 Alone 
 25 Female 24 German Single 0 Alone 
 26 Male 63 Ghana Married 5 Alone 
 27 Male 27 
German/ 
American Single 0 Alone 
 28 Female 33 Lebanon Married 5 
With husband 
and children 
 29 
Female—lone 
parent 50 Iran Divorced 1 With daughter 
 30 
Female—lone 
parent 48 German Divorced 7 With children 
 31 
Female—lone 
parent 32 Nigeria Single 1 With daughter 
 32 Male 33 German Single 0 Alone 
 33 Female 32 German Married 1 
With husband 
and daughter 
 34 Male 40 Turkey Single 0 Alone 
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 Interview Sex Age Nationality 
Family 
 Status 
Number of 
Children 
Do you live 
alone or with 
someone? 
 35 
Female—lone 
parent 49 German Single 1 With son 
 36 
Male (partially 
disabled) 52 Turkey Single 0 Alone 
 37 Male 32 German Single 0 Alone 
 38 Female 40 
German born, 
Turkish Married 2 With family 
 39 Male 23 German Single 0 Alone 
 40 Male 32 German Single 0 
Shared 
accommodation 
 41 Male 25 German Single 0 Alone 
 42 Male 36 German Single 0 
Shared 
accommodation 
 43 Male 59 German Single 0 Alone 
 44 
Female—lone 
parent 33 German Single 1 With child 
 45 Female 46 German Single 0 Alone 
 46 Male 39 Ivory Coast Married 2 With family 
 47 Male 58 German Divorced 0 Alone 
 48 Male—lone parent 48 Morocco Divorced 1 Alone 
 49 Male 38 German Married 1 With family 
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 Interview Sex Age Nationality 
Family 
 Status 
Number of 
Children 
Do you live 
alone or with 
someone? 
 50 Male 40 German Single 0 With girlfriend 
130 
 
Table 5.5 UBII respondent education and employment characteristics 
Sex/Family/ 
Immigration 
status 
Grade 
School 
Haupt- 
schule 
Real- 
schule Gymnasium University 
Apprentice- 
ship UBI 
UB
II 
Working, 
receiving 
UBII top-
up 
State 
Maternity 
Leave 
Currently 
registered 
disabled Last Job 
In receipt 
of UBII 
since 
Unemployed 
with 
interruption 
(i.e., worked)? 
Last Job 
Temp Work 
Male/German  X    X  X   X Cook 2005   
Male/Indian         X   Cook 
Three 
months   
Male/German  X    X  X    Sales One year  X 
Female/ 
Tunisian/Lone 
Parent    X    X  X  Assistant One year   
Female/ 
German  X     X X    
Hospital/food 
purchaser Nov. 2010  X 
Male/German  X      X    
Janitor-One-
Euro-Job 
March 
2011  X 
Male/German     X X  X    Engineer One year  X 
Male/German X       X    
One-Euro-
Job 2005  X 
Male/German  X    X  X    Painter One year  X 
Male/ 
Kazakhstan   X   X  X    
Call centre 
agent 
Nine 
months   
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Sex/Family/ 
Immigration 
status 
Grade 
School 
Haupt- 
schule 
Real- 
schule Gymnasium University 
Apprentice- 
ship UBI 
UB
II 
Working, 
receiving 
UBII top-
up 
State 
Maternity 
Leave 
Currently 
registered 
disabled Last Job 
In receipt 
of UBII 
since 
Unemployed 
with 
interruption 
(i.e., worked)? 
Last Job 
Temp Work 
Female/ 
German/Lone 
Parent   X     X  X  
Finishing 
school Five years   
Female/ 
German    X X   X    
Graphic 
design 2005 X  
Male/Ivory 
Coast    X X   X    Engineer 
Three 
months   
Male/German  X      X    Mechanic 2005 X  
Male/Morocco/
Lone parent    X    X    
Home care 
for elderly 2007   
Male/German    X X   X    Student One year   
Female/ 
German   X   X      Seamstress One year   
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Sex/Family/ 
Immigration 
status 
Grade 
School 
Haupt- 
schule 
Real- 
schule Gymnasium University 
Apprentice- 
ship UBI 
UB
II 
Working, 
receiving 
UBII top-
up 
State 
Maternity 
Leave 
Currently 
registered 
disabled Last Job 
In receipt 
of UBII 
since 
Unemployed 
with 
interruption 
(i.e., worked)? 
Last Job 
Temp Work 
Male/German    X X   X    Architect 2006 X  
Female/ 
German        X   X 
Nestle 
Factory Five years   
Male/German    X    X    
Packaging 
warehouse Four years X  
Female/ 
German born 
Turkish 
citizenship   X   X   X   Cleaner Six years X  
Male/German X       X    
In process of 
completing 
school 2.5 years   
Female/ 
Albanian/Lone 
parent        X  X  
One-Euro-
Job Bakery 
Several 
years X  
Male/German    X X   X    Teacher 1.5 years X  
Male/German   X     X    
Packaging 
warehouse 
Nine 
months X X 
Male/German    X X   X    
One-Euro-
Job art 
gallery Two years   
Male/German      X      Sales 2007   
Female/ 
Nigerian  X      X    Homemaker Six months   
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Sex/Family/ 
Immigration 
status 
Grade 
School 
Haupt- 
schule 
Real- 
schule Gymnasium University 
Apprentice- 
ship UBI 
UB
II 
Working, 
receiving 
UBII top-
up 
State 
Maternity 
Leave 
Currently 
registered 
disabled Last Job 
In receipt 
of UBII 
since 
Unemployed 
with 
interruption 
(i.e., worked)? 
Last Job 
Temp Work 
Male/German    X X   X    
One-Euro-
Job 2006  X 
Female/ 
German   X   X   X   Bakery One year X X 
Male/Turkey X       X    Odd jobs 2008 X  
Female/ 
German/Lone 
Parent   X   X  X    Secretary Two years   
Male/Turkey  X    X  X   
X (partially 
disabled) Electrician Two years   
Male/German  X      X    
Stacked 
boxes 
warehouse 1.5 years  X 
Female/ 
German/Lone 
parent  X      X  X  
One-Euro-
Job kitchen 
Several 
years   
Male/Iran    X  X  X    
One-Euro-
Job library 2000 X X 
Female/ 
German   X   X  X    
One-Euro-
Job 2009  X 
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Sex/Family/ 
Immigration 
status 
Grade 
School 
Haupt- 
schule 
Real- 
schule Gymnasium University 
Apprentice- 
ship UBI 
UB
II 
Working, 
receiving 
UBII top-
up 
State 
Maternity 
Leave 
Currently 
registered 
disabled Last Job 
In receipt 
of UBII 
since 
Unemployed 
with 
interruption 
(i.e., worked)? 
Last Job 
Temp Work 
Male/ 
Ghanaian  X    X  X    Seaman Three years   
Male/German   X   X X X    Tires 
Eleven 
months   
Female/ 
Lebanese X       X    Homemaker 2005   
Female/Iran/ 
Lone parent    X X   X    Bakery Two years   
Male/Turkey        X   X 
One-Euro-
Job 
Drycleaners 2005 X X 
Female/ 
German/ Lone 
Parent   X     X    
Divorced, 
homemaker 2005   
Male/ 
Cambodian        X    
Restaurant 
owner Two years   
Female/ 
German   X     X    
Divorced, 
homemaker 2005   
Female/ 
Ghanaian        X    Cleaner Three years   
Female/ 
German     X   X    
Graphic 
designer Oct. 2010 X X 
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Sex/Family/ 
Immigration 
status 
Grade 
School 
Haupt- 
schule 
Real- 
schule Gymnasium University 
Apprentice- 
ship UBI 
UB
II 
Working, 
receiving 
UBII top-
up 
State 
Maternity 
Leave 
Currently 
registered 
disabled Last Job 
In receipt 
of UBII 
since 
Unemployed 
with 
interruption 
(i.e., worked)? 
Last Job 
Temp Work 
Male/Indian    X X   X    Consultant One year   
Female/ 
Nigerian/Lone 
parent      X  X    Cashier Two years   
Female/ 
German/ 
Turkish       X X   X    
Social 
worker 
August 
2012   
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5.4 Interview process 
 
Qualitative interviews provide the basic data for the development and understanding of the 
relationships between social actors and their situations. “The objective is a fine-textured 
understanding of beliefs, attitudes, values and motivations in relation to the behaviours of 
people in particular social contexts” (Gaskell, 2000: 38-39). This section will explore the type 
of interview used, how the interview schedule was developed and adapted and the type of 
questions posed to respondents. 
 
5.4.1 Type of interview 
 
The different types of qualitative interviews are categorized in the literature, generally, as 
structured, semi-structured and unstructured. Patton, for example, distinguishes between the 
‘informal conversational interview’, the ‘general interview guide approach’ and the 
‘standardized open-ended interview’ (Patton, 2000). Yet the categorization of interviews into 
‘structured’, ‘semi-structured’ or ‘unstructured’ has been criticized by some researchers as 
unrealistic, given that most interviews, including the ‘unstructured’ interview, have some sort 
of structure to them. Indeed, a combination of structured and unstructured may be used in the 
same study, if not interchangeably in the same interview (Pole and Lampard, 2002). A semi-
structured interview schedule was adopted and used for this study. On the one hand, an 
interview schedule was needed to ensure consistency in the topics covered and the questions 
asked across all interviews. But on the other, in order to gain insight into respondents’ 
experiences and perceptions of skills training and job placement services, it was important to 
have a flexible interview schedule that ensured set questions were asked but allowed for room 
to explore issues further, should the need arise. This was particularly important when posing 
questions to respondents about their perception of a right and responsibility to work. For a 
high proportion of respondents, the concept of a ‘right’ and ‘responsibility’ to work were new 
to them. This meant that questions posed often had to be explained or rephrased or additional 
questions needed to be asked when short ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answers were given. A structured 
interview schedule would not have easily allowed for this. Ultimately the semi-structured 
interview schedule was used more as a guide or a checklist. This enabled topics to be 
explored appropriately. For example, if a respondent started discussing their experience of 
skills trainings prior to the question being asked, then I adjusted the interview schedule to 
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allow for this, rather than sticking rigidly to the format and sequencing of questions set out in 
the interview schedule. I made sure to steer the interviewee back to the other questions after 
they had answered the questions on skill training placements, for example. 
 
The interview schedule used for this study was initially developed for the major review and 
was used in my interviews in Hamburg (see Appendix 3). A small pilot study was not 
conducted prior to the commencement of the fieldwork in Hamburg. The interview schedule 
was somewhat modified after the first 12 interviews were conducted in Hamburg, particularly 
the questions pertaining to rights and responsibility. In discussion with my PhD supervisors, 
it was decided that I needed a more straightforward approach to asking whether respondents 
thought they had a right to and responsibility in finding work (see Chapter Eight, section 8.2 
for more detail). The probe that I had been using for those questions was, it was thought, too 
symbolically loaded and, thus, needed to be changed.  
 
The questions posed in the interview schedule for UBII recipients was intended to address the 
research questions as they relate to respondents’ experience and perception of skills training 
and job placement services and their perception of a right to and responsibility in finding 
work. Topics explored included (see Appendix 3 for details):  
 Respondents’ age, family status, education and employment background, including 
how long they have been unemployed and in receipt of UBII.  
 Initial impression of the Jobcenter; what kind of general assistance had they been 
provided; what was their initial impression of their case manager? 
 Experience of skills trainings; which skills trainings did they participate in, for how 
long and where; did they find the skills trainings helpful; did the skills trainings 
assist them in entering the labour market? 
 Experience of job placement services; did they receive any type of consultation 
assistance; did they receive any type of job placement or mediation assistance? What 
was required of them to demonstrate they were searching for work? 
 Respondents’ views regarding whether they felt pressured or influenced by their case 
managers to take temporary work, work in general, participate in a One-Euro-Job or 
other skill training. 
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 Respondents’ perception of their right to and responsibility in finding work; had they 
heard of the concept of Fördern and Fordern and if so what was their impression of 
the concept?  
 
The interview schedule for Jobcenter case managers had two purposes. First, based on an 
initial, cursory read of the data obtained from the interviews with UBII recipients, the 
interviews with case managers was meant to provide an opportunity to cross-check 
information provided by respondents about the structure of the Jobcenter and the 
administration of benefit generally. For example, a very high proportion of respondents 
repeatedly cited being moved from one case manager to the next within a short period of 
time. This constant change disrupted any work made towards securing a skills training, for 
example, or resulted in changed requirements for respondents. Respondents often surmised 
that this was intentionally done by the Jobcenter because management did not want recipients 
to form a bond to or relationship with their case managers. Yet, in my interviews with case 
managers, it was explained that cases often moved from one case manager to the next owing 
to a high caseload coupled with high staff turnover and that there was no master plan by 
management to keep recipients from forming working relationships with their case managers. 
Second, the interviews with case managers provided an opportunity to better understand how 
they implemented policy, i.e., whether and to what degree they had to follow guidelines in 
the decisions they made concerning a given recipient’s case. In addition, it was an 
opportunity to clarify any general administrative and operational questions about how UBII 
was administered coupled with any questions surrounding UBII rules and regulations. The 
interview schedule was written after the interviews with UBII recipients were completed (see 
Appendix 4). Topics explored included:  
 Background information on the case manager; their prior education and 
employment history; how long had they worked at the Jobcenter; how many cases 
they had; did they work with a specific type of client, i.e., under 25s, the disable, 
etc.  
 The process of assessing UBII recipients and the provision of particular skills 
training or job placement service based on that assessment. 
 The process of determining the degree and level of activation that was stipulated in 
the Integration into Work Agreement.  
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 What constraints, if any, they were under in determining the degree of support 
and/or activation provided a UBII recipient.  
 The role pressured played in the decisions they reached about the type of support 
and/or activation applied to recipients. 
 
The fieldwork took place between August 2011 and January 2012. The interviews in 
Hamburg commenced on August 21, 2011 and finished on September 28, 2011. The 
interviews in Bremen were conducted from October 30, 2011 to January 12, 2012. The 
Bremen interviews were conducted in short segments because I was teaching at the time. I 
would thus travel for long weekends to Bremen so that I could conduct the interviews on 
Mondays and Tuesdays and then return to London for teaching on Wednesday, Thursday and 
Friday. I spent a three-week period in Bremen from December 11, 2011 to January 12, 2012 
conducting interviews. The interviews with case managers in Bremen were conducted at their 
office at the end of January and the interviews with the Berlin case managers were conducted 
over Skype in February, 2012. The interviews with UBII recipients lasted, on average, 45 
minutes. The interviews with the case managers lasted one hour. All interviews with UBII 
recipients were digitally recorded except in the case of two interviews. All five interviews 
with case managers were digitally recorded as well.   
 
5.5 Issues affecting the data collection 
 
Ultimately there were few issues that directly affected the data collection. That said, my 
position as an American, female researcher asking sensitive questions no doubt had an impact 
on respondents’ responses. Three issues to arise were the issue of language, the location of 
the interview, and subtle cultural differences.  
 
Language 
 
The interviews were conducted in German except with a few respondents from foreign 
countries. Here particularly the Ghanaian and Nigerian respondents preferred to be 
interviewed in English. While the interviews with Germans and with most immigrants were 
conducted without any problems understanding one another, some immigrant respondents’ 
level of German language proficiency varied. As a result those interviews tended to be 
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shorter because they could not fully express their views and experiences. Moreover their 
limited language ability made it difficult to probe the respondents to the degree I would have 
liked. Therefore, some interviews with immigrants were shorter in length and less in-depth 
data were obtained than was the case with other immigrant respondents who were fluent in 
German. Nevertheless, their experience as immigrants with limited German language 
proficiency was particularly important to include in the data collection in order take into 
consideration their experience and perception of the responsiveness of case managers to their 
needs as immigrants with limited language ability.  
 
Location of the interviews 
 
Initially concern was raised about conducting the interviews at the Jobcenter in an office 
provided by the management. It was felt that the respondents may not be as forthcoming with 
their answers because they could not ultimately trust that I was not connected to the Jobcenter 
in some capacity. It was suggested that I would obtain more honest responses if the interview 
was conducted off-site, at a café for example. Yet conducting the interviews on-site had 
several advantages. First, I was acutely aware that, though unemployed, time was an issue for 
everyone. The idea of asking someone in the waiting room to participate in the study and then 
asking them to go to a café to conduct the interview seemed to be an extra step that might 
actually prevent UBII recipients from participating. Moreover, I was concerned about 
conducting an interview in public given noise levels at a café and the capacity to be 
distracted. The office provided offered a quiet, focused setting that did not require the UBII 
recipient to take any extra time out of their schedule than was necessary to conduct the 
interview. The primary concern that recipients may not believe that I was not associated with 
the Jobcenter and, thus, would be less forthcoming with their answers proved ungrounded. 
The fact that I was an American who spoke German with an accent proved very helpful in 
this area. Not only did I stress that neither I nor my research was associated with the 
Jobcenter, but I always pointed out that I was from the US and that I was here to learn, based 
on their experience, how the German system worked. Respondents did not appear to doubt 
this and overall, based on the quality of responses, did not appear to have problems speaking 
openly about their experiences. 
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Cultural references 
 
In terms of the interview process itself, some issues regarding gender and cultural reference 
points were observed that affected some interactions with interviewees. First, much has been 
written about women researchers and their experience interviewing men, particularly on 
sensitive topics (Pini, 2005; Gailey and Prohaska, 2011).  The literature has focused on the 
power dynamics of an interview that can make the male participant feel vulnerable because of 
the perception that the female researcher is in an authoritative position (Sinding and Aronson, 
2003), whereas it has been argued that there exists a more relaxed and protected atmosphere 
and environment between women who interview women (Sinding and Aronson, 2003).  
While the majority of male and female respondents did not appear affected by my position as 
a highly educated, American woman interviewing them, there were a few cases, especially 
among younger German male respondents, where men sought to challenge my position of 
authority. As a result, a few male respondents attempted to game the interview by not taking 
the questions asked or their responses seriously. They appeared to flirt with me which came 
across as an attempt to undermine my position of authority by not taking me or my research 
seriously. Second, while I am fluent in German—both in language and in understanding the 
culture—nonetheless my American upbringing at times imposed on the tone of the interview. 
For example, it is not uncommon for women in America to go back to work within a six-
week to six-month period of time after the birth of a child because there is no Federal 
maternity or paternity leave policy in the US. Women in Germany have recourse to three 
years of statutory maternity leave which means they can receive Unemployment Benefit II 
without the activation or support requirements during this time. In one interview with a 
woman whose child was two-years old the discussion turned to work. I mistakenly made the 
assumption, which came across in the manner in which I posed the question, that after two 
years she would naturally want to go back to work. To which she responded—indignantly—
no, because she would not leave her child with a total stranger when she could be home 
caring for him. This type of situation did not happen often, but it reminded me that, although 
I know the German socio-political and cultural context extremely well, there were cultural 
points of reference where I had to remind myself that how things are done in Germany is not 
how they are done in America.    
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5.6 Data analysis 
 
Data analysis took place after all 50 interviews were completed. That said, a small proportion 
of interviews had been transcribed and read by me (translated copies were given to my PhD 
supervisors) prior to completion of the fieldwork in order to explore some of the emerging 
themes. All interviews were transcribed but were analysed in German because inference and 
cultural issues can be lost in the translation. This section will cover the process of coding and 
analysing the full interview data. It will also address issues concerning the reliability and 
validity of the data.  
 
5.6.1 Use of NVivo 
 
Fundamental to any qualitative data analysis is ensuring that overarching themes are 
supported by excerpts from the raw data and that the data interpretation remains directly 
linked to the words of the respondents (Fereday and Muir-Cochrane, 2006). In order to do 
this, I coded my data using the qualitative data analysis software programme Nvivo9. The 
software is a way to organize the information and to link research themes and remarks 
through coding. The software does not interpret the research for me (Kelle, 2000). Instead it 
enabled me to classify evidence and place the data into nodes so that patterns and themes 
could emerge in a coherent fashion. Overall, the analysis of the evidence involved three 
stages. First, all the interviews were read through prior to commencing with the detailed and 
systematic data analysis using NVivo. Here brief notes were made on emerging themes in 
relation to the research questions coupled with other themes to emerge outside the scope of 
the research questions. Second, systematic, detailed analysis of each interview was carried 
out using Nvivo. The advantage of using qualitative data analysis software was that it 
facilitated the organization of the data and the coding process. This made it easier to compare 
texts according to one or multiple codes that then allowed patterns in the data to be identified. 
Third, specific themes were selected based on the analytical framework and structure of the 
thesis. Here passages were re-read and another layer of sub-coding took place prior to 
selecting the headline themes and examples for the thesis.    
 
As noted in Chapter One (section 1.2) the analytical process was highly iterative. This thesis 
did not set out to originally test a hypothesis or a theory. Nor did this thesis generate a new 
143 
 
theory, so much as a new theoretically informed interpretation and understanding of the Hartz 
IV reforms. The critical analytics described in Chapter Four were applied after an analysis of 
the evidence had taken place in order to help explain the findings. The criterion employed in 
the initial identification of themes was the analytical framework that was originally based on 
my interview schedule. That said additional themes arose inductively from the analysis that 
were not a part of my original analytical framework (see box 5.1 and 5. 2).  Here thematic 
analysis was used to establish themes (codes) that emerged as being important to the 
description of the phenomenon. The process involved the identification of themes through a 
careful reading of the data (Rice & Ezzy, 1999). Thematic analysis is a form of pattern 
recognition within the data, where emerging themes become the categories for analysis 
(Fereday and Muir-Cochrane, 2006).  Boyatzis defines a theme as “a pattern in the 
information that at minimum describes and organizes the possible observations and at 
maximum interprets aspects of the phenomenon” (1998: 261). As a result, though my original 
analytical framework for UBII recipient interviews consisted of 38 codes, 110 additional 
codes immerged from an analysis of the data. For the case manager interviews, there were 35 
codes based on the analytical framework and an additional seven codes that immerged from 
an analysis of the data. Below provides a list of the codes and sub-codes used in the analysis 
of the data. Owing to space, not all themes based on the codes or sub-codes were included in 
this thesis.    
 
Box 5.1 Analytical framework: codes and sub-codes for UBII recipient data (* delineates codes derived 
from the initial analytical framework) 
1.Personal Details* 
1.1 Age* 
1.2 Marital status* 
1.3 Number of Children* 
1.4 Education history* 
1.5 Employment history* 
                      1.5.1 Length of unemployment* 
2. Jobcenter, general experience at* 
2.1 Length of time on UBII* 
2.2 JobcenterPlus initiative 
2.3 Benefit, enough to live from?* 
2.5 Personal initiative versus assistance received from Jobcenter 
2.6 Pressure by Jobcenter to work* 
2.7 Pressure felt generally* 
3. Skills trainings* 
3.1 Skills training, types of  
                       3.1.1 One-Euro-Job 
                       3.1.2 Mini or Mindi Jobs 
                       3.1.3 Short-term 
                       3.1.4 Umschulung (re-training) 
3.2 Skills training, effective* 
3.3 Advocacy 
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                       3.3.1Ability to advocate for oneself 
                       3.3.2 Limitations to advocacy 
3.4 Choice: Ability to choose which training 
  3.4.1 Did/did not welcome opportunity 
                             3.4.2 ‘I know best’  
               3.4.3‘I don’t need it but it was a must’ 
  3.4.4 Autonomy 
3.5 Entrapment 
 3.5.1 Sense of being ‘busied’
111
 
 3.5.2 Participation as way to move respondents off statistics 
 3.5.3 Training as escape Jobcenter demands 
 3.5.4 Demoralized 
 3.5. 5Beneath ability/qualifications 
3.6 Informative 
 3.6.1 Quality of training* 
                                           Formulaic nature of trainings 
  Not informative 
                Training lacked relevance to prior employment/future options 
 3.6.2 Question of purpose 
  Use of time 
  Cost of time  
              3.6.3 Positive: provided needed information  
  Provided structure and routine 
  Provided needed material 
  Stepping stone 
  Opportunity to work/earn extra cash 
4. Job placement Services* 
4.1 Job placement services generally* 
4.2 Job placement services effective* 
4.3 Job placement as busy work 
4.4 Job placement service as consultation to understand what one wants to do 
4.5 Tricking Jobcenter system 
                             4.5.1 Fraudulent Activity 
  4.5.2 Resistance 
4.6 Job advertisements provided to UBII recipient* 
              4.6.1 Professional match 
 4.6.2 Helpful 
              4.6.3 Waste of time     
              4.6.4 Paternalism: ‘I know what is best for me’ 
 4.6.5 Burden 
 4.6.6. Not current 
 4.6.7 Already investigated 
              4.6.8 Required to send by recipient 
              4.6.9 Structural difficulties in applying 
4.7 Activation: meeting number stipulated* 
 4.7.1 Lack of jobs 
 4.7.2 Finding relevant jobs to apply to 
 4.7.3 Personal circumstances   
5. Rights and responsibilities* 
5.1 Perception of a right to work* 
 5.1.1 Support 
 5.1.2 Freedom to choose 
 5.1.3 Quality earnings 
 5.1.4 Work not a right 
5.2 Perception of Responsibility to work* 
 5.2.1 Duty to state, society, family 
                                                 
111
  I introduced the word ‘busied’ as a thematic code during an analysis of the data. In this context ‘busied’ is used to demarcate respondent 
responses to random allocation in skills trainings as a way to ‘engage’ them,  keep them active or keep them from sitting home being, as 
some respondents said, ‘lazy’.   
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 5.2.2 Pay household expenses 
 5.2.3 Oneself 
 5.2.4 To get off benefit 
5.3 Responsibility to find work* 
 5.3.1 Personal instinct 
 5.3.2 Social norms 
 5.3.3 How job search conducted 
  Job applications sent 
  Freedom 
  5.3.4 Jobcenter help/hinder search* 
 5.4 Jobcenter change sense of responsibility* 
  5.4.1 Freedom from Jobcenter 
  5.4.2 Sense of dependency  
  5.4.3 Benefits of activation 
   Positively reinforcing responsibility  
   Lacking motivation 
   Jobcenter strengthened work search 
   Jobcenter weakened work search 
5.5 Loss of social democratic values 
5.6 Fördern and Fordern* 
              5.6.1 Meaning* 
  Give and take 
  Not fair bargain 
  Structural impediments to work 
                            5.6.2 Impression* 
6. Case manager* 
6.1 Equal treatment 
6.2 Case Manager, differences between 
6.3 Case Manager, helpful* 
 6.3.1Support received 
 6.3.2 Support needed 
 6.3.3 No support 
6.4 Case Manager, informative* 
 6.4.1 Quality of consultation 
6.5 Case Manager, influenced* 
6.6 Case Manager, relationship to* 
6.7 Respondent understanding of Case Manager limitations 
7. Sanctions 
7.1 Motivation to get off benefit 
7.2 Obedience 
7.3 Fear 
7.4 Threaten 
8. Entrapment 
8.1 What recipients want to do versus what they can or are given to do 
8.2 Recipient motivation to work or do something 
8.3 Restrictions 
9. UBII recipients  
9.1 Attitude to work 
9.2 Shame 
9.3 Stereotypes of ALGII recipients* 
9.4 Speculative 
10. Work 
10.1 Age, pressure of 
10.2 Aussländer and work (immigrants and work) 
10.3 Labour market, changing nature of 
10.4 Lone mothers and work 
10.5 Low-wage* 
10.6 Commute* 
10.7 Qualifications* 
10.8 Willingness to work* 
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10.9 Mothers and work 
10.10 Pension 
10.11 Working and receiving ALGII 
10.12 Working more than one job 
10.13 Temp agencies 
10.14 Precarious 
11. Wage 
11.1 Wage versus benefit 
11.2 Wages in Germany 
 
Box 5.2 Analytical framework: codes and sub-codes for case manager data (* delineates codes derived 
from the initial analytical framework) 
1. Personal Details* 
 1.1 Length in position* 
 1.2 Education history* 
 1.3 Description of position* 
2. Mediator* 
 2.1 Role of* 
 2.2 Process of mediation* 
  2.2.1 What is required of client* 
  2.2.2 What is required of mediator* 
  2.2.3 Integration into work agreement* 
 2.3 Number of clients* 
  2.3.1 Reassignment* 
  2.3.2 Reassignment and frustration* 
3. Activation*  
 3.1 Case manager decision making process* 
  3.1.1 Number of interviews assigned* 
  3.1.2 Number of interviews required to demonstrate* 
 3.2 Structural and behavioural consideration in decision making*  
4. Relationship with companies/industry?* 
 4.1 Temp agencies?* 
 4.2 Recommend clients apply to temp agencies?* 
5. Skills training services* 
 5.1 Training services offered* 
 5.2 How assessed/who needs* 
 5.3 Do trainings assist clients?* 
  5.3.1 Link between training and finding work?* 
 5.4 Must client participate?*  
  5.4.1 Ramifications for not participating?* 
 5.5 Umschulung* 
  5.5.1 Circumstances for recommendation* 
 5.6 One-Euro-Job* 
  5.6.1 Circumstances for recommendation* 
 5.7 Short-term trainings* 
  5.7.1 Circumstances for recommendation* 
 5.8 Financing of trainings 
  5.8.1 Pressure to place 
6. Case manager pressure* 
 6.1 Job performance indicators 
 6.2 Job performance pressure 
 6.3 Pressure effect decision making? 
 6.4 Constraints  
 6.5 Capacity to assist  
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5.6.2 Reliability and validity of the data 
 
It has been argued that the application of the quantitative research criteria—reliability and 
validity—should not be replicated to qualitative research. Reliability and validity have long 
been important criteria used in establishing and assessing the quality of quantitative research. 
Some have therefore questioned the relevance of applying typically quantitative modes of 
assessing quality to qualitative research (Lewis and Ritchie, 2003). As Bryman points out 
“…even writers who do take the view that the criteria are relevant have considered the 
possibility that the meanings of the terms need to be altered. For example, the issue of 
measurement validity almost by definition seems to carry connotations of measurement. 
Since measurement is not a major preoccupation among qualitative researchers, the issue of 
validity would seem to have little bearing on such studies” (2004: 272).   But as Lewis and 
Ritchie point out, “in their broadest conception, reliability meaning ‘sustainable’ and validity 
meaning ‘well grounded’ will have relevance for qualitative research since they help to 
define the strength of the data” (2003: 270). It is for these and other reasons that Lincoln and 
Guba (2000) were prompted to propose criteria for assessing qualitative studies that were 
more germane to the methodology, introducing the use of trustworthiness and authenticity.   
While there are different approaches to addressing reliability and validity—Lincoln and 
Guba’s four criteria for “trustworthiness” (1985: 290); Kirk and Miller’s (1986) six reliability 
and validity checks; Hammersley’s (1992) “subtle form of realism”—this section will draw 
on four of Silverman’s (2013) five approaches to ensuring validity in data analysis: the 
constant comparative method, comprehensive data treatment, deviant-case analysis and using 
appropriate tabulations.  Silverman’s first criterion, the refutability principle, addresses the 
problem of anecdotalism by having researchers seek to refute their initial assumptions about 
the data in order to achieve objectivity (2013:289). The point here is to seek and refute 
assumed relations between phenomena. Only if the researcher cannot refute the existence of a 
certain relationship, is he or she in a position to speak about ‘objective’ knowledge. I do not 
use his first method because this criterion is satisfied by using Silverman’s remaining four 
methods as “an interrelated way of thinking critically during the data analysis” (2013: 290). 
As such this method was absorbed into the other four methods to test the validity of my data 
analysis.    
 
The ‘constant comparative method’ means that the qualitative researcher should always 
attempt to find another case through which to test a provisional explanation. In other words, 
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having isolated a specific case or instance of a phenomenon in the data, the researcher should 
then search through the data to obtain a larger sample of cases that support the initial 
phenomena found which can then be compared. This method is particularly relevant to 
researchers who only analyse aspects rather than the whole of a given data set. To ensure that 
I was not simply selecting one-off cases and then generalizing the case to the larger sample of 
UBII recipient experiences and perceptions, all of my data were inspected and analysed (see 
below for more detailed information on how). The instance of a specific phenomenon was put 
into a code (or sub-code) according to the analytical framework and the themes it 
represented. There were many purposes for doing this, but one was to get a sense of how 
many times the phenomenon arose under a specific code or sub-code (theme) and to then be 
able to compare and see if there was commonality between the cases. This gave me a sense of 
proportion within the data set and allowed me to ascertain whether a theme was a one-off 
event specific to someone’s circumstance or whether the theme could be generalised to the 
larger sample.    
 
In terms of ‘comprehensive data treatment’, which requires all data to be incorporated in the 
analysis in order to avoid anecdotalism (selecting data based on it fitting into the analytical 
argument), every interview for this study was transcribed and uploaded into NVivo and 
systematically coded and analysed by me as the themes and categories emerged from the 
analysis. All 50 interviews provided crucial evidence for this research. Even those interviews 
that, at first glance, appeared void of useful information. In order to ensure validity of the 
data analysis the data were read, coded and re-coded on three separate occasions. First all 
interviews were read directly after they were transcribed. Here I made initial notes on 
possible themes. This process took place both during and after the fieldwork, as initial 
interviews from Hamburg and Bremen were transcribed during fieldwork. Second, after all 
the interviews were complete and transcribed, I uploaded the interviews (i.e., the data) into 
NVivo. Here each interview was read and systematically coded and recoded where sub-
themes emerged. The final analysis took place prior to drafting the findings chapters. Here 
the codes were re-read and organized according to the headline findings to emerge from an 
analysis of the data. I then established a structural framework for each of the findings 
chapters. At this point it was less about coding as themes emerged and more about organizing 
the codes and, where necessary, re-coding based on sub-themes to emerge. The themes were 
selected that were relevant to answering the research questions and at this point specific 
codes were re-read to select the best quotes to illustrate the findings.  
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A comprehensive examination of the data also allows for what Silverman (2013) defines as 
‘deviant cases analysis’. Comprehensive data treatment implies actively seeking out and 
addressing anomalies or deviant cases that do not fit a particular theme or analytic argument. 
For example, in analysing respondents experience of participating in skills trainings, it was 
apparent from the start, that a very high proportion of respondents experience of participating 
in a skills training did not result in that training assisting them in entering the regular labour 
market. But an analysis of the ‘deviant cases’ showed that for a proportion of respondents the 
skills training proved helpful and useful in other ways. They provided respondents with a 
sense of direction and purpose and an opportunity to interact with the community—to be a 
part of something on a daily or weekly basis (see Chapter Six, section 6.5 for further 
discussion). An analysis of the deviant cases provided a more in-depth understanding of why 
some respondents may have found skills trainings helpful and beneficial beyond the standard 
objective (of the Jobcenter) to provide support to move recipients into work.  
 
Finally, Sliverman’s (2013) fifth approach to ensuring validity in data is ‘using appropriate 
tabulations’. This involves quantifying or using simple counting techniques, theoretically 
derived and ideally based on the codes and categories deduced from the analysis of the data. 
This approach can be used to survey the whole corpus of data in order to get a sense of how 
often a theme emerges across all the interviews (Silverman, 2013). Here I wanted to ensure 
that I was not ‘cherry picking’ themes or that I did not select themes that were relevant to 
only a handful of respondent experiences and perceptions, rather than prevalent across a 
majority of interviews. In addition to counting instances of a phenomenon in a specific code, 
I also created a very crude excel spreadsheet where I counted whether a theme appeared in an 
interview. This helped me established a sense of proportion and therefore how relevant a 
theme was to an overarching finding.  
 
Hammersley (1992: 67) defines reliability as “the degree of consistency with which instances 
are assigned to the same category by different observers or by the same observer on different 
occasions.”  While it was not possible to have more than one person read and code the data, 
as noted above, the data were read and coded on three separate occasions. Moreover, a select 
number of interviews were transcribed and translated for my PhD supervisors to read. Further 
to that, my interpretation of the data was discussed with my PhD supervisors as well as with 
other researchers and staff members in the Department through presentations and informal 
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discussions on the findings. This also facilitated critical reflection on the data analysis. In 
terms of the ability for this study to be replicated in order to ensure reliability, as LeCompte 
and Goetz point out, it is “impossible to ‘freeze’ a social setting” (1982: 32). That said, given 
the parameters of the research methodology that have been outlined in this chapter, this study 
could be replicated and conducted at different Jobcenters throughout Germany. Moreover, 
given that saturation was reached by the 40
th
 interview—in that by that point any and all 
responses substantiated and replicated respondent responses from previous interviews—it 
may reasonably be inferred that there is a strong probability that similar themes would 
emerge from a similar study conducted in different parts of Germany.    
 
5.6.3 Numbers and generalisability 
 
Lewis and Ritchie (2003) explore the issue of generalisation from three perspectives: 
theoretical, inferential and representational generalisation.
112
 For Lewis and Ritchie 
representational generalisation specifically is the extent to which findings can be inferred to 
the parent population that was sampled. Some authors, such as Miles and Huberman (1994) 
and Arksey and Knight (1999) argue that the particular methods of qualitative research 
studies undermine the scope for representational generalisation because qualitative research 
involves small samples that are not selected to be statistically representative. Others such as 
Hammersley (1992) view the existence of confirmatory evidence from other research 
conducted with the parent population as being necessary to assert that a study’s findings can 
be generalised—indeed Seale (1999) particularly stresses the role of quantitative research 
data here. If we take the basic concepts of representational generalisation—the emphasis on 
probability sampling and measurement—when simply applied to qualitative research it is 
easy to come to the conclusion that representational generalisation cannot be supported in 
qualitative research (Lewis and Ritchie, 2003). However, the basis for representational 
generalisation in qualitative research is very different from quantitative research. Qualitative 
research cannot be generalised on a statistical basis. But as they point out: 
It is not the prevalence of particular views or experiences, nor the extent  
of their location within particular parts of the sample, about which wider  
inference can be drawn. Rather, it is the content or ‘map’ of the range of  
views, experiences, outcomes or other phenomenon under study, and the  
                                                 
112
 To help with clarification Lewis and Ritchie (2003) suggest that generalisation can be seen as involving three linked but separate 
concepts. In addition to representational generalisation explained above, inferential generalisation explores the question of whether the 
findings from a study can be generalised or inferred to other settings or contexts beyond the sampled one. Theoretical generalisation draws 
theoretical propositions, principles or statements from the findings of a study for more general application.   
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factors and circumstances that shape and influence them, that can be  
inferred to the researched population. Although individual variants of  
circumstances, views or experiences would undoubtedly be found within  
the parent population, it is at the level of categories, concepts and  
explanation that generalisation can take place (Lewis and Ritchie, 2003: 269).     
 
Drawing on other research findings can indeed help in assessing how far the findings from a 
study can be generalised to the parent population, but it is not a requirement for 
representational generalisation. Thus in order to assess representational generalisation the 
researcher needs to ensure accuracy with which the phenomena have been captured and 
interpreted in the study sample, which will depend on the quality of the fieldwork, analysis 
and interpretation. Second, it is the degree to which the sample is representative of the parent 
population sampled. Here Lewis and Ritchie stress that representation is not a question of 
statistical match but of inclusivity; “whether the sample provides ‘symbolic representation’ 
by containing the diversity of dimensions and constituencies that are central to explanation” 
(2003: 269). Validity and reliability are thus used in order to establish representational 
generalization—though with different implications than how they are used in statistical 
research as discussed above.  
 
Thus in terms of raw ‘numbers’, the inference that can be drawn from qualitative data rests 
on the nature of the phenomena being studied and not the sheer number of times a given 
phenomena happens or its statistical distribution (Silverman, 2013). That said, as I noted 
above, simple counting techniques based on the categories and themes analysed can offer a 
means to survey the whole corpus of data in order to gain a sense of proportion of the data as 
a whole. This, Silverman (2013) argues, allows the researcher to test and to revise their 
generalisations in order to remove any concern about the accuracy of the researcher’s 
impressions about the data. As such, numbers are presented in the next three empirical 
chapters. While these are not ‘representative’, the aim where they are used is to contextualise 
the patterns identified within the larger data set. 
 
5.7 Chapter summary and conclusion     
 
This chapter described the methods used in the collection and analysis of the data. The 
epistemological position for this research can be described as interpretative in that in order to 
answer this study’s research questions, it was essential to understand the experiences and 
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perceptions of Unemployment Benefit II recipients. The data were obtained by conducting 50 
semi-structured interviews with UBII recipients and five semi-structured interviews with case 
managers. This chapter has outlined the practicalities of the research process as well as the 
problems associated with adopting the methodology used to obtain the data. The next three 
chapters will present the findings derived from an analysis of the data.    
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Chapter Six: Findings on the Role of Skills Training in Assisting 
Unemployment Benefit II Recipients Find Work 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The following chapter presents a thick description
113
 of the findings as they pertain to the first 
research question:  
 
 Are the policy objectives expressed by the Hartz IV reforms reflected in the manner 
and substance of the lived experiences of Unemployment Benefit II recipients? 
 
This chapter will focus on the experience and perceptions of the sample of UBII respondents 
for this study who participated in skills trainings at the Jobcenter in Bremen and Hamburg 
(n=39). The expressed objective of fourth Hartz law in the provision of skills training for 
UBII recipients rests in the notion of support (Fördern) provided to assist in labour market 
integration. 
 
Specifically, according to paragraph §1 SGBII, overcoming or reducing the need for 
assistance through gainful employment is the general goal of the provision of basic security 
(Unemployment Benefit II) for the unemployed (BMAS, 2008). The function of the provision 
of basic security is to assist recipients in either maintaining their current employment, help 
improve their employment options or to assist them in integrating into the labour market 
altogether. Alongside this, the overarching objective of SGBII §1(1)(1) is to strengthen the 
personal responsibility of the person affected (i.e. the unemployed) so that he or she 
contributes and ensures that his or her livelihood is earned independent of receipt of basic 
security and is done so through one’s own personal means and strength (BMAS, 2008). In 
order to achieve this goal, a key component of the fourth Hartz law is the assistance provided 
by the government in the form of ‘support’ instruments (Arbeitsförderung) to help integrate 
UBII recipients into the labour market. Support comes in two forms: job placement services, 
                                                 
113
 The concept of ‘thick description’ in qualitative research was first introduced by Geertz (1993). While the notion of thick description has 
been interpreted in many ways, essentially it requires the researcher to provide sufficient detail of the original observations or commentaries 
(and where warranted, the environment where they occurred) as a way of providing the reader a way to gauge and assess the meanings 
attached to the descriptions (or quotes). That said, the description of findings in this and the following two empirical chapters is not ‘thick’ 
in the ethnographic tradition.    
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which will be discussed in Chapter Seven, and skills training known as Maßnahmen zur 
Aktivierung und beruflichen Eingliederung (skills trainings to activate and occupationally 
integrate the unemployed). The policy objective here is to provide targeted skills training in 
an area deemed necessary to assist UBII recipients integrate into the labour market (BMAS, 
2011). This support (Fördern) provided is arguably an essential component of the fourth 
Hartz law. In fact, as recently as April 2012 the law to improve the integration chances in the 
labour market (Gesetz zur Verbesserung der Eingliederungschancen am Arbeitsmarkt) was 
implemented with the objective of improving on the degree and level of ‘support’ (Fördern) 
already provided to UBI and UBII recipients established in the fourth Hartz law.
114
  
 
Therefore, based on the experiences, perceptions and expectations of a sample of respondents 
in this study who participated in a training, this chapter explores the findings of whether 
respondents’ participation enabled them to meet the objective of the skills training, i.e., to 
assist in labour market integration. Yet as noted in Chapter Five (section 5.3.2) a discussion 
of the evidence in this chapter is to be understood in the context of an important feature of the 
sample selection: namely the sample consists of those UBII recipients for whom the support 
mechanisms have not been terribly helpful or successful. Those UBII recipients who were 
able to find permanent employment, either on account of the support they received at the 
Jobcenter, or because of their own characteristics, are not those individuals who were at the 
Jobcenter at the time I sought to obtain my sample. Thus, there is the potential that the 
experience of those UBII recipients who were at the Jobcenter and available to be 
interviewed were likely to over-represent negative experiences with the support services. 
After all, the very fact that they were still in receipt of UBII meant that they had not found 
work (or work that paid enough), whether with the assistance of support services or not. But 
therein lies and important caveat. Unemployment Benefit II is the benefit for those 
considered ‘long-term unemployed’. These are the messy, difficult and trying stories of 
individuals, whether on account of agency or structure (or a mixture of both), have not been 
able to integrate into the labour market. As a result the question remains: what do to with 
them? The sample for this study is diverse; it includes young and old, citizens, residents and 
non-residents, those with qualifications and those without; lone mothers and fathers, families 
and single men and women for whom labour market integration has proved challenging. Thus 
                                                 
114 While the 2012 law predominantly addresses UBI recipients under the jurisdiction of SBGIII, the objective of §16e SGBII “Förderung 
von Arbeitsverhältnissen” (Support for Work) is to provide more targeted and flexible ‘Fördern’ (support) in assisting UBII recipients find 
employment.   
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while this is effectively a sample of the stock rather than the flow, it is nonetheless the 
experience of the ‘precariat’ (Standing, 2011) that deserves closer inspection.  
 
The initial analytical coding framework used in this and Chapters Seven and Eight consists of 
a sequence of main themes that have been subdivided by a series of related subtopics. These 
main themes and subtopics explored in this and Chapters Seven and Eight derived from an 
analysis of key themes, concepts and emergent categories that fed into the larger thematic 
framework. The initial coding framework (themes) corresponded with the topic guide used to 
conduct the interviews (see Chapter Five, section 5.6.1 for more detail). The evidence 
presented in the following three empirical chapters will be guided by this thematic 
framework. The two-fold critical analytic discussed in Chapter Three (section 4.2) was 
applied after an analysis of the evidence had taken place in order to help interpret the findings 
and thus did not play a role in the framework used in the initial data analysis. It is relevant for 
explaining and giving meaning to the findings which will be discussed in detail in Chapter 
Nine. Therefore, in this chapter section 6.2 presents the findings of respondents’ experience 
and perception of short-term trainings. Section 6.3 presents the findings of respondents’ 
experience and perception of vocational (re-) training placements. Section 6.4 presents the 
findings of respondents’ experience and perception of One-Euro-Jobs while 6.5 will provide 
an account of respondents’ positive experiences with participating in a skills training. Section 
6.6 summarizes the chapter findings and conclusion.   
 
6.2 Unemployment Benefit II recipients’ experience of short-term trainings  
 
This chapter will focus on respondents’ experience of participating in short-term skills 
trainings. The framework initially used to analyse the findings in the following sections 
include the thematic codes listed below that will act as a guide for unpacking the evidence:   
 
Massnahmen, types of  
                       One-Euro-Job 
                       Short-term 
                       Umschulung (re-training) 
Influenced 
  Advocacy: ability to advocate for oneself 
  Limitations to advocacy 
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Choice 
  Did/did not welcome opportunity 
  Gratitude 
  “I know best”  
‘I don’t need it, but it was a must’ 
Autonomy 
Entrapment 
  Sense of being 'busied' 
  Participation as way to move respondents off statistics 
  Participation way to escape Jobcenter demands 
  Sanctions 
  Demoralized 
  Beneath ability/qualifications 
  Perception of wage 
Informative 
  Quality of trainings 
Formulaic nature of trainings 
   Not informative 
                Training lacked relevance to prior employment/future options               
Question of purpose 
  Use of time 
  Cost of time 
 
Massnahme, effective   
Provided needed information  
  Provided structure and routine 
  Provided needed material 
  Stepping stone 
  Opportunity to work/earn extra cash 
 
 
Types of Maßnahmen  
 
What constitutes a skills training (Maßnahme) depends on the degree of support needed by 
the UBII recipient.  The support (Förderung) provided means that the Jobcenter absorbs all 
cost associated with participation in a training for as long as is necessary to cover the purpose 
and the content of the training. During the duration of the training, the UBII recipient still 
receives benefit so long as they are in need of it and while not officially ‘employed’ they are 
considered ‘engaged’ and are therefore removed from the unemployment statistic.  All total 
39 respondents in this study participated in a skills training. While there are a range of 
trainings that constitute a ‘Maßnahme’, the three categories of trainings that will be analysed 
in this Chapter are based on the types of trainings respondents participated in for this study. 
First—kurze Trainingsmaßnahmen—short-term trainings were the most commonly provided 
trainings that respondents participated in (n=26). These are short one-two- and three-week to 
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three to six month trainings in CV building or refresher courses, computer training or 
refresher courses, how to become self-employed (Existenzgründung), interview coaching, 
project management, presentation skills, and German or English language courses among 
many others. Vocational (re-) training—Berufliche Weiterbildung—comprised the second 
category in which some respondents participated (n=11). Here vocational (re-) training 
consisted of the Jobcenter supporting the UBII recipient in completing his or her secondary 
school diploma, participation in an apprenticeship or a vocational re-training into a new 
career. The final category of training that respondents participated in was the One-Euro-
Job—Arbeitsbeschaffungsmaßnahmen (n=15). Of the 39 respondents who participated in a 
skills training, many participated in more than one training, including both One-Euro-Job and 
a short-term training (n=10) or a vocational re-training and a short-term training (n=6). Of 
those who participated in a short-term training, 15 participated in more than one short-term 
training while on UBII. 
 
THEMATIC CODES 
Short-term trainings: Autonomy, Advocacy and Choice 
 
There is a debate in the academic literature about what is meant by and the degree to which 
the concept of autonomy can be used in the welfare policy context (Rössler, 2002; Darnwall, 
2006; Bothfeld and Betzelt, 2013). The concept of autonomy, in relation to active labour 
market policies like skills training implies more leeway for the individual to dictate 
favourable policy outcomes that directly affect him or her rather than having a specific 
behaviour prescribed for her/him (Bothfeld and Betzelt, 2013).  In this context, it is a 
question of the degree to which participation in a skills training affects an individual’s 
autonomy over her/his life situation. Individuals are never fully autonomous in relation to 
their social environment. But Rössler (2002) argues that the major condition for autonomy is 
based on the capacity of individuals to reflect on who they want to be and what they like to 
do combine with their capacity to figure out the ‘authentic’ motives for their decisions. In 
relation to the ability of an individual to exercise autonomy over life choice, the theme to 
arise out of an analysis of the data was whether respondents were able to advocate their 
position for or against participating in a skills training.  
 
Ultimately it was a question of how much choice or say respondents had in being placed in a 
skills training that matched their interests, prior employment history and/or future 
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employment prospects. Here some respondents clearly sought to advocate their position as to 
whether they wished to participate or not in a given (re-) training. But at the same time there 
were a confluence of factors which respondents highlighted that potentially impacted the 
outcome they wished. This confluence of factors includes both whether their case manager 
was open to their suggestions and the degree to which the respondent themselves had done 
the necessary research on a given training, such as which training, reasons for participation, 
when it was starting, for how long and where. If both these factors where in synch with each 
other, then a review of the data suggests that the respondent was somewhat more likely to be 
able to participate in the training he or she desired. But if one or both of these aspects were 
not aligned, then the chances were less so. That said, some respondents did not necessarily 
perceive that they were being randomly assigned to a given training. Indeed for this group of 
respondents, it was more a general sense of confusion as to why they were being put into a 
training they perceived as not relevant or useful to their job search. But for other respondents, 
the fact that they repeatedly sited their placement as a way to remove them from the 
unemployment statistics suggests that they felt they were being randomly allocated to 
trainings as a way to engage them. Here the interviews with case managers are relevant 
insofar as it shows whether or not the respondents’ perceptions were an accurate reflection of 
that reality. Indeed interviews with case managers suggest that UBII recipients can end up 
being placed in a random training simply to fill space and, thus, meet targets.  
 
The ability to advocate for oneself—to give reasons why the respondent did or did not wish 
to participate in a given training did not necessarily have the intended outcome respondents 
hoped for (n=9). This was because those respondents who sought to advocate for themselves 
experienced limitations in their ability to argue for which short-term training they would or 
would not like to participate in. A proportion of respondents who sought to advocate for 
themselves tended to acquiesce to their case manager’s suggestion(s) when it became clear 
that they were lacking progress. They lacked the energy to continually push their interests 
when they realized early on in the process that their interests were not central to the case 
manager’s decision making process. Bowing to pressure coupled with the desire to avoid 
strife with their case manager or the Jobcenter, this group of respondents simply gave in. This 
group acquiescence was not necessarily because they were indifferent to how their time was 
utilized. Depending on what type of case manager they were assigned coupled with their 
prior experience at the Jobcenter, this group of respondents had learned that there simply was 
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no point in protesting because the decisions made were often perceived by the respondent as 
being out of their control.  
I12:All I ever really wanted to do was work. I did not want to participate  
in a training because I have done enough trainings. The main [work]  
experiences I have acquired were in warehouse-logistic. And then all  
at once it started, that one must do a ten-hour per week training. But  
not that which was important, rather banal things like for example,  
how one behaves in pubic and how one addresses someone or stuff  
like that. Then we talked about pyramids and how one creates one and  
this and that and then two hours of ‘fit for work’ and gymnastic and stuff  
like that and I did not want to do any of that. Then I went to the instructor  
and I said that I had no desire to do this because I didn’t need any of it.  
I know how to behave in public, I know what is important, or how to save  
electricity. I did not need that, but it was a must. And then I went to the  
case manager and I said that I did not want to participate. But I had no  
chance. That was just one big sitting around and then I had to go to the  
case manager and listen to what he had to say and sometimes he had  
something instructive to say, but generally nothing special. Then I  
suggested, well if I have to sit here [in the skill training] can’t I do  
something important like internet? No it was already established what  
I must do. You can lay out what you would like to do, but the themes  
are already prescribed. You can’t just change that with them [the Jobcenter].  
Then I stopped asking. I simply had no desire anymore. (29 year-old  
female single German)         
 
A recurring theme to emerge from the interviews was respondents’ perceived inability to 
choose which training they would participate in (n=11). A proportion of respondents did not 
feel they were given the opportunity nor had the freedom to ask for a specific skills training 
they perceived as having the potential to assist their integration into the regular labour 
market. As a result respondents were often frustrated but resigned to the fact that they were 
put in training placements that they perceived as not being of assistance to them.  
AMB: You said to me, you do not like computers, but still you have to  
participate in a computer training? I23: Yes, yes. I had to participate.   
AMB: Really. You had no choice? I23: No, no. There was nothing else  
available at the time. And then she [case manager] said to me, you  
either participate or…(33 year-old female German lone parent) 
Respondents repeatedly noted that they, not their case manager, knew best what they needed 
to assist them in integrating into the regular labour market.  Three respondents were even put 
into the same training on multiple occasions that again was not relevant to their work search 
objectives, their skills or their professional interest.   
I30: Then in May I had to go to a so-called job application centre where  
one is taught how to apply to jobs and how to write a job application. I  
already did that several times, that was nothing new. And that is what I did  
here in Bremen. Then I tried to get a vocational re-training, but that was  
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denied. I want to work, that is not the issue. When I lived in the country it  
was hard without a driver’s license and car and to only rely on the  
regional trains. There [in the country] I was put into even more trainings.  
They were always happy to put me in trainings, but the trainings never did  
anything for me. (48 year-old divorced female German lone parent) 
 
The inability to choose the skill training that this proportion of respondents perceived as 
helpful had the potential to result in a missed opportunity to participate in a specific training 
that could potentially otherwise assist them in finding work in their field. For example, 
respondents’ forty and older often cited that their inability to speak, read and write English 
prevented them from finding work in their field. They cited the change over the years 
between when they first started and where English was not a pre-requisite to it now clearly 
being one. Yet, when a number of respondents asked their case managers if they could 
participate in an English course (n=6), for example, and provided documentation supporting 
their request, two respondents’ requests were accepted while the remaining respondents were 
denied the training (n=4).  
I14: And when I do a training in ‘Office’—five days ‘Office’—I am off the  
statistic. That does not do anything for me. I mean, in the labour market I  
am asked ‘do you know the Cartier programme?’ That is a CAD-programme.  
That programme is expensive, a training in Cartier costs at least six to twelve 
months. Well good [instead] I am starting an SPS continuing education course  
in two weeks and that last five months. I am curious what that will bring. (38  
year-old single male German) 
This group of respondents often wondered why, if they were placed in trainings that were 
perceived by them as not of use or interest but cost money, they could not at least be put in a 
training that they perceived as—at a minimum—helpful; along the lines of what I32 said if I 
have to do a training, then can’t it as least be something I want to do? Some respondents 
viewed the failure of the Jobcenter to place them in appropriate skill trainings as an 
irresponsible use of state funds, especially when the funds could be spent more appropriately 
on a relevant training.       
 
THEMATIC CODES 
Use of time; sense of being busied; question of purpose 
 
For all respondents who participated in a short-term training, it was a question of purpose. 
Indeed, was the skill training of interest to them and/or relevant to their prior work history 
and/or their future work prospects? Of the 26 respondents in this study who participated in 
short-term trainings, a substantial number of respondents (n=15) had participated in more 
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than one short-term skills training during their receipt of UBII. Here a sense that they were 
being ‘busied’ was particularly acute among this group of respondents. A group of 
respondents (those who participated in more than one training) felt that they were simply 
being placed by the Jobcenter into a training as a way to ‘engage’ and move them off the 
unemployment statistic (n=12).  
I14: For most of the [UBII recipients] there appears to be only one  
solution: to be put into temp work or Mini- or One-Euro-Jobs. And  
in truth, I notice that the [Jobcenter] will do anything to make the  
statistics look good. I don’t know if it would be better to just confront  
people with the bare facts. I mean, one is not stupid. I have this feeling  
that they sometimes think we are stupid, but we [UBII recipients]  
notice what is going on. (38 year-old single German male) 
Thus when asked whether the training was useful to them, this proportion of respondents 
questioned the utility of a training that ‘busied’ rather than supported them in their endeavour 
to find work.  
 
Moreover, it was a question of whether participating in the short-term training was the best 
use of the respondents’ time—or whether their time could be better spent looking for work 
(that said, respondents who participated in trainings often had to demonstrate to their case 
manager they were looking for work too). Eleven out of 26 respondents who participated in 
short-term trainings felt that they would rather be spending their time looking for work or 
simply working than participating in the skills training. Indeed it was perceived by this group 
of respondents that the training was an ostensible waste of time and resources both for the 
respondent and the Jobcenter.  
AMB: Have you had to participate in a skills training?   I22: Up to now,  
not yet. Up to now I have avoided that because I would like to work  
and not have to participate in a training where I don’t have any chance  
anyway of integrating into the labour market. (30 year-old single German male) 
Some respondents were simply confused as to why they were told to participate in a training 
that they perceived as having little to no relevance to their employment interests or future 
prospects(n=5). This is perhaps best illustrated by the 63 year-old Ghanaian respondent who 
has lived and worked as a sailor in Hamburg since 1981. He was laid off in 2008 as a result 
of the recession. 
AMB: And what kind of school is that? I26: Language. They say if I stay  
home I will be lazy. So I have to go to school. AMB: And do you want to  
take a German language course? I26: Ahh. I am here for money. I am here  
to get a job. AMB: To do whatever you have to do to get a job… I26. My  
sister, when I finish this course, what am I going to do?! Because now that’s 
left maybe one year or two years or one year I go on Rente [retire] what am  
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I going to do? Because when somebody talks to me, I understand what he is  
saying. Yes, what is the purpose? The school is a waste of time!...I have  
been to the school for 11 months… AMB: 11 months? The school lasts for  
11 months? I26: No, it is lasting for almost 17 months.  AMB: And while 
you are going to school you are still looking for work? I26: I am looking for  
a job. (63 year-old married Ghanaian male) 
This group of respondents generally viewed their placement in a skills training as random and 
not necessarily aligned with the support they needed in order to integrate into the regular 
labour market (n=17). Taken together, this group of respondents’ experiences highlights two 
possible challenges with the provision of short-term skills trainings for some respondents 
with diverse employment and educational backgrounds. On the one hand, it is a question of 
whether the formulaic design of some of the short-term trainings offered to respondents are 
able to meet the needs of a wide variety of UBII recipients’ employment backgrounds. On the 
other, it is a question of whether the purpose of the skills training—to support (Fördern) the 
UBII recipient in their endeavour to integrate into the labour market—is lost in the 
Jobcenter’s pursuit to activate (Fordern) or keep the UBII recipient engaged.  
 
THEMATIC CODES 
Pressure effect case manager decision making; job performance indicators 
 
Given the number of respondents who had mentioned being placed into short-term trainings 
that seemed to have no relevance to assisting them find work (n=11), I asked all five case 
managers who I interviewed why some respondents might have this perception. The 
interview with Case Manager Five proved highly informative in helping to explain one of the 
possible reasons why some respondents simply felt ‘busied’ by the training placement. Some 
of the standard short-term skills training spaces are pre-paid for by the Jobcenter. This has the 
possible effect of management putting pressure on case managers to place anyone who fits a 
specific training profile, for example, respondents over 50 years old, into the training for the 
sake of filling the space so as not to lose out financially. As the interview with CM5 noted:  
CM5: We have integration targets. Management dictates our integration  
target numbers. It is a very important goal of the Jobcenter to meet those  
targets and therefore, it is really paid attention to [by management].  
Management follows the weekly statistics and if they notice that we have  
not met our targets [to integrate UBII recipients into the labour market],  
then they get angry and put pressure on us [to meet targets]. They send  
around an email instructing us to arrange 35 meetings with clients in the  
next week because they think the reason we have not met our target is  
because we have not done a good job of supervising our clients. AMB:  
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You mentioned ‘pressure’. Do you feel pressured by the Jobcenter? CM5: 
Um…ah…yes. Pressure is there. But I have to honestly say, I do not pay  
too much attention to their target goals because I have noticed, even when  
we don’t meet our targets 100 per cent, no one gets fired or penalized… 
AMB: And does this pressure placed on you influence you in how you  
manage your clients? CM5: I try not to let the pressure placed on me by  
management spill over to my clients. It’s not their fault that my employer  
tells me that I have to integrate so many clients within a week. No. I try  
not to let it because I know that even if I do not make my target, nothing  
bad will happen to the case managers…an example from the skills trainings.  
There is a certain amount of pressure because we are told [by management]  
that we have to place clients into a skills training. The Jobcenter purchases  
a certain number of places in a skills training and we have to fill those places  
with clients. That means the skills training has to always be full. Management  
has a list to see who has been placed in the skills training. And if the list  
is empty or not completely full, then they get angry at the case managers  
and tell us ‘you have to fill the skills training [with clients]’. But, I  
personally, don’t believe in that. And when I get those kinds of emails  
then I just delete them…But it has happened now and then—it has  
happened to me—that my team director has looked at my client list.  
They look to see what types of clients we have. For example, the Jobcenter  
had a skills training for clients 50+ and it was our job to place 150 clients  
who fit the age category into the skills training. And then we all received  
daily emails alerting us to the fact that the skills training was not yet full  
and they asked us to please fill the skills training. But then an email was sent  
around instructing us that every client we had in our portfolio who was 50+  
was automatically to be placed in the skills training. Then it happened to me  
that my team director came to me and told me that I had five clients in my  
portfolio who were 50+ and that I did not put them on the list for the skills  
training. And I said that I did not place them in the training because it was  
not relevant to their professional profile. And then he said to me, ‘well,  
you have to place them in the skills training. You have to place all of your  
clients who are 50+ into the training.’ But I found an opportunity and I  
spoke to the clients and told them that I would have to stop managing  
their cases because otherwise I would have to place them in this skills  
training if I continued.    
The point here is to try and triangulate UBII recipients’ evidence about their confusion, 
suspicions and frustration as to why some perceive themselves to be placed in random 
trainings with what I learned from the interviews with case managers. Thus, to what degree 
and whether if at all pressure to place respondents into pre-paid trainings played any role in 
the reasons why respondents in this study felt confused about why they were participating in 
a given training, is an absolute unknown. But the interviews with case managers does beg the 
question more broadly of the degree to which they are able to freely assess the employment 
needs of UBII recipients in the face of possible pressure from management to meet targets. 
Furthermore, the interviews with case managers shed possible light onto the perceived 
limitations of respondent use of choice and advocacy in determining their own outcome.   
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THEMATIC CODES 
Quality of training; training as escape  
 
A number of respondents cited the failure of the skills training they participated in to provide 
them with any new or helpful information that would actually assist them in integrating into 
the regular labour market (n=15). This was a problem for the highly skilled UBII recipient 
who was placed into trainings they perceived as being able to teach themselves or the low-
skilled recipient who already knows for example, how to conduct him or herself in the work 
place.  
I20: So, I said, ok give me what you want. Because my German is still  
not that fluent; I thought I can write my CV in German and get these  
people to help me correct it. Ok. That was my intention and I thought I  
can get something out of it. Then I go to this place and they are teaching  
me how to open Word and then they are telling me how to key A, ok? And  
I wasted four days for that purpose. To key A, Z, E, etc . The other thing,  
some people really need these kind of things, but not me. Ok. So I ask  
them, can you correct my CV? I gave them my German CV and asked  
them, can you correct it? The person who was correcting, now I realize,  
has to really be an MBA or engineer guy with fluent German. So they  
corrected it and the whole meaning was changed. So the main point to  
going to this place was totally nothing. I mean, I didn’t get anything out  
of it. And they are spending some money for this course. Ok. Fine. I  
mean, you have the money…(34 year-old married with children Indian  
male immigrant)  
Moreover, a small group of respondents (n=4) viewed participating in the skills training as a 
way to escape the demands placed on them by their case manager. Respondents often cited 
not wanting to participate in a training, but viewing it as an opportunity to be ‘free’ of 
Jobcenter demands for a given period of time .  
I20: And I can say, I don’t want to go to this training, but I feel much better  
there than dealing with them [the Jobcenter] because then I have to sort out  
these 20 job applications…I feel better because by being at the training I am  
not forced to deal with the Jobcenter and their 20 job applications. Because I  
am in training, I am officially off the statistic. (34 year-old married with  
children Indian male immigrant) 
For these respondents, their reason to participate had nothing to do with them being interested 
in the training. A sense of purpose in the training was absent given that one of the only 
benefits they perceive the training to provide them was the opportunity to escape from and as 
a way to ‘deal’ with the Jobcenter. From their perspective, they were simply at the training 
because they had to be. Here again, this type of response begs the question of whether an 
opportunity for respondents to potentially learn something new or capitalize on knowledge 
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they already have is missed in the possible pressure case managers experience to ‘activate’ 
the unemployed.   
 
A final issue cited by a number of respondents was often the poor quality of the teaching 
and/or curriculum of the various skills trainings (n=11). Thus, while some respondents found 
the idea of participating in a training placement useful, they were frustrated to experience 
poor quality teaching and/or curriculum. The experience of poor quality training was, in part, 
the result of placing skilled or highly skilled UBII recipients into 'one size fits all' trainings 
that are meant for anyone and everyone in recipient of UBII.  
I40: At the beginning I was supposed to participate in a skills training that,  
excuse me, was total bullshit. I could have run that training based on what  
I learned during my studies at university. (32 year-old single German male) 
Moreover a challenge was the lack of consistency in the quality of the training that was cited 
by a proportion of respondents.  As a result, [highly] skilled respondents placed into a CV 
course, for example, experienced boredom which in turn resulted in frustration. Thus, for a 
proportion of respondents, whether the training proved beneficial depended on the quality of 
the curriculum and the instructor. If one or the other were out of sync with each other, all 
respondents—skilled or unskilled—felt bored, busied and frustrated and perceived the 
training as, again, a waste of their time. But, if the instruction and the curriculum were seen 
to be good, respondents profited from and found the training beneficial. 
AMB: And you are now participating in a training? I12: Yes, exactly.  
That is directly related to my occupation: secretarial work. So, a re- 
fresher course in the whole of secretarial work. That was recommended  
to me because it is so, that [because of my back] I can no longer work in  
production. Otherwise I will throw my back out completely. AMB: And  
did you already start the training? I12: Yes, I have been there for two  
weeks. AMB: And how is the training? I12: It is fun. It is something  
different. It is not like the last two trainings I participated in. This course  
is how to be a secretary from start to finish. It covers freight, logistic, how  
to write office letters—when I was in this last course, the teacher just stood  
in front of the class and talked and talked at you. It was really boring. (29  
year-old single German female)  
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6.3 Unemployment Benefit II recipients’ experience of vocational (re-) trainings 
 
THEMATIC CODES 
Type of Maßnahme: vocational re-training; case manager guidelines 
 
A vocational re-training into a completely new field is a costly and lengthy undertaking and 
for obvious reasons is not something the Jobcenter takes lightly. The Jobcenter will pay for a 
re-training so long as it is warranted, i.e.,  the recipient has exhausted all other possibilities to 
find work in their occupation or on account of an injury where they are no longer able to 
remain in their current field of work. A re-training, which includes both the classroom 
instruction and an on-site apprenticeship, can last anywhere from twelve to thirty months and 
during this time the Jobcenter is paying both for the re-training and the UBII recipient’s 
monthly unemployment benefit. Because of the time and costs involved, case managers do 
not simply move just any UBII recipient into a vocational re-training. That said, as an 
analysis of the interviews with case managers for this study suggests, case managers do not 
follow a specific set of guidelines when determining who is or is not granted a re-training. 
Rather the decision to re-train stems from a review of the UBII recipients’ employment 
history and the reasons for their current inability to find a regular source of work. If it is 
decided that all options to enter the regular labour market have been exhausted, then the case 
manager will consider the option to re-train a recipient.  
I5: …and I was told [by the case manager] that since I have been out  
of my profession for longer than four years that I was considered a  
beginner, so statistically I was a beginner in my profession and that  
with two children and being a ‘beginner’ I would not be hired [in my  
field]. Therefore I was advised to do a vocational re-education into a  
new field. (37 year old married with children German female) 
For those who do re-train into a new field, after they completed their re-training the Jobcenter 
will only assist them in finding work in their new career and not in their prior area of work. 
Therefore respondents cannot seek work in their prior and new field at the same time because 
they are now considered to have more qualifications and expertise in their new field as 
opposed to their prior field, no matter the length of time they may have worked in their prior 
field.  
I5: I told them, if I do a vocational re-education into a new field than I  
am still a beginner with two children. The problem was, according to  
the statistics, when one comes directly from a vocational re-education,  
one should have better chances of getting a job rather than having left  
the field for several years and then coming back. So, I did the vocational  
re-education. (37 year old married with children German female) 
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At the time I5 was interviewed, she had finished her re-training into IT and completed her 
apprenticeship. She explained to me that the company where she completed her 
apprenticeship was contemplating hiring her but permanently but owing to the recession, that 
opportunity was lost. Thus, at the time of the interview she was currently looking for work in 
her new field.  
 
THEMATIC CODES 
Advocacy and choice in re-training; case manager approving re-training; cost of lost time   
 
In this author’s judgement, that the German government provides the resources and the 
jurisdiction for Jobcenter staff to enable UBII recipients to re-train into a new vocation is an 
invaluable opportunity for those who do indeed require this level of support. The ability to re-
train into a new profession provides recipients with an opportunity they might otherwise not 
have (or not be able to finance themselves) while also acknowledging that there are structural 
limitations to integrating some UBII recipients into the labour market. Eleven respondents 
had either participated or were in the process of participating in a vocational re-training. Yet, 
when respondents were asked to relate their experiences of participating in a re-training, it 
was not the re-training itself that was poor, rather it was respondents’ experience of 
requesting a particular re-training that proved problematic. The overarching challenge for 
respondents was their inability to necessarily select which re-training they would like to 
participate in. Here it appears that the case manager had the potential to wield an enormous 
amount of power over the professional direction of the respondent because it is the case 
manager who grants the permission to participate, or not, in a given training generally, but a 
vocational re-training specifically.  
 
While a respondent’s ability to advocate for themselves was important in every aspect of their 
interaction at the Jobcenter, their advocacy skills became especially important in requesting a 
specific re-training placement. Indeed a key theme to emerge from an analysis of the 
evidence was that respondents’ ability to choose which re-training they participated in was 
largely dependent on their ability to advocate for themselves. There are two particular cases, 
I5 and I48, that highlight the tension between the ability to and limitations in advocating for 
oneself. 
I5: I ask around wherever I can, but not at the Jobcenter. I seek out  
information through the internet or from acquaintances, friends, etc.  
Then when I have all the information I need, I go to the Jobcenter  
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and I say ‘I want this and this’. (37 year old married with children  
German female) 
As noted in section 6.1, the ability to articulate reasons for or against participating in a given 
training was extremely important. Yet, at the same time it is difficult to untangle the degree to 
which advocating for one’s position necessarily helped. On the one hand, an analysis of the 
evidence suggests that those respondents who were not able to articulate their reasons for or 
against wanting a specific training and/or could not advocate for themselves properly were, to 
some extent, those who were often moved from one training to the next. By contrast, 
respondents who did their own research concerning what trainings were offered by the 
Jobcenter, what the Jobcenter would pay for, or what was available in the community in 
terms of apprenticeships, re-training or other skills trainings, were somewhat more likely to 
secure the training they desired. This being said, it is important to note that respondents’ 
ability to advocate for themselves only went so far and by no means guaranteed them the 
outcome the respondent sought. The final decision was inevitably dependent on whether the 
case manager they were assigned was open to their suggestions and perhaps to a lesser extent 
on whether the relevant training places were accessible to case managers.   
 
Ultimately it appears that, depending on the type of case manager assigned to a recipient, the 
case manager has the ability to determine what a respondent can or cannot do professionally 
since all vocational re-trainings have to be approved by the case manager. Of the 11 who had 
participated in or were in the process of seeking approval for a re-training, five found their 
ability to request which training they wished to participate in problematic. Nine of the 11 (of 
whom the five are included in this count) mentioned the importance of being able to advocate 
one’s position in securing the re-training they wished. Of the nine who mentioned the need to 
advocate, four related experiences of advocating for a particular re-training that they were 
ultimately denied. This suggests that which vocational re-training a respondent desired to 
participate in versus which re-training they were offered by their case manager did not 
necessarily align.  
I48: They had me take an apptitude test to test whether the career as a  
computer scientist is suitable to my strengths and abilities. Even though  
other people have done this job without taking such a test. For example,  
my brother has no idea about computers. He does not even know how to  
turn one on. His case manager offered him a re-training in computer  
science. But I was denied, even though I have a background in computers— 
technically with computers, I have so much experience with computers  
and I can do so much with computers—repair, build, everything. But,  
I was denied the re-training... and then my case manager gave me  
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additional time to apply for jobs and to find a job. Then my case manager  
arranged for a meeting with me so that I come round to speak to her about  
my future training and work. So then I went to her and she said, ok I have  
found a retraining for you as an optician. (48 year old, Morrocan male immigrant, 
lone parent)  
 
I48 highlights a possible tension between the case manager taking labour market conditions 
into consideration while suggesting a specific training to a recipient. Here, for example, it 
appears that his case manager possibly made a suggestion as to which re-training I48 should 
participate in based on benchmarks that did not necessarily align with the respondent’s 
professional background and interests. Although I48 had a history working in computers and 
had studied physics and chemistry at a university in Morocco (without, however, completing 
his studies), he was unable to choose which re-training he wanted to participate in without 
demonstrating, by taking a test, that he had the necessary aptitude and ability to complete the 
re-training.  
I48: I wanted to do this re-training course in computer science. But, then they  
started with this test. They said „you have to first take this test. If you pass  
this test, then you can take the computer science training.“  It is possible that  
when one is already a computer scientist that they still would not pass this test.  
And then I was just so dissapointed because I wanted to train to become a  
computer scientist because I sought out this profession for myself so that I  
would have a chance to find a job.  
Several months after he found out that he had not passed the test and, thus, could not 
participate in the re-training as a computer scientist his case manager requested a meeting to 
inform him that she had found a re-training for him as an optician—if he passed the test—
which corresponded well with there being a high number of positions available in the field. It 
appears to be less about whether I48 wanted to be an optician, rather it was perceived as a 
position he could get a job in (so long as he passed the test for the re-training). As this 
example illustrates, the driving factors for why the case manager is interested in placing a 
UBII recipient into a given re-training can be quite different from those that drive the UBII 
recipient. It is a question of whether the UBII recipient should re-train into a new field 
because there are a high number of positions potentially available, irrespective of whether the 
recipient desires to work in the field. It makes sense for the Jobcenter to think in these terms; 
after all the Jobcenter’s objective is to move the unemployed into work quickly in order to 
reduce the unemployment statistics and a re-training is a costly endeavour for which the 
government would like a return on its investment—namely the UBII recipient to find a job. 
Yet, while on the surface this approach seems logical, it has the potential to be 
counterproductive for the UBII recipient because they are not necessarily maximizing their 
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skillset in the field of their choosing. Again, this highlights a potential missed opportunity for 
UBII respondents through conflicting policy objectives that can result in sub-optimal results 
manifested through an ostensible miss-match of UBII recipients skills and experience.   
 
Irrespective of cost, even when the prospect of obtaining work is directly dependent on the 
respondent getting the necessary training, in this case a truck drivers licence, what the UBII 
recipient wants to do versus what the case manager claims is best for the respondent are 
outweighed by the case manager’s decision not to grant the training.  
I38: For example, my husband, he had—we have the same case manager— 
he wanted to get his truck drivers licence. But then instead she put him in  
a training. The man is 38 years old, he wants to have a future, he does not  
want to sit in a school...he had a letter from a potential employer who wrote 
„Mr. so and so, we are prepared to hire this man when he has obtained his  
            truck driver license. He would be paid 1,700 Euro after taxes...“ He would  
            not have to come to the Jobcenter and I would not have to be here either!  
            Do you know what they did? They did not sign off on the truck driver  
license course! They are so stupid!  Instead they offered him a...training as  
Berufskraftfahrer [commercial goods or passenger transport] for three or  
two years. He can not even do that. (40 year-old German born Turkish nationality 
married female) 
Here, this pragmatic approach to deciding what the UBII recipient will re-train into results in 
decisions being made that are again not aligned with the respondent’s professional interests, 
skills or desires.   
 
The fundamental problem here is that when the case manager denies the respondent the re-
training they would like to do, time is lost—time that could have been spent starting the re-
training, eventually finishing and then looking for employment in their new field.  
I38: Either the money is not there [for the training] so “no” or “yes, we  
will have a look if that works.” I am not stupid. I know what they mean  
when they say, “we will have a look”, that that essentially means no, it  
will not work. But why? I would not be sitting here.  
When a respondent is denied the training they wish, then they have to start from the 
beginning—continue to seek employment while exploring other re-training options with their 
case manager. The case manager may finally decide to allow for a different re-training 
placement, but that is after months have passed that could otherwise have been spent by the 
respondent in the originally suggested re-training.  
I48: I would really like to work. But, they did not give me the opportunity  
nor did they support me. Because if I had done the original training, I would  
have been done a long time ago and been a computer scientist. I wanted to do  
this training, but they said no, otherwise I would have been done a long time  
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ago.   
For I48 well over a year had passed between the time when he originally proposed the re-
training into computer science, then the test to see if he had the aptitude for the position, then 
awaited his results, then met with his case manager to learn that he was denied the re-training, 
then had to search for work, then heard from his case manager that she had an idea for a new 
re-training as optician, then her requirement that he again take a test to determin aptitute, then 
waited for the results and learned that he had passed, until the time I interviewed him in 
January 2012 and learned that he was waiting to meet with his case manager to find out 
whether she would approve the re-training that would start in February 2012 and last two 
years. Only after the two-year re-training as an optician could a man at the age of 48 envision 
finally entering the regular labour market.  
 
6.4 Unemployment Benefit II recipients’ experience and perception of the One-
Euro-Job  
 
THEMATIC CODES 
Type of Maßnahme; welcomed/did not welcome opportunity to participate 
 
As outlined in Chapter Three (section 3.3.1) the One-Euro-Job is considered a skills training 
and not a ‘job’ because it is meant to act as a form of training for UBII recipients who have 
little or no prior work experience. The objective of the One-Euro-Job training is to test a 
recipient’s preparedness to enter the regular labour market by introducing the UBII recipient 
to a regular work schedule while working in a professional environment. Key here is that the 
UBII recipient is, supposedly, not doing work that would otherwise be done by a regularly 
employed member of staff. Essentially it is ghost work, work that otherwise does not exist. 
Perhaps the most striking finding to emerge from an analysis of the evidence is that 
respondents tended to view the One-Euro-Job as work rather than as a skills training per se.  
This, of course, is diametrically opposed to how the Federal Republic packages the objective 
of the One-Euro-Job.  An analysis of the evidence found that of the respondents’ who 
participated in the One-Euro-Job (n=15), there were those who welcomed the opportunity 
(n=8) and those who found the One-Euro-Job problematic (n=7). Of the 15 who participated, 
seven participated in a One-Euro-Job on multiple occasions. Their experiences and 
perceptions of One-Euro-Jobs were wide and varied indeed.  
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THEMATIC CODES 
Welcomed opportunity: One-Euro-Job as escape; stepping stone; opportunity to earn extra 
money/work; sense of gratitude  
 
As noted, for some respondents (n=8), the One-Euro-Job was welcomed and even desired. 
Indeed, a proportion of respondents repeatedly asked their case managers for a One-Euro-Job 
placement but were not necessarily granted one. Of the eight respondents who welcomed the 
opportunity to participate in a One-Euro-Job, the reason respondents desired this was three-
fold. First, UBII recipients who participate in a One-Euro-Job do not have to meet the 
demands of the Jobcenter as outlined in their integration into work agreement 
(Eingliederungsvereinbarung) during their placement. Therefore this group of respondents 
viewed the One-Euro-Job as a win-win; one still received benefit plus an extra c. €200.00 per 
month, but the respondent was no longer obligated to meet the demands of the Jobcenter, so 
long as they were ‘engaged’. Here one of the underlying motivations was to avoid the 
Jobcenter. 
AMB: You would take a One-Euro-Job if it was offered to you?  
I12: Exactly. And it is not an issue of I ‘must’. I would do it. The  
issue is that one is out of the system and on top of that you get  
additional money [per month]. (29 year-old single female, German)  
Second, some respondents viewed participating in a One-Euro-Job as a stepping stone to 
something more permanent and/or better paid. Specifically, this group of respondents 
perceived the One-Euro-Job as either an opportunity to move into their field and to obtain a 
permanent position.  
I23: I also did a One-Euro-Job, so in that sense…AMB: And you would 
do a One-Euro-Job again? I23: Of course. First, so long as I do not have  
any other offers. AMB: Regarding the One-Euro-Job, would you rather  
have a regular job that paid you a regular wage? I23: It does not  
matter to me. I think one can always work their way up in a job. There,  
where I worked [in the One-Euro-Job], they would have hired me but  
unfortunately I got pregnant otherwise they would have hired me. (33 year- 
old female lone parent German) 
Yet, for those respondents who ended up working at a One-Euro-Job that was in their field 
and/or was interesting work, the placement nevertheless did not result in a permanent regular 
work (n=4). Inevitably the contract came to an end, because that is the nature of One-Euro-
Jobs. They simply are not permanent positions. Given that the employer is paid by the state to 
take on One-Euro-Job participants, they have no incentive nor do they necessarily need 
additional employees. Inevitably the respondents found themselves back at the Jobcenter after 
the completion of their One-Euro-Job.  
I24: But I find I have not had a good experience with this miserable work  
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or One-Euro-Jobs. I did three [One-Euro-] Jobs in the public school system  
as a librarian. They always said to me “you are good”. I was given a certificate  
where I earned an ‘A’, but I was never hired. (60 year-old divorced Iranian 
immigrant)  
The third type of response was from respondents who simply were desperate to work and 
earn a little extra money (n=4). Here respondents perceived the One-Euro-Job as an 
opportunity to earn much needed additional money per month coupled with the chance to 
‘work’, i.e., to be engaged on a daily basis. This group of respondents were not concerned 
with what type of work they were necessarily doing nor did they mind doing menial jobs.  
AMB: When you have a One-Euro-Job, then at least you are not... 
I8: ...without work, without anything. You are right. I am really  
happy that I am not standing there with nothing and only alone.  
One says in Germany, ‘the ceiling falls on the head’. In other words,  
I am happy that that is not my situation. That is why I am happy that  
I got the One-Euro-Job. I am really thankful. (42 year-old single  
German male) 
Given respondents inablity to find work in the regular labour market, their desire to 
participate in a One-Euro-Job was underpinned by a desperate need to work in order to earn 
extra money. 
I26…The situation is very bad. I sometimes go to him [case manager]  
and even I tell him, I want One-Euro-Job. Because that will help me a  
bit because the money I am taking is not sufficient, my family they are  
not here…You see, it is very terrible. I have been telling him [case  
manager] my experience, but no help.  AMB: He does not give you… 
26: Never. (63 year-old male married with family Ghanaian immigrant) 
 
THEMATIC CODES 
One-Euro-Job problematic: Sanctions; beneath ability; demoralized; qualifications; 
perception of wage 
 
For other respondents who participated in a One-Euro-Job, it was presented to them as 
something they had to do or face sanctions (n=4). This group of respondents perceived the 
‘job’ as being beneath their ability and if they participated, the experience left them feeling 
demoralized (n=6). Low-skilled respondents with no qualifications in this sample were often 
funnelled into and out of various One-Euro-Jobs over a long period of time (n=5). For them 
the option or possibility of finding or moving into regular work seemed almost foreign to 
them, something that simply was not an option for them.  For those respondents who viewed 
the One-Euro-Job as problematic, their experiences can be put into two categories: The 
experience of respondents with and without formal qualifications. Respondents who did not 
complete primary or secondary school or did not complete an apprenticeship found 
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themselves repeatedly placed in One-Euro-Jobs (n=4). For them a One-Euro-Job placement 
had become a source of continuous (though precarious in nature) work. Once the respondent 
finished their placement, and after they completed their compulsory break, their case manager 
arranged for another placement.  
 I15: Yes, I have actually been doing One-Euro-Jobs for a longer period  
of time. That started in 2005 where I was put in a computer training on  
Thursdays and Fridays and the other days I raked leaves or stuff like that...  
then in 2007 I landed in a Gymnasium, ten months as the janitor. So also  
raking leaves, then looking to see what was broken in the toilet…then  
there were three months where I had no job, the so-called required break 
…and then after three months I landed here in the Hamburger port, well  
not in the port, oh what is that called? There in the port, there are bridges,  
cranes and ships and they need to be cleaned, the old paint removed with  
a machine and then repainted and that kind of stuff. I did that for two years.  
And then I had another required three-month break. And then, like I said,  
back to the school. That is in Bergdorf. I was in a primary school for 1.5  
months and then I was sent to a Gymnasium...collecting papers, sorting  
papers, filling the waste bins and then emptying them. (61 year-old single  
German male) 
 
When asked how respondents felt about earning between €1.00 and €2.00 per hour for the 
work they completed—often for the same work that an employed person did for higher 
earnings per hour—some expressed outrage while others were resigned to the fact and would 
rather have the One-Euro-Job earnings instead of nothing. The additional sum of c. €200.00 
earned per month for the thirty hours worked per week was often perceived as a bonus. The 
extra earnings allowed respondents to put a little aside in savings or buy a favourite CD, for 
example. When asked if respondents would rather have a job in the regular labour market, 
respondents of this group noted the difficulty they have in accessing work in the regular 
labour market.  
 I15:…well one cannot not forget how old I am. Here in Germany, it  
 is so that after 30 it’s over. And I am 61—‘Oh then we prefer to hire  
the younger one’. Let’s say I go to Karstadt and ask if there is anything  
in their warehouse, so boxes that need to be stacked, ‘yes and how old  
are you? 61? ‘We will think about that’. That is how it was at SATURN.  
I applied for a job in their CD department…I was really excited [about  
the prospect of working there]. Then the letter came ‘Mr. Holzhauer,  
we are very sorry, but we decided to hire someone else.’ Bumms!  
Why? Because I was too old. That is how it was at Alster-Haus in their  
CD department WOM. And then they hired everyone from SATURN  
to run their WOM CD department. I didn’t have a chance anyway. And  
when they see how old I am…then one can just be happy that one has a  
One-Euro-Job…so that one can somehow work their way in. (61 year- 
old single German male) 
175 
 
Yet, respondents also noted that even if they were to find work in the regular labour market, 
their lack of qualifications would result in employment where they would hardly be earning 
more than their combined One-Euro-Job plus Jobcenter benefits. On account of such low 
wages, they would inevitably have to apply for wage top-up from the Jobcenter which would 
mean they would still be in receipt of a ‘benefit’ from the Jobcenter. Therefore work in the 
regular labour market did not necessarily mean freedom from the Jobcenter. Respondents 
were aware of the precarity of their situation. While they acknowledged that their 
participation in a One-Euro-Job training meant they were ‘off the statistic’ and no longer had 
to meet Jobcenter demands—as respondents would say “man ist raus” (you are out)— they 
nonetheless knew that within a period of time they would be back at the Jobcenter in the 
same unemployed situation they were prior to accepting the placement. Thus, on the one 
hand, respondents were grateful even appreciative that they had the One-Euro-Job because of 
the opportunity to earn a little extra money while having a ‘job’ that provided a regular 
schedule. Yet, respondents also knew that these, in the end, were superficial benefits that did 
nothing to ultimately change their unemployment status.  
 
For the second category of respondents with qualifications, the One-Euro-Job was beneath 
their skill and qualification level. They were therefore less willing to put themselves in the 
position of taking on a One-Euro-Job and if they did, they did so for a period of time and then 
resolved to never participate again on account of the work being beneath their skill and 
intellectual niveau (n=4).    
I24: For me, the One-Euro-Job was a disappointment…one time she  
[case manager] spoke to me about doing a janitorial job, but I said  
that is not for me. I am not prepared to do that [job]. I completed my  
Abitur in my home country [Iran]. I was a pilot. (60 year-old divorced 
Iranian immigrant) 
Although willing to do whatever they could to find work, this group of respondents 
acknowledged the limitation of One-Euro-Jobs. While all respondents were cognizant of the 
earnings discrepancy between them and those who did the exact same job but earned a 
normal wage, this second category of respondents did not perceive a benefit to the trade off—
working to stay active for €1.50 per hour or not working. Respondents simply were not 
prepared to work for such a nominal hourly compensation. While they acknowledged the 
pressure placed on them by the Jobcenter to participate in a One-Euro-Job, they did not let 
this pressure dictate their choice of work when the job was beneath their skill and 
qualification level.   
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I24: These people with their One-Euro-Job attitude. I have always  
discussed this with these people [case manager]. I have said, for me  
personally, my work is worth more than one euro per hour. (60 year- 
old divorced Iranian immigrant) 
 
Although the objective of the One-Euro-Job is to test UBII recipients’ readiness to work 
while introducing those to a regular work schedule and not to provide a ‘job’ per se, 
nonetheless, it cannot be ignored that UBII recipients do in fact do some form of ‘work’ 
while at their One-Euro-Job placement. Therein lays the challenge with One-Euro-Jobs. On 
the one hand, the One-Euro-Job recipient is not actually ‘working’ because the ‘work’ done 
cannot replace the work of a regularly employed employee; but on the other hand, their time 
is indeed being occupied with some form of ‘work activity’. The result in effect is that UBII 
recipients cannot do work that has meaning attached to it otherwise it would be work that 
should then be performed by a regularly employed person.  
I49: Because the joke about One-Euro-Jobs is that your work is not  
allowed to replace an employed person’s work. That means in German,  
when one speaks frankly, you are only allowed to do useless work.  
Because the moment the work you do has meaning attached to it, is  
the moment that your work will be given to a regularly employed  
person who is paid to do the job. (38 year-old German male married  
with children) 
Thus, it begs the question of what kind of experience the UBII recipient is actually gaining 
from their purported skill training? While the objective of the One-Euro-Job is not to provide 
the UBII recipient with a job, inevitably the perception transmitted from the case manager to 
the UBII recipients is that the One-Euro-Job is indeed a ‘job’. With the experience gained—
be it stacking boxes, cleaning toilets, emptying waste bins or working in a dry cleaners—all 
but one respondent (n=14) who participated in a One-Euro-Job could not say that as a result 
of their work experience they were able to find regular work in a warehouse or as a janitor for 
a school or hospital or a permanent job in a dry cleaners. It is not that this work is not valid or 
that people should not be taught how to do this work. But as a result of their experience doing 
a specific job, respondents would therefore like to be able to move into the regular labour 
market, but were unable to. Moreover, an analysis of the evidence begs the question of 
whether, from a policy perspective, it is fair to assume that the work being completed by 
UBII recipients would not end up being valid work that an organization or company benefits 
from. Indeed, the evidence from this study and others indicates that employers do benefit 
from hosting One-Euro-Job participants (see also BMI, 2012). Respondents cleaned schools, 
stacked boxes in warehouses and worked in the Hamburger port, among other things. If the 
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UBII recipient is not going to stack the boxes, then who is? Furthermore, the organization 
supporting the One-Euro-Job participant has no financial incentive to integrate him or her 
into the workplace environment beyond what they are assigned to do. Thus to what degree 
does the UBII recipient actually experience a ‘work’ environment?  
I28 It is really demeaning what one does. One is in the warehouse,  
filling boxes. The hour does not pass quickly and one is constantly  
moving, one does not have many…how do you say? Not many rights,  
even when you are sent by the Jobcenter, do you understand? When  
you come from the Jobcenter and you have to work there, then you are  
treated like dirt. (33 year-old female married with children Lebanese  
immigrant)  
 
6.5 Unemployment Benefit II recipients’ positive experiences with skills training  
 
THEMATIC CODES 
Sense of purpose; structure and routine; helpful information; provided needed materials 
 
Some  respondents related that while participation in a skills training did not assist them or 
improve their chances of entering the regular labour market, participation did provide a group 
of respondents with a sense of purpose and structure to their daily routine (n=12). The 
significance of this finding is bolstered by other research, including the 2011 German 
government evaluation of skills trainings (BMAS, 2011). In addition to skills trainings 
providing respondents with a sense of purpose and routine, they also provided respondents 
with computers and other materials needed to apply for positions (folders, paper, and 
envelopes)—items they did not necessarily have at home. While many respondents did not 
want to participate in a PC or CV course and at the outset did not think they would get 
anything out of the training, a few respondents who did participate found the training 
unexpectedly helpful (n=3). They cited tips and strategies they were given on how best to 
manage the application process—this included strategies on how to interview for a position.   
AMB: Did you participate in a skills training? I42: Yes, that was a  
two-week job application course on how to write a job application.  
AMB: really?  I42: At first you think as someone with a university  
degree you don’t need such a training. But on the other side, I got  
emotional support through the training. At first it was degrading so… 
because….one thinks you have to go to a course with other idiots  
so…and…yes there were ex-convicts in the course, but they were all  
really nice. So, in retrospect I did not find the training that bad.   
(36 year-old single German male) 
178 
 
The tips provided were particularly helpful for those respondents who had otherwise been in 
a secure job for many years and now found themselves unemployed and as a result were out 
of touch with the current CV format and methods used to apply for work.  
I36: Yes, where I am now unemployed, I learned the modern way  
to write a job application, so printed on the computer, with your  
picture and stuff like that. AMB: Did you find that helpful? I36:  
Yes, a little, naturally because that is required today, that everything  
is well formatted with a picture. That is how it has to be. That is ok.  
But most people do not know how to format a job application. There  
are little tricks you learn and that is what you learn there [at the  
training]. That was really good, yes. (52 year-old single male  
Turkish immigrant) 
 
Here it is important to recognise that there can be and are multiple objectives to providing 
and participating in skills trainings. While one objective for the provision of skills training 
should be as mechanisms to fill a gap in knowledge that will assist the UBII recipient enter 
the labour market, a training can and should provide auxiliary objectives as well. That is 
clearly born out of the analysis of the evidence. When asked whether the skills training they 
participated in assisted them in finding work, respondents often cited that that was not 
necessarily the purpose of the training to start with. For this proportion of respondents, they 
were aware from the start that their participation in the training had to do with factors beyond 
simply finding work—factors they acknowledged they needed and were beneficial to them. 
As I25 notes, the purpose of her training was not to integrate her into the labour market, 
rather to teach her how to do something every day, give her a place to be.  
AMB: And what was the purpose of the training you participated in?  
Did it help you enter the labour market? I25: That was not the objective  
of the training. AMB: What was the objective? I25: The objective was  
that I do something. AMB: Ok. And you knew that? I25: Yes.  AMB:  
And that did not bother you that that was how your time was being  
spent? I25: No. (24 year-old single German female) 
In this sense, it is important to recognize the need to have trainings in place that address a 
wide network of needs of respondents. For some, that their time is structured, that they have a 
sense of purpose when they get up in the morning, that their day is occupied doing something 
they perceive as constructive, that they are meeting people are as—if not more—important to 
them then whether they find work as a result of their participation in a skills training.  
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6.6 Chapter summary and conclusion 
 
This chapter has explored the research findings regarding respondents’ experiences of 
participating in three categories of skills trainings offered by the Jobcenter under the rubric of 
Arbeitsförderung (work support) as they related to the research question: 
 
 Are the policy objectives expressed by the Hartz IV reforms reflected in the manner 
and substance of the lived experiences of Unemployment Benefit II recipients? 
 
While trainings provided some respondents with structure, a routine and social contacts along 
with access to material to apply for jobs and helpful information, the majority of respondents 
who participated in all types of trainings available noted the lack of choice to freely choose 
which and whether they participated in a given training. This inability to choose resulted in 
respondents being put into trainings that were not necessarily perceived as being relevant to 
their prior work, their occupational interest or their future career or job prospects. Moreover, 
a respondents’ ability to advocate for themselves coupled with being assigned a case manager 
who was open and willing to work with the respondent to find the right placement were key 
factors that determined whether respondents’ experience of the training was beneficial to 
them. The case manager assigned to the respondent had the capacity to make or break his or 
her experience at the Jobcenter generally, but their ability or inability to participate in a 
training specifically. This was particularly important for respondents who participated in or 
were seeking to participate in a vocational re-training.  The inability of respondents to choose 
which re-vocational training they participated in directly affected what the respondent might 
end up doing for the remainder of their professional career—assuming that respondents do 
eventually (re)enter the labour market in an occupation for which they have been (re)trained. 
Therefore, it appears that respondents were either lucky or unlucky with who they were 
assigned for a case manager. If the respondent was assigned a thoughtful case manager who 
took his or her interests and wishes into consideration then his or her experience had the 
potential to be positive in nature. But respondents often cited case managers who hindered or 
made their ability to choose which re-training they participated in, and thus their career 
trajectory, difficult. This resulted in respondents having to change their previously conceived 
notion of which career they would develop while feeling stuck in a seemingly never ending 
cycle of unemployment. Therefore, advocating alone did not necessarily result in respondents 
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able to obtain what they viewed as best for themselves nor did it necessarily determine the 
outcomes respondents desired given that no matter how well they argued their position, 
respondents were not always able to successfully negotiate what they wanted.  
 
Indeed, it appears that the case manager inevitably wields an enormous amount of power over 
the job or career trajectory of respondents. That said, case managers are subject to constraints 
that may not be visible to respondents, but it is albeit the respondent who ultimately bears the 
consequence of such constraints. Thus the effect (instances which have been related in this 
Chapter) is to compound respondents’ sense of powerlessness. Moreover, regardless of the 
intentions of policy makers or administrators, the effect of being required to undertake 
inappropriate trainings, though apparently counterproductive and demotivating, is effective in 
lowering recipients’ aspirations while aligning their expectations with market conditions. 
Indeed, the effectiveness of the support recipients receive in this respect appears to be part of 
a game of chance—just like the labour market for which they are supposedly being prepared.  
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Chapter Seven: Findings on the Role of Job Placement Services in 
Assisting Unemployment Benefit II Recipients Find Work  
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
The following chapter presents a thick description of the findings as they pertain to the first 
research question:  
 
 Are the policy objectives expressed by the Hartz IV reforms reflected in the manner 
and substance of the lived experiences of Unemployment Benefit II recipients? 
 
This chapter will focus on the experience and perceptions of the sample of UBII respondents 
for this study who received job placement consultation and support at the Jobcenter in 
Bremen and Hamburg. The government’s expressed objective for providing job placement 
services for UBII recipients rests both in the notion to activate (fordern) and to support 
(Fördern) those UBII recipients perceived as needing assistance in their endeavour to 
integrate into the labour market.  
 
In addition to skills training, the Hartz reforms introduced new and expanded job placement 
services to those previously on social assistance (and to a lesser extent unemployment 
assistance) who, prior to the reforms, had little, if any, recourse to such services (Bernhard 
and Wolff, 2008). This type of support presented itself through the introduction of Jobcenters 
with a case management approach to supporting clients find work. For the purpose of this 
chapter, job placement services are defined as mediation (Vermittlung) which includes 
profiling and case management; depending on the type of ‘client’ profile, the case manager 
may provide the UBII recipient with job advertisements coupled with all UBII recipients 
having access to a central Jobcenter database (Jobbörse) listing job openings in the 
community.
115
 The German government views job placement services as an essential 
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 The introduction of new public management was an important aspect of the reforms and in order to maximize on cost-efficiency and 
effectiveness, job placement services contracted out to private providers became more pronounced with the introduction of Social Code II 
(SGBII) at the beginning of 2005. Until 1994 only the Federal Employment Agency was allowed to provide placement services. The legal 
framework for contracting out aspects of placement, that included profiling and case management, was introduced in the year 1998 as §37 
Social Code III (SGBIII).  In 2002 the placement voucher (§421g SGBIII) was introduced that was, under certain conditions, delivered to 
the unemployed. The placement voucher guarantees a premium for an external provider in case of a successful placement. Contracting out 
all placement services with the aim of immediate placement was introduced in 2002 (§36 SGBIII). Additionally, there was a very similar 
instrument called contract out of reintegration services (§421i SGBIII) between 2003 and 2007. External providers were supposed to design 
and to put in tender innovative strategies to reintegrate the unemployed into the labour market. Thus there exist two quasi-market options for 
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activation measure used to assist UBII recipients integrate into the labour market (BA, 2013). 
Job placement was one of the aspects embedded in the concept of ‘Vermittlungsprozess’ 
(mediation process) that was an important component of the fourth Hartz law. This mediation 
process is manifested in the use of the Integration into Work Agreement 
(Eingliederungsvereinbarung) that the case manager and the UBII recipient enter into 
together. The agreement outlines exactly how the UBII recipient will demonstrate personal 
initiative to find work (i.e., the number of job applications the recipient will send out per 
month) and in return, the level and degree of support the recipient can expect to obtain from 
their case manager. The agreement is solidified under public law, which means that a breach 
of the agreement by the UBII recipient will result in legal consequences in the form of 
sanctions. In the eyes of the Government, this agreement encapsulates the concept of Fordern 
and Fördern. But in the eyes of some critics, the support (Fördern) that is provided in the 
agreement is based on an asymmetrical contract relationship that, because of the threat of 
sanctions, results in a highly stratified, hierarchical and unbalanced relationship between the 
case manager as the foci of support and the jobseeker. The relationship between the case 
manager as ‘mediator’ and the UBII recipient as ‘client’ is one based on reciprocity as 
defined through and based on the rights and responsibilities policy logic (Baethge-Kinsky et 
al., 2007; Osiander and Steinke, 2011). 
 
An important aspect of SGBIII was the introduction of a new case management approach to 
providing services. Here the Federal Employment Agency redefined itself based on a 
corporate-friendly-service-oriented model, where the Jobcenter provides the ‘client’ with 
better and more job placement and service options with the explicit objective to assist 
recipients in their endeavour to integrate into the labour market. It was argued that 
consultation and support service should be client-friendlier, faster and qualitatively better and 
less bureaucratic; that staff should provide support to the ‘client’ in a “professional and 
client-oriented service that addressed the heart of the individual problem and sought to find a 
solution to that problem” (BA, 2009c: 4). Van Berkel and Van Der Aa question whether 
activation work should be organized as a “rule-oriented function or as a professional task” 
(2012: 495) to which this chapter will go one step further and consider whether the observed 
                                                                                                                                                        
involving external placement providers: contracting out and the placement voucher (Bernhard and Wolff, 2008). Initially in 2005 there was a 
particularly large inflow of UBII recipients participating in contracted out placement services. Bernhard and Wolff suggest that this large 
inflow is related to the introduction of the new benefit system and the establishment of Jobcenters. In the first year after the induction of the 
fourth Hartz law, Jobcenters did not yet have the capacity to implement the activation policies as outlined in SGBII. Moreover, the 
Jobcenters were short of experienced case managers, thus contracting out placement services were used to reduce their workload (Bernhard 
and Wolff, 2008).   
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conduct of the case manager, where job placement services fall into his or her job description, 
amounts to that of a professionally trained career development and/or job search and job 
placement specialist or simply in-house staff? Given the importance placed on case 
management as a key component of placement services, this chapter will examine the role 
and function of the case manager as ‘Vermittler’ (mediator between the unemployed and 
employment opportunities) and ‘Berater’ (consultant) in providing job placement ‘support’ to 
the UBII recipient. 
 
With these issues in mind, this chapter explores the findings of the research regarding UBII 
recipients’ experiences and perceptions of job placement services provided to them by the 
Jobcenter via their case manager. The framework used to generate the findings in the 
following sections of this chapter employed the thematic codes listed below and these will act 
as a guide for unpacking the evidence:   
Support: Job advertisements provided to UBII recipient 
            Professional match 
            Helpful 
Waste of time     
            Paternalism: ‘I know what is best for me’ 
            Burden 
 Not current 
 Already investigated 
          Structural difficulties in applying 
Resistance 
 Tricking system 
Activation: meeting number stipulated 
Lack of jobs 
 Finding relevant jobs to apply to 
 Personal circumstances 
Case manager 
Support received 
Support needed 
No support 
Job placement 
Career development 
Quality of consultation 
Case manager helpful 
Case manager, informative 
In the following sections of this chapter, the thematic codes used in the analysis of the data 
are italicized and emboldened to create subsections within each section. The point here is to 
provide a direct link between the description of the evidence and the thematic codes used to 
analyse the data.  
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Section 7.2 explains the use and role of profiling in determining the type of placement 
services UBII recipients receive from their case manager. Based on an analysis of the 
evidence section 7.3 then explores the types of job advertisements respondents received from 
their case managers and in turn section 7.4 describes respondents’ experiences of meeting the 
stipulated number of job applications to be sent out per month. Section 7.5 outlines 
respondents’ experience of and their relationship with their case manager as consultant and 
mediator (Berater and Vermittler) in so far as this impacted their search for work. Section 7.6 
summarizes the chapter findings and conclusion.    
 
7.2 The role of profiling in job placement assistance 
 
As noted, the Integration into Work Agreement outlines the level of activation required and 
support a jobseeker can expect to receive from their case manager. It is agreed that the case 
manager will provide mediation assistance that includes supplying the UBII recipient with 
job advertisements. There are no specific guidelines as to if, when and how many job 
advertisements a case manager is obligated to forward to the UBII recipient. Yet, when the 
UBII recipient does receive a job advertisement forwarded to them by their case manager, the 
UBII recipient must do one of two things: either apply for the job and demonstrate to their 
case manager that they have done so within a prescribed period of time. Or if, for whatever 
reason, they do not wish to apply to the job, the UBII recipient must submit in writing a 
reason why they declined to apply to the job. Thus, the paradox inherent in the support 
provided is the underlying ‘must’ that accompanies any assistance provided to them by their 
case manager. Moreover, while some respondents wished to receive job advertisements 
(n=10), as they fundamentally viewed this as helpful, there was, nonetheless, great variation 
in the number of (if any) job advertisements a respondent may or may not receive from their 
case manager in a given period of time. Therefore, the underlying theme to emerge from the 
evidence was the lack of uniformity from one respondent to the next as to the quality and 
quantity of job advertisements a UBII recipient received. This lack of uniformity, as will be 
explained and explored further in this section, is based on the one hand, on a lack of 
guidelines that outline how many job advertisements a case manager is to supply their ‘client’ 
with and on the other, on the use of Profiling and Client Differentiation. Here UBII recipients 
are classified for re-entry into the labour market according to the probability of their ‘profile 
type’, which has changed how support is provided to the jobseeker by the Jobcenter.  
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Profiling was introduced to all employment agencies (UBI) and Jobcenters (UBII) in 2005.
116
 
As Klevenow and Knecht (2013) point out, while Profiling and Customer Differentiation has 
its origins in the business sector, the procedures for the Federal Employment Agency follows 
a medical logic: the exact description of a person’s characteristics first makes it possible to 
identify symptoms and second, to diagnosis an illness to which a treatment can be prescribed 
(Sainsbury, 2008). Categories can be made where ‘patients’ with the same ‘illness’ receive a 
similar treatment, while those with different ‘illnesses’ receive different treatments. 
Klevenow and Knecht (2013) argue that the Federal Employment Agency uses this type of 
medical evaluation and classification of ‘clients’ as a way to identify symptoms that result in 
a diagnosis, such as ‘low or absent motivation’. UBII recipients are then classified into ‘client 
groups’ which results in those recipients with the same ‘diagnosis’ receiving similar 
treatment (Klevenow and Knecht, 2013). The UBII recipients’ general employment strengths 
and weaknesses coupled with their skills, abilities, qualifications and interests are put into a 
computer profile for case managers and employers to access. It is a part of the obligatory 
arrangement when one first signs up for benefit that the recipient must create a profile. It is 
through this profile system that labour market relevant characteristics of the client are 
ascertained and at which time the client is put into one of four ‘diagnostic groups’ or 
‘customer types’. In 2005 the customer types included the market customers (Marktkunden) 
who were considered easy to integrate into the labour market because they were viewed as 
able to find work relatively easily on their own with little to no support from the Jobcenter. 
The second customer type was the ‘client in need of consultancy and activation’ 
(Beratungskunden fordern) for UBII recipients who lacked motivation and needed to be 
activated. The third customer type was the ‘client in need of consultation support’ 
(Beratungskunden fördern) for recipients who lacked qualifications and/or had additional 
constraints that could be diminished, reduced or removed through training and support 
programmes. The fourth customer type was the ‘client in need of care’ who fell into both 
categories two and three and was considered the recipient in most need of support (Klevenow 
and Knecht, 2013).  
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 Legally the use of profiling was integrated into SGBIII and put into law in 1998. But it was only in 2003 that a standard for profiling 
was established in the employment agencies that administer UBI.  With the reform of ‘client centres’ profiling became a legally binding 
standard with the induction of the fourth Hartz law in 2005. Since 2009 the concept of ‘profiling’ can be found in §37 of SGBIII 
(Oshmiansky, 2011).  
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Based on criticism that ‘care customers’ might be deprived of certain services or that this 
type of profiling could lead to disregarding clients’ interests, in 2009 a Four-Phase Model 
(4PM) was introduced (BA, 2013). This model unified the intra-organisation procedures of 
the Federal Employment Agency, which is responsible for SGBIII (UBI) and the procedures 
of the municipalities that finance the Jobcenters (UBII). It was also thought that the four-
phase model would facilitate communication when moving cases through the system (from 
UBI to UBII) or from one case manager to the next. The first phase includes profiling the 
UBI or UBII recipient by analysing their strengths and the possibility and potential for 
integration into the labour market. In phase one the profile type is determined. This analysis 
includes entering into the profile the educational achievements, professional experience, 
qualifications and competencies of the UBII recipient. The analysis here includes 
categorizing the recipient in terms of their ‘capacity to work’ and ‘motivation’. Second, a 
profile of the recipient’s social environment is created that explores their personal situation 
(i.e., family, financial and living situation). This is then juxtaposed to current labour market 
conditions. Instead of their being four client types there are now six, which are directly 
connected to the recommendations made for a course of action. These include the market 
profile, activation profile, assisting profile, development profile, stabilizing profile and 
supporting profile. If a UBII recipient falls into one of the first three profiles, they are 
considered ‘close to labour market integration’ (Arbeitsmarktnah). If a UBII recipient falls 
into one of the last three profiles, they are considered a ‘complex’ case or far from labour 
market integration (Arbeitsmarktfern). Profiling is followed by the next three phases: setting 
of personal targets, the selection of an integration strategy and finally the creation of an 
Integration into Work Agreement based on their profile-type (Oshmiansky, 2011). The level 
of ‘support’ or activation a UBII recipient receives from their case manager depends heavily 
on which profile-type they fall into. But depending on a case manager’s line management or 
based on the discretion of the case manager, the case manager may or may not choose to 
follow the suggested course of action determined by their profile-type. In other words, the 
case manager may choose to ignore the profile type and provide the level of assistance they 
feel the UBII recipient needs.
117
 Here my interviews with the five case managers were 
particularly insightful in providing both a sense of the degree to which and indeed whether at 
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 Behrend (2007) found that not all case managers were aware that they were not obliged to follow the suggestion of the profile system. 
Case managers who choose a different category from the one suggested by the system ran the risk of having to ‘defend’ themselves to their 
line management. Line managers used profiling and category types to influence targets and the distribution of cases (Behrend 2007:108). 
Additionally, the case managers found that how their ‘clients’ were categorized had a significant influence on determining their workload 
(Behrend et al. 2006; Behrend 2007; Bieber et al. 2006).   
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all they use their own discretion in the decisions they make about their clients. As my 
interview with a case manager in Bremen noted:  
AMB: Do you look for and provide your clients with job advertisements?  
CM1: Yes, we have to do that. That is required of us, especially for those  
clients who are, for example, considered easy to integrate into the labour  
market. Those who, for example, have completed an apprenticeship or  
have graduated from school with very good grades, we must always and  
regularly look for job advertisements for them. That is no problem. You  
go to the profile of the client and then you click on ‘job search’ and then… 
but it is then, well, sometimes I do not send my clients job advertisements  
because I really do not want to send my clients every little shit job that  
is available. I know that most [of my clients] do not want to go to  
temporary job agencies. I know that that they do not necessarily— 
especially young jobseekers—want to travel to Achim or wherever every  
day. Or too, for example, when I have a young woman who wants to work  
in food and beverage—that does not mean she wants to work at some  
corner pub. Then I would not like to well, it is hard…it is the law,  
when one is capable to work—legally there is no possibility for a  
UBII recipient to refuse a job on the grounds of it not being compatible  
with his/her qualifications. Well, theoretically one can do every job so  
long as the job is moral and ethical and healthy. I am not of that opinion  
though. I have seen hourly wages that are so terrible and when you quit  
[that job] one can, for example, get sanctioned [by the Jobcenter]. But  
when I see that and I must say, Mr. Wash—that place makes me want to  
vomit—they have hourly wages from €2,30 and when you work there 40  
hours a week, well that is really hard work and then you are yelled at by  
the management and if you quit that job, well then I would not give that  
person a sanction for quitting. So then, based on experience, I would not  
send out a job announcement from Mr. Wash. I would not send someone  
to that place for work. So, I try to find a job that is a match but naturally  
not everything I send to my clients is a match. That is very subjective. It  
is important to discuss the job [with the client], perhaps, but when there  
are legal consequences if the client does not apply, then we say, ‘you have  
to apply’ but if not, then we discuss [the situation] together.  
In order to understand the experience and perceptions of the respondents’ interaction with 
their case managers in terms of job placement, it is important to note that the UBII recipient 
does not know that they have been placed into one of the six profile-types. They do not know 
that—potentially—the type of support or activation requirements they are (or are not) 
receiving is based on which profile-type they fell into.  
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7.3 Unemployment Benefit II recipients’ experience and perception of job 
advertisements provided to them by their case managers. 
 
 
THEMATIC CODES 
Support: job advertisement received helpful, burden, professional mismatch, waste of time; 
not current; already investigated
118
  
 
Based on the experience of UBII recipients, this section will explore the complexities of job 
placement assistance in terms of receiving job advertisements supplied to respondents by 
their case manager and the UBII recipient in turn assessing whether the job was a suitable 
match for them to apply to. Given the potential effect profiling has on categorizing and, thus, 
placing UBII recipients into different levels of support or activation, the number of job 
advertisements supplied to respondents by their case managers varied greatly. What we do 
not know is whether this was on account of the respondent’s profile-type or whether it was 
based on the discretion of the case manager—or a little of both. Overall, when asked, of the 
22 respondents in this study who had received job advertisements from their case managers, 
ten respondents liked the idea of receiving job advertisements sent to them, irrespective of 
whether the job advertisement was a match to their skills and interests. Overall, they viewed 
this as helpful support that had the potential to assist them in entering the labour market.  
 AMB: And how do you find that [receiving job advertisements]?  
 I46: Good, because they simply send you something. They have my  
 CV. They look at what jobs match my qualifications. I find that good. Yes,  
 but sometimes they send you something and you notice that ‘no I can’t  
 manage that, I can’t do that’. But still, I find the decision to send job  
 advertisements very good. (39 year-old married male Ivory Coast) 
In fact some respondents (n=5) mentioned that while they did not receive any job 
advertisements, they indeed wished that they had.   
AMB: And did you receive any job advertisements? I22: Not this year.  
AMB: Really? Do you have a sense of why that might be? I22: I don’t  
know why. It probably has something to do with the ‘men’ [case managers].  
Maybe he does not like me or, I don’t know. Maybe he does not like my  
nose, I don’t know. AMB: But you are young, capable…I22: I know. Last  
year I got five, six, seven announcements AMB: Per month?  I22: No, not  
per month, in the whole of the year. (30 year-old single German male) 
 
While in principle a group of respondents either liked the idea of receiving job 
advertisements as a form of support and/or wished that they had received advertisements 
when they had not, for those respondents who did, the challenge often rested in the fact that 
                                                 
118
 These are the thematic codes used in the analysis of the evidence presented (see above).  
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those advertisements received had either already been investigated by the UBII recipient, 
were no longer current or were not a professional match (n=17).
119
  
AMB: Do you receive any assistance in integrating into the labour market?  
I13: Yes, they seek to mediate me to different firms, where I then have to  
apply…but that doesn’t matter, because that was only supposed to be for  
a short period of time until I found regular work. But the problem is, when  
you get a letter [job advertisements] from the Jobcenter, from the mediation,  
that you have to apply there and there, it is often passé, because the job has  
already been filled or the person that you are supposed to contact no longer  
works there. Sometimes, it is somehow a little confusing. (38 year-old single  
German male) 
Moreover, when respondents did receive job advertisements that were either out of date or 
not a proper professional ‘match’ to the respondents’ skills, the respondent was faced with 
either having to apply to the job anyway (and providing evidence to their case manager that 
they had done so) or providing their case manager with a reason why they were not applying 
to the job. As a result, a group of respondents ultimately felt more burdened than supported 
by the job advertisements sent to them (n=7). For this group of respondents, their time was 
too often spent contacting human resources departments sorting out which job advertisements 
were current and whether they had already applied to the job in addition to writing time-
consuming job applications, sensing that they would not end up getting the job anyway.  
I10: Sometimes it is so, that when you are going through job advertisements,  
you call before you apply. And then they tell you if the job is still open or not.  
And if it is no longer open, then you put the job advertisement to the side.  
You do not bother with those [that have been filled], only those jobs that have  
not been filled. Then in the morning you get a letter in the post [from the  
Jobcenter with job advertisements] and then I think ‘oh that company is  
somehow familiar to me’. I had already called that firm about the position.  
You make a note of the person you spoke to so that you know whether you  
have contacted them or not. Sometimes it has happened to me that I call [the 
company] and they say ‘why are you calling when you already called on  
Monday—I already told you that the position has been filled.’ (45 year-old  
single German male) 
Some respondents perceived that the time spent addressing the job advertisements sent to 
them by their case manager was often time taken away from their own job search (n=9). 
Furthermore a group of respondents simply did not know that they had the option not to apply 
to a job forwarded to them by their case manager, so long as they provided a reason (n=7).  
I33: I must apply, naturally. I can also say, ‘no I don’t want to apply’, but then I will get a 
sanction. That’s it. Respondents also noted that their case manager often obtained the job 
advertisements from the same source that they have access to—the Jobcenter Jobbörse 
                                                 
119 This is compared to7 respondents who did perceive the job advertisements they received as suitable to their skills and experience. Of this 
total number (n=24) two respondents had mixed feelings, in that they had received both suitable and unsuitable job advertisements.    
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(www.arbeitsagentur.de). In this sense, respondents did not feel that much time, if any, was 
invested in finding suitable potential job matches when those offered them were obtained 
from the same source they used. Thus, while in principle the idea of receiving job 
advertisements was seen by some as helpful and welcomed, overall of the 22 respondents 
who had received job advertisements, the majority felt that it would be more helpful if their 
case manager performed the role of mediator in terms of having internal contacts to local 
corporations and organizations rather than just pulling out job advertisements from a central 
database that everyone already had access to (n=14).  
 
As noted, for those respondents who received job advertisements, a common problem cited 
was the failure of the job advertisements supplied to match their skills, abilities or job 
interest. Case managers rely on the UBII recipients’ profile for information about their job 
history. As a result, job advertisements are sent to the UBII recipient based on what skills, 
prior work experience and qualifications are itemized in their profile. In theory, the profile 
should be a valid source for case managers to identify a UBII recipient’s skills, abilities and 
past work experience in order to determine if a job advertisement is a proper match. But 
because of the formulaic nature of any type of computer profiling system, it fails to pick up 
nuances. For example, a specific ‘skill’ might be ticked but it may be a secondary skill and 
not focal to what the recipient can or wants to do.   
I20: In my position, in every company they have SAP [software]. So I have to  
open SAP to fill in my number of hours I am working, and to see—I work  
on leans—so how much waste is being produced in this place, etc., etc. So  
they [case manager] gave me a form to fill out and I just wrote that I have  
SAP user experience. And they are now sending me jobs that say ‘SAP 
implementation’ or ‘SAP programming’. They are sending me these kinds  
of job advertisements and saying you have to apply or call within this period  
of time and tell us why you are not applying for this job.  AMB: The job 
advertisements are not even in the area of what you do.  I20: No, not at all.  
I am doing MNA consulting and lean consulting. (34 year-old married  
Indian male) 
As a result, respondents repeatedly cited receiving job advertisements that simply did not 
match their interests or their skills adequately. 
I18: I already declined to apply to two jobs that they sent me. I wrote to  
them that the job did not match my apprenticeship, thus, I cannot do what  
they required. And yeah, the job announcements are never really meaningful.  
And if they are, then they are in Cologne or Würzburg or so. (28 year-old  
single German female) 
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In addition to receiving job advertisements that do not match the skills of a recipient, a group 
of respondents repeatedly cited being given job advertisements that required skills they 
simply did not have (n=10).  
I12: He [case manager] put job advertisements on the table in front of me and  
I said ‘I can’t apply to them’. AMB: And why? I12: Russian, Spanish, English 
language competence—well there I do not need to bother applying. These 
applications just fall through the cracks because the required language skills  
are not there. If the job application makes it very clear that, without question,  
these language skills are definitely needed and required in word and writing,  
well then I don’t need to apply…the Jobcenter does not really look at who you  
are. They do not really look at what you have done, what you would like to do. 
Sometimes it is strange. You speak to these people and clarify why you can’t  
apply to a certain job, why you do not want to apply to the job and yet, they  
do not listen to you. (29 year-old partial disabled single German female) 
It appeared to respondents who received mis-matched job advertisements that little time or 
thought went into supporting their employment search through providing job advertisements. 
Respondents were missing proper consultation with someone who had the professional know-
how to properly assess them and then assist them in securing an appropriate job (n=18). For 
respondents this meant, being able to meet with a case manager professionally trained in job 
search and/or career development—and to a lesser degree job placement. Here it is important 
to distinguish between job search, job placement and career development.
120
 Job search 
specialists focus on assisting individuals with preparing their resume, improving their 
interview techniques, assisting in company searches, and providing information about a given 
profession that the individual may want to apply to. Job placement specialist will assist in 
placement into a job through providing contacts, job advertisements or brokering a 
relationship between the individual and the employer by making calls on their behalf to the 
employer. Career development specialists explore what field an individual would like to work 
in, for example, secretarial, nursing, retail or consulting. Here it is not so much about 
providing assistance in getting a job, rather assisting the individual in deciding on a specific 
career.  While the Jobcenter does not provide career development—or even job search 
assistance—the challenge is that some respondents came to the Jobcenter expecting some 
form of job search or career development assistance. This is not unsurprising given how the 
Jobcenter, with its use of case management and its stressing the value and importance of 
mediation, has been branded to the public. It comes back to the use of the word Fördern 
(support). In this study, a group of respondents expected that they would indeed receive 
support in finding work that went beyond simply receiving job advertisements.  Based on the 
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 The distinction made between the three are based on established categories created and used in the job training and development sector 
(see for example the website TargetJobs.co.uk) 
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perception of some respondents, on the surface, the ‘support’ provided in terms of job 
placement services is presented to them as both a combination of job placement and job 
search support—and depending on a UBII recipient’s case manager, they may indeed get help 
in both areas. It appears that based on the evidence, some respondents would like job search 
support but are simply getting basic job placement support, i.e., they are sent job 
advertisements to apply to, which is the extent of the support provided.   
 
THEMATIC CODES 
Paternalism; resistance 
 
Moreover, a minority of respondents viewed the actual act of the case manager sending job 
advertisements to the UBII recipient as paternalistic—as if the case manager knew better than 
the respondent what jobs they should apply to (n=4).  
AMB: And did you receive job advertisements? I14: I received job  
advertisements, which I find a little…well, what really irritates me is  
when you sit in the office [with the case manager] and every time  
they look at the computer screen and every time they print something  
off from the computer, as if I cannot look for myself. After all, I am  
the one who can best determine what is and is not a match. (38 year-old 
single German male) 
This sense of paternalism stemmed from case managers often making assumptions, based on 
the UBII recipient’s profile, of what they can or cannot do instead of discussing job options 
with respondents.  
AMB: Did your case manager send you job advertisements? I42: No,  
actually not. I wasn’t upset about that but at the same time, if they had been  
good job advertisements, I would have definitely applied. And actually, I  
recently asked—there was an internship opening at the Art Gallery—I  
studied to become an art teacher. And when I spoke to my case manager  
about the opportunity she said ‘What? No. What do you want to do with  
that then?’ Maybe her reaction was because I had studied art to become a  
teacher. So she only thinks of me, well as [getting a job as a teacher]. With  
my case manager, I have this feeling—she knows that I have really tried.  
I don’t want to do just any job, but I also know that she really does not  
have any desire to find something suitable for me. (36 year-old single  
German male) 
It was the lack of give and take—the absence of discussion about the respondents’ future that 
frustrated respondents. It was respondents’ perception that their case managers had little time 
and put little thought into finding job advertisements that adequately matched their 
employment history. Some respondents felt that the case managers were simply fulfilling 
their duty, as outlined in the Integration into Work Agreement, rather than taking the time to 
inquire and think what was best for the respondent. Ultimately respondents learned early on 
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that, for whatever reason, be it too many cases, too little time, they could not expect adequate 
assistance and support in the form of job advertisements being sent to them that were worthy 
of their time.  
AMB: They have not sent you any job announcements? 14: No. No. I had to  
do all the looking on my own. Then I said ‘ok’ then I found work and I said  
‘I don’t need them any more’. The Jobcenter only searches for One-Euro-Jobs 
anyway—they can’t think of anything else. Or they threaten you with sanctions 
—with a three-month sanction and that is all they do for you. (38 year-old  
single German male)   
 
Moreover, respondents exhibited a sort of ‘spectrum of resistance’ to the administration of 
job placement service.  Those who were given job advertisements that did not match their 
skills or interests, either ‘tricked’ the system by sending in bogus applications or did what 
they had to do in order to avoid strife with their case manager and the possibility of receiving 
a sanction.  
AMB: Now, let’s talk about the three job applications. Now if I understand  
this right, there is pressure from both sides. On the one hand, if the Jobcenter  
finds a job for you and they give it to you, you have to apply correct? I27:  
Yup.  AMB: And has that happened to you that they have said…? I27: Nope,  
no. Because I always apply to the [job], I do my thing that I have to do.  
(27 year-old single German-American male) 
This spectrum of resistance comprises of, at one end, respondents who were genuinely 
surprised that their case manager was so unhelpful (n=11). The help may have not been 
useful, but this group complied with requirements. In the middle of the spectrum are those 
who are passively cynical about the character of the ‘service’, but who simply ‘put up’ with 
what was required of them (n=23). Then there were those respondents who covertly resisted 
or subverted requirements through token compliance, such as sending in bogus job 
applications to meet their monthly quota, i.e., tricked the system (n=8). At the opposite end of 
the spectrum are those respondents who openly resisted the job placement requirements and 
simply said ‘I am not doing that’ (n=8). They did this knowing that they would most likely 
face legal consequences, but their resistance outweighed the possible consequences that they 
are prepared to deal with. 
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7.4 Unemployment Benefit II recipients’ experience of meeting the stipulated 
number of job applications to be sent to employers as agreed in their Integration 
into Work Agreement 
 
THEMATIC CODES 
Activation: difficulty in meeting number stipulated; lack of jobs; finding relevant jobs; 
personal circumstances versus job availability 
 
Parallel to respondents possibly receiving job advertisements from their case managers, the 
Integration into Work Agreement outlines the degree of activation required and, thus, how 
many job applications a UBII recipient is expected to send out per month. The number of job 
applications—indeed whether it was required at all—varied greatly among the respondents 
for this study, anywhere from three to twenty per month.
121
 As discussed in section 7.2, 
depending on which profile-type a respondent fell into greatly determined the degree of 
activation required. Therefore, those respondents who fell into one of the three profile-types 
that were considered ‘easy to integrate’ into the labour market technically would not be 
required to demonstrate to their case manager that they were applying to jobs. On the other 
hand, those who fell into the last three profile-types that were considered ‘difficult to 
integrate’ into the labour market technically would be required to demonstrate that they were 
looking for work. Yet, while the profile system categorized the UBII recipient, the actual 
decision was ultimately at the discretion of the case manager. Here there are no guidelines as 
to how many job applications a recipient is to send out per month. While respondents were 
unaware that the profile system categorized and determined the degree of activation required, 
they nonetheless surmised why some UBII recipients were required to demonstrate that they 
were applying to jobs while others were not. The feeling among respondents was that those 
UBII recipients who were perceived as ‘easy to integrate’ into the labour market and/or 
demonstrated tenacity in their job search where those who did not necessarily have to 
demonstrate to their case manager that they were sending out job applications. While those 
UBII recipients who were considered ‘hard to integrate’ into the labour market were those 
who had to demonstrate that they were applying to jobs. This perceived reason by 
respondents was corroborated in my interviews with the five case managers who concurred 
that the stipulation could be used as an activation tool for motivating those who appeared 
unmotivated to find work. It appears from an analysis of the evidence that a wide variety of 
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out six, seven respondents were required to send out ten, one respondent was required to send out 15 and one respondent to send out 20.  
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respondents in this study—often their skill and education level having little to do with who 
was required or not—were mandated through their Integration into Work Agreement to 
demonstrate that they were sending out a given number of job applications per month (n=17).  
AMB: Yes, that is what I have not understood. In my interviews, some  
Have to submit 5, some 10, some 15, so the decision rests with you? CM2:  
Yes, exactly. AMB: And what are your criteria? CM2: Well, first it has  
to do with what I can trust the client to do. When I, for example, have an  
academic, someone who has just finished their studies, in my office, and  
he says he is applying across Germany—across Europe [for a job] I do  
not hesitate to require that he demonstrate to me that he has sent out ten job 
applications per month. He will do it without me asking him. If I have  
clients who work in the service area, then I know that with one click [in  
the job database] 30 jobs will appear. But if I have clients who work in  
office administration, and I know that there are not a lot of jobs in that area,  
thus it depends. If I have a mother with six kids who can only work in the  
mornings and can only work close to home, then I cannot require that she  
submit 15 applications per month. So, I have to know the situation of the  
labour market before I require anything. AMB: That is interesting, I would  
have thought that the number you prescribe is dependent on whether the  
client is motivated or not. CM2: Absolutely, yes. I have clients where I  
know that they are so motivated, that I do not have to bother with  
establishing in the Integration into Work Agreement that they demonstrate  
that they are applying to jobs…But naturally we also have clients who are  
as nice as one would like or as approachable as one would like or are as  
trusting as one would like but they will also have a negative attitude  
towards me in my role as mediator, towards the Jobcenter, towards the law,  
towards everything. They also do not want to work. There are only very,  
very few who are like that, but they do exist. And that is where the Integration  
into Work Agreement comes in, where there are clients, who for example,  
refuse to sign the agreement, for that there is the possibility in the administrative  
law to force [them to sign] and that can be used as a method to apply pressure. 
Because naturally in Unemployment Benefit II there is a duty to find work.  
When I make that clear, or signal [to the client] that I am not going to play  
any games, then every mediator must have a method at hand that can be  
used to counteract [such behaviour].   
 
Respondents who were mandated to demonstrate to their case manager that they had sent out 
a specified number of job applications cited the difficulty in meeting the number for three 
main reasons. First, this group of respondents cited that the number required of them was too 
high given the lack of jobs available to apply to in their field and/or where they lived (n=5).  
AMB What did you say, how many was it? I30: Ten to fifteen, well ten  
was the minimum and I never was able to meet the minimum. AMB: And  
why were you not able to meet the minimum? I30: Because there simply  
was nothing available that I could travel to or I did not have the required  
skills and knowledge…and then she [case manager] expected me to go  
from Axstedt to Wallhöfen with my bike—in all sorts of weather. I said,  
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‘I am not doing that’. (48 year-old divorced lone parent German female) 
Respondents were cognizant of the structural impediments to entering the labour market. And 
here the number required of them per month was perceived as unrealistic given the lack of 
jobs available where they lived and/or in their field. As a result, three respondents said that in 
order to avoid sanctions they sent out applications just to fulfil what was required of them.  
 
Second, it was a question of respondents’ ability to send out relevant job applications—
defined by respondents as job applications that were directly related to and matched their 
skills and interests—versus random jobs that they knew they had no chance of getting in the 
first place. Seven respondents cited the fact that it took time and effort to find job 
advertisements that they considered relevant. The time and effort required to find job 
openings in their field (and in proximity to where they lived) did not necessarily correspond 
to what was required of them within a one-month period of time.    
I12: When I find the right job advertisements, then I have no problem  
applying. It is not like how my case manager demanded of me—he  
wanted me to demonstrate that I had sent in 20 per month—that is just  
too many…it always has to do with the situation of the labour market.  
It always comes back to this point, in this sense. I cannot simply write  
non-stop job applications. I mean, I can do it like my case manager  
wants. I can take the Yellow Pages and go through and I can call here  
and ask there. That is all no problem. I can do that. To make calls and  
ask question, no problem. But, to put together a written application that 
is really good—that takes time. (29 year-old partially disabled single  
German female) 
If job openings were plentiful in their field, then respondents generally did not have any 
problems meeting the number required of them per month (n=6). But, if job openings were 
not then it became difficult for respondents to meet what was required of them.  
I20: For me, in my experience, to find the right job, I get maybe six, seven  
jobs that I find personally that I am searching, applying and also getting  
interviews. It is not like I am applying and not getting interviews. Every  
week I have interviews. Last three weeks I was having interviews.  
Tomorrow I have an interview. So they do not understand really how to  
treat every person individually. Just because they are telling me to make  
20 applications, I cannot apply to all the 20, everything that I find in the  
market and keep getting rejections. (34 year-old married Indian male) 
Because of the difficulty in finding suitable openings for this group of respondents, pressure 
placed on them to meet their required job application submissions proved stressful. Indeed it 
was generally viewed by some respondents (n=13) that the number stipulated per months was 
arbitrary and did not necessarily reflecting what one can realistically achieve in a given 
month.  
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Third, based on the experience of the respondents, the number stipulated did not reflect the 
reality of their situation, i.e., mothers with small children who were limited in what types of 
jobs and what hours of the day they could work, individuals who had limited transportation 
options or individuals who suffered physical or emotional impediments which limited the 
types of jobs available to them (n=7).  
AMB: What support do you receive from the Jobcenter to help you find  
work? I36: Support? Yes, well, not much. I actually had more difficulties  
recently than…so job applications that I absolutely cannot use. I am supposed  
to apply, but I get the sense that they are trying to make life difficult for me.  
AMB: Can you please describe that a bit more? What do you mean? I36:  
Yes, well job advertisements, where I do not—at all—have a chance of  
getting the job. And if I don’t apply, then there are problems. I did not bother  
to apply to a few job advertisements sent to me. I called them [the company]  
up and explained that I am partially disabled and they said ‘no, we don’t need  
that’. And they never called back. So there are a few applications [from the  
Jobcenter] that I just did not respond to and now there are problems to come.  
(52 year-old single partially disabled Turkish male)  
It is difficult to ascertain the degree to which case managers took these issues into 
consideration when deciding how many job applications a respondent had to apply to per 
month. In my interviews with case managers they indicated that they did, but how uniform 
this was or how dependent it was on the personal approach of the case manager is an 
unknown.  
 
7.5 Unemployment Benefit II recipients’ experience of working with their case 
managers in a job search or job placement capacity 
 
THEMATIC CODES 
Case manager as foci of support; perception of support received versus support needed; 
absence of support; job placement versus career development  
 
According to Klevenow and Knecht (2013), there are c. 13,700 case managers who work at 
Jobcenters throughout Germany. Case managers are not necessarily trained social workers, 
job search or career development specialist. Their educational backgrounds vary, with some 
having university degrees and others not. According to my interview with a case manager in 
Bremen, it is customary for case managers to be trained at one of two training facilities in 
Weimar or Nordheim Germany. The training facility is run by the Federal Employment 
Agency and offers a range of trainings—from trainings for individuals new to the Jobcenter 
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to additional qualification programmes for staff at all levels of the Jobcenter. But it is unclear 
whether every case manager hired by the Jobcenter is trained at this facility. Furthermore 
there are two types of case managers. The Fallmanager (case manager) handles the more 
difficult cases—individuals with addiction or debt problems, those who are limited in their 
capacity to work based on health-related problems or those who lack care options. It is their 
job to work with the client to find something that they can do with their time. The Vermittler 
(mediator) handles all the standard cases. It is their job to assist in skills training placement 
and manage recipients’ integration into the labour market. It is only when the Vermittler has a 
particularly difficult case that the Fallmanager will step in and assist or take over the case. I 
have used ‘case manager’ throughout this thesis as a general title for someone who manages 
UBII recipients’ cases, which refers more to the job of the Vermittler than the job of the 
Fallmanager. And, indeed, the majority of respondents in my study were advised by 
Vermittler instead of Fallmanager (though some had both). Nonetheless, there is a certain 
amount of ambiguity inherent in the case manager’s title in terms of the degree of support a 
UBII recipient can expect to receive from him or her. Respondents often referred to their case 
manager as Vermittler (mediator) and Berater (consultant) interchangeably. For example I26: 
Herr Bein, he is my Berater [consultant]. The challenge here is that these terms imply very 
different objectives in terms of role of the case manager. A staff member referred to as a 
‘consultant’, for example, could be expected by the UBII recipient to consult with him or her 
on how best to manage their job search or discuss career options. A staff member referred to 
as a ‘job mediator’, for example, could be expected by the UBII recipient to assist them in 
direct job placement. 
I33: They should mediate me into decent work, so that I never have  
to come back here. That is what I demand of the Jobcenter. But that  
is not what happens here. (32 year-old married German female) 
 
Many respondents were cognizant of both the irony in the nomenclature used and how 
Jobcenter titles imply support not necessarily received.  
I32: This agency is not in the position to support (fördern) anyone.  
AMB: And why not? I32: Because this agency is unworldly. I mean,  
look at the terminology: I am the ‘client’. Today I received an  
‘invitation’ to come here. My placement officer is called ‘case  
manager’. An institution that...that…that has only given me three  
job advertisements in six years, that they could have financed on  
their own, calls itself ‘Jobcenter’. I mean, that is all totally crazy!  
(33 year-old single German male) 
Irrespective of how the case manager was referred to (whether as Berater, Vermittler or 
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Fallmanager), both by the Jobcenter and respondents, the important point here is that many 
respondents anticipated meeting a professional who was prepared to work with them to 
manage their case, provide job placement and job support, if not career guidance (n=26). But 
an analysis of the evidence suggest that, instead, respondents received conflicting messages 
from the Jobcenter about the degree of ‘support’ a UBII recipient could expect to receive 
from their case manager. As a result, respondents who came to the Jobcenter expecting 
support and guidance in their job search and/or career development were often bitterly 
disappointed by the lack thereof. They were often left to their own devices, while being 
pressured to meet the requirements set out in their Integration into Work Agreement without 
the promised job placement support from their case manager, as outlined in the agreement.  
 
Based on respondents’ experience, the job placement support provided to them by their case 
manager can be placed into those who received some form of support and those who did not. 
While a group of respondents cited the inability of their case manager to provide job 
placement, job search or career development advice, other respondents did note that when 
they met with their case managers that they were friendly and helpful in that they asked 
essential questions, such as what job-related experience they had (n=8). What would they like 
to do professionally? What skills did they consider themselves good at? Not all case 
managers appeared disinterested. Some case managers did take the time to ask important 
questions concerning what the respondent would like to do professionally based on their 
employment history. Moreover in three cases the case managers were actively involved with 
the respondent and keen to help them develop a job/career trajectory by addressing any gaps 
in their skills or education. Yet in the majority of cases, even the sympathetic case manager 
was ultimately only able to provide support that went so far.   
I34: The consultation…naturally…they ask you what you have done,  
in which profession you have worked, what you would like to do, which  
profession you would like to try out…that all gets asked. Naturally, how  
you answer is up to you. Only, like I said, with me it is so, I still am not  
100% sure which professional direction I should go into. AMB: And did  
the case manager help you figure out which direction that might be? I34:  
No. So concretely that one sits down with you and tries to figure out which  
direction one would like to go professionally, or even, where one might  
imagine oneself working…that is not done here. That is missing here.  
(40 year-old single Turkish male) 
 
Thus, for a large group of respondents, when asked to relate their experience of meeting with 
their case managers to discuss their unemployment situation, they received little to no support 
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beyond the basic and formulaic job placement support provided (if they saw their case 
manager at all) (n=19). Respondents were either placed into a skills training (as discussed in 
the previous chapter) or were instructed to look for work on their own.  
I38: The last time I saw her [the case manager] I said to her, I would really 
like to work in a hospital. She then looked at me and said ‘yes, well, go  
look’ [for a job then]. That was her answer: ‘yes, well, go look’! That  
completely knocked the wind out of me. Her response made me so mad!  
(40 year-old German born Turkish nationality married female) 
The fact that respondents were instructed to look for work was not what was problematic. 
Indeed, respondents were aware of their responsibility to attend to their own job search (see 
Chapter 8). What they had not anticipated was not receiving any support beyond the basic job 
placement assistance, especially when the perception of this group of respondents was that 
the case manager was there to assist and support in their job search, as outlined in the 
Integration into Work Agreement.  
I30: …The only thing you hear [from the Jobcenter] is: “You must,  
must, must!” There is the internet, there is the newspaper. How many  
newspapers have I looked through? I get this newspaper [from the  
Jobcenter] that everyone gets, this Gazette, you can find it in Osterholz  
as well. It is called the Hammer-Report. They tell you: “Look in the  
Gazette!” “Apply to jobs!” “Submit documentation that you have done so!”  
(48 year-old divorced lone parent German female) 
Respondents knew how and where to look for jobs. The challenge lied in some respondents 
expecting (and in fact often needing) assistance that extended beyond basic job placement to 
include job search or career development support (n=14). Yet it appears that what this group 
of respondents expected and, indeed, needed to assist them in their job search clashed with 
the reality of case managers’ situation. On the one hand there were the resource constraints of 
the Jobcenter—the case managers interviewed for this study were assigned anywhere from 
300-400 cases. On the other hand, the case manager was not necessarily trained nor was it 
necessarily in their job remit to provide, for example, career development guidance—a level 
of support and assistance that some jobseekers required and desired.  
I48: The Jobcenter did not offer me any jobs; they did not provide me  
with offers in that sense. They always say, “we are not job mediators”.  
I mean every person has to look for work. They give me material, such  
as when I put my resume together, they give you the folders and stuff,  
and they will pay for that. But job offers, in the sense that they can offer  
me jobs…they have not done that, they do not do that. (48 year-old  
divorced lone parent Moroccan male) 
This begs the question of whether the level of support provided can be anything more than 
the superficial support expected of someone who has anywhere from 300-400 cases: material 
for putting together a resume, permission to attend a skills training or a voucher for 
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placement at a third-party job search centre. As Van Berkel and Van der Aa (2012) point out 
many authors, among them Sainsbury (2008) and Brodkin (2011), consider the issue of high 
caseloads an important determinant to case managers’ ability to adequately carry out their 
work. The combination of a lack of time for recipients coupled with a lack of resources to 
provide adequate services means that high caseloads result in a an additional barrier to case 
managers being able to work according to professional standards (Van Berkel and Van der 
Aa, 2012).  
 
THEMATIC CODES 
Quality of case manager consultation 
 
While a group of respondents received some form of job placement assistance, another group 
of respondents rarely saw their case manager (n=9). Moreover those who did see their case 
manager, even infrequently, questioned the quality of the assistance they received.  
AMB: Can you describe your relationship with your case manager  
to me? I47: We seldom see each other. And good suggestions have  
not been provided. And I have to look for work myself. (58 year-old  
divorced German male) 
Here respondents often described the inability of the case manager to provide even the most 
basic assistance. Respondents who had been out of the labour market for a substantial period 
of time and were now confronted with re-entering it, for example, recently divorced women 
and/or women with children, were in particular need of not only job placement assistance but 
some form of job search or career guidance. Yet, is appears that when case managers were 
confronted with more challenging cases that required more attention and guidance it was at 
this juncture that respondents felt let down.   
I30: Yes, well simply a little change, because for the last thirty years  
I have only known housework and children…awhile back my case  
manager forced me to participate in a skills training, from which I  
fled after three days. The skills training was called ‘Home Economics  
and Food Service’. Their argument was—I could not seek out the  
training on my own, I was just put in the training, was not even asked  
if I wanted to participate—with the argument “yes, well you can run  
a household, you raised a large family.” To which I replied “Yes, I  
did and do you think that that was so much fun that I would like to do  
that professionally too?” No, no, I said, I do not want to do that. When  
I work, then I would like to do something completely different and not  
this same old household crap that I already do from morning till night.  
I really just fled [from the skills training] and I said I am not doing that.  
(48 year-old divorced lone parent German female) 
While the Jobcenter’s objective coupled with its lack of resources’ is not to run a career 
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development advice centre, nonetheless, one cannot ignore that case managers, whether it is 
in their job description or not, do end up advising respondents in some form on their job 
possibilities. The level and degree of advice had an impact on respondents’ behaviour and 
their motivation. Thus, at its most basic, guidance or advice of any sort had the capacity to 
frustrate some respondents, especially those who were highly vulnerable. The way the job 
placement or job search guidance was transmitted and the level of the support provided had 
the capacity to directly affect how respondents in this study sought work.  
I34: And that is what is missing here at the Jobcenter, concerning work,  
that they concretely ask you or seek to find out through talking to you,  
how can this person be helped…or in which direction or which profession  
could I recommend for this person? (40 year-old single Turkish male) 
 
Respondents were cognizant that their case managers were not necessarily professionally 
trained or qualified to assist in a job search or career development capacity.    
I38: You hand it in [your paperwork to the case manager] and she says,  
“You still have not found anything?” –and I think “but why are you here?  
Why are you sitting here…it’s your job to mediate me.” After all your title  
is ‘work mediator’. In that sense they do not do their job at all. She looks  
at me. I say, “I am a medical assistant, I could…” I think, a job mediator  
should be qualified—I don’t know if a work mediator has to have a  
university degree [to have this job]—or how they are trained, but I could  
do this job much better than she can. But they should know, they sit  
between the unemployed and the labour market; they must know how it  
works. (40 year-old married German born Turkish nationality female) 
This perceived lack of qualifications can be linked to what was written in section 7.2 about 
the ability of a case manager to provide different levels of job and career advice that extended 
beyond basic job placement services. As noted, case managers come from a variety of 
backgrounds and education levels. And while the Federal Employment Agency is taking 
steps to introduce a new consultation concept (Beratungskonzeption) and professionalize the 
case manager position, it is unclear if and the degree to which respondents’ case managers 
were trained to professionally manage anything beyond basic job placement service, such as 
job search or career development guidance.
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 Indeed a group of respondents often cited that 
the degree of job placement assistance took the form of case managers suggesting that they 
participate in One-Euro Jobs or go to temporary work agencies to get a job (n=14).  
AMB: What support do you receive from the Jobcenter to assist you in  
entering the labour market? I41: Um, yes, well they gave me addresses  
                                                 
122
 In 2012 the Federal Employment Agency introduce a new consultation concept (Beratungskonzeption) that at the time had been tested at 
two Jobcenters and in 2013 was to be rolled out at an additional 20. The cornerstone of this initiative is to introduce ‘professional and 
competent consultation’ into case management (BA, 2013: 27). Training combines theory with practice. Jobcenter staff is being trained on 
how to structure and manage a consultation discussion, how to identify and target resources, especially for those clients who are considered 
hard to integrate, and how to make apparent recipients’ talents so that they can maximize those talents in their job search.     
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where, for example, after my training I did a One-Euro-Job and then a  
skills training and then I said ‘none of that works for me,  
that is too boring for me’ and then they gave me addresses to local  
temporary work agencies and I went and I got a job. AMB: And that is  
the support you received?  I41: Yes. (25 year-old single German male) 
As a result of the perceived lack of professional training and know-how to provide assistance 
beyond basic job placement, any form of assistance provided often came across as superficial 
in nature by respondents. This was particularly acutely felt by those respondents who were 
not necessarily easily placed in One-Euro-Jobs or sent to temporary work agencies. It was the 
group of respondents who had been educated or trained (i.e., completed apprenticeships) who 
found themselves at the Jobcenter with skills and capability but often no direction and thus 
who required but did not receive quality consultation. 
I49: In my discussion [with my case manager] she essentially said, ‘well,  
I have no idea what we should do with you’. They looked at my skill  
profile—everything I have ever done—but led me to understand that ‘yes,  
well no idea’…and then I went back and tried once more and I said, ‘That  
can’t be all. You have to give me something—provide me with an  
opportunity or give me some tips or have a discussion with me’. I did not  
say, ‘I want you to present me with a job’, rather I need to have someone  
with whom I can discuss [my possibilities] someone who can help me get  
on track, who can clarify to me how this all works, what one does here. I  
have never been unemployed. And I have never been through such  
an unknown application process. (38 year-old married German male) 
 
Ultimately it appears from the perspective of the respondents for this study that case 
managers were more focused on what they can ‘do’ with them rather than focusing on what 
the respondent actually needs in terms of job placement or job search support and assistance. 
The job placement support provided by the case manager appears to focus on placing 
respondents into something such as a skills training, a One-Euro-Job or suggesting some 
respondents work for a temporary work agency. This raises a question: when case managers 
are confronted with a profile-type that falls into the ‘hard to integrate’ category, is it indeed 
the case that the UBII recipient is hard to integrate or it is that the recipient may require 
guidance beyond the basic and formulaic nature of job placement assistance provided that 
proves ‘hard’ for the Jobcenter.  
I50: In retrospect, it would have been much better if someone had said to 
 me “good, how can we help you, what are your strengths”? I think about  
the past and wonder why I have not managed to find work and wonder  
how I can change my approach to finding work. Here it would be helpful  
to have someone say “let’s try doing it this way and see if we can get you  
into a job through this avenue.” Or “here we have a part-time job, go and  
see if that is a way in for you.” The point is to provide you with more  
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opportunities and especially to offer you more job opportunities. I did  
receive job announcements sent to me, that, with the skills I have, I could  
never do. For example, wind energy. Although I am an energy consultant  
and I do have some idea of what wind energy is about—but to be able to  
calculate wind strength, to administer wind energy and to plan wind energy 
—those are completely different jobs. And…what else have I done…I also  
applied to temporary agencies for jobs; I have searched for jobs on my own  
but summa summarum when you look at it. If one had looked at my case file,  
then one would have seen that actually my strengths lie elsewhere. And in  
that sense, these questions they ask you…I found that all a bit superficial.  
That is really just to process you through the system. Yes, my wishes where  
taken into consideration when I said I would like to do this and this. But at  
the end of the day, what really would have personally helped me is if some- 
one had taken me by the hand and said, ‘here, we are offering you this path’.  
Because personally I have had difficulty getting from A to B. (40 year-old  
Single German male) 
 
7.6 Chapter summary and conclusion 
 
This chapter has unpacked the research findings as they relate to this thesis’ first research 
question that explores respondent experiences and perceptions of job placement services. Job 
placement services are a part of the larger activation and support mechanisms provided to 
UBII recipients to assist in meeting the objective of the reforms, namely labour market 
integration for the long-term unemployed.   
 
 Are the policy objectives expressed by the Hartz IV reforms reflected in the manner 
and substance of the lived experiences of Unemployment Benefit II recipients? 
 
The findings in this chapter highlight the complexities of a case management/profiling 
approach as part of job placement service provision—issues that are already well-known in 
the academic literature. Indeed the main themes to arise from the findings in this chapter are 
supported by other research (Sainsbury, 2008; Wright, 2011; Behncke et al., 2007, Brodkin, 
2011). At the heart of a case management approach to job placement services is the frontline 
worker, or in this case, the case manager. And here Lipsky’s (1980, 2010) seminal study of 
street-level bureaucrats is still highly relevant. Lipsky argued that frontline workers’ 
decisions “effectively become the public policies they carry out” because of their 
discretionary decision making ability which directly impacts the benefit recipient (Lipsky, 
1980: xii). Here it is the case manager’s discretionary decision making ability which is the 
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key component to any discussion of case management. At the heart of job placement is the 
case manager who determines, in conjunction with the profiling system, whether the UBII 
recipient requires support (Fördern—receiving job advertisements from their case manager) 
or activation (Fordern—required to demonstrate that they are applying to jobs). This is why 
the discussion of the ‘professionalization’ of activation work performed by the case manager 
is relevant to the findings in this chapter (Van Berkel and Van der Aa, 2012). The interviews 
conducted with the five case managers for this study indicate that they do use discretion in 
the decisions they make about individual recipients. If discretion does indeed play a role in 
the decisions case managers make about who receives what job advertisements, when and 
how many, for example, it is then a question of whether case managers have been 
professionally trained and are thus adequately prepared to provide the level of guidance 
perceived as needed by recipients.  While respondents in this study did not expect that their 
case managers would conduct their job search for them, they did expect that their case 
managers would have the professional capacity to assist in their job placement and job 
search. And here is where the issue of ‘professionalization’ comes in. Although the degree of 
job placement assistance received by respondents varied greatly, the majority of respondents 
required a case manager with the professional know-how to assist them beyond basic 
placement—i.e., providing job advertisements. Here professionalization is less about 
establishing a professional status of activation workers who are expected to act in a 
professional manner (Sainsbury, 2008) and instead, more about case managers being 
professionally trained to adequately assess the job and career needs of their ‘clients’.   
 
Ultimately it is an issue of whether the provision of job consultation and not just placement is 
an objective of the case management approach at the Jobcenter. Here, the Federal 
Employment Agency is currently working to improve and expand the consultation and 
mediation expertise provided to UBII recipients (BA, 2013). This suggest that the 
government recognizes the importance of having competent, professionally trained Jobcenter 
staff who can provide the level of support needed to meet its objective of integrating 
recipients into the labour market. But the question remains whether this degree of support can 
ever ultimately be provided. As Hansenfeld (1999) points out, the mandatory nature of 
activation makes relations of mutual trust between case managers and benefit recipients 
difficult to establish; something that is largely borne out by the findings outlined above.    
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Chapter Eight: Findings on Unemployment Benefit II Recipients’ 
Perception of a ‘Right’ to and a ‘Responsibility’ in Finding Work 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
The following chapter presents a thick description of the findings as they pertain to the 
second research question:  
 
 How meaningful is the Fördern and Fordern policy discourse for Unemployment 
Benefit II recipients, in terms of their perception of a ‘right’ to and ‘responsibility’ in 
finding work?    
 
This chapter will focus on UBII respondents’ perception of a right to and responsibility in 
finding work. As previously explained, reducing the number of those in receipt of long-term 
unemployment benefit was one of the key objectives for reforming the Federal Republic’s 
social security system. To do this, the UK’s ‘rights and responsibilities’ policy logic, where a 
recipient’s ‘right’ to benefit is predicated on his/her demonstrating ‘responsibility’ in finding 
work, was adopted and subsequently manifested itself both in the policy rhetoric and design 
under the maxim of ‘Fördern and Fordern’. While Fördern and Fordern is not a direct 
translation of rights and responsibilities, the underlying premise is similar. The embedded 
assumption in this policy approach is that UBII recipients need to be made to or learn to take 
responsibility for finding work. Policy makers and academics have not heretofore examined 
UBII recipients’ perception of what a ‘responsibility’ to find work means to them. Moreover, 
if UBII recipients have a responsibility to find work, do they then have a ‘right’ to work? 
Given that specific policy mechanisms have been put in place to ‘activate’ recipients and 
make them demonstrate ‘responsibility’, this chapter will explore whether UBII recipients’ 
interaction with the policy mechanism might have changed what responsibility in finding 
(and doing) work means to them and how they actively demonstrate responsibility. 
 
To achieve this objective, this chapter presents Unemployment Benefit II (UBII) recipients’ 
perception of their ‘right’ to and ‘responsibility’ in finding work under the unemployment 
benefit system governed by Germany’s Hartz IV reforms. What will emerge raises questions 
about the assumption by policy makers and governments that the long-term unemployed need 
207 
 
to be made to feel ‘responsible’ for finding work; about the extent to which recipients already 
feel a sense of responsibility to find work.  
 
The framework used to generate the findings in the following sections of this chapter 
employed the thematic codes listed below and these will act as a guide in each section for 
unpacking the evidence:   
Perception of right 
 Support 
 Freedom to choose 
 Quality earnings 
 Work not a right 
Perception of responsibility 
 Duty to state, society, family 
 Pay household expenses 
 Oneself 
 To get off benefit 
Responsibility to find work 
 Personal instinct 
 Shared social norms 
 How job search conducted 
  Job applications sent 
  Freedom 
 Jobcenter helped/hinder search 
Jobcenter changed sense of responsibly 
 Freedom from Jobcenter 
 Sense of dependency 
Benefits of activation  
Positively reinforcing responsibility  
 Lacking personal motivation 
Jobcenter strengthening work search 
Jobcenter weakened work search 
Meaning of Fördern and Fordern 
 Give and take 
 Not fair bargain 
 Structural impediments to work  
 
In the following sections of this chapter, the thematic codes used in the analysis of the data 
are italicized and emboldened and create a subsection within each section. The point here is 
to provide a direct link between the description of the evidence and the thematic codes used 
to analyse the data.  
 
Section 8.2 of this chapter will focus on respondents’ perceptions of their right to work. Here 
respondents’ perceptions, narratives and discourses of their ‘right’ to work are categorized 
into four categories. Section 8.3 explores respondents’ perception of their responsibility to 
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work where there perceptions, narratives and discourses are grouped into four categories of 
responses. Each section will unpack the respective categories as they relate to Dean’s (see 
Figure 4.1) taxonomies for understanding competing constructions based on rights and 
responsibilities. Section 8.4 and 8.5 examine respondents’ perception of whether they are 
personally responsible to find work.  Respondents’ perception of personal responsibility is 
then explored in the context of receiving benefit and going to the Jobcenter. It is a question of 
whether Jobcenter requirements appeared effectively to have changed their perception of 
personal responsibility. While section 8.4 explores whether perceptions have changed, 
section 8.5 discusses whether respondents felt Jobcenter regulations had changed their 
behaviour in terms of taking personal responsibility to find work. After a discussion of 
respondents’ perception and experience of a right and responsibility to find work, section 8.6 
discusses what Fördern and Fordern means to respondents in the Jobcenter context. Section 
8.7 summarizes the chapter findings and conclusion.  
 
8.2 Unemployment Benefit II recipients’ perceptions of their right to work 
 
Translation issues posed an initial challenge when asking respondents whether they had a 
right to work. The concept of a ‘right’ to work has a different linguistic and cultural 
connotation in the German than it does in the Anglophone context. Generally, there are two 
popular understandings of a ‘right to work’ in the German context. First, the right to freely 
chosen work is a legal concept. Although the German constitution (Grundgesetz der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland) does not state that one has a right to work, article 12 does state 
that one has the right to freely choose one’s work, place of work and training facility.123 The 
challenge here was that a group of respondents tended to conflate the right to freely choose 
employment with the right to work (n=8). Thus, when respondents were asked whether they 
had a right to work, this group noted that the constitution stipulates a right to work for 
everyone. I10: When I take a look at the German constitution, everyone actually has a right 
to work. While there was confusion about what the constitution actually stipulates, the fact 
that some respondents initial reaction was to ground their response in the legality of a ‘right’ 
demonstrates the extent to which the concept of a right to work is grounded for some in a 
legal understanding of rights generally. Second, there is a well-established discourse in 
                                                 
123 1) Alle Deutschen haben das Recht, Beruf, Arbeitsplatz und Ausbildungsstätte frei zu wählen. Die Berufsausübung kann durch Gesetz 
oder auf Grund eines Gesetzes geregelt werden. (2) Niemand darf zu einer bestimmten Arbeit gezwungen werden, außer im Rahmen einer 
herkömmlichen allgemeinen, für alle gleichen öffentlichen Dienstleistungspflicht. (3) Zwangsarbeit ist nur bei einer gerichtlich 
angeordneten Freiheitsentziehung zulässig.   
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Germany about the extent to which the government has the ‘Pflicht’ (duty) to legally ensure 
work. A right to work—“Recht auf Arbeit”—is typically used by the German political left 
and is a part of the party platform of Die Linke (The Left). The Left argues that the state has a 
responsibility to provide work for everyone who claims the right. That said, the German left 
certainly does not agree whether everyone has a duty (Pflicht) to work. Thus, the challenge 
with extracting the concept of a right to work, as it is used and understood in the Anglophone 
social policy discourse, and translating that to the German proved to be complex. It appears 
from the analysis that for historical and linguistic reasons, Germans are arguably attuned to 
different meanings of rights and responsibilities.  
 
Moreover, in the first set of interviews conducted in Hamburg, a prompt was used to 
transition from the discussion of respondents’ experiences of skills training and job 
placement services to questions about rights and responsibilities to work. The intent was to 
ease the transition from what I perceived as practical questions to more theoretical questions. 
Therefore I started by asking respondents “would you say, this is perhaps somewhat 
theoretical, but would you say you have a right to work?” or “now, for a few theoretical 
questions. Would you say you have a right to work?” While I initially thought that this was a 
good way to bridge the practical questions, with what I thought the respondents would 
perceive as more theoretical questions, it was decided that when I conducted my second set of 
interviews in Hamburg that I would drop the ‘theoretical’ prompt and simply ask “do you 
have a right to work?” The objective here was for the respondent to respond plainly, without 
me influencing their answer through a prompt. Initially there was concern that as a result of 
this change in approach, I would have two different sets of answers. But my analysis has 
concluded that while there were variations in the type of answers, this variation was not a 
result of whether a prompt was used or not, as I will demonstrate.    
That said a large portion of my sample was either very or somewhat taken aback by the 
question. It was clear that many had never before been posed such a question and six 
respondents said they had never thought about what an answer to such a question would or 
should be. In short, many found this question difficult to answer. Some found the question 
funny such as a 61 year-old unemployed German male who when asked responded with (I15) 
Right to work? [Laughs] I don’t know whether I now have a right to work. Pfff...Others were 
simply flummoxed by the question as exemplified in my interview with a 28 year-old 
unemployed German woman whose response to my question was: I18 Hm. What does right 
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mean? That is a hard question. Right to work? Right to work? Hm. Well, that is definitely a 
funny question. Right to work. I can’t really answer that. Or as a 38 year-old lone mother 
noted (I30): A right to work? I have never really thought about that. A right to work...While 
initial reaction to the question was one of surprise and while some struggled to answer the 
question, nevertheless,  many had a very clear understanding of what a right to work meant to 
them (n=44) once they were given a chance to think about it. What this variation in responses 
demonstrates is that the introduction of a rights and responsibilities framework into the policy 
design was not known or generally understood by respondents. It appears that many 
respondents did not draw a link between the rules and regulations that impacted their 
behaviour at the Jobcenter to the larger political context of ‘Fördern and Fordern ’. In short, 
respondents were not necessarily aware that what their case managers required of them was 
grounded in a rights and responsibilities policy logic. Thus, respondents were confused when 
I asked them about their right and responsibility to work because they did not necessarily 
understand the connection between questions on job placement and skills training and rights 
and responsibilities.   
THEMATIC CODES 
Support; freedom to choose; quality earnings; work not a right 
 
Overall respondents’ perception of their ‘right’ to work fell into four categories. These four 
broad categories constructed in my initial analysis could, after the event, be aligned with 
Dean’s taxonomy of competing approaches to rights and responsibilities, which I discussed in 
Chapter Four and illustrated in Figure 4.1. Dean’s taxonomy was presented as a component 
of a two-fold analytic in which elements of Foucault’s work may be seen to resonate with a 
critical re-conceptualisation of social citizenship and the complex ways in which it may 
constitute the responsibilities of the subject. I will be discussing the relevance of Foucauldian 
thinking to my findings in Chapter 9, but I am introducing Dean’s taxonomy at this stage 
since it articulates directly with the thematic coding that I have undertaken with regard to the 
respondents’ own understanding of their rights and responsibilities.  
 
But first it should be noted that there are clear limitations with what this kind of heuristic 
modelling can achieve. In this case it is used to help make sense of the categories of findings 
that emerged from an analysis of the evidence. The device also helps to make sense of and 
place the findings within the larger rights and responsibilities discourse across Western 
Europe. But these are imperfect categories that are limited in their ability to capture nuances 
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in responses that are then turned into categories. Indeed, categories often overlap or draw on 
one another making it impossible to illustrate ideal types. Nevertheless, with these limitations 
in mind, the first category comprised of those who viewed a right to work as a right to proper 
support in finding work (n=10). This response category corresponds to Dean’s conservative 
quadrant where one can expect help [from the state] when one becomes in need of assistance. 
Second, there were those respondents who viewed a right to work as a right to choose work 
freely (n=17). This corresponds to Dean’s social-liberal quadrant—demanding freedom of 
choice—but overlaps with a social democratic demand for decent work. Thirdly, there were 
those respondents who viewed a right to work as a right to quality earnings that enabled one 
to enjoy life however they defined ‘enjoy’(n=9). This response type corresponds ostensibly to 
Dean’s social democratic quadrant. This group was concerned with earning a living wage for 
the work done. The fourth category of responses concerned those who did not see work as a 
right at all (n=11). This corresponds to Dean’s utilitarian quadrant in that work was perceived 
as simply something one did to survive.  
 
For those respondents whose responses fell into the first category, a right to work meant a 
right to proper consultation and assistance in finding a job.  Consultation in this context was 
defined by respondents as a two-way exchange between a skilled professional trained in 
career development, job search or placement and the jobseeker (as discussed in Chapter 7, 
section 7.5). The skilled professional, while not expected by respondents to be intimately 
familiar with every UBII recipient’s profession, was, nonetheless, trained in career 
assessment and capable of providing meaningful career advice and guidance to the recipient. 
The key here was the ability of the skilled professional to match a recipient’s skills and 
abilities to possible career or job options. But this was to be a two-way, interactive process 
where the jobseeker could discuss employment options without feeling pressured into taking 
any job currently available to them. As I20 noted in response to the question of whether one 
had a right to work:  
I20: A proper consultation. I mean, if I am supposed to have a right to  
work or if I should work, but would also like to work, then I need proper  
consultation. So that when I come [to the Jobcenter] and I say, I have  
these and these skills, and I have these and these ideas [about what I want  
to do or where I want to work], what are my options? That when I come  
[to the Jobcenter] I will receive consultation about what my possibilities  
are and what kind of support I can expect to receive. And at the same time,  
my wishes and ideas [for what I want to do] will be taken into consideration.  
I see that as my ‘right’ in this work. It is not like you come and here you  
have 20 jobs, apply to them. (34 year-old married Indian male) 
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For the second category of responses, their idea of a right to work was a right to job prospects 
and future perspective that was manifested through respondents’ right to choose their job and 
profession freely without feeling pressured to take just any job. Respondents desired that their 
expectations for work and their future more generally should be respected by their case 
managers. As an unemployed architect noted: 
I50: Yes, I have a right to work! AMB: Why? I50:… I do have a right because 
I was born here, I have been socialized here, I live here, yes and it is here that  
I must and want to spend my daily routine. And I am a part of this society. So,  
either one accepts that I am unemployed and cannot find work here, in which  
case then I want money so that I can live decently and I would like to be left in  
peace and quiet. But that is not what happens here—society says ‘no we do not  
want that!’, in which case then one should give me the chance, should give me  
a job. And not just some job like sweeping streets or cleaning toilets, jobs that  
are beneath me, but the job that I have trained for based on my schooling.  
(40 year-old single German male) 
Moreover, this right to choose a job freely was combined with respondents desire to choose a 
worthy job, a job that pays a living wage—indeed the right to be able to work and not have to 
receive wage top-up from the Jobcenter.  
I3: One should have a right to determine what one earns and what one  
wants to do. You can’t send a teacher who is unemployed to a dry  
cleaners. That does not work. He will not do that job. And why should  
he do that job? And if you force him to do that job, well that is not good  
either. He will simply not go and do the job. And if you send him there,  
he will not stay there. And then in one month, he will be back sitting at  
the Jobcenter. (32 year-old partially disabled married Turkish male) 
One-Euro-Jobs and temporary work were perceived as an affront to this group of 
respondents’ right to choose work freely. One does not have a right or loses that right to work 
when respondents are instructed by their case manager to take a One-Euro-Job that they do 
not consider ‘worthy’ or face losing a portion of their benefit through sanctions. A right to 
choose work freely and that which is well paid was inclusive—whether one was German or 
an immigrant—everyone had the right to a job under these conditions.   
I38: …but I said to her [the case manager], do not come at me with  
temp jobs. I am really open, but I am not doing that. You don’t get  
vacation, you don’t get your money—you are paid very little for the  
work you do, you earn very little even though the profession of  
doctor assistance earns well. And when you clean or stack boxes or  
whatever at the [temp] job—work is work, that is ok, all well and  
good—but I think, every person has a right, at a minimum, to cover  
his living expenses or pay his rent. But they [Jobcenter] do not think  
about that. (40 year-old German born Turkish nationality married female) 
A right to choose one’s job freely was also interpreted as the freedom to determine one’s type 
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of work based on what they have trained to do. For this group of respondents, this meant not 
having to tick boxes at the Jobcentre that resulted in UBII recipients being funnelled into any 
job—typically temporary work or One-Euro-Jobs. As a 32 year-old single German male 
noted:   
AMB: …And a right to work, why is that social for you? I37: …Work  
is social…it is social for society and it is also social for oneself…and  
I think, in this system, that is the social; one can choose for himself,  
one does not have to ask anyone, one does not have to put x in boxes.  
One can do with what one wants; one can choose his life freely. That  
is a piece of freedom. (32 year-old single German male)  
 
The third category of responses viewed a right to work as a right to quality earnings that 
enabled individuals and families to enjoy life. A right in this sense was a way to fulfil one’s 
wishes, whether in one’s ability to enjoy the work they perform and/or to live comfortably 
from one’s earning. There was a general feeling of entrapment when respondents did not earn 
enough to enable them to enjoy life. ‘Enjoy life’ was defined as not being able to buy a CD or 
go to a movie or enjoy a dinner out once a year because respondents’ ability to dictate their 
quality of life was impaired by their low earnings. Work was perceived by this group of 
respondents as fundamental to living and defining who they are. Thus, work was as a form of 
expression of that identity and in return for the work done, respondents wished to be able to 
express their identity through the purchases made and the lifestyle cultivated. A right to work 
for this group of respondents was associated with a right to self-expression or self-sufficiency 
through the ability to work, to choose the type of work freely and to earn enough money to 
live from and enjoy life.  
I5: Yes, I would say, I have a right to work. But I see it differently.  
I have a right to work and I have a right to a reasonable wage from  
the money I should earn. The responsibility to work is so that there  
are streets [to travel to work on]; I pay for that through taxes when  
I work. That is correct. That is my responsibility. My right to work  
means for me, that I can live from the money I earn working.  
(37 year-old married German female)    
 
The forth category comprises respondents who did not view work as a right at all. For some, 
practically speaking, the idea of a right to work was simply impossible given that the state 
cannot realistically provide jobs to two million jobseekers. Some respondents questioned how 
one could or would enforce a right to work when there were not enough jobs available. I35: 
How does one want to claim a right to work, when there are no jobs available? That will be 
hard to do. Moreover, if a right to work existed the legal system would be over-taxed with 
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the unemployed demanding their right to work. It was a question of logistics: was one simply 
supposed to show up and demand work from somewhere?  As a 23 year-old German male 
noted, from a logistical perspective, a right to work was simply impossible:  
I39 ...That is a good question! No, where would a right start and  
where would it end? How is one supposed to claim the right? I  
mean, who will finance the work? No, you can’t, one cannot  
require a right to work for everyone…one cannot hire every  
worker…that is...impossible.  
While many see it as one’s responsibility to work, from a practical level, no one can enforce a 
right to work, particularly when there are not enough jobs available. Several respondents 
argued that while one should have a right to choose the type of employment freely, there is no 
right to work per se. Thus, while one cannot demand a right to work, at the same time, one 
should not be forced or pressured into just any type of work either.   
 
8.3 Unemployment Benefit II recipients’ perception of their responsibility to work 
 
Given that policy strategies are in place to activate UBII recipients by making them more 
responsible in taking personal initiative to find work, I proceeded to ask respondents whether 
they have a responsibility to work. My intent in posing respondents’ questions about 
responsibility was three-fold. First, my aim was to learn whether UBII recipients think they 
have a responsibility to work. Second, I wished to better understand how responsibility 
manifested itself in the way respondents looked for work. For example, independent of the 
Jobcenter, how many job applications did the respondent send out per week or month and 
what was their daily or weekly routine in searching for jobs? Third, my objective was to 
better understand whether, as a result of the measures in place to activate UBII recipients, 
respondents felt that the Jobcenter strengthened their personal responsibility in searching for 
work. For example, did the number of job applications UBII recipients had to send out on a 
monthly basis change their perception of what responsibility means and how to responsibly 
search for work? Overall the evidence suggests that respondents had a very clear sense of 
what responsibility meant to them. Respondents knew it was their responsibility to look for 
work. Furthermore, they exhibited a clear sense of whether the Jobcenter effectively helped 
or hindered their ability to search for work.    
 
As with the right to work question, there were translation challenges with the word 
‘responsibility’. The direct translation of responsibility is Verantwortung. But often 
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respondents would use Verantwortung interchangeably with Pflicht which means duty. 
Depending on how responsibility is used in German, it can also mean Pflicht. Thus I would 
ask respondents “sind Sie verantwortlich zu arbeiten?” (are you responsible to work?) and 
some respondents would respond with “ja ich habe eine Pflict zu arbeiten” (yes, I have a duty 
to work). In some instances I would ask “sind Sie verantwortlich zu arbeiten” (are you 
responsible to work?) and where respondents were uncertain what I meant (though others 
were clear) I would then rephrase and ask “haben Sie eine Pflicht zu Arbeiten?”—“do you 
have a duty to work?”—which some respondents responded better to. After this prompt they 
then understood what I meant with the use of ‘Verantwortung’. Furthermore, I used 
‘Verantwortung’ to get at one’s responsibility to do something, but often used 
‘Eigenverantwortung’ (personal responsibility) to gauge one’s sense of personal 
responsibility and not just responsibility generally. While most respondents did not initially 
understand the link between the questions about one’s right to work and their experience at 
the Jobcenter, when asked about one’s responsibility to find work, respondents understood 
the connection between responsibility and the Jobcenter without a prompt.  
 
THEMATIC CODES 
Duty to state, society, family; paying household expenses; Oneself; to get off benefits 
 
The majority of respondents responded to the question of whether they had a responsibility to 
work with a resounding ‘yes’ (n=39). That said a small group of respondents did not think it 
was their responsibility to find work (n=4) while another group was ambivalent, answering 
yes and no (n=4) to the question. While these last two groups acknowledged that if they did 
not work they would not have money to live from, it was earning money that was the 
motivation and reason to work and not necessarily out of a sense of responsibility or duty to 
oneself, family or society. But for the majority of respondents who thought they had a 
responsibility to work, four categories of responses emerged from an analysis of the data. 
These categories again correspond to Dean’s heuristic modelling device for understanding 
competing constructions of rights and responsibilities (see Figure 4.1). The first category of 
response focused on one’s collective duty to the state, society and family (n=11). This 
category corresponds to Dean’s conservative quadrant with undertones of the social 
democratic. Here, the shared obligation to work stems more from an obligation and a 
collective responsibility which is distinctly social democratic in that it embraces a collective 
responsibility to provide work as well as perform it. The second response centred on the 
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practicality of a responsibility to work, i.e., one is responsible to work because one has 
household expenses to pay (n=15). This response category falls into Dean’s utilitarian 
quadrant: work is a means to an end. The third category was more individual in nature—the 
responsibility to oneself to find a job that actualizes one’s skills and interest (n=16). This 
category corresponds with elements from Dean’s liberal and social democratic quadrants in 
that one has a responsibility to oneself to choose work freely but that responsibility also 
entails selecting substantive work. Finally, the fourth category of response embodied the 
rights and responsibility logic—respondents focused on the responsibility one has to the state 
to find work in order to get off benefit (n=7). This corresponds to Dean’s (neo-) liberal 
quadrant, in that it is about one’s personal duty not to be a burden to the state.   
 
In reference to the first category, the responsibility to work was grounded in respondents’ 
collective sense of duty, both morally and otherwise, to their families, the state (via paying 
taxes and contributing to the state pension) and society more generally. But for many, this 
sense of responsibility was seen as a shared responsibility in that if it is one person’s 
responsibility or duty to work, then it is everyone else’s too. I10: Yes certainly. Because it is, 
well, if I as a citizen [work], then it is every citizen's turn, really, [everyone] is obliged to 
fulfil his duty as a citizen. A high number of respondents in this group cited their paying taxes 
or contributing to the state pension as the reason they had a responsibility to work. By paying 
taxes, respondents cited the ability of the state to provide clean streets and decent 
infrastructure so that they can get to and from work. Thus paying taxes was seen as a 
collective responsibility, a responsibility everyone had to the community they lived in and 
society on a whole.  
I39: Yes, in every instance one has a [responsibility] to oneself… 
well…that one…yes, makes something out of his life…yes does  
not just sit around being lazy, rather is active. Perhaps also [a  
responsibility] to society…so…that…that everyone has his part  
to contribute [to society]…yes. (23 year-old single German male) 
 
The second category of response focused on the practical reasons why one is responsible to 
work; I9: Clearly if I want money, then I need to work. Respondents felt a strong sense of 
responsibility to work in order to feed, clothe and house themselves or their family. 
Respondents are responsible for paying their rent or mortgage and their household bills. 
Working is the natural, responsible way to pay for living expenses. While some respondents 
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simply viewed responsibility as naturally linked to working, for other respondents, work was 
not only a duty or a responsibility but also a ‘must’.  
I12: Well, I think I have a responsibility because at some point, when  
I have reached a certain age, I will receive my pension from the state.  
And I must work for this pension. So clearly I am obliged to work  
because I also somehow have to pay my rent and pay for all my other 
bills. So, I do see in that a duty that I must work. (29 year-old  
partially disabled single German female) 
Being unemployed and receiving UBII or €364 a month was not considered by respondents 
as enough to live from rather enough to simply exist from. Thus, for some respondents their 
sense of a responsibility to work was based on simple logic. The reason one works, and hence 
one’s responsibility to find work, is to earn money to purchase goods. If one did not work, 
then one received UBII, which does not provide enough money to live from. As will be 
demonstrated later in this chapter, this logic proved a source of motivation for some 
respondents to find work and get off benefit (n=6).  
 
Furthermore, respondents with families cited that their responsibility to work stemmed from 
their need to provide for their families. ‘Provide’ in this sense was viewed broadly. 
Respondents needed and wanted to provide the basics for their children, but respondents also 
wanted to be able to provide a wider quality of life that included after school activities and 
trips. Thus, it was the respondents’ responsibility to work in order to provide prospects and a 
future for their children.  
I5: But I would really like to teach my children culture…and that is  
why I have a right to work so that I can do this. My responsibility to  
work is so that there are paths to work and orderly streets. That is  
the responsibility part. That is why I pay taxes. (37 year-old married  
German female)  
Respondents with children also desired to set an example for their children. If one wishes to 
purchase something, then one is responsible and works to earn the money to afford the item. 
Furthermore, parents did not want their children to think that taking money from the state was 
[socially] acceptable.  
I11: Yes, I also want to be a role model for my children. It is not just  
for the state, rather for them too, so that they know, when I purchase  
something for myself, then I have to work for that item. (32 year-old 
divorced lone parent German born Tunisian nationality female) 
 
For respondents whose responses fell in the third category, a responsibility to work meant 
more than working in order to pay bills and taxes. Rather, similar to respondents’ response to 
a right to work, one has a responsibility to oneself to actualize the skills and interests one has; 
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not only to perform the job that one can do but also to do the job that one desires to do. 
Particularly for this group of respondents, the idea of being pressured into taking any type of 
job left them feeling, on the one hand, adamant that they would not take any type of work and 
on the other deflated and defeated that they could not access more strategic support from the 
Jobcenter to assist them in their job search on their terms. This group of respondents felt that 
the support provided by the Jobcenter should focus on maximizing their skills and abilities. 
For this group, the lack of professional and strategic support at the Jobcenter coupled with the 
strategies used by case managers to integrate recipients into work was viewed as 
irresponsible. Respondents who were funnelled into and out of temporary jobs noted that 
these jobs did nothing to build their long-term career prospects. This group of respondents 
commented on the fact that it would be equally irresponsible of them if they did not seek 
work that was relevant to their skills and interests. Thus, responsibility fell to both parties—to 
oneself to find a job that matched their skills and to the Jobcenter to provide the support 
needed that enable the recipient to maximize their job search in order to find the job that they 
are qualified for and provided regular employment. In response to whether one has a 
responsibility to work I38 noted:  
Yes, of course…In every instance. One is responsible to oneself to find  
work. That is also correct…But I think, if one is already here [at the  
Jobcenter], then one needs to be helped. After all it is called a ‘Jobcenter’  
and she is called a ‘job mediator’ (Vermittler). One needs to be helped.  
What is the fundamental meaning of this word ‘job mediator’ (Vermittler)?  
She mediates between the unemployed and employment opportunities.  
What do I have? (40 year-old married German born Turkish nationality 
female) 
 
The fourth and final category of responses was grounded in the ‘rights and responsibilities’ 
policy logic. This group of respondents viewed a responsibility to work as a responsibility to 
get off benefit so that they did not need to receive money from the state. This group of 
respondents were conscious that the cash benefit they received was not theirs to have; that 
they had not earned it. Indeed, many were anxious about being on benefit and as one lone-
mother noted  
I2: No because this money that they are giving us is somebody’s  
sweat. Some people are working for this money that they give it  
to us. You understand? But if you work for four or six hours, you  
are trying to do, you even have respect under, under the government,  
you understand? (39 year-old single lone parent Nigerian female) 
Work is equated with earning the respect of family members, friends, the government and 
society generally. Taking responsibility to find work is viewed as a natural action. Thus, not 
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working and receiving UBII benefit meant that this group of respondents did not feel that 
they were a part of a collective, because they were not contributing by paying taxes. Indeed, 
they were instead taking money from the collective. I50: Society gives me a basis to exist. 
Therefore I am also responsible to give something back to society. This is also the reason 
why many respondents voiced anger toward the idea of someone ‘loafing’ from the state—
the Arno and Dieble character who receives UBII benefit and sits on the couch all day 
drinking beer, doing nothing while living off of money from the state. This type of person is 
not taking responsibility—a responsibility that is in turn their duty to find work. If one is in 
receipt of benefit, then it is that person’s responsibility to find work in order to get off 
benefit:  
I8: …crystal clear, when one is unemployed and receives unemploy- 
ment benefit from the state, and the Jobcenter is subjected to the laws of  
Germany, then one does something for himself to at least find something  
[work]. A person—an unemployed person—then exhibits the correct  
behaviour to do something for himself, so that he gets work. (42 year-old 
single German male) 
That one may be in need of unemployment benefit is socially acceptable, but it is the 
responsibility of the recipient to find work as quickly as possible. Benefit alone is not the 
means to live from. 
 
8.4 Unemployment Benefit II recipients’ perception of whether they are 
personally responsible to find work 
 
THEMATIC CODES 
Personal instinct; social norms; freedom to conduct job searches; Jobcenter help or hinder 
 
After discussing whether respondents had a responsibility to work, I proceeded to ask 
respondents whether they are personally responsible to find work and if so, how they conduct 
their job search. All respondents had a clear idea of what it means to take responsibility and 
initiative in their job search. Thus respondents’ sense of responsibility to find work is 
twofold. On the one hand it stems from a personal instinct coupled with adhering to shared 
social norms. Indeed, a group of respondents noted that it is socially expected of individuals 
to take responsibility to find work (n=11). Second, again respondents grounded their 
perception of responsibility to search for work in very practical terms: if one desires to earn a 
living and to advance one’s career, it is in the individual’s interest and thus their 
responsibility to take action (n=21).    
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Respondents described how they took initiative and responsibility to find work independent 
of what was required of them by the Jobcenter. They outlined the number of hours per day 
they conducted computer searchers and a quota of job applications they set for themselves to 
send out on a weekly or monthly basis.  
I12: Personal responsibility means to me in this sense that I really— 
even when I am unemployed—that I sit down every day in front of  
the computer for at least two hours and I look through all of the job  
search web pages. That is what personal responsibility is for me.  
That I look and that I write at least three to four job applications daily.   
(29 year-old partially disabled single German female) 
Furthermore, some respondents associated the responsibility to conduct a job search with 
freedom—the freedom to define the parameters of and conduct one’s job search as one 
wishes (n=13). It was noted by this group of respondents that the Jobcenter was simply not 
equipped to assist respondents in their job searches. That, indeed, the responsibility to find 
work should rest with the UBII recipient as they know best what they want to do and thus 
what type of job they are looking for.  If respondents desired to change their unemployment 
status, then respondents argued it was their responsibility to monitor job opportunities 
because the only way to change their employment status was based on their initiative alone. It 
was at this nexus that this group of respondents felt their job search was often hindered by the 
demands placed on them at the Jobcenter—that their personal responsibility was undermined 
by the Jobcenter's demands (n=13). The time spent applying to mismatched job 
announcements forwarded to them by their case managers or attending skills trainings that 
were of no use or interest to them, was perceived as time taken away from their own job 
search.  
 
8.5 Unemployment Benefit II recipients’ perception of whether the Jobcenter 
changed or strengthened their personal responsibility to find work 
 
THEMATIC CODES 
Freedom; dependency; positively reinforcing responsibility; benefit of activation; lacking 
motivation 
 
The responses were mixed when respondents were asked whether their sense of responsibility 
to find work had changed since being at the Jobcenter. While a majority of respondents 
responded with a resounding ‘no’ that the Jobcenter did not change their sense of personal 
responsibility (n=33), a group of respondents felt that the demands placed on them by the 
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Jobcenter prompted them to search for work even harder than they would have had they not 
been at the Jobcenter (n=4 ). For this group, respondents cited being highly motivated to find 
work in order to be free of the Jobcenter because they felt restricted in what they could do 
with their time while being on benefit. Moreover, respondents resented feeling ‘dependent’ 
on the Jobcenter and the benefit they received coupled with not having enough money to live 
on, let alone live well.  
I43: No, I already have that [responsibility]. That [responsibility] is a part  
of me. The reason for this is very simple: It is purely a computation example.  
I simply have no desire to constantly get by with a few Euros [per month].  
I have no desire. And to be dependent [on benefit]. That is absolutely not  
my thing. Absolutely not! (59 year-old single German male) 
Here this group of respondents associated these feelings with that which motivated them to 
get off benefit. Whether this was a new or different sense of responsibility to find work from 
how they perceived responsibility prior to signing up for UBII benefit is difficult to say. But 
what is clear is that the demands place on them at the Jobcenter did indeed prove to be a 
source of motivation for this group of respondents.  
 
For some respondents, the pressure placed on them by the Jobcenter was seen as positively 
strengthening their sense of personal responsibility (n=6).  
AMB: Did your perception of personal responsibility change since  
you started coming to the Jobcenter? I42: A little... yes, in the end I  
would say that through the pressure [placed on me] that it changed  
a little.  (36 year-old single German male) 
The Integration into Work Agreement signed between the Jobcenter and the UBII recipient 
that stipulates the number of job applications a recipient has to submit per month it appears 
has, indeed, had an impact on a small group of respondents taking initiative and responsibility 
to submit job applications. Furthermore, some respondents cited that meeting with their case 
managers strengthened their job search ability. The meetings between case manager and UBII 
recipient forced some respondents to address critical questions about their future; such as 
whether they should go into one field or another, whether they should do an apprenticeship or 
a re-training. Had respondents not been made to meet with their case managers and comply 
with what was required of them, some respondents felt that they would not have been as pro-
active and taken the initiative or responsibility in sorting out their current unemployment 
situation.  
AMB: Did the Jobcenter strengthen your sense of personal responsibility  
to go out and find work? I49 Yes, sadly, yes. In the sense that they  
motivated me—negatively motivated me, but nonetheless. And that is the  
main point. They negatively motivated me to get out and free myself of  
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this situation. I believe, I would not be in this situation [currently at the  
Jobcenter], if I had really taken the principle of personal responsibility  
seriously. I was a student who just lived for myself and believed at some  
point someone would come along and give me a job and that needed to  
change. (39 year-old married German male) 
 
Other respondents openly acknowledged that they were not always as motivated to find work 
as they should be (n=3). Thus, the demands of the Jobcenter were welcomed because they 
succeeded in putting into perspective the precarity of their situation. Either the respondent 
changes their behaviour and takes responsibility to find a job (thus meeting the demands of 
the Jobcenter) or they risk losing what they had worked hard to acquire. This feeling was 
particularly acute for previously homeless individuals or those without an elementary- or 
secondary-school diploma who struggled to maintain a basic standard of living. As one 
previously homeless man noted when asked if being at the Jobcenter had changed his sense 
of responsibility: 
I13: I would say yes and no…because now and then I am a lazy person  
and I can happily let myself do nothing. It is really a wonder that I have  
an apartment that I really like. But on the other hand, I would not like to  
lose what I have built over time. So, I have to manage everything so that  
I am happy without feeling that I am under pressure. So, I have to be  
independent…actually it was always clear to me. That is my life. I have  
to decide what is and is not correct. I am no longer a soldier who just takes  
commands the whole time without questioning. I do think that it [responsibility]  
rest with me how I construct my future and not how other people would  
construct my future. (38 year-old single German male) 
A small group of respondents felt that while the Jobcenter had either strengthened or 
reinforced their sense of responsibility, it was done so at a cost to their feeling dependent on 
the system while being subjected to a degrading process (n=3).   
AMB: And did your perception of personal responsibility change since  
you started coming to the Jobcenter? I41: Yes, a little, yes. AMB: And  
how? I41: …Yes, well you cannot live your whole life from the Jobcenter.  
To live from Hartz IV, it is not nice to always have to come to the Job- 
center. It is a little, a little degrading. (25 year-old single German male) 
Thus, there appears to be tension between, on the one hand, acknowledging that the demands 
of the Jobcenter had positively prompted respondents to take more responsibility in finding 
work but this, on the other hand, comes at the expense of some respondents losing a sense of 
autonomy over how they direct and manage their lives. It seems that any new sense of 
responsibility obtained derives from respondents desire to be free of Jobcenter rules and 
regulations that constricts their lifestyles—and the only way to achieve this is to either stop 
receiving benefit or to get a job.  
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I39: Somewhat. I want to get out of here. And I keep trying and trying  
even when I have setbacks. It is hard when one did not do an apprentice- 
ship, but one cannot easily bring me down, so the Jobcentre is a source of  
motivation to find work. The sense of responsibility to find work comes  
from not wanting to be at the Jobcenter. (23 year-old single German male) 
 
THEMATIC CODES 
Jobcenter Strengthened; Jobcenter weakened work search  
 
After a discussion with respondents as to whether the Jobcenter had changed their sense of 
responsibility in finding work, I then sought to understand, from a practical perspective, 
whether the Jobcenter actually strengthened or weakened their ability to responsibly look for 
work. Respondents’ responses again demonstrated the competing nature between what is 
required of them by the Jobcenter and their ability to instinctively demonstrate responsibility 
through their own actions. A large group of respondents did not think the Jobcenter 
strengthened their ability to responsibly find work (n=31). Respondents cited the time and 
energy lost when their case manager sent job announcements that did not fit their job or 
career profile but were, nonetheless, required to either apply to the job or send the Jobcenter a 
written reason why they declined to apply. Moreover, this group of respondents were acutely 
aware that it was not the prime objective of the Jobcenter to assist them in finding the work 
they wanted to do, find rewarding or a job in which they can grow professionally and learn 
new qualifications. Indeed, this group of respondents felt it was the Jobcenter that was acting 
irresponsibly by requiring respondents to take up irregular, temporary work that was void of 
future prospects. One respondent noted the irresponsibility of the Jobcenter to send UBII 
recipients into precarious work situations, such as temporary work, knowing that this was not 
a long-term solution to the recipients’ unemployment status.   
I14: My personal responsibility to find work comes from a personal  
instinct to find work. When I work, then out of personal instinct to  
earn a living and to get ahead in life. I am ambitious and want to get  
ahead and earn more money and when I want to get ahead means that  
I use my sense of personal responsibility to do this. But then I want a  
job where I can learn further qualifications and where I have future  
perspective (prospects). To do temp work, there is no future in that and  
then I am here two years later with the same story and that would not be  
using my personal responsibility. I would not be responsible if I were to  
take work like that, that would leave me with little earnings, no prospect  
of upward mobility and unemployed again in two years’ time. (38 year- 
old single German male) 
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Some respondents felt that Jobcenter demands actually detracted from their ability to search 
for employment (n=9). Indeed, respondents related incidences where the Jobcenter’s actions 
resulted in them not being able to actively seek work. An ex-convict who is Turkish though 
born in Germany, but does not have German citizenship, perhaps best illustrates this point. 
His Turkish passport expired and without a valid passport one cannot legally work in 
Germany. When he asked the Jobcenter via his case manager for a temporary loan of €200.00 
to cover the cost for renewing his passport his request was rejected (it is within the remit of 
the Jobcenter to grant small temporary loans).  
I34: No, if anything they prevent me from seeking work. If they would  
assist me in the way I need assistance, i.e., grant me a temporary loan  
of €200.00 to cover the cost of renewing my passport, then I could  
concentrate on finding work instead of concentrating on worrying about  
how to cover this cost. Until I get my passport renewed, I cannot legally  
work. (40 year-old single Turkish male) 
 
8.6 Unemployment Benefit II recipients’ perception of Fördern (to support) and 
Fordern (to demand, require) 
 
THEMATIC CODES 
Give and take; not fair bargain; structural impediments  
 
Given that the fourth Hartz law was designed to activate and integrate the long-term 
unemployed under the maxim of Fördern and Fordern, after having discussed their 
perceptions of a right and responsibility to work, my objective was to understand if and how 
UBII recipients perceived Fördern and Fordern in the Jobcenter context. When asked, many 
respondents simply had not heard of Fördern and Fordern and, therefore, could not explain 
what this meant (n=18). If they had heard of the concept, then it was in passing or something 
they remember Gerhard Schröder saying in public. Yet, unbeknownst to them, respondents 
would describe the concept as it played out in their daily interactions at the Jobcenter and 
ultimately influenced their behaviour. They simply did not (nor was there any reason they 
should) know the policy objective behind the rules and regulations of the Jobcenter. For those 
respondents who were familiar with Fördern and Fordern (n=24), six respondents defined it 
as a “give and take”—the Jobcenter provides support in finding work and in return the UBII 
recipient is required to take action and find a job. When asked to describe Fördern and 
Fordern, the common response was indicative of Interview 25’s reply: If I expect a service, 
then I also have specific things I have to do [in return for that service]. That is quasi a give 
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and take. Moreover, for this group of respondents they understood the political reasons for 
Fördern and Fordern and for them it was both acceptable and realistic of the Jobcenter to 
expect something in return for their receipt of benefit. I8: When I take any type of assistance 
from the state (i.e., money to live from) then I have to do something for it.  And yet, for some 
respondents, their understanding of the ‘support’ (Fördern) provided was undermined by the 
Jobcenter’s use of ‘pressure’ and the lack of competent trained professionals to properly 
assist UBII recipients in their job search.  
 
While not necessarily against the principles of Fördern and Fordern, when asked about their 
understanding and experience thereof, some respondents generally did not feel that it was a 
fair bargain (n=14). It was the poor quality or lack of actual support that frustrated this group 
of respondents. Respondents felt that there was a disconnect between the support provided 
versus using that support (or drawing on it) to address their needs. Here respondents 
identified support as needing to come from competent case managers who were able to 
professionally assess one’s skills and abilities and then assist in their job search. Therefore 
respondents felt that the Jobcenter did not uphold its side of the Fördern and Fordern 
relationship. Respondents felt that they generally met the demands made of them to 
demonstrate they were looking for work, but the Jobcenter failed to provide quality or 
professional support in return.  
I38: I think…I think, this „Fördern und Fordern“... They require something 
from you, so that they can support you in return. They want to know from  
you, for example, whether you are good enough for the support provided.  
Whether you can do it….that is how I would define these two „Fördern  
und Fordern“... They require your strengths so that in return they can  
support [those strengths]. But, they do not actually do that. They do not  
live up to their own duty [to provide support]. That does not exist here at  
all. That is missing. (40 year-old married German born Turkish nationality 
female) 
Thus, while in principle respondents understood and even agreed with Fördern and Fordern—
even when they were unable to link their experience with the actual name of the concept—
some respondents felt frustrated because from their perspective, they were demonstrating 
responsibility and meeting the demands that were required of them, but the Jobcenter was not 
necessarily providing adequate support in return.  
 
Moreover, some respondents noted the complexity of the Fördern and Fordern relationship 
given the structural impediments that prevent respondents from integrating into the labour 
market (n=7). As one respondent noted, “it is not so simple as ‘we support you, you go and 
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get a job’”.  Respondents readily acknowledged structural barriers that prevented them from 
entering the labour market. Muslim women faced discrimination because they wore a 
headscarf; women (whether married or single) felt they were unemployable because they had 
young children; respondents age 50 and older complained of age discrimination; and those 
respondents who suffered from poor health (especially those who suffered from depression or 
work-related injuries such as back problems) had a difficult time finding a job that was 
amenable to their health status. Thus, it appears for some respondents, the Integration into 
Work agreement that the UBII recipient enters into with the Jobcenter is already skewed for 
some respondents given the structural impediments to entering the labour market. Moreover, 
while respondents generally agreed with the premise of Fördern and Fordern because work 
was viewed as worthy and obtaining support from the state to enter the labour market was 
welcomed, a group of respondents noted the lack of cooperation between the Jobcenter and 
recipient on one side and the employers and society (Gesellschaft) on the other. For some 
respondents it was quite simple: if the Jobcenter acknowledges the usefulness of a recipient’s 
skills, then there should be employers who need and will use these skills. While this may be a 
simplified, if not naive, approach to labour market economics, what it represents is the 
thinking among respondents that Fördern and Fordern provides only a one-sided approach to 
finding work—jobs are available, go get one—but this does not take into account the larger 
structural impediments to entering the regular labour market. What seemed evident to these 
respondents was that society generally and the labour market specifically has no 
responsibility to the UBII recipient or to the Jobcenter. 
 
8.7 Chapter summary and conclusion 
 
This chapter has explored the research findings regarding respondents’ perception of their 
right to and responsibility in finding work. Four categories of respondents’ perception of a 
right to work emerged from an analysis of the evidence. First, there were respondents who 
perceived a right to work as a right to proper support in finding work. Consultation was 
understood to be a two-way exchange that should take place between a trained professional 
who assessed career options and job search and placement based on the UBII recipient’s 
skills, job qualifications and interest. For the second category of responses a right to work 
meant a right to choose work freely.  Respondents’ right to choose their profession freely was 
integral to their identity. This group of respondents bristled at the thought of being told or 
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instructed to do a job that was not of their choosing. Third, a right to work meant a right to 
quality earnings that enabled one to enjoy life however the respondent chose. The fourth 
category of responses did not view work as a right at all, rather it was simply something one 
did to survive.   
 
With regard to a responsibility to work, four categories of responses emerged from an 
analysis of the data. The first category of responses perceived a responsibility to work as a 
responsibility to the state (by paying taxes) and one’s family and society more generally. This 
was perceived as a collective as opposed to an individual sense of responsibility. The second 
category centred on the practicality of a responsibility to work, i.e., one is responsible to 
work because one has household expenses to pay. The third category focused more on the 
individual—the responsibility to oneself to find a job that will actualize that person’s skills 
and interest. The fourth and final category of responses embodied the rights and 
responsibility logic. Here respondents focused on the responsibility one has to the 
government to find work in order to get off benefit. The categories of perceptions of a right to 
and responsibility in finding work that emerged from an analysis of the evidence resonated 
with Dean’s (see Figure 4.1) competing constructions of rights and responsibilities. As Dean 
writes “In the real world we encounter hybrid ideologies founded on compromises and 
contradictions” (2010: 21). And, indeed, what is interesting here is the variety of responses 
from respondents who live in what has been categorized as a conservative corporatist welfare 
regime. While one might assume that respondent responses might fall principally in the 
conservative, with some overlap in the social democratic, quadrant the fact that response 
categories span all four of Dean’s quadrants suggest that the popular discourse and 
understanding of a right to and responsibility in finding work among this sample is perhaps 
not so distinct or dissimilar from the Anglophone or even the Nordic world.  
 
Finally, respondents’ perception and understanding of Fördern and Fordern were examined. 
While some respondents had never heard of Fördern and Fordern in the Jobcenter context, 
those who did were not against the underlying principle and appreciated that if they were 
receiving benefit from the state, then it was acceptable for the state to demand something in 
return. What respondents found problematic was the lack of quality support (Fördern) 
provided by the Jobcenter to assist jobseekers find work. Indeed, Fördern and Fordern 
provoked a degree of scepticism, but not because the concept was alien to respondents’ way 
of thinking, but because it appears disingenuous.   
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Chapter Nine: Work, Skills and Support: The Problematic Trilemma of 
Welfare-to-Work Reforms 
 
9.1 Introduction 
 
This thesis has had two objectives: first, to explore the experiences of Unemployment Benefit 
II recipients who have participated in skills training and/or job placement services in order to 
understand the degree to which these mechanisms engage with their needs and whether their 
experiences reflect the policy objectives for the provision of such support and activation 
tools.  In line with the first objective, the second examined how meaningful the Fördern and 
Fordern policy discourse—in terms of their right to and responsibility in finding work—is to 
those UBII recipients who experienced the support and activation mechanisms. As set out in 
Chapter One, this thesis has sought to answer two main questions:  
 
 Are the policy objectives expressed by the Hartz IV reforms reflected in the manner 
and substance of the lived experiences of Unemployment Benefit II recipients? 
 
 How meaningful is the Fördern and Fordern policy discourse for Unemployment 
Benefit II recipients, in terms of their perception of a ‘right’ to and ‘responsibility’ in 
finding work? 
 
The main finding to arise from an analysis of the evidence for this study is that there appears 
to be significant tension between, on the one hand, the policy objectives informing the need 
for and use of skills training and job placement services to assist the long-term unemployed 
integrate into the [regular] labour market and, on the other hand, the aspirations and real-life 
experiences of the respondents interviewed for this study. Indeed, it appears that the 
provision of support (Fördern) to respondents may be undermined by them having to 
demonstrate—rather than effectively to exercise—responsibility (Fordern) in finding work: in 
some instances, at least, Fordern may constrain rather than promote Fördern.  It seems that 
where Fordern (demand/require) exists in conjunction with the threat of sanctions for non-
compliance, based on an analysis of the evidence for this study, there is some likelihood that 
Fördern (support) can be used to regulate the conduct of and discipline respondents rather 
than provide support that is perceived as meaningful to them. This thus suggests that the 
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support provided has the potential to break down when Fordern (activation) is inserted into 
the policy framework.   
 
The above are the ‘headline’ conclusions that arose from an analysis of the evidence. But 
indeed, what is the larger meaning that can be attached to the findings of this study? Here it is 
Foucault's governmentality approach that can help make sense of these findings. In light of 
the findings presented in Chapters Six, Seven and Eight, the govermentality approach helps 
us to understand something about the German Hartz IV reforms that is not necessarily 
obvious, namely that the Federal Republic’s use of support and activation measures—in this 
case skills training and job placements services—ultimately serves an immanent function. As 
discussed in Chapter Four (section 4.2), since the introduction of welfare reforms predicated 
on a rights and responsibilities policy logic in the 1990s, academics have sought to 
understand the significance of reconstituting social citizenship as conditional on one’s 
conduct. In terms of this new politics of welfare provision, Foucault identified the rise of 
disciplinary power that focused on maximizing the utility and docility of individuals (Rose, 
2000). This has helped to explain the effect the reconstitution of social citizenship has had on 
individuals’ conduct and behaviour within the governed space of reforms made to 
unemployment benefit. It is a question of how disciplinary power operates and here Foucault 
directs our attention to an analysis of governmental power as it operates at the micro level. 
Indeed, bureaucratic institutions at the micro level become the foci of analysis because it is 
through them that power relations are made manifest. As Foucault argues, it is not to deny the 
importance of institutions in the establishment of power relations but, rather, to suggest that 
one should analyse institutions from the standpoint of power relations rather than vice versa 
(Foucault, 1994). “Using here the restricted  meaning of the word “government,” one could 
say that power relations have been progressively governmentalized, that is to say, elaborated, 
rationalized, and centralized in the form of, or under the auspices of, state institutions” 
(Foucault, 1994: 345).  Given that the Hartz reforms place emphasis on regulating one’s 
conduct through the interpretation of Fördern and Fordern as constructed through Jobcenter 
rules and regulations, it is then this conduct that is made manifest at Jobcenters which is 
problematized. Rose argues that the rise of Third Way politics based on a rights and 
responsibilities policy logic ushered in the transformation of “caring professionals into 
agencies of control concerned with risk management and secure containment” (2000: 1407). 
In line with Rose’s thinking, this study has explored the overarching policy intention of 
providing support to (and assumptions attached to the need to activate) UBII recipients versus 
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the lived experiences of those respondents who, for this study, participated in said support 
(and activation) mechanisms.  
 
Thus, what Foucault helps us to understand about the evidence stemming from this study is 
that so long as receipt of benefit is predicated on meeting specific requirements, there is then 
some likelihood that the end result will be a system that disciplines rather than supports the 
UBII recipient. As discussed in Chapter Four (section 4.3) while, in the case of the Hartz IV 
policy interventions, policy makers may have intended the Jobcentre to provide legitimate 
'support', and indeed, the aim of the support mechanisms in place are clear and 
comprehensible, the intelligible function of the support provided ends up instead primarily 
disciplining the UBII recipient. Further to that, in Discipline and Punish Foucault (1979) 
argues that in its failure to prevent delinquency, the penitentiary system, nonetheless, 
succeeds within its own milieu: it defines and manages the 'problem' of delinquency and the 
criminals in our midst. Applying this thinking to the Hartz reforms suggests that while on the 
surface it appears that, based on an analysis of the evidence, the Jobcenter ‘fails’ to provide 
the type of support respondents for this study needed to assist them in integrating into the 
labour market, its immanent function lies in the symbolic significance attached to 'support' 
mechanisms. Namely, this support gives the appearance that something is being done in order 
to manage the problem of idleness and the unemployed (while at the same time seemingly 
moving respondents off benefit and thus reducing unemployment numbers). The Federal 
Republic has invested heavily in assisting the long-term unemployed (often the ‘hard’ to 
employ) find work. If, as a result of the support provided, UBII recipients cannot find work, 
then their inability to find work is not because they have not been supported by the 
government. This shifts the responsibility away from the German government and instead on 
to the UBII recipient. The inability of the UBII recipient to find work is a result of their 
shortcomings and not the inability or unwillingness of the Federal Republic to adequately 
address labour market short-comings through the need for alternative economic policies.  
 
Moreover, the Jobcenter succeeds in regulating respondents’ conduct by making them feel 
unsettled by the demands placed on them by their case managers to participate in Jobcenter 
activities that are not necessarily relevant to their employment needs. Jobcenter staff may 
believe that they are supporting their clients. But when stepping back and reviewing the 
evidence on the role of case managers in Jobcenter settings more broadly (Fletcher, 2011; 
Sainsbury, 2008; Brodkin, 2011), the pressures and constraints to which case manager staff 
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are subject, coupled with the limitations of their professional ability to adequately mediate 
and consult with recipients, suggests that they end up imposing different priorities and 
behaviours that may then impact the type of support recipients ultimately receive.  
 
The previous three empirical chapters have presented evidence to support these claims and 
this conclusion. In this final chapter, I will link the findings as they pertain to each research 
question. Section 9.2 will briefly summarize the main findings explored in Chapters Six, 
Seven and Eight. The objective is to draw on a Foucauldian analytic to connect and make 
sense of the findings to emerge from the empirical chapters. Section 9.3 presents a discussion 
and analysis of the findings, exploring three specific themes: the value placed on ‘work’, 
‘skills’ and ‘support’ in unemployment benefit. Section 9.4 presents an alternative to 
Foucault’s arguably nihilistic approach while section 9.5 will conclude by suggesting future 
themes for research that stem from an analysis of the evidence presented in this thesis. 
 
9.2 A summary of the findings 
 
9.2.1 Skills trainings as a form of support (Fördern) to assist in labour market 
integration 
 
What emerges from the findings in relation to short-term and One-Euro-Job trainings that 
respondents participated in is a pattern that equally resonates with the findings on job 
placement services. The support instruments offered—in this case, the skills training—tended 
to be tokenistic and ineffectual. From a Foucauldian perspective, the fact that some skills 
trainings ‘failed’ to provide the necessary support many respondents required in order to 
integrate into the labour market was not necessarily an indication of the system ‘failing’ 
altogether. Rather this ‘failure’ serves an immanent function—that has not been consciously 
embedded in the policy design by policy makers—namely, to shift a sense of responsibility 
for learning and skills development onto the individual. Respondents often noted the waste of 
resources and time that resulted from their being instructed to participate in skills training(s) 
that were not perceived as useful to them. And yet, while many respondents felt that their 
time had been ostensibly ‘wasted’, in actuality their time had been filled—as surely as if a 
respondent for this study had been placed on a treadmill. Respondents may or may not have 
been unrealistic when they sought a training within an occupation of their choice. But what 
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they actually experienced was the way in which the ‘system’ not only kept them moving, but 
moving in a direction that was not necessarily of their choosing. Moreover there is an 
immanent logic to respondents’ perception that the trainings and placement mechanisms were 
a waste of resources. Indeed, this perceived ‘waste’ was not actually wasteful at all. The 
process has symbolic significance. If the German government is unwilling, for example, to 
invest in demand-side policies or create jobs that pay living wages, then although the supply 
side activation measures may not serve the interests of those engaging with them, 
nevertheless, the public perception is that UBII recipients are being supported. And if as a 
result of that support they are unable to find work, then, as noted above, it is they themselves 
who are to blame for their failure to integrate into the regular labour market.   
 
Calmfors et al. (2002) point out that from an economic theory perspective, participation in 
active labour market policies (ALMPs) should help to maintain the motivation to actively 
seek work (i.e. counteract the discouraged worker effect of unemployment). This includes 
increasing the productivity of jobseekers (Calmfors, 1994) through labour market training 
and work experience programmes. Moreover, ALMPs can serve two functions at once, 
namely to help both preserve or increase the skills of the unemployed while stimulating 
competition for jobs. Indeed, employers may perceive unemployed participants of ALMPs as 
more attractive than the unemployed who do not participate, which could result in ALMPs 
having a positive effect on labour force participation rates (Calmfors et al., 2002). In the 
aggregate and from a purely economic theory perspective, this may be the case. But as 
Funnell and Rogers (2011) argue, micro and macro-economic studies have a tendency to treat 
active labour market policies and interventions as simple, often ignoring the complex 
contexts in which these programmes operate. Indeed, a more intricate picture emerges when 
utilizing different questions combined with qualitative methodology to explore, as this study 
did, UBII recipient experience of active labour market polices in the German context. 
Although this is a small qualitative study whose findings are not generalizable to the greater 
UBII population (Lewis and Ritchie, 2010)
124
, nonetheless, the findings suggest that the 
extent to which skills trainings increased the skills of the respondents for this study and thus 
matched the policy objectives expressed by the Hartz reforms—potentially making them 
                                                 
124 As Lewis and Ritchie write “Qualitative research cannot be generalised on a statistical basis—it is not the prevalence of particular views 
or experiences, nor the extent of their location within particular parts of the sample, about which wider inference can be drawn. Rather, it is 
the content or ‘map’ of the range of views, experiences, outcomes or other phenomena under study, and the factors and circumstances that 
shape and influence them, that can be inferred to the researched population. Although individual variants of circumstances, views or 
experiences would undoubtedly be found within the parent population, it is at the level of categories, concepts and explanation that 
generalisation can take place” (2010: 269). 
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more ready and thus attractive to potential employers—should be viewed cautiously. The 
significance of this finding is bolstered by other research. This includes a qualitative study by 
Murphy et al. (2011) where two-thirds of their sample of 150 welfare recipients in Australia, 
who participated in the Job Network Programme, cited negative experiences with the skills 
trainings they had participated in. While a small percentage of their sample cited similar 
positive benefits found in this study with participating in short-term trainings, i.e., provided a 
routine, an opportunity to interact with other individuals and something to do, the majority of 
Murphy’s respondents noted that the trainings were irrelevant, repetitive and uninformative 
coupled with being led by inexperienced trainers.   
Indeed, the evidence from this study suggest that those respondents who had few skills, no 
secondary school and/or apprenticeship diploma, were older and immigrants were those most 
often funnelled into and out of One-Euro-Jobs. While some respondents were simply thankful 
to have the opportunity to earn a little extra money, they, nonetheless, felt trapped in a cycle 
of One-Euro-Jobs. One-Euro-Job participants were cognizant that even if they were to enter 
the regular labour market, their wage would not necessarily equate to more than what they 
were currently ‘earning’ via the One-Euro-Job. The significance of this finding is bolstered 
by other research including Schröder’s (2009) findings in a study conducted for the Friedrich 
Ebert Foundation. Here she interviewed 50 UBII recipients in the East German state of 
Brandenburg and found that One-Euro-Job participants did the same work as the regularly 
employed person and that the training rarely improved recipients’ chances at integrating into 
the regular labour market.  
Arguably this type of activation falls into what Farnsworth has coined ‘corporate welfare’ 
where private companies and organizations are recipients of welfare provision whether 
financially, in-kind, direct or indirect (2012, 2013). Publically subsidized employment falls 
under Farnsworth’s ‘corporate-social welfare’ continuum (2013: 15). Here corporate-social 
welfare provides direct benefit to businesses. The provision of welfare is shaped as much by 
the needs and demands of businesses as it is by the needs of individuals. For Farnsworth, 
make-work schemes and job subsidies are common corporate-social welfare policies. Thus 
while the provision of corporate-social welfare may disadvantage the individual, in that such 
policies may pressure the individual to take a job they otherwise would not take at a low-
wage, the benefit to the corporation and by extension the economy outweighs the negative 
impact such policies may have on the individual (Farnsworth, 2013).  While the ostensible 
objective is to provide support to those UBII recipients who are considered difficult to 
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integrate (‘arbeitsmarktfern’) the real benefit falls to the organizations who host One-Euro-
Job participants.   
While not all trainings proved ineffective or unhelpful, respondents - with a few exceptions - 
did not feel that the training they participated in provided them with new skills or knowledge 
that could (or did) assist in their being hired. From a policy perspective this finding 
contradicts some of the findings from German government evaluations that have relied on 
non-experimental data using propensity score matching techniques to assess causality in 
relation to the effect participation in a skills training has on employment uptake. This is not to 
say that the results stemming from the use of propensity score matching are invalid. But as a 
statistical technique used in labour market policy evaluations to assess whether changes in 
policy and the introduction of new programmes influence outcomes such as employment and 
earnings for those subject to the policy change, it is important to be aware of the problems 
inherent in such techniques that can result in biased estimates (Smith, 2000; Bryson et al., 
2002). The point here is not to argue that quantitative evaluations of programme effects on 
labour market uptake produce incorrect results, but rather to call for more diverse research 
methods that include both quantitative and qualitative evaluations so that policy makers 
obtain a more balanced understanding of the complexity both of the policy under 
investigation and the evaluation results. While this study is not an evaluation of the efficacy 
of German active labour market policy interventions, depending on the type of research 
questions asked and the different methods used, we can get a more robust picture of an 
individual’s experience of support mechanisms. Such variation in findings has the ability to 
provide us with a more complex, nuanced understanding of the role such interventions play in 
the lives of those searching for employment and whether their needs are being met.    
Finally, a proportion of respondents did cite benefits gained from participating in short-term 
trainings, such as access to computers and material for putting their resumes or job 
applications together. Some respondents, though initially dreading having to participate in a 
training placement, were pleasantly surprised to find that the training proved helpful or even 
beneficial. But for the majority of respondents, participation in a skills training was too often 
perceived as a ‘must’. While some voiced objections to participating in a training, many often 
acquiesced to their case manager’s suggestion because they wanted to avoid the threat of 
sanctions. Others did not want to participate in the training, but viewed it as a chance to be 
free of Jobcenter demands. Thus, when confronted with not participating in the training or 
participating as a form of escape from Jobcenter demands, they chose the latter. Here again, 
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Foucault helps us to better understand that skills trainings can end up controlling the 
behaviour of the UBII recipient. Instead of respondents being able to discuss with their case 
manager options that would better match their interests and future job prospects, they were 
told to participate in trainings that largely busied them, provided them with some useful 
information and materials, but little in terms of lasting employment options. The outcome of 
the policies in place appears to infantilize rather than empower UBII recipients. Like 
children, it appears that UBII recipients often have to cower to their case manager (and by 
extension the system). Rather than being able to have an adult discussion about what 
measures and tools they think would best assist and support them, respondents for this study 
learned to trick the system on the one hand or be passive agents on the other. It is at this 
nexus where German activation policies broke down and failed to serve the interest of this 
study’s respondents.      
 
9.2.2 Job placement services as a form of support (Fördern) and activation (Fordern) in 
labour market integration 
 
The Integration into Work Agreement is an important support and activation tool at case 
managers’ disposal. Both the level of support and degree of activation required that is 
outlined in the agreement is predicated on the UBII recipient’s profile type, as discussed in 
Chapter Seven (section 7.2). UBII recipients do not know that they have been put into a 
profile type according to their skills, education and prior work history. That said, the profile 
type alone does not necessarily dictate the level of activation or support a jobseeker receives. 
As is evidenced by the interviews with case managers, it appears that they do use their own 
discretion in determining the type of support required and degree of activation needed. 
Indeed, this suggests that discretion could be a feature of front-line practice with potentially 
profound implications for UBII recipients. The inference is supported by other research, 
including the findings of Flectcher’s (2011) study into the role of front-line practice at 
Jobcentre Plus in the UK. He found that competing agency goals coupled with the inadequate 
training of front-line staff provide the necessary ‘space’ for front-line workers to undertake 
their own interpretations of the advisor role (Fletcher, 2011:456). The larger implication of 
this finding suggests that when put together with other studies of similar issues, where 
reforms that incorporate a combination of New Public Management tools based on a rights 
and responsibilities policy logic, some of the challenges to arise appear to be similar in 
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nature. This suggests that Germany is not especially different from other countries that have 
adopted similar welfare-to-work reforms.  
    
The findings reflect a larger symptomatic problem with job placement services, namely any 
placement assistance provided by the case manager—particularly the type of job 
advertisements supplied to UBII recipients—is dependent on the case manager’s ability to 
professionally assess recipients’ job or career needs. Professional in this context implies 
something different from what Van Berkel and Van der Aa’s (2011) ‘professionalization of 
activation work’ refers to. Here professionalism refers to professionally trained and qualified 
career development or job search specialist. On the one hand, some respondents initially 
expected that their case manager could and would provide guidance and advice beyond the 
standard, basic job placement information they received. On the other hand, whether they 
expected this level of service or not, some respondents simply needed someone who could 
professionally assess and provide career and job guidance. Indeed, that there was such a high 
incidence among respondents of mismatch in, for example, the type of job advertisements 
supplied to them by their case managers, suggest that, be it because of a lack of time, 
resources or skill, case managers did not or could not adequately assess their ‘client’s’ 
professional needs. The significance of this finding is supported by Schröder’s (2009) 
research. She found that respondents missed having a personal integration into work plan that 
would act as a guide to moving recipients into the labour market and that while respondents 
thought that their case managers were nice and well-intentioned, they lacked the ability to 
adequately provide job and support placement options. Moreover, Murphy et al.'s (2011) 
study of the Australian Job Network Programme found that over two-thirds of participants 
cited negative experiences with their case managers. This included excessive and complicated 
administration, poor treatment from their case managers, a lack of individualized attention 
and a general sense that the Job Network Programme had been unhelpful in assisting in their 
search for employment opportunities.    
One of the possible reasons why case managers do not provide more advice and guidance, 
beyond their simply lacking the professional know-how to do so, is that, as the evidence base 
has shown, case managers are often overworked, their caseloads are excessive and they have 
few resources at their disposal. In addition, case managers are confronted with managing 
internal pressure placed on them by their management to meet specific targets which often 
conflict with meeting jobseekers needs. This results in case managers unable to adequately 
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carry out their work (Sainsbury, 2008; Bodkin, 2011) and in a professional manner (Van 
Berkley and Van der Aar, 2012). Further to that, a study conducted by Stafford et al. (2012) 
highlights the difficulty in addressing the individual needs of vulnerable members of 
society
125
 at the UK’s employment service while managing a large and complex service 
system. They found that the move to minimization of face-to-face contact at Jobcentre Plus, 
by redirecting customers to self-help and call centre outlets, further reduced the already 
limited time spent offering job search-related support.  
 
Foucault (1979, 1998) argued that power is ‘immanent’ within all human relationships and 
that over time distinctive ‘technologies’ of power evolve. Key here is that while those 
‘technologies’ of power have not been consciously designed by policy makers to serve a 
disciplinary function per se, they nevertheless have the capacity—often subtly—of 
prescribing behaviour that comes to be regarded as ‘normal’(M. Dean, 1999: 2). As Miller 
and Rose argue “in advanced liberal democracies…these technologies increasingly seek to 
act upon and instrumentalise the self-regulating propensities of individuals in order to ally 
them with social-political objectives” (1990: 28). Indeed, as Foucault writes: 
It [power] is defined in a strangely restrictive way, in that, to begin with,  
this power is poor in resources, sparing in its methods, monotonous in  
the tactics it utilizes, incapable of invention, and seemingly doomed  
always to repeat itself. Further, it is a power that only has the force of  
the negative on its side, a power to say no; in no condition to produce,  
capable only of posting limits, it is basically anti-energy. This is the  
paradox of its effectiveness: it is incapable of doing anything, except to  
render what it dominates incapable of doing anything either, except for  
what this power allows it to do (1998: 85). 
 
As the evidence suggest, characteristics of disciplinary technology are embedded in the job 
placement service function. Here disciplinary technology manifests itself in the banality of 
what is required of UBII recipients: In this study, job advertisements supplied to respondents 
that they had to apply to (or provide a reason why not) but were not relevant to the work they 
did (or were seeking to do) or required skills they simply did not have; respondents made to 
meet a quota of jobs applied to per month but the number often not reflecting structural 
impediments to the labour market; considerable variation in case manager support provided 
to respondents that often resulted in decisions not made in consultation with the respondent; 
and the use of a profiling system that suggests a secret process of disciplinary categorization 
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 Vulnerable or disadvantage groups in the labour market for this study are considered disabled people, ethnic minorities, lone parents, 
individuals over 50, women, unskilled workers and young people.  
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of respondents. The disciplinary technology embedded in the job placement services can thus 
be likened to a (post) modern treadmill. The treadmill represents a process by which some 
respondents are required to engage in futile job search activity that, within a rights and 
responsibilities policy framework, is to atone for their failure to find employment or their 
sluggishness in seeking work. Like the workhouse treadmill, pointless job-searching results 
in emotionally exhausted and demoralized UBII recipients. Furthermore the ‘support’ 
respondents received was never without ramifications or consequences. This suggests that the 
provision of support—under the pretext of help—took on a different function, namely to busy 
or hassle the respondent who must willingly comply or face legal consequences. Thus from a 
Foucauldian perspective, the actual, as opposed to the perceived function, of the job 
placement services is to hassle, keep respondents occupied, irrespective of their skills or 
education level, their motivation or employability.  
 
9.2.3 A right to and responsibility in finding work 
 
Overall four categories of respondents’ perceptions of a right to work and four categories of 
respondents’ perceptions of a responsibility to work emerged from an analysis of the data that 
corresponded to Dean’s (see Figure 4.1) heuristic modelling device for understanding 
competing constructions of rights and responsibilities. The significance of these findings 
suggests two points: First, that the four categories to emerge from respondents’ perception of 
a right to work and the four categories to emerge from respondents’ perception of a 
responsibility to work seems to suggest that the popular discourse and understanding of a 
right to and responsibility in finding work in Germany is not necessarily so distinct or 
dissimilar from the Anglophone or Nordic world. Second, and drawing on the first point, on 
the surface the introduction of Förden and Forden into both the policy rhetoric and design of 
the Hartz IV reforms implies a significant shift with some cultural significance—from social 
solidarity to individual responsibility. But the evidence suggests that this shift in policy and 
its impact on UBII recipient perceptions is complex and less straight forward than it might at 
first appear. Indeed, based on an analysis of the evidence for this study, I would argue that the 
manner in which the rights and responsibilities of citizenship are themselves socially and 
discursively constructed reflect not one immanent logic or function, but competing and 
evolving logics that may, on the one hand, be more or less compliant with, and on the other, 
resistant to attempts by policy makers to steer them.      
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Finally, the finding suggests a positive outcome of Foucault’s conduct of conduct.  For 
Foucault, hierarchical structures of power within society depend on and operate through more 
local, low-level ‘capillary’ circuits of power relationships (Gordon, 2000). Foucault made the 
link between the ‘micro’ and ‘macro’ analysis of power through an analysis of practice that 
informed the analysis of institutions. Although not necessarily intended by policy makers, the 
fact that an outcome of the demands and requirements placed on UBII recipients within the 
rights and responsibilities framework was to change their behaviour to more align with 
Jobcenter expectations—and by extension government expectations—is an example of the 
degree to which power operates at the local level. The job placement and skills training 
policies, for example, are the power capillaries that, as a result of how they are designed, 
have the ability to direct and control the behaviour of individuals to align with macro policy 
objectives. In this case, reducing benefit dependency and unemployment numbers. The role 
of case managers as street level bureaucrats plays a vital role in the performance of policy 
and, by extension, directing the conduct of conduct.  
 
9.3 Discussion and Analysis 
 
At the heart of this thesis lies the question of whether the policy objectives, as outlined in the 
fourth Hartz law, of Fördern—to reduce benefit dependency and increase employment for the 
long-term unemployed through the provision of support—and the policy assumptions of 
Fordern—that the long-term unemployed need to be made to demonstrate responsibility 
through activation measures—reflects the experiences of those who participated in the skills 
training and job placement services. And indeed, therein lies the fundamental relationship 
between the labour market—work, skills and training—and social insurance protection for 
the unemployed. If we step back and explore the changes made to unemployment benefit in 
many countries since the inception of Clinton’s reform of Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children (AFDC) in the US, changes made since the mid-1990s have not only impacted the 
duration, the amount and entitlement to benefit, but have fundamentally changed how work is 
valued through the deployment of a workfare component. This is not to suggest that prior to 
reforms in the US, the UK, the Netherlands, Denmark, Australia and now Germany that 
unemployment insurance was not conditional nor that, workfare, welfare-to-work, flexicurity 
or other forms of LMA schemes were not previously in place. But it was the reconstitution of 
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social citizenship through the introduction of an explicit ‘rights and responsibilities’ policy 
logic in social policy design generally and unemployment policy specifically that has 
arguably proved to be a watershed.  
 
Indeed here Germany is an interesting case study because it is a question of how ‘new’ the 
rights and responsibilities logic is to the German welfare regime. The introduction of the neo-
liberal rights and responsibilities policy intervention into the design of the Hartz IV reforms 
suggests, on the surface, a possible departure from the Federal Republic’s traditionally 
described conservative-corporatist welfare regime. Yet closer analysis of the historic 
development of Germany’s social insurance system since Bismarck indicates that threads of 
liberal, individualistic responsibility were always a part of the design of the German social 
state. That is why the findings of UBII recipients’ perception of a right to and responsibility 
in finding work are interesting because the diversity of responses in many ways reflects the 
hybridity of the German social state itself. While this is not a representative sample and thus 
we cannot generalize the findings of this study to a larger population, nonetheless, it is 
noteworthy that in addition to responses falling in Dean’s (see Figure 4.1) conservative 
quadrant, a proportion of responses also fell into or overlapped with the liberal, social 
democratic and utilitarian quadrants. Given that Germany has traditionally been described as 
a conservative-corporatist welfare regime with underlying principles of solidarity, one might 
expect that respondent responses would fall principally in Dean’s conservative—with some 
overlap in the social democratic—quadrant. But this was not the case. As discussed in 
Chapter Two, there is evidence of substantive and ethical continuity in German 
unemployment insurance policy overtime. While the Hartz IV reforms introduced concrete 
changes into the structure and administration of unemployment benefit, the reforms 
nonetheless draw on pre-existing Catholic as well as variants of Protestant social doctrine. 
Indeed this ideological and moral complexity is reflected in UBII respondent underlying 
perceptions’ of their right to and responsibility in finding work.  
 
9.3.1 Work 
 
Active labour market policies predicated on a rights and responsibilities logic are now a 
staple part of social insurance in countries across Western Europe, North America and 
Australia. Although the actual type, structure and administration of active labour market 
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policies adopted varies across countries, the focus on ‘work as the best form of welfare’ (UK 
Department of Social Security, Press Release, 6 May 1997) is a constant across countries that 
adopted welfare-to-work policies, irrespective of their regime type. Work is unilaterally 
perceived as a social good. Not working or not demonstrating that one is seeking work is 
perceived as bad. This perception of work as the alternative to benefit has become so 
normalized in popular and political discourse—especially by mainstream politicians, whether 
to the left or the right of the centre ground—that its salience appears to be rarely questioned. 
Indeed, a good example of this was during the 2012 US presidential campaign. There was an 
interesting, though little publicized, spat between Republican presidential nominee Mitt 
Romney and President Barak Obama about the degree to which work requirements were 
mandated in Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), the federal welfare-to-work 
programme. In July 2012 the Obama Administration directed the Department of Health and 
Human Services to grant state waivers which would give states more latitude in running 
TANF. As a result, the Romney presidential campaign accused the Obama Administration of 
being lax on the work requirements for TANF recipients by providing waivers to states that 
would allow them to lessen the work requirements. In other words, the President (and by 
extension, the Democrats) were seeking to provide welfare money without encouraging 
TANF recipients to find work. What ensued was a lot of back and forth between the two 
campaigns about who was tougher on welfare recipients, i.e., who required tougher work 
requirements. In a letter of July 2012 Kathleen Sebelius, the Health and Human Services 
Secretary argued that the proposal “strengthens the law’s purpose to move people off of 
welfare and into jobs by utilizing state-based innovation…Our goal is to accelerate job 
placement by moving more Americans from welfare to work, and no policy which undercuts 
that goal or waters down work requirements will be considered or approved by the 
department” (Berg, 2012).  
 
This example highlights the degree to which the discussion is focused on the individual who 
needs to [be made to] ‘work’ and individual behaviour rather than exploring the complexity 
of work and working in an ever changing labour market landscape (Standing, 2011; Doogan, 
2009). Popular and political discussion about the structural impediments to finding and 
staying in work are rarely a part of the larger political and social discourse on ‘work’ and 
unemployment benefit. At times it appears that there is little in terms of an alternative voice 
to challenge conventional thinking that ‘work’ is necessarily the best route out of benefit. As 
the evidence from this study suggests, work opportunity programs, such as the One-Euro-Job 
242 
 
serve an immanent function. It is the symbolic perception that one is doing something other 
than being a passive agent on benefits. Indeed, this ‘something’ is better for them than doing 
‘nothing’. Yet based on an analysis of the evidence for this study (bolstered by Schröder’s 
(2009) and the Supreme Audit Commission’s (Bundesrechnungshof, 2010) findings), UBII 
respondents are not necessarily in a better financial or emotional place based on the work 
performed to meet Jobcenter requirements. Temporary jobs provide no security or job 
protection and are often lower-paid jobs for the same work done by regularly employed 
employees paid at a higher wage. Subsidized work experience programmes like the One-
Euro-Job may have the objective of testing work readiness but, as the evidence for One-Euro-
Jobs suggest, recipients end up doing substantively productive work that employers profit 
from for a meagre or nominal wage (Supreme Audit Commission, 2010). Finally in a country 
like Germany that does not yet have a minimum wage,
126
 often low-skilled workers’ only 
options are working at service-sector jobs like the car wash chain, Mr. Wash, for example, 
that pay c. €2,50 an hour after tax. Individuals may be ‘working’ but it is questionable 
whether they are ‘living’ in any satisfaction sense.  
 
9.3.2 Skills 
 
Like work, skills are often perceived by policy makers as the cornerstone to creating and 
maintaining a country’s human capital, innovative, productive and competitive workforce. 
Indeed, in recent years it has been argued that country’s like the UK, the US and Germany 
have been confronted with a ‘skills gap’, that is a shortage of skilled manufacturing workers, 
including highly skilled ‘advanced manufacturing’ positions in energy, technology, health 
care and communications. While a discussion about the reasons for this skills gap is beyond 
the scope of this thesis, as the evidence stemming from this study suggests, a call for more 
‘skills’ is not necessarily the answer to the problem of unemployment for UBII recipients. 
Skills trainings remain a cornerstone of the Hartz policy interventions. In terms of German 
policy makers utilizing skills trainings as an important component of the support (Fördern) 
provided in the Hartz reforms, then it is a question of the type and quality of and reasons for 
recipients participating in a training placement that is crucial.  
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 In April 2014 German Chancellor Angela Merkel approved the country’s first minimum wage set at €8.50 an hour to start in 2015.  
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As the evidence suggests (see Chapter Six, Section 6.2) it appears that there is internal 
pressure from management to fill training spaces that have been purchased as a package by 
the Jobcenter. In other words placing UBII recipients in trainings currently meets the double 
purpose of both filling a space previously purchased so as not to lose money and keep a 
Jobcenter’s unemployment numbers low, so as to meet targets for placing recipients in 
‘work’, i.e., engaging them. The driving factor for placing an individual into a training should 
ideally rest with meeting the professional needs of the UBII recipient. It is striking that an 
analysis of the evidence for this study suggests that for most respondents, the skills 
training(s) they participated in tended to be either training down or, at a minimum, training 
across, skill levels—but training up in only two cases.127 Based on an analysis of the evidence 
for this study, a skills training should be used as a support instrument if and only if it is 
ascertained by a professional in consultation with the UBII recipient that a specific training 
could help fill a gap in skills that may then better position the recipient to find a job. If it is 
perceived by the UBII recipient that the training will not be helpful to their professional 
development, then the recipient should not be made to participate. The findings for this study 
suggest that this is not necessarily happening. Thus, while some respondents benefited from 
skills trainings in that they provided them with contact to others, material for applying to jobs 
and inserted some regularity into their daily schedule, these ‘benefits’ are not enough to claim 
that ‘skills’ trainings are the type of trainings needed to meet both demand, i.e., fill a ‘skills 
gap’ in the workforce, and supply, by providing UBII recipients with the skills needed that 
will translate into a concrete job. But the challenge here is that from a Foucauldian 
perspective, the ‘inappropriate’ training is not a ‘missed opportunity’ if it keeps the 
unemployed benefit recipient busy. This begs the question of whether there is an underlying 
motivation or policy makers are blithely unaware of the immanent function fulfilled by the 
politics they pursue. 
 
9.3.3 Support 
 
My research suggest that so long as the intelligible function of the Jobcenter and its support 
and activation requirements are to, as Foucault would argue, discipline; to make the 
unemployed visible in a particular way by regulating their conduct, then support through job 
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 By training up, I mean acquiring new skills either in addition to the skills one already has or an altogether new set through a re-training, 
that will potentially make the individual more attractive to employers in their job search.  
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placement and skills training services can be difficult to provide in such a manner that meets 
the needs of recipients. While respondents for this study were required to and, seemed to a 
great degree, to meet the demands placed on them in return for the support provided, the 
actual support provided to them in terms of consultation with a case manager, general job 
placement and skills training mechanisms offered were perceived too often to be tokenistic 
and ineffectual. As a result UBII recipients are caught between meeting competing job search 
demands—theirs and the Jobcenters—which results in ostensibly wasted time and resources 
for both Jobcenter staff and the UBII recipients. It therefore comes back to Hasenfeld (1999) 
who questions whether support (Fördern) and activation (Fordern) can ever naturally work in 
tandem together. Can a Jobcenter ever really provide the mediation and consultation support 
needed when ‘support’ is predicated on recipients meeting requirements knowing that if they 
do not, they will be sanctioned?  
 
With the introduction of welfare reform in the US, a right to benefit became predicated on the 
benefit recipient demonstrating responsibility in finding work. The onus of responsibility is 
placed on the recipient because, it is argued, they are the ones who are at fault for not having 
work, they fail to take responsibility to find work and therefore they need to be activated 
through active labour market policy schemes (Murray, 1994; Mead, 1986). But there is an 
inherent flaw with this argument. Namely it ignores the structural factors that prevent 
individuals of all skill levels from integrating into the regular labour market. Indeed, 
Germany’s deregulation of its temporary work sector perhaps best illustrates the impact 
government policy has had on individuals’ inability to find regular work. The Federal 
Republic’s ongoing effort to liberalize its traditionally ‘rigid’ labour market regulations has 
resulted in a markedly changed labour market landscape. As pointed out in Chapter Three 
(section 3.3.1) the gradual reform of the Labour Placement Act between 1972 and 2003 to 
allow for the use of temporary agency work contracts is an example of a changed German 
labour market landscape. While the Labour Placement Act has gradually been reformed 
starting in 1972 through to its current status in 2003, the end result is a German labour market 
that welcomes temporary agency work and, to a great degree, relies on it to keep labour costs 
down while integrating the unemployed into the labour market in order to keep 
unemployment numbers low (Antoni and Jahn, 2009). Indeed, as noted in Chapter Three 
(section 3.3.1) based on micro census data, between 1997 and 2007 standard (regular) 
employment declined by 1.53 million jobs (8.5 percentage points) and atypical employment 
increased by 2.58 million. Over a twenty year period, Germany went from not allowing any 
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temporary work to gradually allowing corporations to rely more and more on the temporary 
work sector. The correlation between the increase in the percentage of workers employed in 
irregular work and the deregulation of temporary work cannot be ignored. When respondents 
were asked what type of work was offered to them by the Jobcenter, most of them disclosed 
that they had been instructed by their case manager to go to the temp-agencies to find work, 
both case manager and respondent knowing that they would be back at the Jobcenter within a 
certain period of time.  
 
9.4 A path out of the gloom? 
 
Foucault was not interested in exploring ‘solutions’ and therefore a Foucauldian analytic does 
not suggest alternatives to the operation and consequence of a given polity. Indeed, a 
Foucauldian analytic is arguably nihilistic. Yet, although an analysis of the conclusions from 
this study have partly been framed using a Foucauldian approach, the evidence does not 
suggest that the established authority in place is so corrupt or that there is no objective basis 
for truth or that the operation of unemployment benefit in Germany must be overturned in 
order to rebuild a just policy. Foucault's nihilism was a posture against conventional 
ideological discourse. Thus, if we set aside the nihilistic aspects of a Foucauldian analytic, I 
would argue that ultimately the evidence suggests that a foundation for support is in place 
and that it has the potential to better meet the needs of UBII recipients.  But this would 
depend on making key policy changes and here, in the context of my analysis, any policy 
change (incremental or otherwise) would only be worthwhile if policy makers acknowledged 
and subsequently disowned the immanent function of the Hartz IV 'reforms'. Thus there is a 
path out of this Foucaulidan gloom, but it would require policy makers to turn away from the 
neo-liberal labour market activation paradigm and instead towards something different.  
The underlying objective of the fourth Hartz law—to support the long-term unemployed in 
their endeavour to find work—is not incorrect or misguided. A system has been built and put 
in place that could have the capacity to meet the needs of the unemployed—be it further 
training, job counselling or assistance with placement. But as an analysis of the evidence for 
this study suggests, changes in the system would need to be made in order for these support 
services to work to the advantage of the unemployment benefit II recipient. Here the intent to 
‘support’ would have to be genuine and not confused with objectives to discipline or regulate 
recipients’ behaviour.  Thus, when ‘skills’, for example, are referenced as that which the 
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unemployed lack and, therefore, need more of in order to integrate into the labour market, I 
would argue that what is instead needed is a much more nuanced discussion about what type 
of skills and thus training is being referred to. Presently it appears that skills and skills 
training must be a part of any policy solution to sort supply and demand in the labour market 
generally and something the unemployed need specifically. Like ‘work’ being perceived as 
that which will solve the problem of the benefit scrounger, skills are perceived as that which 
the unemployed do not have and is thus needed to assist in integrating the long-term 
unemployed into the labour market. It is this neo-liberal discourse that has resulted in policy 
makers insinuating that the unemployed are not getting jobs because they lack skills, which 
subsequently puts the onus of blame and responsibility on them instead of investigating 
structural barriers to the labour market that are preventing the unemployed from finding work 
with the skills they do have. Thus one way to change the discourse is to stop blaming the 
unemployed while acknowledging the need for demand-side policies in Germany. Such 
policies include mandating that employers pay employees living wages, decreasing the ability 
of employers to rely on short-term, fixed-rate contracts while allowing the government to 
play a more active role in creating jobs.
128
 The fundamental question here is how to employ 
demand side policies that can better assist at integrating the ‘precariat’ into the labour market.    
9.5 Chapter conclusion 
 
This chapter has summarized and discussed this thesis’ research findings. There is scope for 
further study, expanding on some of the themes to emerge from an analysis of the evidence 
but not discussed in this thesis. For example, there is room for further research into the role of 
the case manager in steering policy in Germany. Drawing on Lipsky’s (1980, 2010) seminal 
study of street-level bureaucracy, the last decade has witnessed a renewed interest in 
exploring how street-level bureaucrats impact policy (Wright, 2003; Brodkin, 2011; Fletcher, 
2011; van Berkel and van der Aa, 2012). While changes made to the structure of Jobcenters 
as client-friendly, service-orientated institutions has been researched in Germany (Schütz and 
Oschmiansky, 2006; Greifenstein et al., 2007; Baethge-Kinsky et al., 2007), more research is 
needed that examines the micro-level effects New Public Management tools, such as targets 
coupled with limited resources, has on case managers interaction with and the decisions they 
make regarding their ‘clients’ employability.   
                                                 
128 It should be noted that during the recent recession, the German government ran a successful policy subsidising the continued employment 
of over a million workers employed in smaller businesses. This helped to keep down the unemployment rate even during a severe slump in 
national output. 
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Secondly, there is always more room for further research into the role of responsibility in 
social security provision. Dean, H. calls for a collective responsibility of employers as well as 
the nation state to accept some responsibility in employing “a range of workers who cannot 
become immediately productive” (2014: 164). If we apply this logic to Unemployment 
Benefit II, then it becomes a question of responsibility as perceived by the UBII recipient, the 
state and employers in which case questions about how the state and employers perceive their 
role in the responsibility of employing a range of workers become crucial. Indeed, what then 
does responsibility mean to German employers and to what extent do they think it is their 
responsibility to employ the unemployed—especially the hard to employ?  
The notion of a ‘responsibility’ in finding work and in working will always be a part of 
Western society as it is currently constituted. But it is a question of whose responsibility it is 
to find work. We are at a policy juncture in which it is time to shift the terms of the debate 
away from the discussion about ‘responsibility’ as it pertains to the individual and instead 
explore the responsibility of the state to its citizens and non-citizens alike in creating 
balanced labour market policies that do not undermine workers ability to integrate into the 
regular labour market and employers responsibility in hiring a range of workers at living 
wages. Building on previous work, my study suggests that it is time to stop penalizing the 
unemployed and instead explore how more fairness and greater stability can be inserted into 
the labour market so that the onus of responsibility in finding and staying in work need not 
always be placed at the hearth of the jobseeker.  
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Appendices  
Appendix 1  
Initial Introduction Letter to Jobcenters 
Sehr geehrte Damen und Herren, 
ich schreibe Ihnen, um zu fragen, ob es möglich wäre, mein  Forschungsprojekt bei dem 
Jobcenter Oldenburg durchzuführen. 
Mein Name ist Anne Marie Brady. Ich stamme aus Washington, DC. Zur Zeit bin ich aber an 
der London School of Economics im Fachbereich Sozialpolitik tätig, wo ich derzeit 
promoviere.    
Meine Doktorarbeit beinhaltet ein Forschungsprojekt, indem ich die Auswirkungen der 
relativ neuen Hartzreformen (Arbeitslosengeld II) auf die Empfänger dieser Bezüge 
untersuchen werde. Genauer betrachtet, mich interessieren die Maßnahmen der JobCenter 
und wie die ALGII  Empfänger damit klar und zurecht kommen. 
Um herauszufinden, welche Auswirkungen die Massnahmen auf die  Empfänger hatten, ist es 
für meine Forschung notwendig, Befragungen mit Arbeitslosengeld II Empfängern 
durchzuführen. Eine Möglichkeit würde beinhalten, dass ich im Warteraum des Jobcenters 
die Betroffenen treffe und frage, ob sie ein Interview mitmachen könnten. Dies geschieht 
natürlich auf freiwillige Basis. Dabei werden die Betroffenen nicht namentlich erfasst und 
bestehende Datenschutzbestimmungen genauestens  eingehalten. Hierzu würde ich erklären, 
dass die Informationen des Interviews nur für mich und mein Forschungsprojekt sind, und 
dass niemand ausser mir Zugang zu diesen Informationen hat.  
Um den Prozess an einem Jobcenter genauer zu verstehen und auch um die Interviews mit 
den Empfängern noch weiter zu ergänzen, möchte ich wissen ob es auch möglich wäre, 
Interviews mit einigen Mitarbeit aus dem Jobcenter zu führen? Dies geschieht wieder auf 
freiwillige Basis und würde den Ablauf des Arbeitstags nicht stören. 
 Es würde mich freuen, mein Forschungsprojekt in der Stadt Bremen  durchzuführen und 
mehr über die Hartz IV Reformen von der Seite sowohl der Empfänger als auch der 
Mitarbeiter zu lernen und verstehen. 
Ich würde mich sehr freuen, wenn Sie mir mitteilen könnten, ob dieses Projekt überhaupt in 
Ihrem Haus möglich wäre. 
Wenn Sie zu meiner Anfrage weitere Fragen haben, stehe ich natürlich  zu jeder Zeit zur 
Verfügung. 
Ich verbleibe hochachtungsvoll und mit freundlichem Grüssen 
Anne Marie Brady 
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Appendix 2 
Consent Form 
English Version 
Dear 
 
By signing this letter you are consenting to voluntarily participate in my research by being 
interviewed. The interview will take between 40 and 60 minutes. I will ask you a series of 
questions about your employment history, your views on employment and your future 
employment prospects. You are free to decline any questions which you do not wish to 
answer. Furthermore, if at any time you wish to end the interview and leave, you are free to 
do so. If you agree to the interview, you will be recorded for transcription purposes.  
 
All information that is shared in the course of the interview is kept strictly confidential. Your 
name will not be associated with the information you share in any of the analysis or in the 
final write-up of the report. The information you provide will only be used for the purposes 
of this study.  
 
The information you share will be written up in a PhD thesis and in papers for publication in 
academic journals. You will not be identified in any of the publications.  
 
I agree to take part in the study described above: 
 
Name:      Signature: 
 
Date:  
 
German Version 
 
Sehr geehrte Damen und Herren, 
 
mit dieser Unterschrift erklaeren sie sich bereit, freiwillig an meiner Forschungsarbeit 
teilzunehmen und von mir dazu befragt zu werden. Die Befragung dauert zwischen 40 und 60 
Minuten. Ich werde sie zu ihrer vergangenen Beschaeftigungssituation und ihren beruflichen 
Zukunftsaussichten befragen. Es steht ihnen frei, jede Frage, die sie nicht beantworten 
moechten auszulassen. Zusaetzlich koennen sie jederzeit das Interview beenden oder 
verlassen. Wenn sie sich mit der Befragung einverstanden erklaeren, werden sie 
ausschliesslich zu Transkriptionszwecken (Verschriftlichung) aufgenommen. 
 
Jede Information, die sie waehrend der Befragung mitteilen, wird streng vertaulich behandelt. 
Ihr Name wird nicht mit Informationen, die sie waehrend der Befragung mitteilen oder der 
Analyse in meiner Doktorarbeit in Zusammenhang gebracht.  
 
Die Informationen, die sie mir geben werden ausschliesslich zu Forschungszwecken fuer 
meine Doktorarbeit oder wissenschaftlichen Veroeffentlichungen gebraucht. Ihre Daten 
werden anonymisiert. 
 
Ich erklaere mich hiermit bereit, an dieser Forschungsarbeit teilzunehmen 
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Ort:                                         Datum: 
 
Name:                                           Untschrift:] 
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Appendix 3 
Interview Schedule (Unemplyment Benefit II Recipients) 
English version 
How old are you? 
Are you single or in a relationship? 
 Do you live alone or with others? 
Do you have children? 
What is your citizenship status? 
Can you tell me about your prior education and/or apprenticeship history? 
Can you tell me about your employment history? 
 Where was your last place of employment? 
 How long were you there for? 
How long have you been unemployed? 
How long have you been in receipt of UBII? 
 Have you previously been on benefit? If so, when, how long and what has happened 
that you are back at the Jobcenter? 
To-date, what is your experience, generally, with the Jobcenter? 
 For example, have the staff been helpful and friendly? 
What kind of support is provided to you by the Jobcenter to assist you in finding work?  
 Do you find this helpful? 
Have you participated in skill training sessions provided by the Jobcenter or another third 
party? 
 What, when, where and for how long? 
 Have you found the training helpful? 
 Has the training assisted you kin gathering skill(s) needed to find a job? 
 Has the training matched the type of work you are looking for or want to do? 
What type of work is avaible to you and does this match what you have previously done or 
would like to do? 
 Does it match your prior wage? 
Do you feel under pressure by the Jobcenter to find work? 
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 Has this pressure influenced the type of work you have taken or would take? 
 Do you feel pressure by the Jobcenter to take any job? 
How would you describe your relationship to work? 
 Would you sooner have a low-paid job (or a boring job for which you are 
overqualified) than no job at all? 
 Would you take a job that is below your education level/previous 
occupation/position? 
 Let’s say you won the lottery. Would you still continue to work? 
Prompt: clearly you want to work. Do you think work is a right?  
Do you have a responsiblity to work? 
 Has your experience of claiming benefits while unemployed and/or the way the 
Jobcenter helps you, change the way you feel about personal responsiblity? 
 How as the Jobcenter demands placed on you impacted your own sense of personal 
responsilibty [to find work]? 
Let’s talk about Fördern and Fordern. It has been in the media.  
How would you define Fördern and Fordern in the Jobcenter context? 
 What do you think about Fördern and Fordern?  
How do you think people around you regard the unemployed? The Hartz IV recipient?  
Is the monthly stipend you receive from the Jobcenter enough to live from? 
German version 
Wie alt sind Sie? 
Sind Sie ledig order verheiratet? 
Haben Sie Kinder?  
Leben Sie alleine oder mit jemanden? 
Sind Sie Deutsch oder...? 
 Wenn nicht, seit wie langem sind Sie in Deutschland gewesen? 
Könnten Sie mir bitte etwas über Ihren Bildungsweg sagen?  
Könnten Sie mir bitte etwas über Ihr letztes Angestelltenverhältnis sagen? 
 
 Wie lange waren Sie bei Ihrem letzten Arbeitgeber angestellt? 
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Seit wann sind Sie arbeitslos? Bzw... 
 
Seit wann erhalten Sie Arbeitslosengeld II? 
 
 Haben Sie zuvor schon mal Hartz IV erhalten? Wenn ja, was ist passiert, dass Sie 
erneut Hartz IV beantragt haben? 
 
Gross und grob, wie ist Ihre Erfahrung mit dem Jobcenter bis jetzt? 
 
 Sind die Mitarbeiter hilfsbereit, zum Beispiel?  
 
Welche Unterstuzung bekommen Sie von dem Jobcenter, damit Sie wieder Arbeit finden?  
 
 Finden Sie diese hilfreich? 
 
Haben Sie an Fortbildungmaßnahmen des Jobcenters oder anderen Anbietern teilgenommen? 
 
 Wenn ja, was war das fuer eine Maßnahme? 
 
 Wann, wo, wofuer und viel lange hat die Maßnahme gedauert 
 
 Fanden Sie diese Maßnahme hilfreich? 
 
 Wenn Sie in der Vergangenheit an solchen Maßnahmen teilgenommen haben, hat es 
Ihnen geholfen, wieder Arbeit in Ihrem Bereich zu finden? Und haben diese 
Maßnahme Ihnen geholfen, in dem neuen Bereich, in dem Sie ausgebildet worden 
sind, einen Job zu finden? 
 
Welche Art von Arbeit könnten Sie zur Zeit annehmen? Passt das zu dem, was Sie vorher 
getan haben. Ist das, was Sie machen möchten? 
 
 Verdienen Sie so viel wie vorher?  
 
Verspüren Sie Druck von seiten des Jobcenters, einen Job zu finden oder is es ok gewesen? 
 
 Wenn Ja, hat dieser Druck Sie beeinflußt, welche Art von Arbeit Sie angenommen 
haben bzw. annehmen werden? 
 
 Fühlen Sie sich vom Jobcenter beeinflußt, irgendeinen Job anzunehmen? 
 
 
Sind Sie bereit einen Job anzunehmen, bei dem Sie weniger verdienen, weniger Stunden 
arbeiten und/oder wo die Wegezeiten länger ist? Wenn ja, warum? 
 
 Würden Sie einen langweiligen oder einen Job annehmen, bei dem Sie 
überqualifiziert sind, sodass Sie wenigstens einen Job haben? 
 
 Angenommen Sie würden im Lotto gewinnen, würden Sie weiterhin arbeiten? 
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Prompt: Es ist Klar, dass Sie arbeiten wollen.  
 
 Meinen Sie dass die Arbeit ein Recht ist (meinen Sie, Sie haben ein Recht auf 
Arbeit)?  
 
 Finden Sie, dass Sie eine Phflicht haben zu arbeiten? Sind Sie dafür verantwortlich 
Arbeit zu finden?  
 
 Finden Sie, dass Sie eine Verantwortung haben zu arbeiten? 
 
Has anything that has happend to you at the Jobcenter changed the way you feel about that? 
(work, responsiblity).  
 
 Hat Ihre Einstellung zur „Eigenverantworung“ geaendert seitdem Sie am Jobcenter 
sind?  
 Staerkt das Jobcenter Ihre Eigenverantwortliche Suche nach Arbeit?  
 
 Oder wuerden sie sagen, dass das Jobcenter Sie in ihrer Eigenverantwortung 
einschraenkt oder behindert, indem es Sie zu Massnahmen auffordert bzw noetigt? 
 
Hat sich während der Zeit, in der Sie Arbeitslosengeld II beantragen, Ihre Einstellung zur 
Arbeit geändert?  
 
Haben Sie vom Fördern und Fordern gehort? Es ist oft in den Medien in zusammenhang mit 
dem Jobcenters bzw. den Hartz IV Reformen besprochen.  
 
Was bedeutet Fördern und Fordern im Zusammenhang mit dem Jobcenter fuer Sie? 
 
Was meinen Sie, wie betracten die Menschen, die entweder Sie begegnen oder die um Sie 
herum sind, die Arbeitslosen? Und Sie als ‚Hartz IV Empfänger‘? 
 
Reicht das Geld, das Sie monatlich vom Jobcenter erhalten, für Sie (und Ihre Familie)?   
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Appendix 4 
Interview Schedule (Case Managers) 
What is your position and how long have you held it? 
Can you describe your position to me? 
As I understand, a key role you play is to act as mediator between the employer and the 
unemployed. To what degree are you able to actually do this in practice? 
Can you walk me through the process, staring with the first time a client meets with you to 
discuss their unemployment status through to them finding employment: 
 What is required of the client? 
 Can you explain to me the role of the integration into work agreement that the client 
must sign? 
How many clients are you assigned to oversee? 
 In my interviews with the clients, many noted that they found themselves reassigned a 
new case manager on a regular basis. How long do you work with the clients before 
they are reassigned? 
 Is there a reason why clients are reassigned so often? 
 In my interviews, clients often found this change stressful and frustrating because 
they would have to start from the beginning with each new case manager. How do 
you find the frequent change of clients in your ability to assist them find work? 
 
In my interviews, clients noted that they were required to demonstrate to the Jobcenter that 
they had sent in a specified number of resumes per month. Interestingly that number varied 
from one client to the next. Some were not required to demonstrate a number, others had to 
demonstrate 5, 10, 5 and 20 a month.  
 How do you determine how many job applications a client has to send in a month and 
why the vast variation from one client to the next? Are there guidelines you follow? 
 To what degree are you able to take the individual circumstances of each client into 
consideration why you are working with them, i.e., determining how many jobs to 
apply to, what jobs, etc? 
 
If I understand this correctly, any job application that you find suitable for your client and 
then forward to him or her, that client must then apply to the job, correct? In my interviews 
with the clients, many often felt that the jobs forwarded them were not suitable to their 
professional profile or what they wanted to do. But, since there is a requirement to apply, 
they do so.  
 Do employees ever complain that they receive applications from UBII recipients via 
the Jobcenter that are not suitable for the job? 
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Does the Jobcenter generally, you as case managers specifically, have contact to 
companies/industry?  
 Are you able to assist in placement via such connections? 
Many clients have noted their experience with temporary work. Many find this type of work 
difficult because, as the nature with temporary work is, they find themselves at some point 
unemployed again. 
 Do you have contacts with the temp agencies specifically? 
 Do you recommend that your clients apply for jobs via temp agencies? 
Let’s talk about training services. 
What training services are offered? 
How do you assess who needs what training? 
Are you able to demonstrate a direct link to the clients’ participation in a training session and 
their ability to find work as a result of the training? 
What happens if clients do not want to participate in a training? Do they have to? 
Can you please explain the One-Euro-Job to me? 
 What is your role in recommending a One-Euro-Job to a client? 
 Who typically performs One-Euro-Jobs? 
 How do you determine who is best suited for a One-Euro-Job? 
 
Retraining into a new vocation is a big step for a client. How often to you make such a 
suggestion? Under what circumstances would you make such a suggestion? 
In my interviews with clients, many have noted the problem their lack of English ability has 
had on them not obtaining work. Yet, when I asked if they were offered an English language 
course from the Jobcenter, some said they were not allowed to participate. 
 Why would a client be denied an English language course when they are able to 
demonstrate the necessity of said ability in finding work? 
 Is it an issue of money? 
 
Many clients feel trapped in a system that provides them with more busy work than real 
assistance in finding work. In your professional opinion, do you think the Jobcenter has the 
capacity to realistically assist each client in finding work? 
What pressures are you under to move clients off unemployment into employment? How 
much of your job performance is based on the number of clients you successfully move off 
unemployment benefit? 
 Does this pressure affect how you interact with clients? The degree of support and 
assistance you are able to provide? 
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